United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-2531
MIRIAM SANTOS and KAREN BRIDGEFORTH,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
SUNRISE MEDICAL, INC. and SUNRISE MEDICAL HHG, INC.,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Lipez, and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Joseph J. Leghorn, with whom Nixon Peabody LLP and Bart
Heemskerk were on brief, for appellants.
Terry M. Ford, with whom Frank R. Saia and Saia Law Office
were on brief, for appellees.
December 12, 2003
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Defendants Sunrise Medical, Inc.
and Sunrise Medical HHG, Inc. (collectively, “Sunrise”) challenge
a jury verdict in favor of two certified nurse assistants who were
injured at a Massachusetts nursing home while using medical
equipment manufactured by Sunrise. Sunrise contends that the
district court erred in denying Sunrise’s motions for judgment as
a matter of law and for a new trial. We affirm.
I.
On July 1, 1999, Miriam Santos and Karen Bridgeforth were
injured while using a hydraulic Hoyer lift manufactured by Sunrise
to transfer a nursing home resident from her bed to her
wheelchair.1 While the plaintiffs were transferring the patient,
the lift began to tip. The plaintiffs suffered neck and back
injuries in attempting to prevent the patient, who weighed
approximately 210 pounds, from falling to the floor.
In December 2000, the plaintiffs brought the underlying
diversity action against Sunrise, asserting claims for negligence,
failure to warn, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,
and violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 93A (“Chapter 93A”). The case was tried before a
jury in July 2002. At trial, Santos and Bridgeforth described the
1
The Hoyer lift has a metal frame supported by a U-shaped base
that can be positioned under a patient’s bed. The patient is
secured in the lift by a harness attached to a boom at the top of
the frame.
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accident and their resulting injuries. In addition, they called a
mechanical engineer, Richard Montefusco, who testified that the
lift was defective because the locking mechanism of the adjustable
base had a tendency to get “hung up” or to disengage if the lift
was moved, allowing the legs of the base to close and the lift to
tip.
At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, Sunrise moved for
judgment as a matter of law, alleging, inter alia, that Santos and
Bridgeforth had failed to establish a prima facie case against
Sunrise under any theory of liability. The district court granted
the motion in part, disposing of the failure-to-warn counts. At
the close of all the evidence, Sunrise unsuccessfully moved again
for judgment as a matter of law. The remaining claims for
negligence and breach of warranty were submitted to the jury.2 By
special verdict, the jury found Sunrise liable on both counts,
awarding $600,000 to Santos and $450,000 to Bridgeforth. Sunrise
renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50(b), and moved, in the alternative, for a new trial.
The district court denied the motions. This appeal followed.
2
The Chapter 93A claims, which were not subject to resolution
by jury trial, see Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v. American Motors
Sales Corp., 780 F.2d 1049, 1066-67 (1st Cir. 1985), were dismissed
in September 2002 on the ground that the demand letter sent to
Sunrise provided inadequate notice of the plaintiffs’ claims.
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II.
Sunrise contends that the plaintiffs failed to prove a
prima facie case of negligence or breach of warranty. Challenging
the district court’s failure to enter judgment as a matter of law,
Sunrise argues that no reasonable jury could have reached a verdict
for the plaintiffs on the evidence presented. Alternatively,
Sunrise claims that the district court committed reversible error
in (1) excluding relevant evidence providing an alternate theory of
causation, and (2) permitting the plaintiffs’ counsel to make
improper and inflammatory remarks during closing arguments.
A.
We review the district court’s denial of Sunrise’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law de novo, considering the evidence
in the light most favorable to Santos and Bridgeforth as
nonmovants. Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Aastar Mortgage Corp., 89
F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1996). In so doing, we do not “consider the
credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, or
evaluate the weight of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Wagenmann v.
Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1987)). We reverse “only if the
facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor
of the movant that a reasonable jury could not have reached a
verdict against that party.” Id. (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co. v.
Atallah, 45 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1995)(internal quotation
omitted)).
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Sunrise contends first that the plaintiffs failed to
establish a causal connection between any purported design defect
and their injuries. Sunrise identifies numerous evidentiary
weaknesses in the plaintiffs’ case on causation, including the
absence of eyewitness testimony that the base of the lift actually
closed; a contemporaneous report based on the plaintiffs’ account
of the accident that does not state that the base closed; and some
unexplained events at the time the lift tipped (such as screws or
metal pieces hitting the floor and the handle of the lift becoming
detached). Sunrise also questions the utility of Montefusco’s
testimony, characterizing the testimony as too speculative. It
notes that Montefusco never conducted an accident reconstruction
nor determined the amount of force necessary to tip the lift.
