United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 04-1933
04-2047
OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEVATOR CONSTRUCTORS, LOCAL 4;
MICHAEL LANGER, Individually and as Business Manager;
KEVIN MCGETTIGAN, Individually and as Business Representative;
and STEVE MORSE, Individually and as Business Representative,
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Timothy E. Copeland, Jr., with whom Downs Rachllin Martin
PLLC, Peter B. Robb, Shari S. Sobel, Morgan, Brown & Joy, LLP and
Nathan L. Kaitz were on brief, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Paul F. Kelly, with whom Stephanie R. Pratt and Segal, Roitman
& Coleman were on brief, for appellees/cross-appellants.
May 11, 2005
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. This case is before us on
interlocutory cross-appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1),1 as
a result of the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction
under the aegis of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (finding jurisdiction to enjoin a labor
organization from engaging in a work stoppage over a dispute
subject to arbitration under the governing collective bargaining
agreement).
I. Background
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Otis Elevator Company
("Otis") constructs and services elevators throughout the United
States, including in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine. Otis
employs elevator mechanics, helpers and apprentices, all of whom
are represented for collective bargaining purposes by the
International Union of Elevator Constructors ("IUEC") on behalf of
its locals, including Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant IUEC Local
4 ("Local 4").2
1
"[C]ourts of appeal shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
. . . [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the United
States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions."
2
Also appearing as Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants are
Michael Langer, Kevin McGettigan, and Steve Morse in their
individual and official capacities as officials of Local 4. The
term "Local 4" used herein includes the individually named
defendants in addition to the local union.
-2-
A. The Collective Bargaining Agreement
On July 9, 2002, Otis and IUEC, on behalf of Local 4 and
other local unions, entered into a five-year collective bargaining
agreement ("the Agreement") that covers all of Otis' elevator
employees in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine. The Agreement
contains three provisions central to the present appeals.
The first is Article XIV ("Strikes and Lockouts"), which
prohibits strikes or lockouts during the life of the Agreement,
provided the parties comply with the terms therein. The second is
Article IV, paragraph 11, which deals with the processing of
grievances related to Article IV ("Work Jurisdiction") and Article
IV(A) ("Systems, Modular, and Industrial Structures"), which
specify the work that the parties have agreed will be performed by
IUEC members under the Agreement. Article IV, paragraph 11(a)
requires that such disputes "be settled in accordance with the
grievance procedures in Article XV." Paragraph 11(b) stipulates
that while work disputes are "being processed [Otis], where
possible, shall assign the employees work other than the work in
dispute." However, "[w]here the work has progressed to a point
where it is not possible to perform work other than the work in
dispute, then the employees shall perform the disputed work pending
final resolution as provided herein." Art. IV, para. 11(b).
Finally, in Article XV ("Arbitration"), the parties
unambiguously agreed that "[a]ny difference or dispute regarding
-3-
the application and construction of the Agreement" constitutes a
"grievance" which "shall be resolved under the [procedures
established therein]." Art. XV, para. 1. Article XV's grievance
procedures constitute an elaborate, integrated and well-detailed
process intended by the parties to provide a modicum of industrial
justice in the workplace, while at the same time allowing for
stability in the collective bargaining relationship.
"Any employee, local union, or [Otis]" has the right to
initiate a grievance, first by presenting an oral complaint before
a designated representative of Otis (or the IUEC, when Otis is the
grievant) within ten working days of the grievance being known.
Id. para. 2. If, after this initial interchange, the grievance
remains unresolved, the aggrieved party has ten working days to
formalize the complaint in a written form provided for such
purposes, thus moving the grievance procedure to the next step.
Id. para. 3.
