United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-1729
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
AUSTIN R. WILKERSON,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
John R. Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Miriam Conrad for appellant.
Jonathan L. Marcus, United States Department of Justice, with
whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, District of
Massachusetts, and John T. McNeil, Assistant United States
Attorney, District of Massachusetts, were on brief, for appellee.
June 9, 2005
*
Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. Austin R.
Wilkerson appeals his conviction for possessing a firearm as a
convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), possessing more than
five grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute under 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and carrying a firearm in connection with a
drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Wilkerson
asserts that the district court erred by admitting prior consistent
statements of a government witness in violation of Fed. R. Evid.
106 and the common law, permitting a government witness to
interpret one of his post-arrest statements in violation of Fed. R.
Evid. 701, and allowing the prosecutor to improperly vouch for his
witnesses in summation and engage in other forms of prosecutorial
misconduct. Wilkerson also challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to establish a nexus between the firearm and interstate
commerce, and he argues that his sentence should be remanded
pursuant to United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We
hold that the district court erred in the admission of prior
consistent statements, but this error was harmless. We remand to
the district court for resentencing, and we affirm the district
court on all other issues.
Boston police officers Tom Joyce and Ed Fleming stopped
Wilkerson after he made an illegal U-turn. During the stop, the
officers learned he was driving with a suspended license. Officer
Joyce asked Wilkerson to step out of the vehicle, but Wilkerson
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refused. Joyce and Wilkerson struggled for the door while Officer
Fleming called for back-up. Wilkerson then drove off and a chase
ensued.
The car chase ended when Wilkerson abandoned his vehicle
and took off on foot. From about thirty to forty feet away, the
officers saw Wilkerson holding his right side around his waist
area. Joyce informed his partner, "Eddie, be careful, I think he
has a gun." Joyce then broadcast over the radio, "He's reaching
for his budge," meaning that Wilkerson was reaching for the
waistband area where he thought Wilkerson had a gun. The officers
reported that Wilkerson continued to hold his right waist area
while they followed him, but they did not actually see a gun.
The officers pursued Wilkerson onto Hartwell Street.
Officer Joyce testified at trial that he was about sixty feet away
when he saw Wilkerson turn into an alley between houses at 11 and
5 Hartwell on the north side of the street. Officer Fleming
testified that he had just turned onto Hartwell when he saw the
same thing. As Wilkerson turned into the alley, Joyce slowed down
and peered down the driveway on the south side of 11 Hartwell,
between 11 and 15/17 Hartwell, to see if Wilkerson would come back
the opposite way. He did not. When Joyce reached the alley, he
saw Wilkerson climbing over a six- or seven-foot-high fence, no
longer clutching his waist area. Joyce did not see anything in
Wilkerson's hands or belt as he lowered himself over the fence.
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Joyce did not attempt to scale the fence, but instead turned around
and ran up the driveway. There Joyce saw Wilkerson running west
through the backyards toward Cheney Street. Officers from another
police unit arrested Wilkerson when they caught him running at a
slow jog on Maple Street near Cheney.
After Wilkerson's arrest, officers were ordered to
retrace the route of the foot chase looking for anything he might
have discarded. Another officer accompanied by Joyce found a gun
and 12.55 grams of crack cocaine in the alley between 11 and 5
Hartwell. The items were described as clean and dry and lying on
top of damp, dirty refuse. The gun was cocked, loaded, and ready
to be fired. The key factual dispute at trial was whether
Wilkerson ran up the alley where the gun and drugs were found,
between 5 and 11 Hartwell, or whether he ran up the driveway
between 11 and 15/17 Hartwell, which he would have had to pass
before reaching the alley.
I.
Both of the evidentiary issues Wilkerson raises on appeal
involve testimony about his flight path on Hartwell Street. We
first address Federal Rule of Evidence 106 and the common law to
determine when prior consistent statements may be used to
rehabilitate a witness's credibility.
Officer Fleming testified that he saw Wilkerson turn into
the alley between 5 and 11 Hartwell. Defense counsel attempted to
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impeach Fleming's credibility on this subject by eliciting
testimony that (1) he did not describe the alley in the radio
broadcasts he made while chasing Wilkerson, (2) he referred to the
alley as a driveway in his police report, and (3) in state grand
jury testimony he stated that Wilkerson ran between the second and
third houses on Hartwell, which would be between 15/17 and 11 if
counting from the direction in which they ran. Fleming was
impeached on other subjects with his federal grand jury testimony,
but none concerned Wilkerson's flight path.
