United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1793
NEREIDA RUIZ-CASILLAS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
LUIS A. CAMACHO-MORALES, in his official capacity as Federal
Programs Director of the Municipality of Humacao; JANE DOE;
conjugal partnership CAMACHO-DOE; MARCELO TRUJILLO-PANISSE,
in his official capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of
Humacao; JANE DOE; conjugal partnership TRUJILLO-DOE,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Marie Elsie López-Adames, on brief, for appellant.
Jorge Martínez-Luciano, with whom Gina Ismalia Gutiérrez-
Galang, Law Offices of Pedro Ortiz-Álvarez, and Michael C. McCall,
Civil Rights Legal Task Force, on brief, for appellees.
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June 30, 2005
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Nereida
Ruiz-Casillas appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of
defendants-appellees Mayor and Federal Programs Director of the
Municipality of Humacao for claims of political discrimination
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Ruiz contests the district
court's finding that she occupied a policymaking trust position,
thereby foreclosing her First and Fourteenth Amendment claims given
the party affiliation requirement. Appellant also argues that,
despite her dismissed causes of action, the district court erred in
failing to address defendants' qualified immunity defense. After
careful review, we affirm.
I. Background
Ruiz, an employee of the Municipality of Humacao, Puerto
Rico and a member of the Popular Democratic Party (PDP), has served
as Administrative Director of the Federal Programs Division of
Humacao since 1985. Although her appointment as Administrative
Director was initially transitory, the position was made permanent
by virtue of a 1991 ordinance.1
In January 2001, defendant-appellee Marcelo Trujillo-
Panisse became the Mayor of Humacao and, as such, took
responsibility for establishing the municipality's public policy,
1
The "Programmatic" Director position was held by Zaida Pérez
from 1985 until 1996, when Pérez departed. This position remained
vacant until 2001, making Ruiz the de facto Director in the interim
period.
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organization, and personnel regulation. Trujillo appointed
defendant-appellee Luis Camacho-Morales as Director of the
Municipality's Federal Programs Division that same year. Like
Ruiz, both Trujillo and Camacho are members of the PDP.
Ruiz alleges that after defendants' assumption of power,
they harassed and discriminated against her by, inter alia,
stripping her of the job's functions and duties, denying her access
to a phone line, telling other employees not to speak with her, and
acting aggressively towards her. These actions were allegedly
spurred by Ruiz's political beliefs, specifically, her support for
the previous mayor and administration, who were affiliated with the
rival New Progressive Party (NPP).
On November 6, 2002, Ruiz filed a complaint in the
federal district court for the District of Puerto Rico, which she
amended on February 10, 2003 to add First and Fourteenth Amendment
claims under § 1983. Defendants moved for summary judgment on
September 11, 2003, arguing, inter alia, that the claim was barred
by the statute of limitations defense, that Ruiz had failed to
establish a prima facie case, and that they had qualified immunity.
On April 27, 2004, the district court granted defendants'
summary judgment motion and dismissed Ruiz's claims. Ruiz-Casillas
v. Camacho-Morales, No. 02-2640 (D.P.R. Apr. 27, 2004). The court
reviewed the record properly before it to find that the nature of
Ruiz's tasks and her position's close involvement with high-level
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policymakers indicated that she was a policymaking trust employee,
for whom party affiliation was an appropriate employment
requirement. Id. at 13-23. The court also found that Ruiz's
Fourteenth Amendment claim faltered because as a trust employee,
she had no cognizable property interest in her trust employment for
a due process claim, id. at 23-24, and her equal protection claim
merely restated her failed First Amendment claim, id. at 24-25.
Having dismissed all causes of action, the court declined to
address the qualified immunity defense. Id. This appeal follows.
II. Analysis
A. First Amendment
Ruiz first argues that the district court erred in
finding that she had occupied a "political" position, and thus
lacked a colorable First Amendment claim for political
discrimination on the basis of party affiliation. We are not
convinced.
