United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-2592
JENNIE TORRES-FUENTES; JESSICA SANTIAGO-TORRES;
ANGEL M. SANTIAGO-TORRES,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
MOTORAMBAR, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee,
KIA MOTORS, INC.; CHARLIE AUTO, INC.;
JUNIOR PEREZ AUTO SALES; FIRSTBANK OF P.R.,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Howard, Circuit Judge,
and Carter,* Senior District Judge.
Rafael A. Oliveras Lopez De Victoria on brief for appellants.
Carlos Concepción-Castro with whom Agustín Collazo Law Offices
was on brief, for appellees.
February 8, 2005
*
Of the District of Maine, sitting by designation.
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Appellants Jennie Torres-Fuentes
and her minor children brought this action under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act ("Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et. seq., against
Motorambar, Inc. and a host of other defendants claiming that the
KIA automobile that she purchased had severe mechanical defects.1
Torres-Fuentes sought restitution of the purchase price of the car
(plus financing costs) in the amount of $21,967.00, expenses of
$1,400.00, and compensation for mental and moral anguish totaling
$130,000.00.
Motorambar2 filed a motion to dismiss, which Torres-
Fuentes did not oppose, on the ground that the complaint, on its
face, failed to meet the Act's jurisdictional requirement that the
amount in controversy equal or exceed $50,000. See 15 U.S.C. §
2310(d)(3)(B). In support of this argument, Motorambar asserted
that damages for mental and moral anguish were not available under
Puerto Rico law (the Act looks to state law to determine available
damages) on the facts alleged. The district court agreed and
dismissed the case with prejudice. Torres-Fuentes never asked the
district court to vacate or set aside the judgment. Instead, she
1
Torres-Fuentes also invoked "pendent jurisdiction" under the
Civil Code of Puerto Rico in the complaint, but identified no
particular provisions of Puerto Rico law under which she was suing.
The district court construed the complaint as seeking recovery only
under the Act, and we follow its lead.
2
Torres-Fuentes failed to serve the other defendants, and the
claims against them were dismissed without prejudice.
-2-
brought this appeal to argue that mental and moral anguish damages
are available under Puerto Rico law if, as she argues here, the
seller knew of the product's defective condition at the time of
sale. Alternatively, she argues that the dismissal should have
been without prejudice.
Torres-Fuentes's first argument is forfeited. We
recently held that "a party who fails to object to a motion to
dismiss must raise any claims of error by filing the appropriate
post-judgment motion, or forfeit his or her right to raise those
claims before this court." Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Sch.,
362 F.3d 143, 146-47 (1st Cir. 2004). "To hold otherwise would
undermine the ability of the district courts to serve as an
effective and efficient forum for the resolution of disputes." Id.
at 147.3 As set forth above, Torres-Fuentes filed neither a
response to the motion to dismiss nor an appropriate motion to
obtain reconsideration after judgment entered. Accordingly, her
arguments regarding the appropriateness of the dismissal are not
preserved.4
3
While Pomerleau dealt with a motion to dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we see no reason why the rule should not apply
here as well, as Motorambar's motion was solely directed to the
allegations of the complaint.
4
Nor is this a case in which we would sua sponte recognize
plain error –- regardless of whether Torres-Fuentes' view of Puerto
Rico law is correct.
-3-
Torres-Fuentes's challenge to the form of the judgment is
a different story. Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction should
generally be without prejudice. See, e.g., Mills v. Harmon Law
Offices, 344 F.3d 42, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2003)(lack of subject matter
jurisdiction precludes district court from disposing of the case on
the merits). Indeed, in a case involving similar facts, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff should not be barred from
raising the identical claims in state court under the Act after a
dismissal for failure to satisfy the $50,000 jurisdictional hurdle.
See Ansari v. Bella Auto. Group, Inc., 145 F.3d 1270, 1272 (11th
Cir. 1998). See also 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)(A)(the $50,000
jurisdictional requirement only applies to claims brought in
federal court; litigants may still raise smaller claims in state
court). The judgment is modified to provide that the dismissal is
without prejudice and is otherwise affirmed.5
5
At argument, Torres-Fuentes asked that we ignore the
jurisdictional limitations in the Act in the name of equity, as
most people who purchase automobiles would be barred from bringing
claims under the Act by the $50,000 jurisdictional threshold. As
this issue was not raised until argument, it is forfeited. See
United States v. Sacko, 247 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 2001). In any
event, as noted above, claims for less than $50,000 may be brought
under the Act in state court.
-4-