United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-2652
RICHARD J. FOREST; NANCY FOREST; ELIZABETH FOREST
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
PAWTUCKET POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY OF PAWTUCKET, by and
through its Treasurer, Ronald Wunschel; SCOTT M.
FEELEY, in his individual and official capacity;
JOHN CLARKSON, in his individual and official capacity;
GEORGE L. KELLEY, in his individual and official capacity;
DENNIS SMITH, in his individual and official capacity;
WILLIAM MAGILL, in his individual and official capacity;
Defendants - Appellees
JEFFREY T. MONTELLA; GAIL MONTELLA, individually and as
parent/legal guardian of Jeffrey T. Montella;
CHARLES MONTELLA
Defendants
_____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, Senior U.S. District Judge]
______________________
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Rosenn, Senior Circuit Judge,*
Howard, Circuit Judge.
______________________
*
Of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, sitting by designation.
Jeffrey D. Sowa was on brief for appellant.
Marc DeSisto was on brief for appellee.
July 28, 2004
ROSENN, Senior Circuit Judge. This appeal presents an
important, although not infrequent, question arising out of the
delicate relationship between a teacher and student in the public
school system. The question is: how deep must a police
investigation extend before there is sufficient probable cause for
the arrest of a school teacher accused of sexually molesting a
student? At stake is the professional career and reputation of a
high school teacher on one hand, and on the other the safety,
health, and moral values of the student. Caught between the two
are the police officers called to investigate and, if warranted, to
arrest for prosecution.
A fifteen-year-old male student complained to his high
school principal that his special education teacher had sexually
molested him while in class. The complaint led to an investigation
and the arrest of the teacher by the Pawtucket, Rhode Island,
Police Department. The charge against the teacher, Richard Forest
(“Forest”), a Massachusetts resident, was ultimately dismissed by
the state court. Forest thereupon brought a civil suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island against the City of Pawtucket, the Police
Department, and individual officers, claiming a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights under the Federal Constitution.1 The
1
The pertinent language of the Fourth Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
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District Court found that the police officers had reasonable
probable cause to arrest Forest and granted summary judgment in
their favor. Forest timely appealed. We affirm.
I.
Forest had been employed by the Pawtucket School District
in Rhode Island as a full-time special education teacher at Tolman
High School for 30 years. At the time of the events relevant to
this case, he taught a “life skills” course for special needs
children. Jeffrey Montella (“Montella”), one of his students, left
Forest’s classroom on January 24, 2000, and went to the principal’s
office to report an incident of misconduct. Montella informed
Principal Rousselle (“Rousselle”) that Forest touched him
inappropriately in a sexual manner during class. Montella provided
a written statement to Rousselle detailing the incident.
At approximately 5 p.m. that evening, Montella and his
mother, Gail Montella, went to the Pawtucket Police Department and
filed a complaint against Forest. Montella gave Officer Dennis
Smith a written statement alleging that Forest “grabbed and rubbed
[his] penis during class.” Montella also disclosed that Forest had
rubbed his shoulders and legs in the past, in a way that made him
uncomfortable.
Officer Smith referred the complaint to Detectives Scott
Feeley and William Magill, who reinterviewed Montella and his
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.”
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mother on that same evening. During the second interview, Montella
drew a diagram depicting the seating arrangement in the class at
the time of the alleged incident. The diagram shows that when the
misconduct allegedly occurred, there were four other students in
the classroom, two sitting beside Montella and two sitting across
the room facing him. A teaching assistant, Cheryl Ann Lainhart,
was seated a short distance to the left of the row occupied by
Montella and his two fellow students.
Gail Montella also provided a written statement to the
detectives. She affirmed that her son told her about the
inappropriate touching that occurred earlier in the day, and that
her son had complained in the past about Forest rubbing his
shoulders and thigh. Ms. Montella explained that when her son
originally complained of inappropriate touching, she did not
believe it to be significant because she assumed that Forest was
simply being nice to her son. She also assumed that Forest’s
attention to Montella was not out of the ordinary, as Forest had
been generous with the Montella family in the past, giving them a
large bag of gifts at Christmas and a $50 gift certificate to a
grocery store. Ms. Montella explained in her statement that she
believed her son’s story about the alleged misconduct in the
classroom because Forest had always been nice to her family, and
therefore her son had no reason to lie in order to harm him.
