Howe v. Scottsdale Insurance Co.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 99-30040 JOHNNY WADE HOWE, Individually and on behalf of Courtney Howe, Plaintiff-Intervenor Defendant- Appellant VERSUS SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE CO.; ET AL. Defendants LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellee Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana March 2, 2000 Before HIGGINBOTHAM and SMITH, Judge.* Circuit Judges, and FALLON, District 1 ELDON E. FALLON, District Judge: On September 22, 1998, LSUMC moved to intervene in Howe's suit because it Johnny Wade Howe, on behalf of himself claimed an interest in the proceeds. The and his daughter Courtney Howe (hereinafter district court granted the motion, and collectively referred to as "Howe"), sued the LSUMC filed a complaint of intervention on Louisiana State University Medical Center September 29, 1998 asserting its medical lien ("LSUMC") for a portion of their legal fees privilege over the deposited funds for the and costs of recovering damages from the amount of Howe's medical bills. defendants, Scottsdale Insurance Company On October 8, 1998, LSUMC filed a ("Scottsdale"), General Motors Corporation, motion for summary judgment seeking and Gordon Ira Schlafman. LSUMC, which $22,035.49, the full amount of its medical treated Howe for injuries suffered in an lien, without any pro-rata reduction for the automobile accident with Mr. Schlafman, attorney's fees and costs incurred by the argues that it is entitled to a full plaintiff. Howe opposed the motion arguing reimbursement from any damage award for that LSUMC, as partial subrogee and/or co- the services it rendered without any owner, is responsible for its share of the reduction for a proportionate share of expenses incurred in securing damages from Howe's legal fees and costs. Because the the defendants. district court correctly granted summary On December 7, 1998, the district court judgment for LSUMC, we affirm. granted LSUMC's motion for summary judgment finding that LSUMC did not owe I. any portion of attorney's fees or costs to the Johnny Wade Howe and his young plaintiff and was entitled to recover the daughter Courtney Howe were injured in an amount of its medical lien. Plaintiff automobile accident with Gordon Ira subsequently appealed. Schlafman on October 27, 1995. Following the accident, they were taken to LSUMC in II. Shreveport, Louisiana for treatment. The Louisiana provides two statutory cost of treatment totaled $22,035.49. vehicles for its charity hospitals to recover On February 26, 1996, Howe filed suit the costs of treating patients injured by third against the defendants in the First Judicial parties. District Court in Caddo Parish, Louisiana to First, the Louisiana legislature created a recover damages suffered from the accident. medical lien privilege which provides: The defendants removed the case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction to the Western A health care provider, hospital, or District of Louisiana on March 4, 1996. ambulance service that furnishes On June 12, 1998, Scottsdale, services or supplies to any injured Schlafman's insurer, deposited $100,000, the person shall have a privilege for the limit of its insurance policy, into the Court's reasonable charges or fees of such registry. health care provider, hospital, or ambulance service on the net amount payable to the injured person, his * District Judge of the Eastern heirs, or legal representatives, out of District of Louisiana, sitting by designation. the total amount of any recovery or 2 sum had, collected, or to be share of Howe's legal costs. collected, whether by judgment LSUMC insists that it did not exercise its or by settlement or compromise, subrogation rights in this case. Rather, from another person on account LSUMC asserted its medical lien privilege of such injuries . . . . The pursuant to La. R.S. § 9:4752 and therefore privilege of any attorney shall does not owe Howe for his legal costs. have precedence over the privilege created by this Section. III. The substantive law of this case is the La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:4752 (West 1999). law of Louisiana. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The issue is A charity hospital such as the LSUMC whether Louisiana law requires an may also intervene in suits brought by the apportionment of recovery costs between patient/plaintiff it treats. LSUMC and the appellants. We review this issue de novo. See Labiche v. Legal Sec. Where a patient in any state Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 350, 351 (5th Cir. supported or veterans administration 1994). To determine Louisiana law on the hospital in the state has been injured apportionment of recovery costs, this Court by the negligence of another person should first look to final decisions of the other than his employer . . . and has a Louisiana Supreme Court. Id. right of action for the recovery of If the Louisiana Supreme Court has not compensatory damages against that ruled on this issue, then this Court must person, the department . . . shall be make an "Erie guess" and "determine as best subrogated to the right of action to it can" what the Louisiana Supreme Court the extent of reasonable charges for would decide. Krieser v. Hobbs, 166 F.3d services rendered to the patient, in 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1999); id. (quoting accordance with like charges in other Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. first class hospitals, including Transportation Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 physicians' and surgeons' fees. (5th Cir. 1992)). In making an Erie guess in the absence of Id. § 46:7. The statute further explains that a ruling from the state's highest court, this "[a]ll proceedings for the recovery of any Court may look to the decisions of charges or fees due any charity hospital of intermediate appellate state courts for this state . . . may be presented in any court guidance. See Matheny v. Glen Falls Ins. of this state . . . in a direct action or by Co., 152 F.3d 348, 354 (5th Cir. 1998). intervention, or by third opposition." Id. § Intermediate appellate courts of Louisiana 46:11. are "a datum for ascertaining state law which Howe contends that this statutory is not to be disregarded by a federal court framework makes LSUMC a legal subrogee unless it is convinced by