To rehabilitate his credibility, the government asked
Officer Fleming on redirect examination, "[A]t any time prior to
writing the report or in testifying in this case, did you ever
indicate that [Wilkerson] ran up anyplace other than that area
between 5 and 11 Hartwell?" He answered no. He was then asked,
"[A]t any prior time, writing a report or in your prior testimony,
did you indicate that the defendant ran up any location other than
this location between 5 and 11 Hartwell?" Again he answered no.
Finally he was asked, referring to his federal grand jury
testimony, "[D]o you recall what you said in that testimony?"
Fleming answered:
A. I testified to the fact that I saw the defendant
run on to Hartwell Street and run up an alleyway
between two homes on Hartwell Street.
Q. And were you shown two photographs in the grand
jury?
A. I was.
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Q. And what did you identify those photographs as
being?
A. As the alleyway the defendant ran.
Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning.
She argued that the testimony was hearsay and should not be allowed
as non-hearsay prior consistent statements under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) because it was not offered to rebut a charge
of recent fabrication. The district court agreed and ruled that
Fleming's testimony could not be admitted under Rule 801. Instead,
the court allowed the testimony under Rule 1061, the rule of
completeness. Defense counsel maintained her objection. The
district court, sua sponte, gave a limiting instruction directing
the jury to consider the testimony only for the officer's
credibility and not for the truth of the statements.
We review the district court's ruling for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Millan, 230 F.3d 431, 434 (1st
Cir. 2000). We conclude that the district court erred in admitting
the testimony, but the error is harmless.
In United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 25-29 (1st
Cir. 2001), this court addressed the same issues presented here.
On cross-examination, a witness's prior inconsistent statements
1
"When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or
recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it." Fed. R. Evid. 106.
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were used to impeach his credibility. On redirect the government
asked the witness about statements he made to the grand jury which
were consistent with his trial testimony. Some of the questions
went beyond the specific points covered on cross-examination, but
all were within its general scope. Many of the statements were
used only to rehabilitate the witness, rather than as substantive
evidence. See id. at 26.
In Simonelli we stated that when prior consistent
statements are admitted to rehabilitate a witness, admissibility is
"determined by the interplay between the rule of completeness and
the common law doctrine about prior consistent statements." Id. at
27. We noted that both the rule of completeness and the common law
doctrine allow prior consistent statements when they tend to show
that a statement used to impeach a witness is not really
inconsistent when understood in its proper context. See id. at 27-
28.
The government argues that Officer Fleming's testimony
was properly admitted because it was offered to rebut the
impression created by defense counsel's cross-examination that
Officer Fleming had given conflicting or uncertain accounts of
Wilkerson's flight path. However, Simonelli makes clear that prior
consistent statements must at least have "some rebutting force
beyond the mere fact that the witness has repeated on a prior
occasion a statement consistent with his trial testimony." See id.
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at 27 (quoting United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir.
1986)). The redirect testimony at issue does not meet the required
standard. Defense counsel cross-examined Officer Fleming about
inconsistencies in the way he described Wilkerson's flight path and
his failure to broadcast information about the alley over the
police radio. Confirming on redirect that the officer had never
described a different flight path did not clarify or otherwise
provide context for the statements used to impeach Fleming.
Rather, the testimony only bolstered Officer Fleming's credibility
generally by restating what had already been said. That kind of
rehabilitation is impermissible. See Simonelli, 237 F.3d at 28
("There is no rule admitting all prior consistent statements simply
to bolster the credibility of a witness who has been impeached by
particulars.").
The government argues that any error in admitting the
testimony is harmless. "A non-constitutional evidentiary error is
harmless . . . so long as it is highly probable that the error did
not influence the verdict." United States v. Piper, 298 F.3d 47,
56 (1st Cir. 2002). Several factors lead us to conclude that the
error is harmless.
