United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 05-1951
JOSEFINA RIVERA RODRÍGUEZ; JORGE APONTE RODRÍGUEZ;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP APONTE RIVERA,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
SEARS ROEBUCK DE PUERTO RICO, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Juan Rafael González Muñoz, with whom González Muñoz &
Vicéns Sánchez, Carlos M. Vergne, and Law Offices of Carlos M.
Vergne were on brief, for appellants.
Rafael E. Aguiló-Vélez, with whom Anabel Rodríguez-Alonso
and Schuster Usera & Aguiló LLP were on brief, for appellees.
December 23, 2005
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Josefina Rivera Rodríguez and her
husband appeal from entry of summary judgment in favor of her
former employer, Sears Roebuck de Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Sears"), on
her age discrimination claims under federal and Puerto Rican law.
See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621
et seq.; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29,
§ 194a(a).1
Rivera worked for Sears from 1964 until her voluntary
retirement in 1998. She had been promoted in Puerto Rico from
Sales Manager to District Merchant in 1993, when she was 50 years
old. Rivera voluntarily left Sears after she was not hired into a
Buyer position she had sought in 1997. When Rivera announced her
decision to retire, various Sears personnel tried to talk her out
of it. These included her supervisor and the human resources
manager.
This is not the usual claim by a former employee that her
employment was terminated due to discrimination. The claim is
rather that when Rivera sought reemployment with Sears, she was not
hired for two positions, a District Merchant position in late 2000
and a Buyer position in the summer of 2002. We affirm, taking all
1
Rivera's husband and the conjugal partnership brought
derivative claims under Puerto Rican law. As the parties agree
and the district court held, if Rivera's claims of discrimination
and retaliation fail, these derivative claims must fail as well.
See Marcano-Rivera v. Pueblo Int'l Inc., 232 F.3d 245, 257-58 & n.7
(1st Cir. 2000).
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facts and inferences in plaintiff's favor and engaging in de novo
review. Nadherny v. Roseland Prop. Co., 390 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.
2004).
The standards of persuasion and proof which plaintiff
must meet are the subject of skirmishing in the briefs. Defendants
say the standard model of inferential proof set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), governs. The
plaintiffs argue that in their opposition to summary judgment, they
chose to have the case treated as a mixed motive case. See Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003); Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989).
In the end, the question is whether a rational trier of
fact could conclude that the reason, in whole or in part, that
Rivera was not hired for either position was age discrimination, or
that she was not hired for the second position due to retaliation
for having filed an age discrimination claim. See Hillstrom v.
Best W. TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[E]ven in
mixed-motive cases, plaintiffs must present enough evidence to
permit a finding that there was differential treatment in an
employment action and that the adverse employment decision was
caused at least in part by a forbidden type of bias."). In a
thoughtful opinion, the district court did consider both the mixed
motive and the McDonnell Douglas claims and concluded that Sears
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would be entitled to summary judgment under either theory. A brief
recitation of the undisputed facts quickly shows why.
A. District Merchant Position -- Fall 2000
In August of 2000 Rivera, then aged 57, learned through
a former Sears co-worker that Rebecca Ayala would be leaving her
post as District Merchant at Sears. Rivera called José Burgos, the
vice president of merchandising and marketing at the Sears store,
to ask about taking over this position. Rivera says that Burgos
responded: "Well, I have to talk to [James] Denny [then President
of Sears] and call you back." Rivera never heard back from Burgos
regarding this position. As was its policy, when Sears announced
on October 16, 2000 that Ayala was leaving, it posted the position
internally. Sears hired an internal candidate, Luis Fernández, on
November 30, 2000.
It was only after the District Merchant position was
filled in November of 2000 that Rivera sent a letter requesting
consideration for hiring, on December 12, 2000, to James Denny,
then President of Sears. Thus, the job opening she claims to have
been discriminatorily denied did not exist at the time of her
August conversation with Burgos and was filled by the time of her
letter of December 12 to Denny.
Rivera, as a former employee of Sears, confirmed that the
company did in fact post positions internally as a matter of
course. A document in evidence, entitled "The Employment Process
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for Salaried Positions," describes the first step as "Post[ing] job
internally." Under the policy, the company looks for external
candidates only if a decision is made that such recruitment is
needed, in which case both internal and external candidates are
considered. Thus, Rivera would have to show that Sears addressed
the question of whether external candidates were needed and that
the decision they were not needed was motivated by age
discrimination against her. Rivera offered no evidence to prove
either point.
Rivera suggests that as a former employee she was
entitled to treatment as though she were an internal candidate.
However, Sears' Human Resources Guide for Managers (which did not
purport to give rights to employees in any event) merely says:
"Retirees and other former associates may be reemployed if their
prior work record was satisfactory." The language disqualifies
former employees with unsatisfactory work records from reemployment
and does no more. It certainly does not say former employees are
to be treated as internal candidates.
