United States v. Coccia

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 03-1674

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

LARRY J. COCCIA,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,

Siler,* Senior circuit Judge,

and Howard, Circuit Judge.

Raymond E. Gillespie on brief for appellant.
S. Waqar Hasib, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, was on
brief, for appellee.

May 5, 2006

*
Of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
 HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Defendant Larry Coccia appeals,

on several grounds, his conviction for possession of a firearm

while subject to a domestic restraining order, pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). We affirm.

I.

We present the facts in the light most favorable to the

verdict, see United States v. Boulerice, 325 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir.

2003), reserving a discussion of some facts for our analysis.

Coccia, a retired U.S. Air Force officer, was in the

midst of a difficult divorce in Pennsylvania in 2001. A

Pennsylvania family court had issued a domestic restraining order

against Coccia on April 2, 2001. The order forbade him from

abusing, harassing, or threatening his wife or children, and from

"possessing, transferring or acquiring any weapons" for one year

from the date of the order.

To increase his chances of securing more favorable

visitation rights with his children, Coccia traveled to New England

to seek a favorable psychological evaluation from an "Ivy League"

doctor. Ultimately, he secured an appointment with a psychiatrist,

Dr. Margaret McGovern, in Wellesley, Massachusetts. Coccia met

with Dr. McGovern on three consecutive days in November 2001.

During the first session, Dr. McGovern became "spooked"

by her new patient, who refused to provide any information about

where he was staying. Concerned for her safety, Dr. McGovern

-2-
arranged to have her daughter call during the second session to

confirm that she was safe. Matters worsened at the second session.

Coccia stated that he might plan a bombing or disperse anthrax;

that he was capable of such things based on his military

experience; that Dr. McGovern would read about his actions in the

papers; that he would go after President Bush; and that he had been

previously caught with firearms in his car in Maryland in violation

of a judge's order. Dr. McGovern was sufficiently troubled by

Coccia's comments that she called the FBI before the third

session.1 Two FBI agents, accompanied by two Wellesley police

officers, including Detective Jill McDermott, met with Dr. McGovern

shortly before the appointment. Dr. McGovern and the officers

agreed that, in light of Coccia's comments, a more extensive in-

patient psychiatric evaluation was warranted.

Coccia arrived in a rental car, jam-packed with his

personal possessions, and parked in Dr. McGovern's circular

driveway directly in front of her front door.2 Dr. McGovern met

with Coccia, informed him that the she had called the FBI, and

notified Coccia that FBI agents were waiting for him. Thereafter,

while the officers and agents met with Coccia, Dr. McGovern

1
The event triggering the call was the then-unexplained crash of
an airliner in New York on morning of November 12, 2001. This
crash, and more general concerns about terrorism following the
September 11, 2001 attacks, increased Dr. McGovern's fear that
Coccia posed a real danger.
2
Dr. McGovern practiced out of her home.

-3-
prepared a "pink paper", i.e., an order from a medical professional

providing for the involuntary commitment and psychiatric evaluation

of an individual thought to be a danger to himself or others.3

Coccia was upset and hostile. He discussed his divorce, the

custody proceedings, and his intent to relocate to Colorado. But

he did not answer the officers' questions about where he was

staying in Massachusetts. Upon learning that his car would be

towed, Coccia refused to give his car keys to the officers or

consent to a search of the vehicle. While awaiting the ambulance,

Coccia called his sister in Michigan to tell her what was happening

to him.

After Coccia was taken away, Detective McDermott and her

partner arranged to tow Coccia's vehicle. A subsequent inventory

search at the Wellesley Police Department's impound lot revealed

several double-edged knives, a replica pistol, and a rifle case.

At this point, Detective McDermott and her partner obtained a

search warrant. After obtaining the warrant, the officers opened

Coccia's rifle case, which contained an assault rifle and

approximately 1300 rounds of ammunition. The officers also found

documentation regarding the divorce and child custody actions, a

copy of the restraining order, a knapsack containing over $160,000

in cash, and a receipt for a recent purchase of ammunition.

3
See generally McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Service, Inc., 77
F.3d 540, 547-49 (1st Cir. 1996).

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 Coccia was indicted on one count of violating 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(8), which outlaws possession of a firearm by anyone

subject to a domestic restraining order. He moved to suppress the

firearm on the ground that the decision by the Wellesley police

officer to impound his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment

rights. He argued that the seizure of his vehicle was unreasonable

because he could have made other arrangements to remove it from Dr.

