Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32. 3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-2557
GUILIN F. JOLICOEUR,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
SOUTHERN NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF LAW, FRANCIS J. LARKIN,
DAVID M. PRENTISS, ROBERT V. WARD, BOARD OF TRUSTEES, JOHN
DOES 1-10,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Porfilio, * Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Jonathan D. Plaut, on the brief for appellant.
Elizabeth A. Houlding, with whom Allen D. David, was on
the brief for appellees.
July 7, 2004
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. Guilin F. Jolicoeur appeals the dismissal
of his complaint alleging Southern New England School of Law
(School) fraudulently induced him to transfer, attend, and
graduate from the school upon its representation the
American Bar Association’s (ABA) accreditation of its
academic program was imminent. In an order entered by
electronic transmission, the district court granted the
School’s motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
“for the reasons outlined in defendants’ memorandum of law.”
Despite the opacity of that order, the School’s contention
Mr. Jolicoeur’s action is untimely radiates through our
review under Rule 12(b)(6). We, therefore, affirm.
From the vantage of de novo review of the district
court’s order to dismiss, Martin v. Applied Cellular Tech.,
Inc., 284 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2002) (citation omitted),
the allegations of Mr. Jolicoeur’s complaint, accepted as
true and read to permit all reasonable inferences to be
drawn in his favor, limn the details he contended amounted
to the School’s fraudulent conduct. Mr. Jolicoeur averred
while a student at the Massachusetts School of Law in 1996,
he received a solicitation sent to his home in Morristown,
New Jersey, to attend an open house at the School. From
that open house in July 1996, until his graduation on June
10, 2000, the School, according to Mr. Jolicoeur, continued
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to misrepresent its efforts to satisfy the legal education
requirements for its ABA accreditation. These alleged
verbal assurances, Mr. Jolicoeur averred, were made even
after he enrolled in the final semester of his law school
education when the School knew he planned to return to his
residence in New Jersey, a state which includes graduation
from an ABA accredited law school as a prerequisite to a
license to practice law.
In his pro se complaint filed on June 18, 2003, Mr.
Jolicoeur alleged claims for fraud, respondeat superior,
breach of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 2, negligence, breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith, and violations of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The School
moved to dismiss on numerous grounds including the three-
year statute of limitations for actions in fraud, Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 260, § 2A.
The latter ground, under any view of the record (and
without any guidance from the district court), warrants
dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That is, under
the relevant Massachusetts statute of limitations, Mr.
Jolicoeur had three years to file his lawsuit, the
overriding theme of which was fraud. Hendrickson v. Sears,
310 N.E. 2d 131, 132 (Mass. 1974); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 260
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§ 2A. Even drawing the facts and their reasonable
inferences in Mr. Jolicoeur’s favor and substituting Mr.
Jolicoeur’s graduation date, June 10, 2000, for the last
possible time when the ABA’s November 1999 denial of
accreditation to the School caused him injury, we must
conclude the complaint was untimely.
In his reply brief, Mr. Jolicoeur stated his “cause of
action did not even accrue until June, 2000 when he
graduated from the unaccredited school.” Further, he
contended each false promise constituted “a separate harm
for which the statute of limitations began anew.” Under
either theory, the date of accrual of Mr. Jolicoeur’s rights
is either November 2002, or June 10, 2003. Surely, the
“storm warnings” were visible on both dates. Young v.
Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002). Mr. Jolicoeur filed
his complaint on June 18, 2003, eight days after the
limitary period had run. The complaint is, thus, barred by
the statute of limitations.
Nonetheless, despite the apparent lack of merit in this
appeal, we find it necessary to remind the district court of
its critical responsibility. As part of the appellate
process, a trial court must insure the basis for its
resolution of a matter subject to appeal is clear. Even
when a court finds arguments of counsel persuasive, as the
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district court apparently did in this case, it must keep the
appellate record in mind. Because it is the basis for any
appeal, the district court’s disposition informs the review.
It is vital, therefore, that an appellate court be provided
with the district judge’s thoughts rather than be left to
rummage about in papers filed by counsel in an attempt to
deduce the trial court’s reasoning. Moreover, the appellate
court must also have assurance that a district court’s
decisions will not be subjected to hindsight revision by a
zealous advocate who is free to write upon a blank page.
This assurance comes about when the trial court explains its
reasoning.
Finally, it is only by happenstance that this record
permits one resolution; otherwise, we would have had to
remand the matter to the district court to complete its
task. Although we fully appreciate the burdens and time
constraints imposed upon our trial courts that make
expeditious results attractive, we cannot help but observe
that a few moments spent at the district court level often
can forestall the expenditure of much more time bringing the
appellate process to a full and proper conclusion.
We affirm the dismissal of the complaint.
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