At this point the matter is taken up by higher-level Otis
and IUEC representatives, who must meet to again attempt to reach
a mutually satisfactory solution of the grievance. Id. At this
meeting, the responding party is obligated to answer the written
complaint. Id. Within ten working days thereafter, Otis or the
IUEC, as the case may be, may indicate its dissatisfaction with the
opposing party's answer by notifying that party of its intention to
-4-
appeal from the decision. Id. Any grievance disposition not
appealed to the next step is final and binding on all parties. Id.
If appealed, the grievance then moves to the next step in
the process, in which the matter is placed on the agenda of a
scheduled meeting of the National Arbitration Committee ("NAC").3
Id. para. 4. At the NAC meeting, the responding party may make a
written proposal for the disposition of the grievance. Id. If
accepted by the opposing party, the solution becomes a final and
binding disposition of the grievance on all parties. Id. If not
accepted, the aggrieved side may notify the other in writing of its
desire to seek arbitration of the grievance. Id.
The parties are then required to attempt to agree upon an
impartial arbitrator. Id. para. 6. If unable to do so, they must
jointly request arbitration before a member of the National Academy
of Arbitrators, pursuant to the Labor Arbitration Rules and
Procedures of the American Arbitration Association. Id. The
decision of the arbitrator is final and binding on all parties.
Id.
Although this is the mandatory procedure for the
resolution of most grievances, Article XV, paragraph 9 also
establishes an expedited arbitration procedure in the case of
3
The NAC meets once every calendar quarter. On the employer's
side, the NAC is composed of Otis Director of Labor Relations (or
his designee) and two other Otis representatives, while the IUEC is
represented by its General President (or his designee) and two
other union representatives. Art. XV, para. 4.
-5-
grievances involving the discharge of an employee. Within this
limited subset, the parties have agreed to a fast-track procedure
for discharge grievances not satisfactorily resolved after the
matter is grieved in the formal written step. Id. para. 9. At
this point, the controversy is directly referred for a discussion
between Otis' Director of Labor Relations and the IUEC's General
President, and if the matter is not resolved, either party may ask
for "immediate, expedited impartial arbitration." Id.
B. The Concerted Activities
The present appeals arise from a work stoppage directed
by Local 4 against Otis that resulted from a dispute over the use
of cranes to hoist and put in place elevator plunger/cylinder
units. Local 4 claims that this practice is prohibited by the
collective bargaining contract, which, it alleges, only allows use
of a crane to hoist "heavy material" -- a term that includes
plunger/cylinder units -- outside of building structures. It is
Local 4's position that, inside buildings, these units must be
hoisted manually. Otis responds that the use of cranes to move the
plunger/cylinder units in the manner to which Local 4 is now
objecting has been Otis' long-standing practice, a practice which
it alleges was acquiesced in by Local 4 until recently. In fact,
it claims, during the prior year alone, plunger/cylinder units for
50 to 60 elevators were installed with cranes. Neither side filed
-6-
a grievance,4 although Otis claims it offered to submit the dispute
to expedited arbitration, a proposal that apparently was not acted
upon by the IUEC. In fact, Local 4 officials have allegedly
indicated that they will not file a grievance.
As is the case with many labor disputes, there is
considerably more background to this controversy than meets the
eye. Throughout the spring of 2004, there arose a series of work
controversies between Otis and Local 4 in various sites throughout
Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine, all of which "involved
Otis' use of labor saving devices." Brief of Appellee/Cross-
Appellant at 9. In April 2004, Otis unsuccessfully sought
injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maine against Local 4 over alleged work stoppage activities related
to disputes about safety precautions for union members working in
elevator hoist ways. Otis Elevator Co. v. Local 4, Int'l Union of
Elevator Constructors, No. 04-00074 (D. Me. Apr. 14, 2004)
(transcript of conference in chambers) (finding no cause for
granting equitable relief because the employees in question had
already returned to work). Two days later, Otis again sought
injunctive relief, this time for alleged work stoppage activities
4
Local 4 had, however, previously filed grievances concerning
disputes over the use of cranes for plunger/cylinder installation.
