United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1941
RYMES HEATING OILS, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SPRINGFIELD TERMINAL RAILWAY CO.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, Chief U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Robert M. Thomas, Jr., with whom Rory H. Delaney and Thomas &
Associates were on brief, for appellant.
Eric L. Hirschhorn, with whom Robert B. Culliford and Winston
& Strawn were on brief, for appellee.
February 13, 2004
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This is a dispute between an
extremely dissatisfied shipper and a rail carrier, Springfield
Terminal Railway. The shipper, Rymes Heating Oils, says it was
stymied in its efforts to get satisfactory rail service from
Springfield by Springfield's misrepresentations to it that
Springfield had exclusive trackage rights to the side track
connecting to Rymes's propane distribution center. Rymes took the
exclusive rights dispute to the Surface Transportation Board (STB)
in September 2001 and, over Springfield's objection, obtained an
order in July 2002 declaring that Springfield did not have such
exclusive trackage rights. Rymes then sued in federal court,
invoking a provision of the Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 11704(b), and saying, based
on the administrative order, that it was entitled to damages
flowing from the misrepresentations. In the complex world of
federal regulation of railroads, we affirm the dismissal of Rymes's
damages claim, which was never presented to the STB.
I.
The parties agreed before the district court to treat
this as a case stated. Where facts are in dispute, we describe the
dispute. Those disputes, however, are immaterial, given the
grounds for our decision.
The story starts with a series of orders by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), now known as the Surface
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Transportation Board (STB), in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Springfield is the successor in interest of the Boston & Maine
Corporation (B&M). B&M at one time owned the portion of the
Connecticut River Line involved in this case. In August 1988, the
ICC ordered B&M to convey the Connecticut River Line to the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) under 45 U.S.C. §
562(d). Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. -- Conveyance of B&M Corp.
Interests in Conn. River Line in Vt. & N.H., 4 I.C.C.2d 761, 767-73
(1988) (hereinafter "Amtrak I"). In a related petition, the ICC
then allowed Amtrak to turn around and sell the line to Central
Vermont Railway. Id. at 798-800. The ICC required, however, that
B&M be paid just compensation and allowed to retain some trackage
rights on the line after these transactions took place. Id. at
798, 800.
B&M and Central Vermont were to negotiate the precise
scope of the trackage rights to be retained by B&M, but
negotiations failed and the ICC stepped in to resolve the dispute.
The ICC imposed a trackage rights order, Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
-- Conveyance of B&M Corp. Interests in Conn. River Line in Vt. &
N.H., 6 I.C.C.2d 539 (1990) (hereinafter "Amtrak II"), that was
still in effect at the time of the events in this suit. Under
Amtrak II, Springfield, as B&M's successor, has the "exclusive
right to serve all existing shippers and shippers' facilities that
were located on the [line] as of [September 9, 1988], including any
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and all new shippers that locate at such existing facilities after
[that date], provided that [Springfield] makes available a minimum
three day per week service." Id. at 560. Springfield can compete
with New England Central Railroad (NECR), Central Vermont's
successor, to provide rail service to remaining shippers not
covered by the exclusive right. That "exclusive right" is at the
heart of Rymes's case.
Rymes sells propane to customers in central and southern
New Hampshire. Between 1995 and 1996, Rymes built a propane
distribution center in Claremont, New Hampshire. Rymes also laid
a new stretch of railroad track that connected the distribution
center to an existing side track, which in turn connected to the
Connecticut River Line.
In November 1996, after construction of the distribution
center was completed, Springfield began to provide rail service to
the center. In his affidavit, James Rymes, the owner of Rymes
Heating Oils, said that his company was harmed by "incessant
delays" in Springfield's service and by Springfield's "constant"
failures to make deliveries and pick up empty cars after delivery.
As a result, Rymes said that his company had to purchase more
expensive propane imported by other means, arrange for deliveries
by road, buy a fleet of trucks, build an expanded storage facility,
and restructure its bank financing to pay for the new storage
facility.