The government's case against Wilkerson was strong even
without Officer Fleming's redirect testimony. Wilkerson drove away
from the officers, prompting a car chase; Wilkerson abandoned his
vehicle and ran from the officers on foot; both officers saw
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Wilkerson holding his waist area and believed he had a gun; Officer
Joyce warned other officers over the police radio that Wilkerson
was reaching for his "budge," a term that conveyed Joyce's belief
that Wilkerson had a gun; Joyce, who followed closer behind
Wilkerson during the chase and was the government's key witness,
also testified that he saw Wilkerson run up the alley where the gun
and drugs were found; the gun and drugs were clean and dry in an
otherwise damp and dirty alley, indicating that they had not been
there very long; and shortly after running from the alley where the
gun and drugs were found, Wilkerson gave up the chase. The
exculpatory evidence Wilkerson presented at trial was minimal and
unpersuasive.
Moreover, Officer Fleming's redirect testimony was not
unique and was used only to rehabilitate his credibility. "By
definition, prior consistent statements do not consist of new
substantive information. Their impact comes from corroborating
other, perhaps less compelling, evidence." United States v. Awon,
135 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1998). At most the testimony
strengthened Officer Fleming's previous testimony by corroborating
his story. While this may warrant a new trial in some cases, it is
highly probable that the corroborating testimony did not influence
the verdict in this case. We conclude that the district court's
error is harmless.
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II.
The second evidentiary issue Wilkerson raises is whether
the district court violated Federal Rule of Evidence 701 by
allowing a government witness to interpret one of Wilkerson's post-
arrest statements. The decision to admit lay opinion testimony
pursuant to Rule 701 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Tom, 330 F.3d 83, 94 (1st Cir. 2003). We conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
testimony.
Wilkerson described his route during the foot chase in an
interview after his arrest with Boston Police Detective Jeremiah
Benton. Detective Benton testified that Wilkerson told him that
"he grabbed the tall fence to get up on the small fence." Over
defendant's objection, Benton testified that he understood the
defendant "to mean that he grabbed on to a higher fence to pull
himself up on to a lower fence to get over the higher fence."
Detective Benton then illustrated this testimony by pointing to
parts of a fence in a photograph of the alley between 11 and 5
Hartwell. In its closing argument, the government asserted that
Wilkerson's post-arrest statement referred to the fence in the back
of the alley in which Officers Joyce and Fleming saw the defendant
run.
The government argues that this testimony is admissible
under Rule 701, which permits the admission of lay opinion
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testimony only when it is:
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness,
(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness'
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 701. Wilkerson argues that the testimony did not
meet the requirements of (a) or (b).
The first element of Rule 701 is "the familiar
requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation." Fed. R. Evid.
701 advisory committee's note. This court has noted that the
requirement is met when the testimony is based on the personal
perception of the witness and does not require any irrational leaps
of logic for the witness to render the opinion. See Lynch v. City
of Boston, 180 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999). Wilkerson argues that
this test is not met because Detective Benton lacked any special
understanding of what Wilkerson meant and he had no special
familiarity with the area. This argument is unpersuasive.
Detective Benton testified that he was familiar with the alley in
which the gun and drugs were found and with the driveway that
defense counsel argued Wilkerson used to flee. He walked up the
alley before interviewing Wilkerson, he viewed the driveway the
same night of Wilkerson's arrest, and he walked up the driveway the
next day. He was thus in a position to assess which fence
Wilkerson referred to in his statement. Benton's opinion is
therefore rationally based on his perception.
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Wilkerson also argues that the "helpfulness" requirement
is not met because the statement itself is clear and the jury had
other evidence before it from which it could determine which area
Wilkerson was describing. Wilkerson points to several cases
holding that the interpretation of clear statements is not helpful
to the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103,
1109 (3d Cir. 1988)("[T]he interpretation of clear statements is
not permissible, and is barred by the helpfulness requirement of .
. . Fed. R. Evid. 701."). However, these cases involve the
interpretation of facially clear and coherent statements.
Wilkerson's statement that he "grabbed the tall fence to get up on
the small fence" is vague and confusing. It is not at all clear
from the photographs of the alley and the driveway what Wilkerson
meant. Detective Benton saw the area immediately after Wilkerson's
arrest. He walked through the alley before taking Wilkerson's
statement and walked through the driveway the next morning.