Summary judgment entries are reviewed de novo, viewing
all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
granting all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See,
e.g., Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d 13, 18 (1st
Cir. 2000). Such judgments are upheld "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
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to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary
judgments will also be upheld "if the nonmoving party rests merely
upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported
speculation," Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d
5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Finally, our inquiry as to whether a
government position is "political," though fact intensive, presents
a question of law requiring a de novo assessment of all relevant
evidence. Ortiz-Piñero v. Rivera-Arroyo, 84 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir.
1996).
In political discrimination cases, plaintiffs must first
establish that party affiliation was a substantial or motivating
factor behind the adverse employment action. See Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
Defendants then carry the burden to establish either a
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, see id. at 287,
or that plaintiff held a "political position," for which party
affiliation constitutes "an appropriate requirement for the
effective performance of the public office involved," Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). See Ortiz-Piñero, 84 F.3d at 12.
Unlike non-policymaking career positions, "political positions" are
terminable without cause when political affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the position. See, e.g., Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976); Galloza v. Foy, 389 F.3d 26,
28-29 (1st Cir. 2004). This rule ensures that "representative
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government [will] not be undercut by tactics obstructing the
implementation of policies of the new administration, policies
presumably sanctioned by the electorate." Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367.
In determining whether a position is "political," we
engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the governmental unit
decides "issues where there is room for political disagreement on
goals or their implementation," and (2) whether the position's
responsibilities "resemble[] [those of] a policymaker, a privy to
confidential information, a communicator, or some other office
holder whose function is such that party affiliation is an equally
appropriate requirement." Jiménez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide,
807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc); see also Galloza,
389 F.3d at 29-30; Duriex-Gauthier v. López-Nieves, 274 F.3d 4, 9
(1st Cir. 2001).
In determining the second prong, we examine the
position's "inherent attributes," for which the job description is
the most useful starting point. Galloza, 389 F.3d at 31. Job
descriptions that are broad or open ended -- given the employee's
latitude to exercise discretionary judgment -- generally indicate
a policymaking position, while job descriptions that are narrowly
circumscribed inhibit freedom of action and generally indicate a
non-policymaking position. Id. The job title, however, is not
necessarily dispositive in the inquiry, Duriex-Gauthier, 274 F.3d
at 8. Instead, we examine other indicia including "relative pay,
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technical competence, power to control others, authority to speak
in the name of policymakers, public perception, influence on
programs, contact with elected officials, . . . responsiveness to
partisan politics and political leaders . . . [and]
responsibilities that are not well defined or are of broad scope."
Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Before delving into our inquiry, we note that appellant
has submitted voluminous documents to this court that were never
introduced, or were never properly introduced,2 before the district
court. Our inquiry, therefore, is limited to the record properly
before the court. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a).
The resolution of the instant case revolves around the
second prong described above, as "the OFP [Office of Federal
Programs] unmistakably is a municipal department or agency whose
overall functions involve decision making on issues where there is
room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation."
Ortiz-Piñero, 84 F.3d at 12-13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our examination of the second prong -- for which the job
description3 is the most useful starting point -- indicates that
2
The district court declined to consider one document submitted
by defendants which failed to comply with the requirements of 48
U.S.C. § 864 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
3
Although neither party submitted a proper job description before
the district court (defendants submitted an untranslated copy of
Ruiz's job description which was not considered), defendants
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appellant's responsibilities resemble those of a policymaker. Her
duties are broad and open-ended: "[a]ny matter for the mayor
referred to [her] regarding the [federal] programs." Docket
Document No. 52. Moreover, Ruiz remained in continuous contact
with the Mayor and the Director regarding the progress of projects,
attended meetings, seminars, Housing and Development (HUD)
orientation, and accomplished various tasks which demonstrate
"technical competence, power to control others, authority to speak
in the name of policymakers, . . . influence on programs, [and]
contact with elected officials."4 Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at
242. Furthermore, Ruiz's "relative pay," another factor we
consider, see id., is only $100 less than the monthly salary of
Director Camacho, whose position is indisputably a "political"
trust position. We also note that when Camacho left the director
office on October 9, 2001, Ruiz assumed the de facto position of
director, assuming duties including the supervision of employees.5
submitted certified translations of Ruiz's deposition discussing
her job description, which forms the basis of our inquiry. This
deposition testimony merely recites the duties in Ruiz's official,
written job description (Form OP-16).