other persuasive or co-owner of the cause of action. Because data that the highest court of the state would LSUMC could have acted directly or decide otherwise." Labiche, 31 F.3d at 351 indirectly as co-owner of a cause of action (quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, under La. R.S. § 46:6, et seq., Howe argues 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967)). that LSUMC should be responsible for its 3 A. explains that this Court should extend the With these principles in mind, we turn to co-ownership principles of Moody beyond Louisiana jurisprudence. The Louisiana the worker's compensation arena because the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of Louisiana Supreme Court has already applied whether charity hospitals are required to Moody to the case of an insurer. See contribute toward its patients' costs of Barreca v. Cobb, 668 So. 2d 1129 (La. recovering damages from tortfeasors. The 1996) (holding health insurer responsible for Court most closely addressed this issue of legal costs of plaintiff's recovery). Appellant cost-sharing in Moody v. Arabie when it further contends that the principles of equity considered the apportionment of legal costs and unjust enrichment require LSUMC to in a workers' compensation suit. See 498 share in the costs of obtaining a recovery So. 2d 1081 (La. 1986). because La. R.S. § 9:4752 provides LSUMC In Moody, an injured worker who had with a right to claim a portion of Howe's received worker's compensation benefits recovery. brought suit against a third party tortfeasor. Appellee responds that Moody and its See id. at 1083. The worker's compensation progeny are not applicable to LSUMC carrier for the employer intervened to because it is not a co-owner of a cause of recover the amount of compensation paid to action against a tortfeasor. Therefore, the the worker. See id. The Court granted the co-ownership responsibilities of Moody recoupment by the worker's compensation should not be applied to it. carrier, but held that the carrier was Howe's reliance on Barreca is misplaced. obligated to pay a portion of the injured In Barreca, the Louisiana Supreme Court worker's recovery costs. See id. applied the rationale of Moody to a health The Court concluded that the employer insurer because the insurer had a provision in and worker held co-ownership over a its policy granting it "the right to assert the property right to recover damages from a actions and rights of the plaintiff against the third party. See id. at 1085. According to a tortfeasor." Id. at 1131. Because the Court theory of co-ownership, "each co-owner is found that the insurer was contractually responsible for his proportionate part of subrogated to the plaintiff and therefore a reasonable and necessary expenses and legal co-owner of the cause of action, it held the services that accrue to his benefit." Id. The insurer responsible for a proportionate share costs of recovering from the third party of the recovery costs. See id. at 1132. In tortfeasor, therefore, "are to apportioned the present case, however, no explicit between the worker and the employer agreement or statute makes LSUMC the according to their interests in the recovery." subrogee and/or co-owner of Howe's cause Id. at 1086. of action. Appellant argues that the cost-sharing Because the Louisiana Supreme Court rationale of Moody should apply to the has not spoken directly on whether Moody present case because La. R.S. 46-6, et seq. should be extended to require charity makes LSUMC the co-owner of appellant's hospitals seeking compensation for medical cause of action against a tortfeasor. As a co- services to pay a share of a plaintiff's owner of a cause of action, LSUMC should attorney fees and costs, we must make our be responsible under Moody for a portion of best Erie guess as to how the Louisiana the appellant's costs of recovery. Howe Supreme Court would decide this issue. The 4 role of this court is not "to create or modify charity hospital which has no independent state law, rather only to predict it." St. Paul right to seeks medical expenses from a Fire & Marine v. Convalescent Services, tortfeasor), writ denied, Charity Hosp. of 193 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 1999). Because Louisiana v. Band, 600 So. 2d 645 (La. there is no Louisiana Supreme Court 1992). precedent on point, we seek guidance by We cannot disregard a plethora of looking to the precedents established by precedent provided by the intermediate intermediate state appellate courts. See appellate courts of Louisiana when the Labiche, 31 F.3d at 351. appellant offers nothing to suggest why the Louisiana Supreme Court would decide this B. case differently. Accordingly, we make an Four of the five intermediate appellate Erie guess that the charity hospitals of courts in Louisiana have refused to extend Louisiana would not be required to Moody to charity hospitals and have held contribute to the costs of recovering from a that charity hospitals are not responsible for tortfeasor by the Louisiana Supreme Court. the costs of recovering damages from third Therefore, we find that the district court party tortfeasors. See Mena v. Muhleisen correctly granted summary judgment for Properties, 652 So. 2d 65, 69 (La. Ct. App. LSUMC and affirm the judgement. 5 Cir. 1995) (holding that a charity hospital seeking to enforce its medical lien privilege AFFIRMED. pursuant to La. R.S. § 9:4752 is not required to contribute to the costs of an injured person's recovery), writ denied, Mena v. Muhleisen Properties, 653 So. 2d 592 (La. 1995); Nicholes v. St. Helena Parish Police Jury, 604 So. 2d 1023, 1034, (La. Ct. App. 1 Cir. 1992) (refusing to apply Moody because specific statutes and not the general law of co-ownership govern the relations of a plaintiff and a charity hospital), writ denied, Nicholes v. St. Helena Parish Police Jury, 605 So. 2d 1378 (La. 1992); Moore v. State for Louisiana State Univ. Medical Ctr., 596 So. 2d 293, 296 (La. Ct. App. 3 Cir. 1992) (holding that LSUMC does not co-own a cause of action against a tortfeasor when it exercises its privilege under La. R.S. § 9:4752 and therefore is not obligated to pay a portion of recovery costs), writ denied, Moore v. State for Louisiana State Univ. Medical Ctr., 600 So. 2d 667 (La. 1992); Charity Hosp. of Louisiana v. Band 593 So. 2d 1392, 1394 (La. Ct. App. 4 Cir. 1992) (distinguishing Moody from the case of a 5