Although the jury viewed the area, it was before they heard any
testimony. Under the circumstances, the district court could have
reasonably determined that Detective Benton was in a unique
position to help the jury understand what Wilkerson might have
meant. See Tom, 330 F.3d at 94. Accordingly, we conclude the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
testimony.
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III.
Wilkerson also contends that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct in his closing argument and rebuttal. There was no
contemporaneous objection to the closing argument or rebuttal at
trial, so we review for plain error. United States v. Figueroa-
Encarnacion, 343 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1140 (2004). Review for plain error requires determining
whether an error occurred which was clear or obvious and which not
only affected the defendant's substantial rights but also seriously
impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.
2001). Wilkerson argues there were five separate instances of
prosecutorial misconduct, but we conclude there were none.
First, Wilkerson asserts that the government improperly
vouched for the credibility of the officers' testimony by arguing
in rebuttal that if the officers wanted to lie they would have made
up a better story. "[A] prosecutor improperly vouches for a witness
when she places the prestige of her office behind the government's
case by, say, imparting her personal belief in a witness's veracity
or implying that the jury should credit the prosecution's evidence
simply because the government can be trusted." United States v.
Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003). In Perez-Ruiz, we
determined that the statement, "If they [were going to] make up a
story, wouldn't it have been a better story?" was not improper
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vouching, but rather "a logical counter to the assertions of
defense counsel . . . that various government witnesses had
fabricated their testimony . . . ." Id. at 9-10. The comments
before us are very similar. In response to defense counsel's
assertions that the officers may have fabricated their stories, the
government argued that if the officers had wanted to lie, they
could have said they saw defendant with a gun or otherwise
embellished their testimony to make the case better. These
statements do not constitute improper vouching. See also Figueroa-
Encarnacion, 343 F.3d at 29 (admission of the government's
statements that witnesses could have lied to make a better story
was "not remotely plain error").
The prosecutor also stated several times in rebuttal that
the officers "didn't stretch the truth here" when noting that the
officers testified that they saw Wilkerson reach for his budge area
but did not testify that they actually saw a gun. With these
statements the prosecutor comes closer to the line of imparting his
personal belief in the witness's veracity. However, there is no
plain error, since if there is error, it is not clear or obvious
and it does not seriously impair the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Sullivan,
85 F.3d 743, 751 (1st Cir. 1996) (not plain error where the
government in closing argument and rebuttal stated that one witness
"came off pretty believable," that another "couldn't have lied
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about anything," that another "told you the truth," and that all of
them "were up there telling the truth").
Second, Wilkerson contends that the government improperly
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant by arguing that, for
the jury to find that Wilkerson went through the driveway and not
the alley, they would have to find that Officers Joyce and Fleming
did not tell the truth. Wilkerson relies on United States v.
Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1997), where the court found
improper burden shifting when the government stated "when a
defendant does 'go forward' to offer evidence, 'the defendant has
the same responsibility as the government and that is to present a
compelling case.'" Id. at 1015. The prosecutor's argument in this
case is not like the statements in Roberts. Here, the government
did not argue that Wilkerson had the burden to prove another set of
facts. Rather, the government argued that if the jury found that
Wilkerson ran up the driveway, they would necessarily have to find
that the officers did not tell the truth, because the officers
testified that he ran up the alley. This logical response to
Wilkerson's theory of the case is not plain error.
Third, Wilkerson argues that the government impermissibly
commented on Wilkerson's decision not to testify and shifted the
burden of proof when he said "there's no real evidence" that he did
not go up the alley and "pretty much nothing" to say that Wilkerson
ran up the driveway. A prosecutor's remarks violate a defendant's
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Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination if "in the
circumstances of the particular case, the language used was
manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would
naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of
the accused to testify." United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 769
(1st Cir. 1996). We are not persuaded the jury would naturally and
necessarily take the statements to be a comment on Wilkerson's
decision not to testify. In the context of the trial, it is likely
the comments referred to Wilkerson's failure to produce other
evidence supporting his theory of the case. At most, the comments
are ambiguous. Moreover, there was significant evidence of
Wilkerson's guilt and the judge instructed the jury of the
defendant's right not to testify and of the government's burden of
proof. We conclude that these statements do not rise to the level
of plain error. See Wihbey at 770-71 (no plain error where there
is ambiguity, jury instruction, and significant evidence of guilt).