On both prior occasions, Otis rejected the grievances, and Local 4
did not appeal to the next step of the Article XV procedure, thus
rendering Otis' objection binding. See Letters of May 5 and May 7,
2004 from Dorothy L. Mynahan, Otis Branch Manager, to Michael
Langer, IUEC.
-7-
related to the installation of prefabricated electronic components
and pre-drilled, pre-tapped doors. Otis Elevator Co. v. Local 4,
Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, No. 04-00074 (D. Me. Apr. 16,
2004) (transcript of conference in chambers). The court again
denied a temporary restraining order, as it appeared that other
work could be continued while the dispute was addressed through the
Agreement's grievance procedure. Id. at 23-25.
Thereafter, commencing on May 13, 2004, Otis elevator
employees at the Bentley College work site in Waltham,
Massachusetts reported being instructed by Local 4 officials to
refuse to work, purportedly over the installation of certain pre-
tapped elevator doors. The stoppage spread to other work sites in
the Boston area, with an additional eighteen elevator employees
eventually joining the refusal to work. On May 14, 2004, Otis
sought injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, as a result of which the court issued an
order on May 19, 2004 requiring arbitration of the dispute and
enjoining the work stoppage "pending resolution of all issues
deemed by the arbitrator to be related to the dispute over the
installation of the elevator car doors." Otis Elevator Co. v.
Local 4, Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, No. 04-10966 (D.
Mass. May 19, 2004) (Order to Arbitrate and Restraining Order).
On May 26, 2004, as a result of instructions given by
Local 4 officials to its members, Otis was unable to proceed with
-8-
the scheduled installation of plunger/cylinder units at four
Boston-area job sites. Otis' operations were seriously disrupted,
as were those of other contractors at the building sites. For
example, at one job site, the contractor was forced to leave a hole
open at the top of a completed building frame to permit
installation of the plunger/cylinder unit at a later date.
Finishing work in the building could not proceed until the top of
the building was enclosed. According to Otis representatives, the
work at the job sites in question had progressed to such a point
that, until the plunger/cylinder units were installed, no other
work was available to be assigned to the elevator mechanics. Thus,
Otis claimed, two union members were sent home without pay for lack
of work. Local 4 saw the matter differently.
By May 27, 2004, 90 of the 110 Local 4 members Otis
employed in the Boston area, including all employees assigned to
service elevators, were reporting "sick" or absent "for personal
reasons." Otis was thus unable to respond to service calls
involving elevator malfunctions, including two such calls from a
hospital.
C. The Boys Markets Injunction
Otis proceeded to file for injunctive relief in the
District of Massachusetts under Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). After a brief hearing on
May 27, 2004, attended by attorneys for both parties and recessed
-9-
temporarily to allow the parties to submit proposed orders, the
district judge signed Local 4's draft order, finding in relevant
part: (1) that the parties had a collective bargaining agreement,
which contained a no-strike clause and a grievance and arbitration
provision applicable to the existing plunger/cylinder dispute; (2)
that the parties were claiming mutual breaches of the collective
bargaining agreement; and (3) that ordinary principles of equity
warranted the granting of relief. Otis Elevator Co. v. Local 4,
Int'l Union of Elevator Constructors, No. 04-11108 (D. Mass.
Jun. 3, 2004) (Temporary Restraining Order); see also Boys Markets,
Inc., 398 U.S. at 254 (adopting conditions for injunctive relief).
The order, issued through June 7, 2004: (1) enjoined Local 4, and
all in concert therewith, from striking or otherwise interfering
with Otis' normal operations; (2) required the parties to arbitrate
the plunger/cylinder dispute "pursuant to the Expedited Labor
Arbitration Procedures of the American Arbitration Association";
and (3) restrained Otis from "imposing discipline on Local 4
members over contract disputes between Otis and Local 4, and from
applying to the Court for further equitable relief unless it has
first offered to Local 4 the opportunity to arbitrate the
underlying dispute pursuant to the Expedited Labor Arbitration
Procedures of the American Arbitration Association."