McGovern's driveway. At the suppression hearing, Dr. McGovern and

McDermott testified for the government. Terri Torres, Coccia's

sister, and Tim Aiken, a friend of Coccia's, testified for the

defense that other arrangements could have been made for Coccia's

vehicle. The district court denied the motion and held that the

towing decision was reasonable under the circumstances.

At trial, the government presented the testimony of

McDermott and a firearms expert, as well as documentary and

physical evidence. Coccia elected to represent himself, with

standby counsel assisting him, and took the stand on his own

behalf. He testified that he was heartbroken by his family

situation and desperately trying to improve it, had not said

anything inappropriate to Dr. McGovern, had purchased the gun and

ammunition as an investment many years before, had never fired the

gun, had never seen the restraining order, and was in the process

of moving to Colorado. Coccia's parents and sister testified

regarding Coccia's character and family travails.

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 The jury convicted him, and the district court, departing

upward from the applicable guidelines sentencing range based upon

Coccia's dangerousness, sentenced him to sixty months'

imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II.

Coccia raises several challenges to his conviction.

First, he argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress. Second, he asserts that the court erred in

denying his motion for acquittal on the ground that the

Pennsylvania restraining order did not contain the restrictions

explicitly required by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). Third, he

contends that § 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional under the Second

Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, and the Commerce Clause.4

A. Motion to Suppress

Coccia contests the towing of his car from Dr. McGovern's

property as an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.5 The government responds that the decision by the

4
The government questions whether Coccia preserved all issues for
plenary appellate review but argues Coccia's claims fail on the
merits in any event. Except where we note otherwise, we will
assume arguendo that Coccia's claims were preserved.
5
He does not, however, challenge the subsequent inventory search of
his car after it was towed. In any event, if the seizure of the
car was unconstitutional, the materials later recovered during the
inventory search would be excluded. See United States v. Duguay,
93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 1996).

-6-
police officers to impound the car was a reasonable exercise of

their community caretaking function.

We consider Coccia's claim under a bifurcated standard.

See United States v. Kornegay, 410 F.3d 89, 93 (1st Cir. 2005).

We review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusion de

novo. See United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2005).

In so doing, "we will uphold a denial of a motion to suppress if

any reasonable view of the evidence supports it." United States v.

Garner, 338 F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2003).

Generally, a law enforcement officer may only seize

property pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause describing

the place to be searched and the property to be seized. See Horton

v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 n.4 (1990). There are, however,

exceptions to this requirement, including the community caretaking

exception.6 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 446-447 (1973).

The community caretaking exception recognizes that the police

perform a multitude of community functions apart from investigating

crime. In performing this community caretaking role, police are

"expected to aid those in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent

6
At least one commentator has argued that the community caretaking
function should not be considered an exception to the warrant
requirement because police officers acting pursuant to community
caretaking objectives can seldom meet the requirements necessary to
obtain a warrant. Therefore, the Warrant Clause of the Fourth
Amendment should be deemed inapplicable to community caretaking
searches and seizures. See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Community
Caretaking and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 261
(1998).

-7-
potential hazards from materializing and provide an infinite

variety of services to preserve and protect public safety." United

States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1991).

Relevant here, the community caretaking function encompasses law

enforcement's authority to remove vehicles that impede traffic or

threaten public safety and convenience. See S. Dakota v. Opperman,

428 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976).

Coccia acknowledges the community caretaking exception,

but, citing Opperman and Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987),

he argues that the community caretaking exception does not apply to

the impoundment of his car because the government failed to

establish that the car was towed from Dr. McGovern's property

pursuant to standard operating procedures. We disagree with his

contention that the absence of standardized criteria invalidates

the impoundment at issue in this case.

Neither Opperman nor Bertine holds that the impoundment

of a vehicle conducted in the absence of standardized protocols is

a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, Opperman does

not even concern impoundments. Its focus is on the need for

standards to govern inventory searches conducted after a lawful

impoundment. See also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)

(stating that criteria or standardized routine must guide an

officer's discretion during an inventory search); United States v.

Hellman, 556 F.2d 442, 444 (9th Cir. 1977) ("It is the inventorying

-8-
practice and not the impounding practice that, if routinely

followed . . . could render the inventory search a reasonable

search under Opperman.").

Bertine as well was concerned primarily with the

constitutionality of an inventory search. It is true that the

Court did state that the impoundment of the car in that case was

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted

pursuant to standard criteria and was based on something other than

the suspicion of criminal activity. 479 U.S. at 375. Contrary to

Coccia's suggestion, however, we do not understand Bertine to mean

that an impoundment decision made without the existence of standard

procedures is per se unconstitutional. Rather, we read Bertine to

indicate that an impoundment decision made pursuant to standardized

procedures will most likely, although not necessarily always,

satisfy the Fourth Amendment. See Miranda v. City of Cornelius,

429 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he decision to impound

pursuant to the authority of a city ordinance and a state statute

does not, in and of itself, determine the reasonableness of the

seizure under the Fourth Amendment."); see also United States v.

