Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-2196
KELVIN ACEVEDO-QUILES; EUGENIO ALBINO-SEPÚLVEDA;
LUZ E. ARZOLA-TORRES; LIZZI CALES-PADILLA; SONIA CALO-VELÁZQUEZ;
ERIC CAMACHO-PAGÁN; WILLIAM CARABALLO-GONZÁLEZ;
JOSÉ CARABALLO-ECHEVARRÍA; WILFREDO CARABALLO-PÉREZ;
ADELINA CINTRÓN-GONZÁLEZ; WILFREDO ECHEVARRÍA-MARTÍNEZ;
RODOLFO FIGUEROA-TORRES; SAMUEL FILION-JUSINO;
ZOILO GARCÍA-RIVERA; RAMÓN GARCÍA-IRIZARRY;
HELEN GONZÁLEZ-QUESADA; RAFAEL GONZÁLEZ-QUESADA;
AQUILINO HERNÁNDEZ-QUIRÓS; MILAGROS HERNÁNDEZ-RODRÍGUEZ;
ISRAEL IRIZARRY-CORREA; GLORIMAR LÓPEZ-SÁEZ;
JASMINE LÓPEZ-VELÁZQUEZ; LYDIA LÓPEZ-ALONSO; JAIME LUGO-TORRES;
ANA MALDONADO-FIGUEROA; LUIS MANUEL TORRES-CARABALLO;
FELIPE MOLINARI-VÁZQUEZ; AGNES MUÑOZ-CEDEÑO;
SYLVIA NIEVES-FELICIANO; PEDRO OCASIO-SANTOS;
EDUARDO OLIVERA-RIVERA; BENITO PÉREZ-UBILES;
TRINIDAD PÉREZ-SEPÚEVEDA; SEVERIANO PÉREZ-GONZÁLEZ;
JOSÉ PÉREZ-BÁEZ; MOISÉS ORTIZ-MORRIS; FLAVIA ORTIZ-CAMACHO;
WILLIAM PACHECO-GONZÁLEZ; MIGDALIA QUIRÓS-TORRES;
WILBERTO RAMÍREZ-LÓPEZ; JOSÉ LUIS RAMOS-MILÁN;
WILSON RIVERA-CEDEÑO; ANÍBAL RODRÍGUEZ-IRIZARRY;
NANCY RODRÍGUEZ-RAMOS; EDISON RODRÍGUEZ-RODRÍGUEZ;
AMANDA ROJAS-BAUZÁ; VIRGEN ROMÁN-FELICIANO;
EDGARDO ROMÁN-ORTIZ; LUIS RUIZ-CORREA; JUANITA SANTANA-FREYRE;
JOSÉ SANTIAGO-SANTIAGO; YAMILET SANTIAGO-FELICIANO;
JESUS SANTIAGO-FELICIANO; ALLENY SANTIAGO-CARABALLO;
MARIO SANTIAGO-TORRES; WILFREDO SUPÚLVEDA-ARZOLA;
CÁSTULA TAPIA-SOSTRE; MILTON TORRES-RIVERA;
ABNER TORRUELLAS-COLLAZO; LUIS VARGAS-SANTOS;
ANGEL RODRÍGUEZ-MARTÍNEZ; NANCY VEGA-TORRES;
BENJAMÍN VEGA-TORRES; PABLO VELÁZQUEZ-OQUENDO;
GUADALUPE VÉLEZ-VALEDÓN; AMÉRICA TORRES-HERNÁNDEZ;
NOAMY RODRÍGUEZ-BERGOCHEA; WANDA SÁEZ-ECHEVARRÍA;
OLGA M. MARRERO-MERCADO; ARISBIL IRIZARRY-NIEVES;
ROSA M. QUIÑONES-IRIZARRY; ELIEZER TROCHE-ORTIZ;
ANDY IRIZARRY-FRATICELLY,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
IVÁN CRUZ MELETICHE,
Plaintiff,
v.
EDGARDO ARLEQÚIN-VÉLEZ; MUNICIPALITY OF GUAYANILLA;
KAREN MATTEI-BECHONAGA,
Defendants, Appellants,
MILAGROS MONTALVO-QUIRÓS,
Defendant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Hill,* Senior Circuit Judge, and
Howard, Circuit Judge.
Johanna M. Emmanuelli Huertas with whom Gina Ismalia
Gutiérrez-Galang and Law Office of Pedro E. Ortiz Álvarez, were on
brief, for appellants.