The court failed, however, to address Otis' objections to
those parts of the order imposing expedited extra-contractual
-10-
arbitration of the plunger/cylinder dispute, and prohibiting
disciplinary action against employees or the seeking of additional
equitable relief, absent prior extra-contractual arbitration of
said actions. Otis' protestations were again of no avail when the
district court, on June 17, 2004, converted the temporary
restraining order into a preliminary injunction containing
substantially the same conditions.
These two issues constitute the principal questions
raised by Otis' appeal.5 The issues raised by Local 4's cross-
appeal are better viewed as arguments in support of the district
court's order than as objections to the same. Thus, our
consideration of Local 4's cross-appeal is subsumed within, and
will be addressed as part of, Otis' appeal.
II. Standard of Review
A district court may grant a Boys Markets injunction
provided the petitioner establishes that: (1) a collective
bargaining agreement between the parties provides for mandatory
5
Because we ultimately reverse those portions of the injunction
directed against Otis, we need not consider its additional claim
that the district court committed error in not granting an
evidentiary hearing before issuing the preliminary injunction. See
29 U.S.C. § 107 (requiring hearing prior to issuance of an
injunction in labor disputes). As to the portion of the
preliminary injunction that we affirm -- the prohibition on further
work stoppages by Local 4 -- no evidentiary hearing was necessary
because the facts supporting that relief are not in dispute. See
Kansas City S. Transp. Co., Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 41,
126 F.3d 1059, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that if 29 U.S.C.
§ 107 applies to Boys Markets injunctions, it does not require an
evidentiary hearing when injunction is based on undisputed facts).
-11-
binding arbitration; (2) the dispute giving rise to the concerted
action which is sought to be enjoined is subject to binding
arbitration under that agreement; and (3) ordinary principles of
equity warrant injunctive relief. Nat'l Elevator Indus. v. Int'l
Union of Elevator Constructors, 776 F.2d 374, 376-77 (1st Cir.
1985).
The issuance of a Boys Markets injunction is reviewed, as
in the case of other injunctions, for abuse of discretion.
See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 387-88
(1974); see also SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002).
Questions of law are reviewed de novo, and those of fact are
subjected to a clear error standard. Fife, 311 F.3d at 7. There
is an abuse of discretion by the trial court if an error of law is
committed, or if it "considers improper criteria, ignores criteria
that deserve significant weight, or [if it] gauges only the
appropriate criteria but makes a clear error of judgment in
assaying them." Rosario-Urdaz v. Rivera-Hernández, 350 F.3d 219,
221 (1st Cir. 2003).
With this framework of review to guide us, we turn to the
actions of the district court in these appeals.
-12-
III. Analysis
A. The Quid Pro Quo
Today, it is a fundamental principle of industrial
relations in the United States that labor disputes are settled
through voluntary arbitration rather than labor/management strife.
Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458
(1957) (identifying "congressional policy toward settlement of
labor disputes by arbitration"). As background to this principle,
we note that the use of injunctions in labor disputes has evolved
through various stages, commencing with an early period during
which the organization of labor for collective bargaining purposes
was considered a criminal enterprise, and the indiscriminate use of
the labor injunction to stop these activities was the order of the
day. Cf. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586 (1895) (upholding President
Cleveland's power to obtain an injunction against the Pullman
Strike despite the absence of any statutory authority, on the
grounds that "the wrongs complained of [were] such as affect[ed]
the public at large"). In response to a period of considerable
labor instability and unrest, Congress enacted the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101-115, which
continues in effect to this day. Nevertheless, changing times and
the growing strength of the unions eventually led to a relaxation
of these stringent standards via Section 301(a) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (providing federal
-13-
courts jurisdiction to hear disputes arising from violation of
collective bargaining agreements), as interpreted in Boys Markets,
398 U.S. at 250-54, to permit labor injunctions in limited
circumstances.