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Rymes said that he knew that Springfield had competitors
on the rail line, namely NECR, but that his company did not switch
carriers because Springfield repeatedly and inaccurately
represented to him that it had the exclusive right to provide
service to the Claremont distribution center.1 Springfield,
however, denies making any such representations. By affidavit,
Kenneth Berg, Springfield's director of marketing, stated that
Springfield and Rymes never actually discussed whether Springfield
had the exclusive right to serve Rymes. Springfield's vice-
president of marketing, Joseph Crawford, stated by affidavit that
both Springfield and Rymes simply believed that Springfield had the
exclusive right to serve the Claremont distribution center.
According to Crawford, Springfield thought that Rymes was a "new
shipper[]" located at an "existing facilit[y]" under Amtrak II
because the distribution center was connected to the Connecticut
River Line through a side track built prior to September 9, 1988.
Whether or not Springfield made the representations complained of
is immaterial to the outcome here.
In September 2001, Rymes petitioned the STB, seeking a
declaration that, under Amtrak II, it was entitled to receive
competitive service at its Claremont distribution center from NECR
as well as from Springfield. Rymes did not seek any damages in its
1
Those at Rymes Heating Oils apparently failed to read
Amtrak I and Amtrak II.
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petition. The STB instituted a declaratory order proceeding
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) and 49 U.S.C. § 721 of the ICCTA.
Springfield opposed the petition, arguing (1) that Rymes did not
have standing to seek relief because Rymes was not a party to
Amtrak II, (2) that the STB did not have jurisdiction to grant
relief, and (3) on the merits, that Springfield had an exclusive
right to serve the Claremont distribution center because Rymes was
a new shipper located at an existing facility. On July 17, 2002,
the STB issued an order declaring that Rymes had standing to seek
relief under Amtrak II and that the STB had jurisdiction to
interpret Amtrak II and to grant any appropriate relief. Rymes
Heating Oils -- Petition for Declaratory Order, STB Finance Docket
No. 34098 (July 17, 2002) (hereinafter "Rymes Order"). Proceeding
to the merits, the STB then held that "Rymes is neither an existing
shipper nor a new shipper located at an existing facility within
the meaning of [Amtrak II]." Id. The net effect of the order was
that Springfield did not have the exclusive right that it thought
it had (and which, perhaps, it had represented it had). The STB
reasoned that even though Rymes's distribution center was connected
to the rail line through an existing side track, the center was
"located" at a new facility (namely, the new side track laid by
Rymes). Id. The STB therefore entered a declaratory order that
"Rymes is entitled to obtain competitive service from NECR." Id.
That was the full extent of the relief granted.
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Rymes then decided to pursue a damages action, taking the
position that it had been hoodwinked by Springfield into believing
that Springfield had the exclusive right to serve the Claremont
distribution center. Rymes argues that if it had not been
hoodwinked, it would have changed sooner to a different carrier,
and, if it had changed sooner, it would not have suffered the
damages that it did.
II.
On December 20, 2002, Rymes sued Springfield in federal
district court, seeking damages. Count One of the complaint
alleged that Springfield had "wrongfully excluded competition" in
rail service to the Claremont distribution center from 1996 to 2002
in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 11704(b) of the ICCTA. Count Two,
which was eventually dismissed without prejudice and is of no
relevance to this appeal, alleged that Springfield had failed to
provide the timely and reasonable service to Rymes required by
Amtrak II and had thus violated 49 U.S.C. §§ 11101 and 11704 of the
ICCTA. Rymes sought damages including but not limited to: "a) the
costs of constructing and maintaining expanded storage facilities,
b) the cost of acquiring additional trucks to obtain and move the
product, c) additional acquisition costs of propane on the spot
market, and d) additional financing costs due to the impact these
expenditures had on Rymes's credit with its major lender, Fleet
Bank."
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On January 27, 2003, Springfield moved to dismiss.
Springfield argued that Rymes had no cause of action for Count One
under 49 U.S.C. § 11704(b) because that statute provides a private
right of action only for violations of the Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). Amtrak II, Springfield argued,
was issued under the Rail Passenger Service Act (RPSA), 45 U.S.C.
