United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-1141
JORGE J. MAYMÓ-MELÉNDEZ,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
JULIO ÁLVAREZ-RAMÍREZ, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Ivette M. Berríos-Hernández with whom Eduardo A. Vera-Ramírez
and Landrón & Vera, L.L.P. were on brief for appellants.
Charles A. Cuprill-Hernández with whom Charles A. Cuprill,
P.S.C. Law Offices was on brief for appellee.
April 12, 2004
BOUDIN, Chief Judge. This appeal concerns efforts by the
Puerto Rico Horse Racing Industry and Sport Administration (the
"Administration") to suspend the horse training license of Jorge
Maymó-Meléndez ("Maymó") for improperly administering drugs to
certain race horses under his care. The district court granted a
preliminary injunction preventing Maymó's suspension and the
appellants now seek reversal of that order.
Pursuant to the Puerto Rico Horse Racing Industry and
Sport Act, 15 L.P.R.A. §§ 198-198s (2000), the Administration was
"created as a public instrumentality to regulate everything
connected with the horse racing sport in the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico." Id. § 198a. The Administration is comprised of a Racing
Board, which is made up of three members, and a Racing
Administrator; the members of the Racing Board and the Racing
Administrator are appointed by the Governor of Puerto Rico. Id. §§
198c(a), 198j(a).
The Racing Board is "empowered to regulate everything
connected with the Horse Racing Sport," 15 L.P.R.A. § 198e(a),
including "[t]o prescribe, by regulations, the fines,
administrative penalties and suspensions that can be imposed by the
[Racing] Board, the Horse Racing Administrator, . . . or other
authorized officials." Id. § 198e(b)(8). The Racing Administrator
is the Administration's principal executive officer, id. § 198k(a),
and has the power to "[e]nforce compliance [with] the racing laws
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and regulations and the orders and resolutions of the Horse Racing
Board," id. § 198k(a)(1), and to "[g]rant, suspend temporarily, or
permanently cancel the licenses of horse . . . trainers" after
notice and hearing. Id. § 198k(a)(2).
In 1996, the Racing Board promulgated the "controlled
medication program," a set of regulations that governs the
administration of drugs to race horses. The controlled medication
program prohibits some drugs outright; others are allowed, but only
if administered in accordance with established procedures by
authorized personnel. Two of the drugs regulated (but not
prohibited) by the medication program are Clenbuterol, given to
horses with respiratory problems, and Tramadol, which is an
analgesic.
Between June 10, 1999, and June 21, 1999, nine horses
that had been trained by Maymó underwent post-race urine tests that
came back positive for Clenbuterol–-one horse tested positive
twice, thus making a total of ten positive tests. By August 17,
1999, then Racing Administrator Juan Alves Rueda ("Alves") had
filed ten corresponding charges against Maymó, alleging that
Clenbuterol had been administered in violation of the controlled
medication program. Alves consolidated the charges (the
"Clenbuterol case"), assigned Irba Cruz de Batista ("Cruz"), an
independent contractor for the Administration, to act as hearing
examiner, and ordered Ricardo Pacheco Pacheco ("Pacheco"), an
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attorney employed by the Administration, to act as prosecutor. 15
L.P.R.A. § 198k(a)(9).
Hearings in the Clenbuterol case were held before Cruz
from August to October 2000. In the midst of these proceedings, on
September 29, 2000, a horse trained by Maymó underwent a post-race
urine test that came back positive for Tramadol. On October 16,
2000, Cruz submitted a report to Alves, concluding that, in all ten
instances, Maymó had administered the Clenbuterol in violation of
the controlled medication program. Maymó filed objections to
Cruz's report, but on November 3, 2000, Alves adopted the report,
accepting its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Alves
suspended Maymó's license to train horses for five years and
imposed a $2,750 fine.
Maymó filed a petition for review of Alves's decision
with the Racing Board, 15 L.P.R.A. § 198m, and moved for a stay of
the license suspension and fine pending review. While Maymó's
petition and motion were pending before the Racing Board, Alves
filed a new charge against Maymó based on the positive Tramadol
test (the "Tramadol case"); Alves again assigned Cruz as hearing
examiner and Pacheco as prosecutor. The Racing Board ultimately
granted Maymó's requested stay in the Clenbuterol case, and later
Maymó's license was renewed for the following year. Id. § 198o(b).