Sunrise downplays Montefusco’s testimony that the alleged design
defect caused the accident as “an out of context answer on cross-
examination.”
In denying Sunrise’s renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law, the district court found that “[t]he testimony
adequately conveyed that the base of the lift ‘closed up,’ causing
the instability and the accident. The expert testimony adequately
tied the ‘closing up’ to a simple design defect. While the
evidence was not overwhelming, it was sufficient.” We agree.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, a reasonable jury could have credited Santos’ testimony
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that the base of the lift was not open to its widest position
because of the configuration of the beds in the patient’s room;
that upon securing the patient in the harness and lifting her,
Santos began to pull the lift out from under the bed and turn the
lift slightly to adjust the base to its widest position; that when
Santos attempted to widen the lift, it “closed” and “started
tipping”; and that the plaintiffs were injured in attempting to
keep the patient from falling.
The jury could have also credited Montefusco’s testimony
that the pin and the engaging mechanism that were designed to keep
the adjustable base of the lift in a locked position could get
“hung up,” or fail to engage; that moving the lift while this
mechanism was disengaged and the lift was loaded could cause the
pin to slide into the narrowest setting; that the lift was likely
to tip if the base was in its narrowest setting; that slight
alterations to the shape of the pin and the engaging mechanism
would have allowed the pin to catch on the next setting, instead of
slipping into the narrowest setting; that a slight lengthening of
the pin would have kept the pin from becoming disengaged; and that,
as Montefusco testified on cross-examination, the accident was
caused by this design problem.
On appeal, Sunrise attacks the credibility, weight, and
value of the plaintiffs’ evidence of causation. But it is not the
province of this Court to reevaluate the evidence presented at
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trial. Star Financial Services, 89 F.3d at 8. We determine only
if the evidence was minimally sufficient to support the verdict.
Considering the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable
to the plaintiffs, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have
found that a design defect in the lift caused the accident that
injured Santos and Bridgeforth.
Sunrise also contends that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that the lift had been properly maintained in the six
years following its manufacture. Implicit in this argument is a
misunderstanding of the evidentiary burden imposed on a plaintiff
alleging a design defect under Massachusetts law. See Smith v.
Ariens Co., 375 Mass. 620, 626 (1978). In such cases, a plaintiff
need only show that the defect existed when it left the control of
the manufacturer. Id. (“No negating of the possibility of
mishandling by intermediaries is necessary.”).
At trial, Montefusco testified that, based on his review
of the lift’s manuals and parts list, the lift arrived from Sunrise
in three pieces, but the base of the lift (which included the
locking mechanism) came fully assembled. The jury also heard from
the executive director of the nursing home where the accident
occurred, who testified that he looked for maintenance records on
the lift and, based on the few records he located, found no
evidence of any changes made to the lift other than the replacement
of a hydraulic pump. This evidence, taken together, could have
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supported an inference that the defect in the lift existed at the
time it left Sunrise’s control. See, e.g. id. at 627 (finding
reasonable inference that sharp metal protrusions on brakes of
snowmobile were present when product left factory when testimony
established that although snowmobile arrived partially assembled,
brake clamps arrived riveted to handle bar); Collins v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 31 Mass. App. Ct. 961, 962 (1992) (finding
reasonable inference that a clothes dryer was in same condition at
time of sale as it was at time of accident when jury heard no
evidence that electrical system had been repaired after purchase).
As set forth above, no more is required to sustain a design defect
claim under Massachusetts law.
B.
Sunrise contends that even if we reject its arguments for
judgment as a matter of law, it is entitled to a new trial on the
basis of an erroneous evidentiary ruling and improper closing
argument by the plaintiffs' counsel. We review the district
court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, a standard that
allows the court “considerable latitude in determining whether to
admit or exclude evidence” under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Espeaignnette v. Gene Tierney Co., Inc., 43 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 1994). “Only rarely -- and in extraordinarily compelling
circumstances -- will we, from the vista of a cold appellate
record, reverse a district court’s on-the-spot judgment concerning
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the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect.” Id.