Fourth, Wilkerson contends that the government misstated
the evidence. The prosecutor stated several times that the
witnesses saw something "heavy" in Wilkerson's right hand. He also
referred to "the fence" and "that fence" in the alley when
discussing Wilkerson's post-arrest statement, implying that
Wilkerson had identified the fence in the alley to Detective Benton
and had described pulling himself up it. These misstatements
involved reasonable inferences that the prosecutor asked the jury
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to draw from the facts. They were de minimus and did not stray far
enough from the actual testimony to indicate prejudice or bad
faith. Moreover, the judge instructed the jury that the lawyers'
assertions were not evidence. The statements did not "so poison[]
the well that the trial's outcome was likely affected." See United
States v. Morales-Cartagena, 987 F.2d 849, 854 (1st Cir. 1993).
See also United States v. Yanovitch, 101 F.3d 202, 213 (1st Cir.
1996). We therefore conclude that these statements were not plain
error.
Finally, Wilkerson's claim that the prosecutor demeaned
the defense by calling one of the defense theories a "red herring"
is meritless. See United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 46-47 (1st
Cir. 1996)(did not cross the line to call a defense argument a
"diversion" that "doesn't pass the laugh test").
IV.
Wilkerson contends that evidence that the gun was
manufactured outside of Massachusetts in 1918 is insufficient to
establish a nexus between the firearm and interstate commerce under
§ 922(g). He points to the Supreme Court's decisions in United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848
(2000), as calling into question whether the minimal nexus
standard, which requires only that the firearm has traveled in
interstate commerce at some time, sufficiently satisfies the
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interstate commerce element of § 922(g). See Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 575-78 (1977)(establishing minimal nexus
standard). In United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 892 (2003), we held that Jones does not
alter Scarborough to require proof that the defendant transported
the firearm in interstate commerce. Id. at 26. Every Circuit that
has addressed the minimal nexus requirement after Morrison and
Jones has also concluded that the nexus to interstate commerce is
established if the firearm "has traveled at some time in interstate
commerce." United States v. Gaines, 295 F.3d 293, 302 (2d Cir.
2002); see also United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 634 (5th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2429 (2004); United States v.
Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 2001). We likewise conclude
that the evidence that a firearm has traveled at some time in
interstate commerce is sufficient to establish a nexus between the
firearm and interstate commerce.
V.
Wilkerson argues in a supplemental brief that, in light
of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S.
Ct. 738 (2005), his sentence should be remanded to the district
court. Wilkerson concedes that he did not preserve this issue in
the district court, so our review is for plain error. United
States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 76 (1st Cir. 2005). A
determination of plain error is appropriate where "there [is] an
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'error' that is 'plain' and that 'affect[s] substantial rights.'"
Id. at 77 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732
(1993)). If those factors are met, we may correct the error only
if it "seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. (citation omitted).
Wilkerson satisfies the first two requirements of the
Olano plain error test because his sentence was imposed under a
mandatory Guidelines system. Id. at 77. In order to prove the
second two requirements, prejudice and fundamental unfairness,
Wilkerson need only present a "reasonable indication that the
district judge might well have reached a different result under
advisory guidelines." United States v. Heldeman, 402 F.3d 220, 224
(1st Cir. 2005) (remanding for resentencing where defendant's age
and health were worthy of consideration but did not warrant a
downward departure under the mandatory Guidelines).
The district judge sentenced Wilkerson to the lowest
available sentence under the Guidelines. He repeatedly expressed
his concern about disparate treatment between federal and state
court sentences in similar cases, but stated that the Guidelines
did not permit him to take that disparity into account. The
district judge also observed that Wilkerson had the most horrible
young life he had seen in 17 years on the bench. Both the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities and the history and
characteristics of the defendant are among the factors to be
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considered by the now advisory Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
As this court recognized in Heldeman, where there is a reasonable
indication that the district judge might well have given a
different sentence under an advisory guidelines regime, and it
would be easy enough for him to say no with a minimum expenditure
of effort, we are persuaded that remand is required. 402 F.3d at
224. We express no view on whether defendant should be resentenced
or on any possible resentence.
We affirm Wilkerson's conviction and remand the case to
the district judge for further sentencing proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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