On April 9, 2001, the Racing Board, by divided vote,
sustained Alves's decision in the Clenbuterol case, affirming the
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five-year suspension of Maymó's license and the $2,750 fine.
Pursuant to 15 L.P.R.A. § 198n(a), Maymó sought review of the
Racing Board's decision in Puerto Rico's Circuit Court of Appeals.
That court granted Maymó a stay of the penalties that had been
imposed upon him pending resolution of his appeal.
In June 2001, Julio Álvarez Ramírez ("Álvarez") succeeded
Alves as Racing Administrator. Hearings in the Tramadol case were
held before Cruz from January to May 2002. On June 10, 2002, Cruz
sent a report to Álvarez, concluding that Maymó had violated the
controlled medication program by improperly administering Tramadol
to the horse in question.
On June 21, 2002, the Puerto Rico Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the Racing Board's decision in the Clenbuterol
case. However, Álvarez took no immediate action to impose the
license suspension and the fine, there being some uncertainty as to
whether the court's stay continued in effect until its mandate
issued. On June 26, 2002, Álvarez adopted Cruz's findings of fact
and conclusions of law in the Tramadol case. Álvarez directed that
Maymó's license be suspended for five years to run consecutively to
the pending suspension in the Clenbuterol case and imposed a $1,000
fine.1
1
Álvarez also referred Maymó to the Racing Board, asking that
it declare Maymó a "racing nuisance," a statutory brand that, if
imposed, would have subjected Maymó to criminal penalties
(including up to ten years in prison) for even attempting to enter
a "racetrack or dependency thereof." 15 L.P.R.A. § 198e(b)(7).
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On June 27, 2002, with the suspension of his license from
the Tramadol case set to begin on July 1, 2002, Maymó filed suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) in federal district court in Puerto
Rico against Álvarez, Pacheco, and Cruz. The suit, directed solely
to the suspension in the Tramadol case because the Clenbuterol case
remained in limbo in the state court, alleged due process
violations: that the controlled medication program was
unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary and that the named
defendants were unfairly biased against Maymó. The suit sought
damages and to enjoin the Racing Administrator from suspending
Maymó's license.
On July 3, 2002, notwithstanding the federal lawsuit,
Maymó petitioned the Racing Board for review of Álvarez's June 26,
2002, decision, adopting Cruz's findings of fact and conclusions of
law in the Tramadol case. 15 L.P.R.A. § 198m. On the same day,
the federal district court held a hearing on Maymó's request for
interim relief relating to the Tramadol suspension. At the
hearing, Álvarez made clear that he intended to suspend Maymó's
license based on the Clenbuterol case when the state-court stay
expired. With respect to the Tramadol case, the district court
ultimately entered a temporary restraining order pending resolution
of the request for a preliminary injunction.
On July 11, 2002, Maymó having failed to obtain an
extension of the state-court stay, Álvarez suspended Maymó's
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license based on the Clenbuterol decision.2 That same day, Álvarez
returned to Maymó his petition for the Racing Board to review the
Tramadol decision, saying that review was pointless in light of the
ongoing litigation in federal court. On July 14, 2002, Maymó filed
a second federal action, similar to the first (except for the
addition of Alves as a defendant), to enjoin suspension based on
either the Clenbuterol or the Tramadol case; the district court
consolidated the two federal cases and issued a second temporary
restraining order.
From September 30, 2002, to October 4, 2002, the district
court conducted a hearing on whether to issue a preliminary
injunction barring the Racing Administrator from suspending Maymó's
license. On the first day of this hearing, the defendants filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing inter alia that the district court
should refrain from deciding the consolidated cases based on the
principles of abstention outlined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), and that the defendants were covered by quasi-judicial or
qualified immunity.
On November 26, 2002, the district court issued an
opinion and order holding the following: that the individual
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and immune from
2
On August 7, 2002, the Puerto Rico Circuit Court of Appeals
denied Maymó's motion for reconsideration of its decision affirming
the Racing Board in the Clenbuterol case. Maymó sought review in
the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. On October 25, 2002, the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico denied Maymó's petition for further review.