§ 562(d) (1988) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 23511(c)), under
which no private right of action is available. Moreover,
Springfield contended that even if Amtrak II had been issued under
the ICCTA,2 § 11704(b) provides a private right of action only for
violations of the ICCTA itself, not for violations of
administrative orders issued pursuant to the ICCTA. Springfield
then argued that the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11706(a), which
governs claims for loss or damage of goods in shipping, provided
the exclusive remedy for the type of injuries claimed by Rymes in
both Count One and Count Two. Treating both counts as Carmack
Amendment claims, Springfield argued that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction and that even if there were jurisdiction, the
claims were time-barred. In the alternative, if the court did not
agree that the action was founded entirely on the Carmack
Amendment, Springfield moved to refer the case to the STB under the
2
At the time Amtrak II was issued, the relevant provisions
of the ICCTA were part of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA). For
the sake of clarity and convenience, however, this opinion refers
to these provisions as part of the ICCTA.
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primary jurisdiction doctrine for, inter alia, a determination
whether Springfield could be held liable for damages based on the
Rymes Order.
The district court held a hearing on the motion to
dismiss on February 19, at which the parties agreed that the
dispute over Count One involved mostly legal issues and that, at
most, very limited factual development was necessary. The court
denied the motion to dismiss. With the agreement of the parties,
the court adopted an accelerated schedule for the filing of cross-
motions for summary judgment on Count One, noting that full-blown
discovery would not be necessary, and deferred consideration of
Count Two until after those motions were resolved.
Less than a month later, on March 17, 2003, Rymes and
Springfield filed cross motions for summary judgment on Count One.3
Springfield asserted substantially the same arguments as in its
motion to dismiss. At the April 8 hearing on the motions, Rymes
conceded that "there are no genuine issues of material fact on the
liability as to Count One," and the parties agreed to treat the
issue of liability under Count One as a case stated.
On April 16, the court raised sua sponte the question
whether Springfield owed any legal duty at all to Rymes as to Count
One. The court apparently viewed the case as turning on rights
3
Rymes moved for summary judgment on Count One as to
liability only.
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arising under state contract and quasi-contract law, despite the
heavy federal regulation of this area. On May 30, 2003, after
additional briefing by both sides on the issue, the court granted
summary judgment to Springfield on Count One, concluding that Rymes
had no cause of action.4 After the court granted summary judgment
to Springfield on Count One, Rymes voluntarily dismissed Count Two
without prejudice and requested entry of a final order to allow an
immediate appeal of the court's ruling on Count One.
III.
The court entered a final order, and Rymes appealed.
Springfield urges alternative grounds for affirmance: namely, that
Rymes had no claim under § 11704(b) for the reasons advanced in
Springfield's motion to dismiss and that, to the extent Rymes's
claim is based on state law, it is preempted by the Carmack
Amendment and is time-barred under that Amendment.
At oral argument, we asked the parties whether the
Carmack Amendment provides the exclusive remedy under Count One.
Rymes responded, inter alia, that the Carmack Amendment would not
4
Rymes, the court found, had identified only one plausible
basis for its cause of action: that Springfield had contractually
breached its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing under
Amtrak II. But the court determined that, even if the STB's ruling
in Amtrak II constituted a contract under Massachusetts law,
Springfield owed no legal duty to Rymes under this "contract." The
court reasoned that because Rymes was not a party to Amtrak II,
Rymes could recover only if it was an intended third-party
beneficiary of the decision. Rymes, the court held, was not an
intended third-party beneficiary because Amtrak II did not have a
clear and definite intent to benefit shippers such as Rymes.
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apply to its claim for damages based on the difference in the rates
charged by Springfield and by NECR.5 We ordered supplemental
briefing on this issue and on whether a rate differential claim
should be adjudicated by the STB rather than by a federal court.
In the supplemental briefing, Rymes stressed that it was not
bringing a Carmack Amendment claim at all in Count One.
