United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 03-2738
PAULO ROCHA PEREIRA DA SILVA ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Coffin and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
Kevin R. Murphy on brief for petitioners.
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,
Linda S. Wernery, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration
Litigation, and Kathleen M. Zapata, Trial Attorney, on brief for
respondent.
January 5, 2005
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Paulo Rocha Pereira Da
Silva, a Brazilian national, seeks review of a final order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejecting his request for
withholding of removal. Discerning no error, we deny the petition.
I.
Background
In November of 1997, the petitioner, previously a
domiciliary of Campos, Brazil, entered the United States on a six-
month tourist visa. He took up residence in the Boston area and
overstayed his visa. A year later, he was joined by his wife,
Regina Celia Gomes De Lima Silva, and his minor daughter, Paola
Lima Rocha Pereira. They also arrived as tourists and stayed past
their respective visa expiration dates.
In September of 2000, the petitioner requested asylum on
behalf of himself, his wife, and his daughter. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) responded by serving a notice to
appear.1 That notice directed the trio to answer charges that
their continued presence in the United States violated the
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). See 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). At a hearing before an immigration judge
(IJ), the family members admitted through an attorney that they had
1
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, § 471,
116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 291(a)),
abolished the INS and transferred its duties to the Department of
Homeland Security. See Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 13 n.2 (1st
Cir. 2004).
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overstayed, acknowledged removability, conceded that the
application for asylum was time-barred, and sought withholding of
removal on the ground that the petitioner had a well-founded fear
of future persecution in his native Brazil because of his
membership in a particular social group, that is, his status as a
"member of society [who] refused to perform illegal tasks simply
because of pressure from his immediate supervisors at work."
In support of his application for withholding of removal,
the petitioner testified that he had been employed as a part-time
accountant for a government-funded drug rehabilitation center in
Campos. While carrying out his bookkeeping duties, he learned that
the chief executive officer of the center, Fred Luis Mauricio, was
embezzling funds. The petitioner aided and abetted the
embezzlement by creating phony invoices to account for the missing
money. When at long last the Brazilian federal government launched
an inquiry into the center's operations, Mauricio threatened to
kill the petitioner and his family if he spoke about the
corruption.
Despite the threat, the petitioner gave a statement
implicating Mauricio to the investigators. Subsequently, his wife
was threatened and his apartment ransacked. He reported these
incidents to the local office of the military police,2 who declined
2
According to the United States Department of State Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices — Brazil (2001), entered into the
administrative record, Brazil's police forces consist of a small,
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to afford him special protection because he did not know whether
Mauricio was responsible for what had transpired. The petitioner
took this refusal as a sign that Mauricio and the local police were
conspiring against him and that further requests for police
assistance would be an exercise in futility.
Concerned about his safety and that of his family, the
petitioner borrowed money from relatives and fled to the United
States. His wife and daughter stayed in Brazil, but moved to his
brother's house ninety miles from Campos. A year passed without
any untoward incidents. At that point, the petitioner's wife and
daughter joined him in the United States.
After listening to the petitioner's tale, the IJ found
credible those portions of his testimony that recounted facts
within his personal knowledge, e.g., that his work situation was
corrupt; that he had initially participated in the corruption but
later cooperated with the authorities to root it out; that by
providing information to the federal police, he had acted as a
whistleblower, albeit one with "lesser status" since his
whistleblowing began only when it became apparent that he could be
prosecuted for his complicity in the ongoing embezzlement; and that
Mauricio had threatened him. The IJ explicitly declined to make a
primarily investigative federal force and several state police
forces (the uniformed members of which are colloquially known as
"military police").
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finding that Mauricio was responsible for the threat to the
petitioner's wife or for the break-in at the petitioner's home.