This path has not been without bumps and bruises. All
sides to labor strife have had to give some quid in exchange for
some quo. To achieve a measure of labor peace and uninterrupted
business operations, employers have had to surrender some of their
traditional management prerogatives, subjecting many of these so-
called rights to scrutiny and judgment before private, quasi-
judicial fora in the form of arbitral tribunals. See Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. at 455 ("Plainly the agreement to arbitrate
grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to
strike."). The use of this voluntary system of dispute resolution
is so prevalent today, not only in a labor relations setting, but
in commerce and industry generally, as to hardly require further
comment.
One cardinal principle, however, needs to be kept in mind
when considering the issues before us. Notwithstanding our
comprehensive system of labor relations legislation in the United
States -- which, among other things, establishes the right of
employees to organize and negotiate with employers for collective
bargaining purposes, 29 U.S.C. § 157 -- with few exceptions, the
contents of collective bargaining agreements are left to the
-14-
discretion and negotiating strength of the parties, see id. § 158
(d). That is, it is ultimately up to the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement to determine what working conditions and
similar matters they wish to agree upon, and make part of, their
contractual relationship. This includes which method, if any, they
will use to resolve disputes that arise during the course of their
collective bargaining agreement. While there is no legal
requirement that employers and unions include a grievance and
arbitration procedure in their collective bargaining agreement, it
seems that, in practice, almost all such agreements today do
include a grievance and arbitration procedure. However, this is
just one of several items subject to mandatory negotiation, but
which theoretically can be rejected by the parties from becoming
part of the collective bargaining contract if they fail, in good
faith, to agree on said provision. The point is that it is up to
the negotiating parties whether or not to agree to have a formal
method for settling their labor/management differences, and it is
up to them, and only them, to determine what shall be the
procedure. See id. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d).
Once there is agreement, however, the chosen procedure is
binding on the parties and subject to judicial enforcement. Id. at
§ 185. Compliance with agreed-upon grievance procedures is highly
desirable from a public policy standpoint, to such a degree that if
a collective bargaining contract has a binding grievance and
-15-
arbitration clause, Boys Markets relief is available even without
the existence of a specific no-strike clause in the contract.
Gateway Coal Co., 414 U.S. at 381; see also Boys Markets, 398 U.S.
at 248 ("[A] no-strike obligation, express or implied, is the quid
pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance
disputes to . . . arbitration.") (emphasis added). Once a court
determines that a dispute between the parties is covered by a
binding grievance and arbitration agreement between them, the court
should enforce the arbitration provisions of that agreement.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455 (stating that the Labor Relations
Management Act "expresses a federal policy that federal courts
should enforce [collective bargaining] agreements on behalf of or
against labor organizations and that industrial peace can best be
obtained only in that way"); Int'l Detective Serv., Inc. v. Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 251, 614 F.2d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 1980) ("The
Supreme Court has consistently emphasized and promoted federal
policy which encourages peaceful settlement of labor disputes
through compelling arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements.").
B. The Injunction
In the instant case, the district court reached the
essentially uncontested conclusion that a work stoppage was being
promoted by Local 4 against Otis over the use of cranes to place
plunger/cylinder units, a dispute subject to the grievance and
-16-
arbitration procedures detailed in Article XV of the Agreement.
Both parties had agreed to use those procedures for resolving their
disputes. Otis indicated its willingness to submit the dispute to
the agreed process, but, for whatever reason, Local 4 chose not to
avail itself of that process and instead promoted a concerted work
stoppage in violation of the no-strike clause in Article XIV of the
Agreement. The district court correctly enjoined the work
stoppage, and rightly ordered the parties to submit the
plunger/cylinder dispute to arbitration. It should have stopped
there.