Detectives Feeley and Magill interviewed Principal
Rousselle on the same evening of the complaint. Rousselle
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confirmed that Montella had come to his office during class that
day, made an oral complaint, and provided a written statement
regarding the incident. After confirming the incident with
Rousselle, the detectives called Forest at 8:30 p.m., leaving a
message on his answering machine, and again at 9:10 p.m., when they
reached Forest on the phone. The detectives asked Forest to come
to the police station, but Forest declined because he could not
reach his attorney. At 10 p.m., after speaking with his attorney,
Forest called the detectives and agreed to voluntarily appear at
the police station. On January 26, 2000, Forest was arrested and
charged with second degree sexual assault.
Detective Feeley prepared the affidavit in support of the
arrest warrant on the evening of January 24, after he received the
complaint from Montella, verified the incident with Montella’s
mother, and confirmed the incident with Principal Rousselle.
Feeley did not interview Forest, the teaching assistant, or any
other students present in the classroom at the time of the alleged
incident. But, Feeley stated that he found Montella’s claim to be
credible.
The affidavit in support of the arrest warrant recounted
Montella’s story, explaining that Forest asked Montella about his
new fleece jacket, and allegedly rubbed Montella’s penis while he
reached upward to feel the jacket material. Feeley did not include
in the affidavit an explanation that Montella was a special needs
student taking Ritalin for his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
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Disorder, nor did he indicate that there were other students in the
classroom during the alleged incident who may have witnessed the
event. Bail Commissioner Ernest Pratt reviewed the affidavit,
found probable cause to arrest Forest, and signed the warrant.
The Pawtucket School Department investigated Montella’s
allegation and found that “[t]here was no credible evidence
presented that Jeffrey Montella was fondled sexually by Richard
Forest in the Life Skills Class.” Subsequently, the Rhode Island
Attorney General’s office declined to prosecute, and the Rhode
Island state district court dismissed the case.
After the charges were dismissed, Forest brought suit
raising eleven counts against multiple defendants.2 Counts I
through VII, which included claims brought under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments plus multiple state law claims, were raised
against the city, the police department, and several officers
involved (“Pawtucket Defendants”). Counts VIII through XI included
state law claims raised against Montella and his family members
(“Montella Defendants”). Only the Pawtucket Defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the District
Court. Therefore, counts VIII through XI involving the Montella
Defendants were not considered on summary judgment before the
2
The District Court maintained jurisdiction over the
original federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and over
the state law claims pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a). This court has jurisdiction over an appeal of
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
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District Court, and are not now before this court on appeal.
Furthermore, Forest only appeals the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment on Count I involving the alleged violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. Our review is limited to this single
issue.
II.
Forest’s Fourth Amendment claim asserts that his
constitutional rights were violated because he was arrested without
probable cause. The District Court granted summary judgment on
this claim based on two separate, but related grounds. First, the
District Court found that the detectives had probable cause to
arrest Forest, and thus there was no constitutional violation. The
Pawtucket Defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
Second, the Court’s finding of no constitutional violation also
justified summary judgment on the merits of the § 1983 claim. See
Morales v. Ramirez, 906 F.2d 784, 787 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining
that although qualified immunity and the merits of § 1983 suit are
separate inquiries, a finding of no constitutional violation may
resolve both).
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Grant’s Dairy-Maine LLC v. Comm’r of Maine Dept. of
Agric., Food and Rural Res., 232 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2000). We
review all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, and will affirm if we conclude that there are no issues of
material fact, and the Appellees deserve judgment as a matter of
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law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Savings
Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1995).
III.
Qualified immunity is not a defense on the merits, but is
“an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of
litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (citation
omitted). Consequently, it is important to resolve the immunity
question as early as possible in the litigation. Id. at 201.
Government officials will not be entitled to qualified immunity if
their conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right that is
“clearly established.” Id. Thus, the first threshold inquiry must
be whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the
party claiming injury, show that an officer’s conduct violated a
statutory or constitutional right. If the facts do not support the
violation of a right, then the inquiry ends at that point, and the
court does not proceed to the second question of whether the right
allegedly violated was clearly established. Id.
Probable cause analysis requires inquiry into the facts
and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge at the
time of arrest to determine if a person of “reasonable caution and
prudence” would have believed that the defendant committed a crime.
Floyd v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985). It does not
require evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
“[P]robable cause need not be tantamount to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . . Probability is the touchstone.” U.S. v.
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Grant, 218 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “The
probable cause standard does not require the officers’ conclusion
to be ironclad, or even highly probable. Their conclusion that
probable cause exists need only be reasonable.” U.S. v.
Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1999).
This court has affirmed that police officers can
justifiably rely upon the credible complaint by a victim to support
a finding of probable cause. B.C.R. Transport Co., Inc. v.
Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting that although not
a per se rule, a probable cause determination predicated on
information furnished by the victim is generally considered
reliable). Therefore, the primary inquiry in this case is whether
there is any evidence that the officers acted unreasonably when
they determined that Montella’s accusation was credible, in light
of all the circumstances known at the time.
Forest argues that the accusation was inherently
unreliable because Montella alleged that the incident occurred in
front of an entire classroom of students and a teaching aide, none
of whom were interviewed prior to the arrest. However, the facts
known to the detectives at the time of arrest do not support this
conclusion. Montella did not claim that Forest molested him in
clear view of an entire classroom of students. According to the
diagram provided by Montella, there were only four other students
and a teaching assistant in the class at the time of the incident,
and only two of the other students were facing Montella. The
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others in the room were situated to Montella’s side where they
would not necessarily have had a clear view. Also, Montella
explained that Forest was commenting on, and touching Montella’s
jacket when the alleged molestation occurred. Therefore, it was
reasonable for the detectives to conclude that even an eye witness
would not necessarily have recognized any inappropriate touching.
Forest also argues that because Montella was a special
needs student, his credibility should have been questioned. But
there is no evidence that Montella’s condition of Attention Deficit
and Hyperactivity Disorder, and his prescription of Ritalin, had
any effect on his credibility. Rather, Detective Feeley believed
that Montella was not mentally incapacitated in any relevant
manner, and made an independent determination that Montella was
“fairly intelligent and credible.”
Finally, Forest argues that under Bevier v. Hucal, 806
F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1986), the officers were required to interview
readily available witnesses before seeking an arrest warrant.
However, Bevier does not support Forest’s argument. In Bevier, the
police arrested two parents for child abuse with absolutely no
investigation or evidence supporting the abuse, even though
witnesses who could have been consulted were readily available.
Id. at 128. In this case, the police did conduct an investigation.
The detectives interviewed Montella twice to ascertain his primary
accusation, interviewed his mother to verify the account and learn
that Montella had complained in the past of inappropriate touching,
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and confirmed the events with Principal Rousselle. All of the
information gleaned from these interviews and statements provided
reasonable evidence to support probable cause.
Forest asserts that the officers should have interviewed
the other students in the classroom and the teaching assistant
before seeking the arrest warrant. However, the law is clear that
once police officers are presented with probable cause to support
an arrest, no further investigation is required at that point.
See, e.g., Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75 f.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir.
1996) (noting that officers are not required to conduct mini-trials
before arrest).
We agree with the District Court that probable cause
existed to arrest Forest. Therefore, there was no violation of
Forest’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the Pawtucket Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity.
IV.
Forest argues in the alternative that the Pawtucket
Police exaggerated the evidence presented in the arrest warrant
knowing that Montella’s claim was not credible. A Fourth Amendment
violation may be established if a defendant can show that officers
acted in reckless disregard, with a “high degree of awareness of
[the statements’] probable falsity.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d
781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Forest asserts that
the officers acted with reckless disregard because they relied on
witnesses who were not present during the incident (i.e. Montella’s
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mother and Principal Rousselle), and because the officers added
information about Forest’s gift giving to the Montella family,
which was speculative and irrelevant.
We believe that Forest’s claim of reckless disregard must
fail. First, the detectives did not rely on the statements of
Montella’s mother and Principal Rousselle to verify the account of
the alleged assault in the classroom. Rather, the detectives
relied on those statements to confirm (1) that Montella actually
left the classroom and went straight to the principal’s office to
report the incident, and (2) that Montella had complained of
inappropriate touching by Forest in the past. Both of these items
were relevant to a finding of probable cause. Second, the
inclusion of Forest’s generosity towards the Montellas in the past
was relevant when considered in the context explained by Montella’s
mother. Gail Montella stated that she believed her son’s claim
because he had no reason to harbor any ill will towards Forest;
Forest had been kind to the Montellas in the past. Therefore, the
inclusion of this fact directly supports Montella’s credibility.
Forest also argues that the officers omitted crucial
facts from the affidavit, particularly that the alleged assault
took place in front of the entire class and the teaching assistant.
Yet, as explained above, Forest’s assertion that the incident took
place in front of the entire class is an overstatement. The entire
class consisted of only five students including Montella, and only
two of the students were facing Montella at the time of the alleged
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incident. Additionally, Montella alleged that the touching took
place under the pretense of Forest’s feeling his jacket, so under
this scenario, even an eye witness may not have realized what was
occurring. Therefore, the officer’s omission of these facts from
the affidavit was not misleading, and there is no basis for the
claim of reckless disregard.
V.
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment is affirmed. Each party is to bear its
own cost.
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