Despite her acceptance of much of the petitioner's
testimony, the IJ refused to embrace many of the conclusions that
the petitioner sought to draw from the underlying facts, calling
them "mere speculation." Specifically, she refused to credit the
petitioner's self-serving accusation that the local police were in
league with Mauricio, observing that no hard evidence of such a tie
had been proffered. She also noted that the petitioner had made no
effort to enlist the help of any police department outside of the
local area in which Mauricio might have had political influence,
thus further weakening his broad-brush claim of police bias. She
then rejected as a matter of law the petitioner's contention that
his whistleblower status made him a member of a targeted social
group within the purview of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Finally, she
denied his prayer for withholding of removal.3
The petitioner appealed. The BIA adopted the IJ's
findings of fact and conclusions of law, adding an independent
finding that the feared harm related to what was "essentially a
3
The IJ also held that the petitioner had not established a
basis for relief under Article III of the Convention Against
Torture. Inasmuch as the petitioner did not include this claim in
his appeal to the BIA, he has effectively abandoned it. See
Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that
"theories not advanced before the BIA may not be surfaced for the
first time in a petition for judicial review of the BIA's final
order").
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personal dispute" between Mauricio and the petitioner. For that
reason, any threats that had been made against the petitioner and
his family were insufficient to establish a well-founded fear of
future persecution.
After the BIA affirmed the IJ's order, this petition for
judicial review eventuated.4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b).
II.
Analysis
Under the INA, an otherwise deportable alien may avoid
removal if the Attorney General determines that "the alien's life
or freedom would be threatened in [the destination] country because
of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion." Id. §
1231(b)(3)(A). The applicant must carry the devoir of persuasion
to show either that (i) he has suffered past persecution on account
of one of these five protected grounds (thus creating a rebuttable
presumption that he may suffer future persecution), or (ii) it is
more likely than not that he will be persecuted on account of a
protected ground upon his return to his native land.5 See 8 C.F.R.
4
The petitioner's wife and minor daughter appear as co-
petitioners. Since their claims are purely derivative, we do not
dwell on them. It suffices to say that our denial of the head of
the household's claim, see text infra, necessitates the denial of
their derivative claims as well.
5
The threshold of eligibility for withholding of removal is
higher than the threshold of eligibility for asylum. Mekhoukh v.
Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 118, 130 (1st Cir. 2004); Ipina v. INS, 868 F.2d
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§ 208.16(b); see also INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984).
A showing of a well-founded fear of future persecution involves
both objective and subjective elements. See Laurent v. Ashcroft,
359 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2004). To perfect that showing, an alien
must establish not only that he harbors a subjectively genuine fear
of future persecution but also that an objectively reasonable basis
for that fear exists. Id.
The Attorney General's authority to make these
determinations has been delegated to the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. §
1003.1(a)(1). We review the BIA's findings of fact, including its
credibility determinations, pursuant to the substantial evidence
standard. Mediouni v. INS, 314 F.3d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 2002). Under
that regime, a reviewing court will accept the BIA's findings as
long as they are "supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole." INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). This means, in effect,
that we will set aside the BIA's findings only if, and to the
extent that, "the record evidence would compel a reasonable
factfinder to make a contrary determination." Aguilar-Solis v.
INS, 168 F.3d 565, 569 (1st Cir. 1999). A recent amendment to the
INA has codified this deferential standard. See 8 U.S.C. §
511, 515 (1st Cir. 1989). In this instance, the IJ ruled that the
petitioner's application for asylum was time-barred, and the
petitioner has not challenged that ruling. Thus, the petitioner
must satisfy the higher eligibility standard for withholding of
removal.
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1252(b)(4)(B) (ordaining that the BIA's findings of fact shall be
upheld "unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary").
Rulings of law command our attention under a somewhat
different framework. We afford de novo review to the BIA's legal
conclusions, but cede some deference to its interpretations of the
INA. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999); Lattab
v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
In this case, the petitioner focuses on the fourth of the
five protected grounds: membership in a particular social group.
He variously defines that social group as comprising those who
"refused to perform illegal tasks because of pressure" from
workplace supervisors or "trapped" employees forced to acquiesce to
the demands of corrupt employers.6 To make matters more nebulous,
the IJ synthesized his argument as being that the particular social
group consisted of "whistleblowers," and the petitioner has not
6
We flatly reject the petitioner's belated suggestion that his
social group consists of either public employees or business
professionals. No such argument was made to the BIA, and it is too
late to make new arguments here. See Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d
75, 80 (1st Cir. 2004); Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 761 (1st
Cir. 1992). In all events, by the petitioner's own account, the
threats supposedly directed against him and his family emanated
solely from his participation in the government investigation into
alleged corruption and only peripherally involved his particular
occupation and place of business.