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money damages; that abstention under Younger was not appropriate;
and that Maymó was entitled to a preliminary injunction preventing
the defendants from suspending his license and collecting the fines
that had been levied against him. The defendants now appeal,
arguing that Younger abstention was required and, alternatively,
that Maymó failed to establish the prerequisites for a preliminary
injunction.
Younger is a court-made rule of abstention built around
the principle that, with limited exceptions, federal courts should
refrain from issuing injunctions that interfere with ongoing state-
court litigation, or, in some cases, with state administrative
proceedings. See generally Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45, 53-54.
This core principle leaves open a host of peripheral questions to
which the precedents provide only half answers or decisions in
tension with one another. See Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction §
13.3 (3d ed. 1999); 17A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 4251, at 180-81, 191-93 (2d ed. 1988). This case
poses several of those problems.
Although initially applied to protect state criminal
prosecutions against interference, the Younger doctrine has been
extended to "coercive" civil cases involving the state and to
comparable state administrative proceedings that are quasi-judicial
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in character and implicate important state interests.3 In
regulating thoroughbred racing, the Commonwealth aims to ensure the
integrity of the sport and to protect legitimate state interests.
The proceedings within the Racing Board to cancel licenses after
notice and hearing fit within the category of matters potentially
subject to Younger. See Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d
613, 616-21 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Younger).
The district court said that Younger abstention did not
apply because neither the Clenbuterol nor the Tramadol matters were
"ongoing" at the time the principal injunction was granted on
November 26, 2002. By that time the state-court proceedings
affirming the sanction in the Clenbuterol case were effectively
completed with the affirmance of the Racing Board's action; and in
the Tramadol case, the Racing Administrator had imposed penalties
and had returned Maymó's review petition so no proceedings were
pending before the Racing Board.
Although the Clenbuterol case had been decided by the
state appeals court when Maymó filed his second federal complaint--
the time at which the Younger test is applied, Bettencourt v. Bd.
3
See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603-05 (1975)
(applying Younger to a civil proceeding initiated by the state to
enforce a nuisance statute); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton
Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 623-27 (1986) (applying
Younger to state administrative proceedings based on alleged sex
discrimination); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 435 (1982) (applying Younger to
administrative proceedings brought by state ethics committee to
discipline an attorney).
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of Registration in Med., 904 F.2d 772, 777 (1st Cir. 1990)--the
state case was still technically ongoing because Maymó had filed a
petition for reconsideration. Yet it would be a waste of time to
reverse based on this technicality,4 and, as it turns out, the
injunction against the Clenbuterol order is barred on other grounds
to which we will shortly turn.
Although Younger is ordinarily described as applying
where the state case or proceeding is "ongoing," a moment's
reflection suggests that this cannot be the whole story. There is
some sense to a mechanical rule that Younger does not apply where
the state litigation has not yet begun; after all, the underlying
concern is that state proceedings, once begun, should be respected
by federal courts so long as the federal claims or defenses can be
litigated in the course of the proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S.
at 44-45, 53-54; cf. Brooks v. N.H. Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 638
(1st Cir. 1996).
However, it makes little sense to ignore Younger's policy
simply because the state process has come to an end. After all,
how does it "respect" state proceedings to wait until they are
concluded and then ignore or overturn them? And yet the case law
is something of a vacuum on this question, partly because of the
variousness of the situations but mostly because other rubrics
4
Because a dismissal on Younger grounds is without prejudice,
see Caldwell v. Camp, 594 F.2d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 1979), Maymó
would presumably be free in this case to re-file the complaint
immediately (state court review having now undoubtedly concluded).
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usually foreclose the collateral attack after the state proceedings
have ended, making unnecessary any discussion of Younger.
Three such rubrics have special force where, as with the
Clenbuterol proceedings, state-court judicial review of an
administrative ruling has been undertaken and completed: res
judicata, the federal full faith and credit statute, and the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.5 Although nominally independent
doctrines, they are variations on the same theme: the first
embodies a bedrock respect for prior judgments, subject to
exceptions; the second, a statutory compulsion for the first where
federal courts confront state judgments; and the third, a broader
and blunter version of the other two.