4
After Camacho assumed the Director position, Ruiz admits to,
inter alia, participating in the preparation of a HUD monitoring
report, reviewing professional services contracts, attending
meetings with auditors to discuss audit reports, sending a memo to
Camacho regarding the dress code, reviewing contracts regarding the
building facilities, and drafting communication directing employees
to take ethics seminars. Ruiz Casillas, No. 02-2640 at 19-20.
5
It also appears that Ruiz occupied the de facto director
position from 1996 until 2001, when the Director position was
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Given Ruiz's broad-based responsibilities,6 as well as her close-
working relationships with policymakers, we find that she occupied
a "political" trust position, for which party affiliation is a
requirement, see Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 240.
Appellant nonetheless attempts to salvage her claim by
arguing that the Administrative Director position was labeled as a
"career" position by a 1991 municipal ordinance. While such
designation might be entitled to some deference by this court,
"[w]e have consistently held that the job description is the best,
and sometimes dispositive, source for determining the inherent
functions of the position." Duriex-Gauthier, 274 F.3d at 8. This
is the case here, where an examination of Ruiz's job description
strongly indicates that she occupied a policymaking trust
position.7
Appellant also alleges that the district court erred in
relying on her deposition testimony relating to tasks she performed
as Director and Administrative Director. The deposition testimony
analyzed by the district court, however, merely recites the duties
unoccupied.
6
Although the record indicates that Ruiz also performed more
specific tasks, such as answering mail and phone calls, we find
that her overall job description accords more closely to a
policymaking position.
7
Furthermore, the "Programmatic" Director position, like the
Administrative Director position, is likewise labeled as "career,"
further indicating the gap between position labels and actual job
functions.
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in appellant's official, written job description (Form OP-16). We
therefore find no error in the district court's reliance on the
deposition testimony.
Since appellant's Administrative Director position
resembles that of a policymaking trust employee -- for which party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement -- her First Amendment
claim necessarily founders. Thus, we affirm the district court's
entry of summary judgment on her First Amendment claim.
B. Fourteenth Amendment
Appellant further argues that even if she had performed
certain policymaking duties, this did not extinguish her "career"
position and the due process "property rights" attached thereunder.
This argument also fails.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects government employees who possess property interests in
continued public employment. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Galloza, 389 F.3d at 33. To
determine whether public employees possess such a property right,
we examine the local law and the terms and conditions of the
employment arrangement. See id.; Ortiz-Piñero, 84 F.3d at 17.
Under Puerto Rico law, public employees are categorized into either
career or trust/confidential positions. 3 P.R. Laws Ann. § 1349.
Trust or confidential employees "intervene or collaborate
substantially in the formation of the public policy, [and] . . .
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advise directly or render direct services to the head of the agency
. . . ." Id. § 1350. Unlike career employees, who are removable
only for cause, trust employees are of "free selection and
removal." Id. Thus, "trust [employees] do[] not have a
constitutionally protected property interest in that position."
Galloza, 389 F.3d at 34.
In any event, whether or not appellant's downgrading of
duties would constitute adverse action for purposes of the First
Amendment, Ruiz was not fired, and "[u]nder Puerto Rico law, public
employees have a property interest in their continued employment,
not in the functions they perform." Rosado de Vélez v. Zayas, 328
F. Supp. 2d 202, 212 (D.P.R. 2004) (citing Consejo de Educación de
la U.P.R. v. Roselló, 137 D.P.R. 83, 110 (1994)). The equal
protection claim also founders, as it is a mere restatement of
appellant's failed First Amendment claim. See, e.g., Néstor Colón
Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir.
1992) (finding "little basis or justification for applying equal
protection analysis" where Equal Protection claim overlapped with
failed First Amendment claim). We therefore affirm on this issue.
C. Qualified Immunity
The failure of appellant's constitutional claims obviates
our need to address the qualified immunity defense: we have found
no constitutional violation. See Suboh v. Dist. Attorney's Office,
298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
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730 (2002); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)) ("The threshold inquiry [in
determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity]
is whether the plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a
constitutional violation."). The district court's judgment is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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