Unfortunately, the district court went further, and in
doing so exceeded its discretion by requiring that the parties
submit to an arbitration regime different than what was
contractually bargained for. For example, Otis points out that the
Expedited Labor Arbitration Procedures of the American Arbitration
Association, unlike the arbitration procedures provided for in
Article XV of the Agreement, do not permit the parties to choose
the arbitrator and explicitly prohibit the filing of post-hearing
briefs and the preparation of a stenographic record of the
proceedings. The district court's abrogation of the regime
contractually bargained for was inappropriate. Only the procedures
of the Agreement, voluntarily agreed upon in good faith by the
-17-
parties, could be enforced by the court.6 It was beyond the
district court's power to go further under the circumstances, and,
in doing so, it contravened the policies promoted by Boys Markets,
398 U.S. at 248, and Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455. The equitable
powers of a court are not a warrant for reforming the conditions of
a collective bargaining agreement.
The district court's intrusion into the disciplinary
authority of Otis, restraining it from taking action against
employees engaged in strike activity in violation of the no-strike
clause, is also an abuse of discretion. An employee who engages in
such conduct engages in unprotected activity and as such may be
subject to discipline. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d
595, 604-05 (1st Cir. 1979) (upholding employer's right to
discipline employee engaged in activities not protected by the
National Labor Relations Act, including "activities . . . in breach
of contract"); see also NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344
(1939). The employee may, of course, challenge such an accusation
6
We note that the Supreme Court approved an order, which did not
preempt any previously agreed-upon procedure, that was issued to
eliminate a potentially unsafe working condition pending
arbitration. Gateway Coal Co., 414 U.S. 368 (approving court
ordered suspension, pending arbitration, of foreman whom union
believed to pose a safety risk). No such order is at issue in the
instant case. Moreover, we express no view at this time on what
limited measures to order expedition of existing grievance
procedures, if any, lie within a court's equitable authority, nor
on what circumstances justify their use. See Hanna Min. Co. v.
United Steelworkers, 464 F.2d 565, 569 (8th Cir. 1972). The
procedure ordered here diverged from that agreed upon by the
parties in more than just the time requirements.
-18-
by use of the contract's grievance and arbitration procedure, but
the district court exceeded its authority in preempting the normal
and agreed upon process for dealing with such matters.
The district court's last imposition upon Otis, barring
it from requesting further equitable relief from the court unless
Otis first extends an offer to Local 4 to arbitrate the dispute
pursuant to a procedure other than the one outlined in the
Agreement, is on particularly shaky ground. A federal court's
ability to restrict a litigant's access to the courts by issuing an
injunction prohibiting any further filing, although not unheard of,
can only be justified "in extreme circumstances involving
groundless encroachment upon the limited time and resources of the
court and other parties." Castro v. United States, 775 F.2d 399,
408 (1st Cir. 1985). The district court's cryptic orders give no
explanation in support of this unusual directive, nor can we find
any on the record unless we consider Otis' two prior requests for
relief, previously described, as the sub silentio basis for its
action. But "litigiousness alone will not support an injunction
against a plaintiff." Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st
Cir. 1980). Otis' filings pale in comparison with those rare
instances in which limitation of access to the courts has been
justified. See, e.g., Castro, 775 F.2d at 409 (upholding
injunction against further filings against employer for nonrenewal
because multiple actions filed were intended only to harass,
-19-
contained virtually identical allegations, and were personally
insulting to defendant and its counsel).
Considering the above, we affirm that part of the
preliminary injunction which orders Local 4 to cease and desist
from engaging in or promoting concerted activities against Otis, or
in any way interfering with its normal operations. All other parts
of the preliminary injunction issued on June 17, 2004 are reversed,
and the matter is remanded for the district court to modify the
preliminary injunction to indicate that any grievance by Local 4
concerning the use of a crane to hoist and place a plunger/cylinder
unit must be processed as indicated in Article XV of the Agreement.
It is so ordered. Costs are taxed against Local 4.
-20-