Often the first resort of federal judges is to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine--and peculiarly so in case of disbarment,
revocations of licenses, and the like. See 18B Wright, Miller &
Cooper, supra, § 4469.1, at 120. Merger and bar doctrine is often
hard to adapt to claims not cast in the traditional common law
mode; and collateral estoppel requires the precise identification
of issues actually litigated and decided in the first case and
sought to be re-litigated in the second. Restatement (Second) of
5
Res judicata is familiar common law doctrine, see Restatement
(Second) of Judgments §§ 17-20, 24, 27 (1982); the federal statute
is 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000); and Rooker-Feldman refers to Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). It is no accident that the
doctrines are discussed together in 18B Wright, Miller & Cooper,
supra, §§ 4469-4469.1.
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Judgments § 27 & cmt. c-o (1982). So, despite the disapproval of
scholars, federal courts regularly use Rooker-Feldman to rebuff
collateral attacks on prior state court judgments without
purporting to apply the technical preclusion rules of res
judicata.6
One obvious reason is that when a state judicial
proceeding does occur, federal judges usually say that the parties
ought to raise all of their claims, defenses and objections. If
the parties do, and are permitted to litigate the issues, the
judges think that should ordinarily settle the matter, subject to
certiorari review in the Supreme Court; and if they don't, they
should not later come and complain to the federal courts. There
are pluses and minuses to this approach but, with some exceptions,
it has carried the day so far, and it does so here as to the
Clenbuterol case.
In that case, the Racing Administrator and the Racing
Board may have been biased, unfair, or flat out wrong; but the
state provided a judicial remedy, Maymó invoked it, and he lost.
Maymó conceded at oral argument that he had argued to the state
court in the Clenbuterol case both that the medication program was
constitutionally flawed and that bias infected the administrative
6
The catalogue of federal cases doing so, and the scholarly
disapproval, are both reflected in 18B Wright, Miller & Cooper,
supra, § 4469.1. For a thick law review volume devoted to (thus
far ineffectual) scholarly criticism of Rooker-Feldman, see
Symposium: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1081,
1081 (1999).
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proceeding. Although he disputes that he had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate these issues, we address this claim below
and find that it is unpersuasive.
To enjoin enforcement of the Racing Board's sanction,
after its affirmance by the state court, amounts to a collateral
attack on a state court judgment. See, e.g., Wang v. N.H. Bd. of
Registration in Med., 55 F.3d 698, 703 (1st Cir. 1995). Rooker-
Feldman does not depend on what issues were actually litigated in
the state court; and it is enough that granting Maymó the
injunction he seeks would effectively overturn the state court's
decision. The case law to this effect is extensive. E.g., Mandel
v. Town of Orleans, 326 F.3d 267, 271 (1st Cir. 2003); Hill v. Town
of Conway, 193 F.3d 33, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1999).7
There are exceptions to Rooker-Feldman, see 18B Wright,
Miller & Cooper, supra, § 4469.1, at 127-37, and the one that comes
closest derives from cases saying that a general attack on a state
law or regulation is not precluded by a prior judgment applying
such a law or rule to the federal plaintiff. Id. at 123; Wilson v.
Shumway, 264 F.3d 120, 124 (1st Cir. 2001). The exception does not
apply, however, if the relief sought in federal court is directed
towards undoing the prior state judgment. See Kenmen Eng'g v. City
of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 476 (10th Cir. 2002) ("In conducting
7
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine was not raised as an objection on
this appeal, but it is jurisdictional, Mandel, 326 F.3d at 271, and
cannot be ignored. Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 195-
96 (4th Cir. 2002).
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[Rooker-Feldman] analysis, we must pay close attention to the
relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff." (emphasis in
original)).
Here, one facet of Maymó's due process claim was a
general attack on the Racing Board's drug regulations; he argued
that they were unconstitutionally vague and contradictory and the
district court agreed. But, so far as advanced as a reason to
grant an injunction overturning his license suspension, Maymó's
challenge is an attack on the Puerto Rico Circuit Court of
Appeals's decision affirming the suspension and is therefore barred
by Rooker-Feldman. See Wilson, 264 F.3d at 125; Hill, 193 F.3d at
39-40. Had he been suspended for a week and then sought to enjoin
future enforcement of the regulations, that would be a different
question. See Hood v. Keller, 341 F.3d 593, 597-99 (6th Cir.