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disavowed that nomenclature. The petitioner urges that the BIA
erred in concluding that he failed to prove a cognizable threat of
future persecution on account of that membership, however defined.
His argument is unpersuasive.
In determining what constitutes persecution on account of
membership in a particular social group, the key is whether the
claimed persecution is aimed at an individual because of his or her
affiliation with a group of persons, all of whom share a common,
immutable characteristic. See Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36
(1st Cir. 1993); Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st
Cir. 1985); see also In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA
1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439
(BIA 1987). Because the most obvious groups meeting these criteria
— such as racial or ethnic groups — are independently covered under
the withholding of removal statute, stand-alone social group claims
are rather rare. See Gebremichael, 10 F.3d at 35 n.20. When such
claims are proffered, they usually are based on discrete classes
such as gender, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir.
1993), kinship units such as clans, e.g., In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec.
337, 337 (BIA 1996), or individual family membership, e.g.,
Gebremichael, 10 F.3d at 36.
To be sure, the common characteristic also may reflect a
shared experience, such as past membership in a military or
paramilitary force. See, e.g., Mediouni, 314 F.3d at 28. Whether
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the common characteristic is innate or experiential, "it must be
one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should
not be required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciences." Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at
233.
At first blush, none of the labels used by the petitioner
or the IJ seems to fit comfortably with the concept of a
"recognizable and discrete" social group. Gebremichael, 10 F.3d at
36. One telltale is the difficulty that the petitioner has in
delineating his particular social group; he defines it in various
ways at various times, without much in the way of precise line-
drawing. Yet, notwithstanding this imprecision, we are keenly
aware that refugees' situations vary widely. Thus, we have been
reluctant to exclude characteristics categorically from the "social
group" definition. Cf. Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 396 (1st
Cir. 2004) (cautioning that the term "particular social group," as
used in the INA, is not "free from ambiguity"). The taxonomic
problem is exacerbated here because whistleblowers generally have
been recognized as political, rather than social, refugees, see,
e.g., Reyes-Guerrero v. INS, 192 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1999);
Marquez v. INS, 105 F.3d 374, 381 (7th Cir. 1997), yet the
petitioner explicitly relinquished this ground before the IJ and
does not attempt to resurrect it here.
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Even so, characteristics relating to current or former
employment status can, at least theoretically, form the linchpin
for assembling a protected social group. See, e.g., Meguenine v.
INS, 139 F.3d 25, 27 n.2 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that a health
care worker who refuses to violate her profession's code of ethics
might have a "trait which a member of that group should not, in
good conscience, be required to change"); see also Alvarez-Flores
v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding "strained," but
accepting arguendo, a petitioner's contention that he was a member
of a social group of cheesemakers subject to persecution for having
supplied food to guerilla groups). The petitioner here
alternatively self-identifies as a "trapped" or harried
governmental employee, and at least one court has been willing to
recognize a social group of "former government employees who
refused to comply with their employer's demands." Marku v.
Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 982, 987 n.8 (6th Cir. 2004).
In the last analysis, we find it unnecessary to decide
whether former employees or whistleblowers can comprise a
cognizable social group. Assuming, for argument's sake, that the
"social group" requirement has been met, the petitioner nonetheless
has failed to show persecution based on his claimed membership in
such a group: the evidence in this case does not compel a finding,
more likely than not, that he was persecuted on account of his
status as a member of that group. That defect is, in itself, fatal
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to his claim for withholding of removal. See Aguilar-Solis, 168
F.3d at 570 (explaining that there must be a nexus between the
alleged acts of persecution and the statutorily protected ground);
see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b). We explain briefly.
The BIA found that the petitioner did not forge the
necessary connection between the claimed persecution and the
claimed social group membership. The record amply supports this
finding. The most obvious justification is the BIA's determination
that the petitioner and Mauricio had became ensnared in what was
"essentially a personal dispute." This determination represents a
fair inference from the record and, therefore, is supported by
substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). That
determination contradicts any claim that the petitioner was
persecuted on account of his membership in any particular social
group. See Romilus v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004)
("The INA is not intended to protect aliens from violence based on
personal animosity."); Aguilar-Solis, 168 F.3d at 572 (similar);
see also Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 447.