Joan S. Peters with whom Nachman & Guillemard, was on brief,
for appellees.
August 16, 2005
*
Of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, sitting by designation.
Per Curiam. Defendants Edgardo Arlequín-Vélez and Karen
Mattei-Bechonaga, respectively the Mayor and Human Resources
Manager of the Municipality of Guayanilla, bring this appeal to
challenge the denial of their motion for summary judgment on
grounds of qualified immunity. Defendants, who stand accused of
participating in the unlawful termination of a number of former
municipal employees following the 2000 elections in Puerto Rico,
argue that the district court erroneously looked only to the
complaint, and not the summary judgment record, when it denied
their motion. Defendants further assert that a proper review of
the summary judgment record would reveal that, as a matter of law,
they were entitled to qualified immunity because there were
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the employment actions
that they ordered, and because a reasonable official would have
understood himself or herself to be entitled to take the actions
undertaken.
It is true that, in its opinion denying defendants'
motion for summary judgment, the district court referenced only to
the allegations in the pleadings, and not the proof in the summary
judgment record, as is required when a defendant asserts a
qualified immunity defense on the basis of the summary judgment
record and argues that the record fails to substantiate the
existence of a viable constitutional claim. See e.g., Riverdale
Mills Corp. v. Pimpare, 392 F.3d 55, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2004). But it
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is simply not the case that the court failed to conduct the
threshold constitutional analysis against the backdrop of summary
judgment principles. For the court, in a separate opinion issued
the same day as the qualified immunity opinion, performed the
calculus that defendants say should have been conducted within the
qualified immunity opinion. In this "merits" opinion, the court
ruled that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether
plaintiffs have made out a viable constitutional claim. While the
court, in its qualified immunity opinion, might have cross-
referenced its record-based merits analysis (or, better yet, issued
a single opinion addressing first whether plaintiffs' First
Amendment claim was sufficiently supported to warrant a trial and
then whether defendants nonetheless were entitled to qualified
immunity from that claim, see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-02
(2001)), there can be no doubt that the court reviewed the summary
judgment record and concluded that there is a genuine issue of
material fact whether defendants' actions violated plaintiffs'
First Amendment rights. To pretend otherwise, as the individual
defendants ask us to do, would be empty formalism. We therefore
reject the primary appellate argument -- that the district court
failed to decide whether plaintiffs' constitutional claim was
adequately supported by the summary judgment record -- as built
upon a faulty premise.
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Defendants devote the remainder of their brief to an
implicit challenge to the district court's merits ruling, arguing
that budgetary and public policy considerations entitled them to
act as they did. Plaintiffs respond that the court's ruling was
correct, that there was sufficient evidence that defendants were
motivated by political animus, and that defendants' argument
assumes as a given a crucial fact in dispute: namely, that
defendants were in fact motivated by the budgetary and public
policy considerations that they say motivated them. Defendants
counter mostly by challenging the adequacy of plaintiffs' evidence.
But they also suggest that, under relevant law, any political
animus they harbored is immaterial.
The dispute over the correctness of the district court's
conclusions that plaintiffs had established a trialworthy issue as
to defendants' motivations is one that we are powerless to resolve
at this time. Our jurisdiction extends only to interlocutory
challenges to denials of qualified immunity that are premised on
alleged misapplications of governing law, and not to claims that
the court misapplied the summary judgment framework to the
evidence. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309-20
(1995); Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 204 F.3d 1, 10-14 (1st Cir.
2000). To the extent that defendants have suggested that they were
entitled to act as they did notwithstanding any political animus
they harbored, they do not develop the following argument, which
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would be cognizable on interlocutory appeal: that they lawfully
could take action against plaintiffs even if, as the court
concluded, there are trialworthy issues whether they were motivated
by political animus and/or non-discriminatory considerations. See,
e.g., Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2005)
(employee may be terminated for political affiliation if position
is policymaking or confidential). Rather, their argument is that,
because there existed legitimate and reasonable bases for the
challenged conduct -- i.e., the budgetary and public policy
considerations that defendants say animated them -- plaintiffs
cannot establish a constitutional violation even with their
evidence of animus. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593
(1998) (discussing the affirmative defense in Mt. Healthy City Bd.
of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). But the court did not
agree with defendants' premise: that the summary judgment record
compels a finding that defendants were in fact constrained by the
budgetary and public policy considerations they cite. And we lack
jurisdiction to review this fact-based rejection of the lynchpin of
defendants' position.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part.
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