2003).
Maymó's assault on the Tramadol suspension presents a
different problem. As to it, there was no state-court proceeding;
indeed, Maymó was only to the stage of appealing the Racing
Administrator's decision to the Racing Board when he brought his
initial federal action to enjoin the suspension. Rooker-Feldman is
based on the Supreme Court's reading of a statute governing review
of state-court judgments, Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476 (relying on 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (2000)); Rooker-Feldman does not insulate from
federal challenge administrative rulings standing alone. Van
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Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1349 (7th Cir. 1997); 18B
Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 4469.1, at 143-44.
However, Younger (as already noted) does apply to
administrative proceedings like this one. Thus, we confront the
district court's conclusion that Younger did not apply in this case
because the administrative proceedings in the Tramadol case were
not ongoing when the first federal action to enjoin the
Administrator's order was filed. True, thereafter Maymó sought
review by the Racing Board but, as the review petition was then
returned (because of the pending federal action), we will accept
arguendo the district court's premise that the federal action came
after the conclusion of any pending administrative proceedings.
The question, then, is whether Maymó can avoid Younger
abstention by failing to pursue his administrative remedy within
the Racing Board. This question, although not identical, is
related to the larger question whether, even if Maymó had completed
review by the Racing Board, he could have refused to seek judicial
review in the state court and instead brought his federal claims to
federal court in an injunction action. Needless to say, this
issue--essentially an exhaustion of remedies question--is a matter
of general importance that could affect an array of state
proceedings.
To us, the answer is dictated by Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592 (1975), and its progeny. In Huffman, the Supreme
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Court said that once a state judicial proceeding had begun, the
exhaustion of state judicial remedies was required by Younger;
despite the formal break between trial and appellate review, the
Court deemed the proceeding "ongoing" for Younger purposes until
the state appellate process was complete. Id. at 607-11. This was
so even though the state court decision would then likely be
preclusive of any new federal lawsuit.
At the time Huffman was decided, Younger had not formally
been extended to state administrative proceedings; and the Court
reserved the exhaustion question as to them.8 But the Supreme
Court thereafter extended Younger to such proceedings in Middlesex
County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S.
423 (1982), and Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian
Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986), its premise being that the
administrative proceedings were subject to Younger because they
were "judicial" in character. 457 U.S. at 432-34; 477 U.S. at 627-
28. In Dayton, the Court further stressed that if the
constitutional mistakes were not remedied at the administrative
level, state courts would be available to set the matter right.
477 U.S. at 629.
Given such rhetoric and the policy judgments underlying
the recent decisions, Younger now has to be read as treating the
8
It purported to reserve this issue, citing two ancient
Supreme Court cases that allowed federal equity suits to challenge
state administrative action. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 609 n.21.
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state process--where the administrative proceeding is judicial in
character--as a continuum from start to finish. There are
exceptions to Younger (to which we will return) but, absent an
applicable exception, there cannot at any point on the continuum be
an automatic right to detour into federal court because unhappy
with an initial answer.
The principal author of these "Younger-extended" opinions
has been Chief Justice Rehnquist. When, following Dayton, he
summed up in a concurrence in New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
(NOPSI) v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989), he
specifically described the Younger rule as one that treats a matter
as "ongoing" from the administrative proceeding into the state
judicial proceeding:
Nothing in the Court's opinion curtails our
prior application of Younger to certain
administrative proceedings which are 'judicial
in nature[';] nor does it alter our prior case
law indicating that such proceedings should be
regarded as 'ongoing' for the purposes of
Younger abstention until state appellate
review is completed. (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
This conclusion does little more than spell out what is
inherent in Huffman, Middlesex, and Dayton, taken together; and it
is certainly the view taken by three out of four circuits that have
addressed the exhaustion question.9 The majority view--
9
Compare Thomas v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 807 F.2d
453, 455-57 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that exhaustion of
opportunities to appeal in state court from adverse administrative
decision is not required by Younger), with Majors v. Engelbrecht,
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reflected in O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785 (3d Cir.