Rivera also attacks Sears' explanation that there was a
hiring freeze during this period as to external hires. She says
that Sears never informed her of this hiring freeze when she did
not get the District Merchant job. She relies on the failure of
Sears to produce any written documentation to substantiate its
claim of a hiring freeze. Sears instead relied solely on the
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deposition testimony of its employees to support the hiring freeze
claim. This was a risky strategy for Sears, a national company
with documented personnel policies, and could well have raised a
disputed issue of fact. See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d
1103, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he fact that a company the size of
GTE does not have a memorandum, meeting notes, or other evidence of
this hiring freeze or the financial difficulties that allegedly
spurred the hiring freeze provides circumstantial evidence that the
hiring freeze did not in fact exist."). Here, though, even if the
existence of a hiring freeze on external candidates were disputed,
the issue is not material. No dispute is raised about the fact
that the vacancy was posted internally and a qualified internal
candidate had been selected before receipt of plaintiff's December
letter. There is no evidence of discrimination in the hiring for
the District Merchant job that could raise any possibility of
inference of prohibited age discrimination under these
circumstances.
B. Buyer Position -- Summer 2002
The second position Rivera sought was a Buyer position
which came open in the summer of 2002, when the incumbent, Lissette
Beltran, gave notice of her resignation. Rivera had been found to
be unqualified to fill the same position in 1997. By the time of
her application for the Buyer position, Rivera had filed a
complaint against Sears in 2001 alleging age discrimination for the
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failure to hire her for the District Merchant position. Rivera did
not receive the Buyer position; on August 15, 2002, Frieda Morales
was hired instead.
Rivera claims that the failure to hire her for the Buyer
position in the summer of 2002 was motivated by both age
discrimination and retaliation against her for bringing suit
against Sears. Rivera does not argue that she was as qualified or
more qualified than Morales for the position; nor would the
evidence support such an argument. Rather, her argument is that
but for the company's conclusion that she was not qualified for the
Buyer position (which was motivated by age discrimination or
retaliation), she would have gotten the Buyer position and Morales'
application would never have been considered. The factual
underpinning for that argument is simply missing. Plaintiff
applied for the job on June 30, 2002. Morales applied for the job
the next day. The job application period was open until July 29.
Both applicants were considered for the position. So Morales would
have been considered in any event. Further, Sears considered
Rivera to be unqualified, just as she had been in 1997. Sears
concluded that five years later she was no more qualified for the
Buyer position, having had no relevant experience in the interim
which would have improved her qualifications.
Against this very strong evidence that it was not
discriminatory for the company to conclude that since she was not
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qualified in 1997, then she was not qualified in 2002, plaintiff
offers only two arguments. Neither suffices to forestall summary
judgment. The first is that Fernández, who hired Morales in the
summer of 2002, was notified by the HR department that Rivera had
filed a discrimination complaint. Since Sears put on no evidence
as to why this was so, Rivera argues that this notice to Fernández
is sufficient to permit an inference of retaliation against her.
Even taking reasonable inferences in her favor, the evidence Rivera
points to, the deposition testimony of Fernández, does not support
her contention:
Q: When [Bob Molina, Sears' District Operations Manager]
mentioned [Rivera] for the first time, uh, did he ask you
whether you knew her or . . .?
A [Fernández]: The first time that he mentioned Rivera
was in, because of the lawsuit. [W]e were in the process
of finding a buyer . . . for my soft lines areas. I lost
my buyer. [I] believe [Rivera] ha[d] sent some papers
and some resume or something to the company . . . and he
had mentioned . . . that I should consider her as part of
the process.
Fernández also testified that he, in fact, did consider Rivera, but
found her unqualified for the Buyer position. Nothing suggests
that the lawsuit played a role in Fernández' hiring decision.
Rivera does not contest that Morales is better qualified, and the
evidence is clear she was in competition with Morales for the job.
In the end, Rivera's claim of discrimination rests almost
entirely on a purported opinion expressed by the vice president of
merchandising and marketing, Burgos, that Denny, who was Sears'
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president until the summer of 2002, preferred to work with younger
people. Burgos' view was not based on any statement from Denny and
no grounds have been offered as to admissibility. More tellingly,
by the time of the hiring for the Buyer position, Denny was no
longer the company president and was not involved in the hiring
decision. The final interview of Morales was conducted by Gary
Salvatore, who was Denny's replacement. No evidence of
discriminatory motive is offered against Salvatore.
Under these circumstances, no reasonable jury could have
found that either hiring decision was motivated, even in part, by
age discrimination; nor could it have found that the decision on
the Buyer position in the summer of 2002 was motivated by
retaliation against plaintiff for having filed an age
discrimination complaint.2 Summary judgment was properly awarded
to Sears.
Affirmed. Costs are awarded to Sears.
2
Rivera's claims under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146, also
known as "Law 100," and P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194a, also known
as "Law 115," were also properly dismissed. While Law 100 and the
ADEA allocate the burdens of proof in different ways, see Alvarez-
Fonseca v. Pepsi-Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17, 27 (1st
Cir. 1998), "the burden of proof on the ultimate issue of
discrimination remains with the plaintiff" in both causes of
action, id. at 28. See also Gonzales v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63,
73 n.7 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[T]he merits of the age-discrimination
claims asserted under the ADEA and Law 100 are coterminous."
(citation omitted)). As to Law 115, once the employer has provided
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the ultimate burden of
showing pretext still falls on the plaintiff. Compare P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 29, § 194a(c), with Ramírez Rodríguez v. Boehringer
Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 425 F.3d 67, 84 (1st Cir. 2005).
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