Sunrise argues that the district court committed
reversible error in excluding a January 2000 letter from the
plaintiffs’ counsel to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”). In the letter, counsel requested an
inspection of the nursing home where the plaintiffs worked “for the
failure to maintain its Hoyer Lifts resulting in personal injury to
Karen Bridgeport [sic] and Miriam Santos.” Counsel also opined
that “OSHA rules and regulations have been violated by the
employer.” During its cross-examination of Bridgeforth, Sunrise
sought to introduce the letter as an admission of the plaintiffs
that the cause of the occurrence was lack of maintenance of the
lift, rather than any design defect. Sunrise alleges that the
letter was a critically important admission as to an alternative
theory of causation.
We find that the district court acted within its
discretion in excluding the letter to OSHA. Contrary to Sunrise’s
assertions on appeal, the district court explained the bases for
its ruling. The court stated that the letter was cumulative of
testimony of an accident report and a complaint made by Santos, and
that it would open up an area of potential confusion for the jury,
namely OSHA’s investigation and findings with respect to the lift.
The district court also found the letter cumulative, confusing, and
perhaps unfairly prejudicial to the extent that it was a statement
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by counsel, but not necessarily by the plaintiffs.
Sunrise argued below that counsel was acting as the
plaintiffs' agent when the letter was sent, and alluded to case law
supporting the letter’s admission. The court invited Sunrise to
identify the authority to which it was referring, but ruled that in
the meantime, Sunrise could ask Bridgeforth if she recognized the
letter and question her about the source of the information
contained therein if she did. When asked, Bridgeforth stated that
she had never seen the letter before, and it was not admitted.
Sunrise did not raise the issue again until its motion for new
trial. Under these facts, we cannot say the admissibility ruling
constituted reversible error.
Sunrise also contends that plaintiffs’ counsel made three
“inflammatory” statements during closing argument that caused
prejudicial error. First, counsel argued that a small object on
the floor could have obstructed the casters on the base and caused
instability. According to Sunrise, this argument had no basis in
fact, and was an improper reference to the failure-to-warn theory
of liability, which was foreclosed by the district court’s earlier
disposition of the failure-to-warn claims. But Sunrise did not
object to this line of argument. Thus we review it only for plain
error. Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1999).
We ask whether this constituted a plain error affecting substantial
rights, and, if so, whether review is necessary to avoid a
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miscarriage of justice. Id. at 26 (“Plain error is a rare species
in civil litigation, encompassing only those errors that reach the
pinnacle of fault envisioned by the standard set forth above.”
(internal quotation omitted)). Here, counsel’s reference to a
possible obstruction had some basis in the record, including
testimony that pieces of metal, possibly screws, were found on the
floor after the accident. Further, counsel did not suggest a
failure to warn by Sunrise; to the contrary, counsel noted that a
training videotape that accompanied the lift in fact warned against
rolling the lift over an obstruction. We find no error, plain or
otherwise.
Second, Sunrise alleges that counsel made references to
the removability of the handle of the lift that were improper in
light of a pretrial ruling that certain evidence relating to the
handle would not be admitted because of an untimely expert
disclosure. But Sunrise’s only objection came after counsel’s
statement that the handle had been altered. The district court
sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard this
remark. Sunrise did not object when counsel argued that the handle
was designed to be removed when transporting the lift. We
therefore ask whether this portion of the closing argument was
plainly erroneous. See id. Even if we assume arguendo that
counsel should not have referred to the handle, Sunrise has
demonstrated no prejudice to its substantial rights.
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Finally, according to Sunrise, counsel improperly
referred to a duty to test the lift that Sunrise failed to meet.
In discussing the locking mechanism of the base, counsel stated
“They didn’t test it under a dynamic load I submit,” and Sunrise
objected. The court asked counsel about the purpose of this
argument and whether he was going to talk about testing. Counsel
stated that he was not going to talk about testing, and the court
instructed him to move on. Counsel then turned to the subject of
the manufacturer’s obligation to foresee the way the product would
be used. We assume without deciding that Sunrise’s objection was
sufficient to preserve the issue for review. But Sunrise bears a
heavy burden on appeal -- it must show that the district court
abused its discretion in denying Sunrise's motion for new trial
based on counsel's comment, and that prejudice has resulted.
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Constructora Lluch, Inc., 169
F.3d 68, 81-82 (1st Cir. 1999). Considering the isolated nature of
the statement, its irrelevance to the core issues considered by the
jury, and the prompt limitation of the line of argument by the
district court, we find no error. Id. at 82 (“In assessing the
effect of improper conduct by counsel, the Court must examine the
totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the
comments, their frequency, their possible relevancy to the real
issues before the jury, the manner in which the parties and the
court treated the comments, the strength of the case, and the
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verdict itself.”).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
denial of Sunrise’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and new
trial.
So ordered.
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