Goodrich, 183 F. Supp. 2d 135, 140-41 (D. Mass. 2001) (stating that

impoundments conducted pursuant to standardized procedures fall

within a safe harbor of constitutionality).

Courts, including this one, have frequently held that

impoundments of vehicles for community caretaking purposes are

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consonant with the Fourth Amendment so long as the impoundment

decision was reasonable under the circumstances. See Rodriguez-

Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 786 (1st Cir. 1991) (collecting cases).

This reasonableness analysis does not hinge solely on any

particular factor. See United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117,

1125-26 (1st Cir. 1978) (concluding that the seizure of a boat was

constitutional under the community caretaking exception, without

regard to the existence of standard procedures, because the

officers' conduct in boarding the boat was reasonable under all of

the circumstances); Miranda, 429 F.3d at 865 (stating, in an

impoundment case, that the question upon review "of a state-

approved search (or seizure) is not whether the search or seizure

was authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the

search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.").

We have explained previously that it is inappropriate

for the existence of (and adherence to) standard procedures to be

the sine qua non of a reasonable impound decision:

Virtually by definition, the need for police to
function as community caretakers arises fortuitously,
when unexpected circumstances present some transient
hazard which must be dealt with on the spot. The police
cannot sensibly be expected to have developed, in
advance, standard protocols running the entire gamut of
possible eventualities. Rather, they must be free to
follow "sound police procedure," that is to choose freely
among the available options, so long as the option chosen
is within the universe of reasonable choices. Where . .
. the police have solid, non-investigatory reasons for
impounding a car, there is no need for them to show that
they followed explicit criteria in deciding to impound,
as long as the decision was reasonable.

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Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 787. We did not decide in Rodriguez-

Morales whether standard procedures could be required where, as

here, the impoundment was followed by an inventory search, but we

do not think a per se rule requiring such standards would be

appropriate. 929 F.2d at 787 n.3. As explained in Rodriguez-

Morales, standard protocols have limited utility in circumscribing

police discretion in the impoundment context because of the numerous

and varied circumstances in which impoundment decisions must be

made. See id. at 787. Moreover, a police officer's discretion to

impound a car is sufficiently cabined by the requirement that the

decision to impound be based, at least in part, on a reasonable

community caretaking concern and not exclusively on "the suspicion

of criminal activity." Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375. Accordingly, the

impoundment of Coccia's car did not violate the Fourth Amendment

merely because there was no evidence that the impoundment was done

pursuant to pre-existing police protocols.

As we held in Rodriguez-Morales, whether a decision to

impound is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is based on all the

facts and circumstances of a given case. See id. at 785 (stating

that to find whether the impoundment of a car was reasonable a court

must "look to all the facts and circumstances of the [present] case

in light of the principles set forth in prior decisions"). For

several reasons, the decision to tow Coccia's car from Dr.

McGovern's property was reasonable.

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 First, Coccia was being removed from Dr. McGovern's

property in an ambulance for a psychiatric evaluation, and there is

no claim that the decision to evaluate Coccia was pretextual.

Because Coccia would be indisposed for an indeterminate, and

potentially lengthy, period, the officers properly made arrangements

for the safekeeping of the vehicle, which was packed with his

personal belongings. Because Coccia's car was filled with many of

his belongings, it was a possible target for theft or vandalism.

See United States v. Ramos-Morales, 981 F.2d 625, 626 (1st Cir.

1992) (Breyer, C.J.) (impounding a vehicle to protect it from theft

or vandalism is reasonable under the community caretaking

exception).

Second, towing the vehicle reduced the risk of a future

confrontation between Coccia and Dr. McGovern. Coccia knew that Dr.

McGovern had been involved in the decision to commit him and there

was testimony that Coccia was angry about the commitment. Under the

circumstances, the officers were reasonable in concluding that

removing Coccia's car from Dr. McGovern's property would eliminate

the need for Coccia to return to Dr. McGovern's property to collect

his car and thereby reduce the possibility of a violent altercation.