The finding of a lack of connection between the claimed
persecution and the claimed social group membership is sustainable
on another ground as well. In the prototypical case, a well-
founded fear of persecution arises when an alien faces the prospect
of severe mistreatment at the hands of his own government should he
be returned to his native land. See Ananeh-Firempong, 766 F.2d at
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622-23. Action by non-governmental actors can undergird a claim of
persecution only if there is some showing that the alleged
persecutors are in league with the government or are not
controllable by the government. See Aguilar-Solis, 168 F.3d at
573; see also de la Llana-Castellon v. United States, 16 F.3d 1093,
1097 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that installation of a new
Nicaraguan government did not necessarily quell petitioner's fears
of persecution at the hands of the Sandinistas).
By like token, an alien who asserts a fear of future
persecution by local functionaries ordinarily must show that those
functionaries have more than a localized reach. The rationale
behind this requirement is that if a potentially troublesome state
of affairs is sufficiently localized, an alien can avoid
persecution by the simple expedient of relocating within his own
country instead of fleeing to foreign soil. See Lukwago v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 181 (3d Cir. 2003); Singh v. Moschorak, 53
F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases); In re C-A-L-,
21 I. & N. Dec. 754, 757 (BIA 1997); see also 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(b)(2) (stating that an alien seeking withholding of removal
cannot show that it is more likely than not that he will suffer
future persecution if he "could avoid a future threat to his or her
life or freedom by relocating to another part of the proposed
country of removal and, under all the circumstances, it would be
reasonable to expect the applicant to do so").
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Viewed in this light, the BIA had adequate justification,
based on the record, for finding no cognizable persecution. The
petitioner did not present a shred of evidence that Mauricio posed
any danger beyond the municipal boundaries of Campos. Moreover,
the fact that the petitioner's wife and daughter lived in Brazil
without incident during the year that they spent at a relative's
house outside the city limits speaks volumes about the localized
nature of any such peril.
To cinch matters, the record contains no evidence that
the federal government lacked either the will or the wherewithal to
discipline Mauricio and those loyal to him. Indeed, the very fact
that federal investigators shut down Mauricio's corrupt boondoggle
undercuts the petitioner's wholly conclusory claim that his boss
enjoyed special protection outside the local purlieus in which he
operated. This lack of proof that the federal authorities would be
unable or unwilling to do their duty, and thus safeguard the
petitioner and his family, is telling. See Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft,
383 F.3d 228, 234 n.9 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that persecution
requires either state action or a demonstrated inability of the
state to protect victims from non-state actors); Aguilar-Solis, 168
F.3d at 573 (similar).
Let us be perfectly clear. If the state is the putative
persecutor, internal relocation will almost always be a moot point.
See Singh, 53 F.3d at 1034 ("it has never been thought that there
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are safe places within a nation when it is the nation's government
that has engaged in the acts . . . that have driven the victim to
leave the country"). Even if the putative persecutor is a local
official or other non-state actor, an alien need not show that he
will be unsafe anywhere in the country in order to avoid automatic
disqualification from withholding of removal. Where, for example,
the non-state actor's reach is countrywide, the inefficacy of
internal relocation will be apparent. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Atty.
Gen., 378 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that IJ erred
by holding that persecution could be avoided by relocating within
Colombia, given uncontradicted evidence that "guerillas exercise
influence throughout [the country]"). The touchstone is whether,
under all the circumstances of a particular case, internal
relocation is a reasonable solution.
In this instance, even if the petitioner had shown that
he would be subject to persecution based on his alleged social
group membership, the putative persecutor is an individual whose
sphere of influence apparently encompasses only one municipality in
a large country. Moreover, there is no evidence that the
government cannot or will not protect the petitioner should he
return. Here, then, relocation within the country is a feasible
course of action.7 Given that reality, the BIA was not compelled
7
The petitioner's claim that he made reasonable efforts to
relocate within Brazil is unavailing. He couches this claim in
sweeping generalities and never explains why the funds that he
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to find that the petitioner had a well-founded fear of future
persecution.
III.
Conclusion
We need go no further. While we leave the "social group"
question open, we nonetheless uphold both the BIA's determination
that the petitioner failed to establish a well-founded fear of
future persecution and its rejection of the petitioner's claim for
withholding of removal.
The petition for review is denied.
borrowed to bring himself and his family to the United States could
not have been expended to establish a new Brazilian domicile away
from Campos.
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