In its complaint and district court filings, Rymes pled
Count One as a claim under 49 U.S.C. § 11704(b). Although
Springfield and the district court have spent much time discussing
whether Rymes might have a viable state law claim for breach of
contract and whether that claim would be preempted by the Carmack
Amendment, Rymes did not assert any such claim in the district
court proceedings, so we do not address it. Similarly, because
Rymes insisted in its district court filings and on appeal that it
is not asserting a Carmack Amendment claim, we do not address any
possible Carmack Amendment claim by Rymes or the possible
interaction between the Carmack Amendment and § 11704(b).
5
We do not consider this damages claim in our analysis
because it was raised for the first time at oral argument. No such
damages claim was brought in Rymes's complaint, which alleges
damages based only on "expenses [Rymes] was forced to incur due to
[Springfield's] substandard service." And Rymes presented no
evidentiary support for a rate differential claim on summary
judgment. None of the three affidavits that constituted Rymes's
evidence on summary judgment made any mention of rate differential
damages. Indeed, although the complaint alleges that the service
eventually provided by NECR after July 2002 was "less expensive"
than Springfield's service had been, neither the complaint nor the
affidavits indicate whether NECR's prices were higher or lower than
Springfield's during the relevant time period -- that is, from
November 1996 to May 2002.
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Count One was brought under § 11704(b), which states that
"[a] rail carrier providing transportation subject to the
jurisdiction of the [Surface Transportation] Board . . . is liable
for damages sustained by a person as a result of an act or omission
of that carrier in violation of [the rail portion of the ICCTA]."
Section 11704(c)(1) then provides a private right of action for
such liability: "A person may . . . bring a civil action under
subsection (b) of this section to enforce liability against a rail
carrier." 49 U.S.C. § 11704(c)(1). Here, Rymes makes no claim
that the statute itself independently imposed a duty that was
violated. Rymes's claim in Count One depends instead on the
language of Amtrak II, as further interpreted in the Rymes Order.
Rymes argues that Springfield's inaccurate assertion of monopoly
rights violated Amtrak II and that this violation of Amtrak II was
tantamount to a violation of the ICCTA itself.
The first issue raised by Rymes's position is whether
Amtrak II was issued pursuant to the ICCTA or pursuant to the Rail
Passenger Service Act. If Amtrak II was issued pursuant to the
RPSA, Rymes would clearly have no cause of action under it: no
private right of action is available for violations of the RPSA,
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 464-65 (1974), and § 11704(b) would not apply because
there would be no violation of the ICCTA.
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It is not clear, however, whether the trackage rights
order in Amtrak II was issued pursuant to the RPSA or the ICCTA.
Amtrak II does not expressly state the statute under which it was
issued, but several clues suggest that Amtrak II may, in fact, have
been decided under the ICCTA.
First, the RPSA does not authorize the ICC to set
trackage rights between private railroads such as B&M and Central
Vermont; only the ICCTA authorizes such an order.6 Springfield
argues that Amtrak II does not set trackage rights between ordinary
private railroads, but rather between Amtrak and B&M, and that the
RPSA does authorize the ICC to set trackage rights between a
private railroad and Amtrak when Amtrak is buying rail property.
See 49 U.S.C. § 24311(c). Springfield argues that Amtrak II sets
rights between B&M and Amtrak, with Central Vermont merely standing
6
Springfield argues that 49 U.S.C. § 11324 -- the
provision of the ICCTA that authorizes the ICC to impose a trackage
rights order as a condition of its approval of a rail property
transaction -- does not apply here. Specifically, Springfield
notes that Central Vermont petitioned the ICC to exempt its
acquisition of the rail line from the traditional § 11324 review
process and that the ICC granted that petition.
We are not sure, however, that this exemption takes the
trackage rights order outside the ICCTA. The ICC's power to grant
an exemption is itself based on the ICCTA. The ICCTA allows the
ICC to exempt transactions only when the ICC determines that
regulation is not necessary to carry out the transportation policy
of the ICCTA. See 49 U.S.C. § 10502. Here, the ICC granted an
exemption to Central Vermont because Central Vermont forestalled
possible objections to competitive effects of the acquisition under
§ 11324 by voluntarily agreeing to grant trackage rights to B&M on
terms to be determined by the ICC. See Amtrak I, 4 I.C.C.2d 761,
799-800. The ICC's imposition of the trackage rights order could
thus be read as an exercise of its power under § 10502.