1994)--is persuasive to us:
We have been given no reason why a
litigant in a state administrative proceeding
should be permitted to forego state-court
review of the agency's decision in order to
apply for relief in federal court. Rather, we
find the grounds offered by the Supreme Court
to support its holding in Huffman--that state
appellate review of a state court judgment
must be exhausted before federal court
intervention is permitted--are equally
persuasive when considered with respect to
state-court judicial review of a state
administrative decision.
Id. at 790-91. The opinion continues by quoting portions of
Huffman and other decisions that reinforce this view. Id. at 791.
Huffman is a reliable guide only where full-fledged state
administrative proceedings of a judicial character and, arguably,
of a coercive nature, are directed against the federal plaintiff.
See Alleghany Corp. v. Haase, 896 F.2d 1046, 1050-53 (7th Cir.
1990). If Maymó had been summarily suspended by the Racing
Administrator and no administrative proceeding had been begun, he
could have gone directly to federal court to challenge his
dismissal. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 498, 516
(1982); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 59-61, 63 n.10 (1979); see
also Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. at 627 n.2.
Admittedly, a line between summary action and full-fledged
149 F.3d 709, 712-13 & n. 3 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding the opposite),
O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 790-91 & n.13 (3d
Cir. 1994) (same), and Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney, 896 F.2d 1138,
1143-45 (8th Cir. 1990) (same).
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administrative proceedings that are judicial in nature is bound to
be fuzzy.
In Kercado-Melendez v. Aponte-Roque, 829 F.2d 255 (1st
Cir. 1987), a school superintendent (Kercado) in Puerto Rico was
terminated after an informal hearing at which she was given a
chance to respond to allegations of "incompetence, negligence,
insubordination, and improper conduct." Id. at 257-58. The
termination order specified that it would take effect ten days
after receipt, unless Kercado chose to file an administrative
appeal to the Board of Appeals of the Public Education System. Id.
Instead, Kercado filed a federal suit, alleging retaliation for
activities protected by the First Amendment. Id.
The panel majority held that Younger did not apply
because Puerto Rico did not require any kind of formal procedure
prior to the issuing of a termination order and because all post-
order proceedings were within the discretion of the aggrieved party
and were not necessary to the order's taking effect. Kercado-
Melendez, 829 F.2d at 260-62.10 Kercado-Melendez does Maymó no
good, however, because he was suspended only after full-fledged
administrative proceedings. There is a spectrum stretching from
10
Judge (now Justice) Breyer dissented, arguing that the
termination was not truly complete until after the formal review
process--he deemed the termination order merely the beginning of an
integrated proceeding--and he thought that in any event Huffman
still applied. Id. at 267-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Huffman to Patsy and Kercado-Melendez may be in the middle; but
Maymó's situation is clearly at the Huffman end.
Younger, even where it presumptively applies, is not
implicated where the federal claims cannot be raised and resolved
somewhere in the state process. Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457
U.S. at 432. How far the Racing Board would entertain
constitutional objections to its regulations or practices is
unclear, but the state court clearly would do so and this is
enough. As noted above, in Dayton the Supreme Court said "it is
sufficient . . . that constitutional claims may be raised in state-
court judicial review of the administrative proceeding." 477 U.S.
at 629.
Maymó says that one claim in particular--that Alves
harbored bias against him--could not be developed because, in the
administrative proceeding involving Clenbuterol, he was not allowed
to subpoena Alves to develop that claim and so was limited by a
truncated record on appeal. Denial of an opportunity to develop a
material issue is a standard basis for overturning an adverse
administrative decision, Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S.
729, 744 (1985), and Maymó has not persuasively explained why this
remedy was inadequate in this case.11
11
At oral argument, Maymó said (without citation) that the
state court had no power to remand to the Racing Board to develop
more evidence. But it would take more than general assertion to
persuade us that a competent state court with authority to review
a disciplinary order lacked other remedies (e.g., setting aside the
order) where a material issue had been wrongly foreclosed.