Third, Coccia's comments to Dr. McGovern led to a concern

that Coccia's car might contain items constituting a threat to

public safety, such as explosive material, chemicals or biological

agents. Pursuant to the community caretaking function, police may

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conduct warrantless searches and seizures to take possession of

dangerous material that is not within anyone's control. See Cady,

413 U.S. at 447-48 (finding warrantless search proper under the

community caretaking exception where the officers reasonably

believed that a gun was abandoned in the trunk of a car).

Finally, there was no obvious alternative means for

removing the car other than impoundment. The only call that Coccia

made before going to the hospital was to his sister in Michigan, and

he did not inform the officers of another means to remove the car.

In these circumstances, the officers were reasonable in concluding

that there was no one immediately available to take the car.7 See

United States v. Vega-Encarnacion, 344 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2003)

("Caselaw supports the view that where a driver is arrested and

there is no one immediately on hand to take possession, the

officials have a legitimate non-investigatory reason from impounding

the car.")

Despite these facts supporting the reasonableness of the

impound decision, Coccia argues that the impoundment was

unreasonable because Officer McDermott admitted that she wanted to

7
Coccia contends that the seizure of his car was improper because
the officers did not provide him with an opportunity to arrange for
someone else to pick-up the car. There is no such requirement.
See Vega-Encarnacion, 344 F.3d at 41 ("Law enforcement officials
are not required to give arrestees the opportunity to make
arrangements for their vehicles when deciding whether impoundment
is appropriate").

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search the car, and that the impoundment was unlawful under

Massachusetts law. Neither contention is persuasive.

That Officer McDermott may have favored impounding the car, in

part, because she wished to search its contents is not dispositive.

A search or seizure undertaken pursuant to the community caretaking

exception is not infirm merely because it may also have been

motivated by a desire to investigate crime. "As long as impoundment

pursuant to the community caretaking function is not a mere

subterfuge for investigation, the coexistence of investigatory and

caretaking motives will not invalidate the seizure." Rodriguez-

Morales, 929 F.2d at 787; see also Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 (search

is valid if it is not for the "sole purpose of investigation"). As

discussed above, there were legitimate community caretaking

justifications for impounding Coccia's car and there was no evidence

that these justifications were merely pretext for an investigatory

search.8

8
There is precedent for an alternative approach limiting our
reasonableness inquiry to the objective facts justifying a seizure
for community caretaking purposes and not considering the officer's
subjective motivation. Cf. United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60,
66 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004) (concluding that officers' subjective
intent is irrelevant in determining the constitutionality of a
search pursuant to the emergency exception to the warrant
requirement). As this issue is not outcome determinative here, we
do not reach the question of whether a showing that the officers'
subjective motive was entirely investigatory would suffice to
invalidate a warrantless seizure defended by the government on
community caretaking grounds.

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 Finally, assuming that the legality of the impoundment

under state law is relevant to the Fourth Amendment inquiry, the

impoundment of Coccia's car did not violate Massachusetts law.

Under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 266, § 120 D, a car may be only be towed

from private property at the request of the car owner or the

property owner. See Commonwealth v. Brinson, 800 N.E.2d 1032, 1038

(Mass. 2003). Officer McDermott testified that Dr. McGovern wanted

the car removed from her property. This testimony was supported by

Dr. McGovern's statements to the officers that she feared Coccia.

The officers could have reasonably inferred from Dr. McGovern's

statements that she wanted the car towed to avoid any further

confrontation with Coccia.9

In sum, we conclude that the officers acted reasonably by

towing Coccia's car from Dr. McGovern's property. The motion to

suppress was therefore properly denied.

B. Motion to Acquit

Coccia argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion for acquittal because the Pennsylvania domestic abuse order

did not meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

Specifically, Coccia maintains that the order is inadequate because

9
In a related vein, Coccia incorrectly contends that an impoundment
of a car on private property is per se unreasonable under the
community caretaking exception because the car is not impeding
traffic. See 3 W.R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 7.3 (c) at 521 (3d
ed. 1996) (collecting cases where the impoundment of a car on
private property was held to comport with the Fourth Amendment).

-15-
it does not use the same verbiage as the statute, which requires

that the order "explicitly prohibit[s] the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or

child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury . .

. ." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). Coccia posits that, because

the statute requires the order to "explicitly" prohibit "physical

force," only those exact words will suffice. Coccia also contends

that the district court's use of the broad Pennsylvania statutory

definition of "abuse" (which does not match verbatim the wording in

§ 922(g)(8)(C)(ii)) in the jury instructions did not cure this

shortcoming.10 The government maintains that the order's language

meets the statutory requirement. We review a district court's Fed.