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in Amtrak's shoes as the eventual owner of the rail line. The
weakness of this argument is that Amtrak II extends trackage rights
to B&M on sections of the Connecticut River Line that Central
Vermont already owned before its transaction with Amtrak. See
Amtrak II, 6 I.C.C.2d at 559-60. The ICC had authority to set
those rights only under the ICCTA, not the RPSA.
Second, the ICC imposed labor protective conditions on
Central Vermont's purchase of the rail line. The ICCTA requires
the ICC to consider labor interests, see 49 U.S.C. § 11324(b)(4),
but the RPSA does not, see 49 U.S.C. § 24311(c).
Third, the Rymes Order, which explicates Amtrak II,
recites that the declaratory order proceeding was instituted, inter
alia, under 49 U.S.C. § 721, which enumerates the powers of the
Board under the ICCTA.
In light of those clues, we assume arguendo, in Rymes's
favor, that Amtrak II was issued under the ICCTA, and we move to
the next step in the analysis: whether and when § 11704(b) provides
a cause of action for damages based on the violation of an STB or
ICC order.
Most commonly, liability under § 11704(b) and its
predecessor statute, 49 U.S.C. § 8, is invoked in cases in which a
shipper complains that rates charged by the railroads are unjust
and unreasonable and seeks reimbursement ("reparations") of
unlawful transportation charges. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce
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Comm'n v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 383 U.S. 576 (1966). By
contrast, where the claim for damages is for actual loss or injury
to the property caused by the carrier, it is usually brought under
the Carmack Amendment to the ICCTA, 49 U.S.C. § 11706. See N.Y.,
Phila., & Norfolk R.R. Co. v. Peninsula Produce Exch. of Md., 240
U.S. 34, 38 (1916) (Carmack Amendment covers "all damages resulting
from any failure to discharge a carrier's duty with respect to any
part of the transportation to the agreed destination"); Rini v.
United Van Lines, 104 F.3d 502, 503 (1st Cir. 1997).
Leaving issues of primary jurisdiction aside, § 11704(b)
clearly provides a damages action for a direct statutory violation
of the ICCTA itself, cf. Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Me. Cent.
R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 198 (1st Cir. 2000) (claim that unlawful
refusal to provide rail service violates 49 U.S.C. § 11101(a) of
the ICCTA), but Rymes has not claimed any such violation in Count
One.
Section 11704(b) also clearly provides a cause of action
to enforce an STB order awarding damages. This is because 49
U.S.C. § 11704(d) lays out a series of procedural requirements that
apply "[w]hen a person begins a civil action under subsection (b)
of this section to enforce an order of the Board requiring the
payment of damages by a rail carrier." But Rymes has obtained no
such order. Amtrak II obviously made no award of damages to Rymes
for Springfield's actions, and Rymes neither sought nor received
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such an award from the STB in the Rymes Order. Nor did the Rymes
Order find that Springfield had acted unlawfully under the ICCTA by
doing something prohibited or omitting to do something required,
which are the prerequisites for a damages action under § 11704(b).
Rymes's claim is instead a hybrid one, purporting to be
based on the argument that § 11704(b) creates a cause of action for
a violation of two orders -- namely, Amtrak II and the Rymes Order
-- that neither found the conduct of which Rymes complained to be
unlawful nor awarded damages to Rymes. Even assuming arguendo that
§ 11704(b) provides a damages action for violations of some STB
orders beyond those requiring payment of damages by a carrier,7
such a claim could only be stated if the STB order actually
prohibits the conduct in question or requires conduct that has not
been carried out. If no claim of statutory violation is made and
7
Springfield effectively concedes that 49 U.S.C. § 8, an
older version of § 11704(b), did provide a cause of action for
violations of STB orders, including those that awarded no damages.