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Taking a related but somewhat different tack, Maymó
argues that an exception to Younger permitted him to go to federal
court directly to forestall an administrative action against him
conducted by a biased tribunal. In substance, Maymó says that
Alves, Cruz, Pacheco, and Álvarez were prejudiced against him and,
in addition, that he was singled out for discipline while other
trainers similarly situated were not pursued. These facts, he
says, he was entitled to develop in an independent action in
federal court. His main reliance is upon Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564 (1973).
In Gibson, a group of optometrists sued in federal court
to enjoin disciplinary proceedings against them by a state board,
411 U.S. at 568-70; and the Supreme Court said that Younger did not
bar a due process claim that the administrative tribunal was
"incompetent by reason of bias [an alleged financial stake in the
outcome] to adjudicate the issues pending before it." Id. at 577-
79. The Court also said: "[n]or, in these circumstances, would a
different result be required simply because judicial review, de
novo or otherwise, would be forthcoming at the conclusion of the
administrative proceeding." Id. at 577.
Gibson was decided only two years after Younger began the
process of contracting federal-court remedies, but it has never
been formally overruled. Further, in Huffman itself, the Supreme
Court said that "of course" exceptions to Younger's bar remained,
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mentioning not bias but state proceedings brought "to harass," or
"in bad faith," or to enforce a flagrantly unconstitutional
statute. 420 U.S. at 611-12. The opinion added, however, that
irreparable injury would still be required for an injunction based
on such an exception. Id. at 612.
The scope and conditions of the various Younger
exceptions remain uncertain. Underneath the surface is an unspoken
policy debate as to how much should be done by federal courts and
how far state courts are to be trusted; the Chief Justice's
majority opinion in Huffman plays out this debate in a counterpoint
with the dissent, joined by three Warren Court veterans. Compare
420 U.S. at 608-11 (Rehnquist, J.), with id. at 616-18 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). About all that is certain is that there is some
reason for interim federal court intervention where core
constitutional values are threatened during an ongoing state
proceeding and there is a showing of irreparable harm that is both
"great and immediate." See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
In all events, this case--given its present posture--
cannot fall within any rational Younger exception. Because the
first five year suspension (based on the Clenbuterol order) has now
been immunized from district-court review on grounds independent of
Younger, only the second (Tramadol) suspension remains; and it has
no bite for five years. This makes it impossible to show an
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immediate threat to Maymó's constitutional rights that would
justify an injunction by-passing existing state remedies.
So far as the Younger exceptions are concerned with the
impact of the state proceeding independent of any final remedy
(e.g., to harass), the suspension order has already been entered;
so far as the concern is with implementing an order before state
review is completed (e.g., the initial injunction against the
theater in Huffman), Maymó now has five years to complete his
administrative and judicial review options. Nor is there any
"flagrantly" unconstitutional statute or regulation. Compare
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611-13.
This case is not one in which a denial of relief is a
comfortable outcome. Maymó offered more than trivial evidence that
the medical regime used by the Racing Board is incomplete and was
unfairly implemented; the district court thought that the evidence
(on a preliminary look) was persuasive. The district court also
saw force in Maymó's claims of bias or selective enforcement,
although to us this is less clear-cut. Maymó's suit is by no means
"totally unfounded, frivolous, or otherwise unreasonable"--the test
for awarding fees against the plaintiff who fails in a section 1983
action. Casa Marie Hogar Geriatrico, Inc. v. Rivera-Santos, 38
F.3d 615, 618 (1st Cir. 1994).
Yet so long as the Administrator is prepared to reinstate
Maymó's temporarily dismissed Tramadol appeal, it is not apparent
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why Younger's policy bar should be ignored and state processes by-
passed.12 Conceivably, the district court's findings, which have
at least persuasive force, may give Maymó some basis for asking the
Racing Board or the state courts in the Clenbuterol case to re-open
that matter as well--steps that might vindicate the faith Huffman
and Dayton now place in state proceedings.
The district court's injunctive orders are vacated and
the matter remanded to the district court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Each side will bear its own costs on
this appeal.
It is so ordered.
12
Maymó did not fail to seek administrative review; he did file
a request, which the Administrator returned because of the pending
federal court action. If the Administrator now failed to reinstate
the review proceeding, there would be a serious question whether
state procedures were adequate to protect Maymó's constitutional
rights.
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