See, e.g., Nemitz v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 436 F.2d 841, 850 (6th
Cir. 1971). Springfield argues, however, that the cause of action
under § 8 relied on language in ICCTA's predecessor statute, the
Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), which stated that "it shall be the
duty of every common carrier . . . to observe and comply with [ICC]
orders." 49 U.S.C. § 16(7) (1976) (repealed 1978). This language,
Springfield notes, was eliminated in 1978. Interstate Commerce
Act, P.L. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337. However, Congress stated that the
1978 amendments were intended to "revise, codify, and enact without
substantive change the Interstate Commerce Act." See id. (emphasis
added). This legislative history suggests that § 11704(d) should
encompass the same causes of action that were available under § 8
before 1978.
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no claim of a violation of an STB order is stated, § 11704(b)
cannot apply.
Here, Amtrak II does not on its face prohibit the
misrepresentations allegedly made by Springfield. Amtrak II is a
trackage rights order; it makes no reference to duties to make or
refrain from making representations about who may serve particular
shippers. Trackage rights orders are often complex and open to
several interpretations. It does not follow from the fact that the
Rymes Order resolved the extent to which Springfield had exclusive
trackage rights that there were any duties imposed earlier as to
representations about those rights.8 In short, we do not read the
language in Amtrak II or the Rymes Order as creating a claim of the
type asserted here, under which suit could be brought in federal
court through § 11704(b).
Rymes's claim under Amtrak II and the Rymes Order raises
another concern: that of primary jurisdiction. "[T]he primary
jurisdiction doctrine requires initial submission to the [STB] of
questions that raise issues of transportation policy which ought to
be considered by the [STB] in the interests of a uniform and expert
8
We note in passing that Rymes's complaint does not allege
bad faith, and neither party's supporting affidavits indicate that
Springfield knew or should have known that it did not have the
exclusive right to serve Rymes under Amtrak II. Indeed, from Rymes
Order, it appears that Springfield did have a colorable textual
basis for its interpretation of Amtrak II, albeit one with policy
implications that the Board found troubling and thus ultimately
rejected. Rymes Heating Oils -- Petition for Declaratory Order,
STB Finance Docket No. 34098 (July 19, 2002).
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administration of the regulatory scheme laid down by [the ICCTA]."
Atlantic Coast Line, 383 U.S. at 579 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Specifically, three factors are relevant to whether the
primary jurisdiction doctrine applies: "(1) whether the agency
determination lies at the heart of the task assigned the agency by
Congress; (2) whether agency expertise is required to unravel
intricate technical facts; and (3) whether, though perhaps not
determinative, the agency determination would materially aid the
court." Pejepscot, 215 F.3d at 205. All three of those factors
are invoked here. The STB's expertise is clearly involved, and
its determination would materially aid the federal courts. Many of
the central questions raised in this case turn on the
interpretation of orders issued by the STB or its predecessor, the
ICC. Those questions include whether Amtrak II was issued pursuant
to the RPSA or the ICCTA, what duties were actually imposed by
Amtrak II and the Rymes Order, and to what extent damages are
available when those duties are violated. The STB is uniquely
suited to determine not only the purpose of those orders but also
the likely effect of the various interpretations on transportation
policy. Furthermore, obtaining an initial STB decision promotes
uniformity in the interpretation of trackage rights orders. See
Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co., 328 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1946)
(holding that the ICC had primary jurisdiction to interpret a
trackage rights agreement because "[i]t is the function of the
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Commission to determine the terms and conditions under which
trackage rights are acquired"). Accordingly, even were we to
assume dubitante that a viable cause of action were stated in
federal court, we would still respect the primary jurisdiction of
the STB to decide questions such as the ones raised here and would
require that the action be dismissed.9 See Pejepscot, 215 F.3d at
205-06.
IV.
The district court's entry of judgment in favor of
Springfield is affirmed. Costs are awarded to Springfield. So
ordered.
9
When an agency has primary jurisdiction, the court has
discretion either to stay the case pending an STB determination or,
if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, to dismiss the
case without prejudice. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269-70
(1993). "Dismissal of the complaint may be appropriate when all of
the relief that is sought in court can be obtained in an
administrative forum . . . ." Hansen v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 689
F.2d 707, 714 (7th Cir. 1982).
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