R. Crim. Pro. 29 determinations de novo. United States v. Pimental,

380 F.3d 575, 583-84 (1st Cir. 2004).

The one circuit that has addressed this issue readily concluded

that an order directing the defendant to "refrain from abusing" his

wife satisfied the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).

See United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 722 (4th Cir. 1999). We

agree. "In scrutinizing [statutory] language, we presume . . .

that Congress knew and adopted the widely accepted legal definitions

of meanings associated with the specific words enshrined in the

statute." United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 2001).

10
Coccia did not object to this jury instruction at trial and does
not argue that its use constituted plain error. See generally
United States v. Zanghi, 189 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir. 1999).

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The definition of "abuse" as a verb includes "[t]o injure (a person)

physically or mentally." Black's Law Dict. (8th ed. 2004). "Abuse"

as a noun includes "[p]hysical or mental maltreatment, often

resulting in mental, emotional, sexual, or physical injury." Id.

Thus, the commonly understood definition of "abuse" includes

violent acts involving physical force within the definition. This

suffices. "[C]ourts are bound to afford statutes a practical,

commonsense reading," O'Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st

Cir. 1996), and Coccia's narrow reading, which would subvert

Congress' intentions in passing § 922(g)(8), fails this test.

C. Constitutional Claims

Coccia raises a host of constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(8). First, Coccia asserts that the statute violates

individual rights embodied in the Second Amendment because (1) the

rights may be lost too readily and (2) restraining order forms that

provide clearer notice are available. Second, Coccia claims that

§ 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause because,

in light of the Supreme Court's rulings in United States v. Lopez,

514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598

(2000), it seeks to regulate conduct with no real economic impact.

Third, Coccia posits that § 922(g)(8) violates the Due Process

Clause, as applied, because he did not received fair notice that his

conduct was wrongful. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225

(1957). Finally, Coccia asserts that § 922(g)(8) violates due

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process and the Tenth Amendment because it violates state

sovereignty. Specifically, Coccia contends that 18 U.S.C. § 2265

is overly broad and conflicts with Massachusetts' requirement that

out-of-state restraining orders be registered, and thereby makes its

application to him fundamentally unfair.

We review challenges to the constitutionality of a statute de

novo. United States v. Caro-Muniz, 406 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2005).

We conclude that Coccia is essentially inviting us to overturn

established case law with these claims.

As to Coccia's Second Amendment challenge, even the one circuit

court to conclude that the rights embodied in the Second Amendment

vest in the individual, rather than the State, has concluded that

the procedural requirements to be followed before imposing §

922(g)(8)'s restrictions adequately safeguard the right to possess

firearms. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261-65 (5th

Cir. 2001). See also United States v. Price, 328 F.3d 958, 961-62

(7th Cir. 2003)(discussing Emerson). Indeed, "[n]o circuit court

which has addressed the question has found 922(g)(8)

unconstitutional under the Second Amendment." United States v.

Lippman, 369 F.3d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004)(collecting cases).

Given that Coccia has conceded that he had notice of his hearing in

family court, attended the hearing, and participated in the hearing,

we see no basis for departing from this well-established authority.

Moreover, we reject Coccia's contention that the restraining order

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was unclear. Coccia's order specifically provided, in bold-face

type, that "Defendant is prohibited from possessing, transferring

or acquiring any weapons for the duration of this order." There can

be no misunderstanding of such a clear prohibition.

Coccia's Commerce Clause argument is untenable in light of our

case law rejecting this very argument. See United States v.

Wilkerson, 411 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2005); see also United States

v. Felton, 417 F.3d 97, 103-4 (1st Cir. 2005). Indeed, this court

has characterized facial challenges to § 922(g)'s constitutionality

under the Commerce Clause as "hopeless." See United States v.

Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Blais,

98 F.3d 647, 649 (1st Cir. 1996).11

We have also rejected a Lambert challenge to § 922(g)(8),

concluding that it passes constitutional muster regarding notice

because both the "proscribed conduct and the affected class of

persons are explicitly set forth." United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d

215, 225 (1st Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Denis, 297 F.3d

25, 28-31 (1st Cir. 2002). As noted above, Coccia's restraining

order specifically forbade him from possessing firearms.12 As we

11
There is no dispute that Coccia's weapon traveled in interstate
commerce.
12
Coccia argues that, under 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105, he is not forbidden
from having firearms unless the restraining order specifically
orders the "confiscation" of his weapons. Coccia did not raise
this claim in the district court, and it falls well-short of
persuading us that a plain error has occurred. See United States
v. Vazquez-Rivera, 407 F.3d 476, 483 (1st Cir. 2005)(arguments not

-19-
said in Meade, given the potential for tragic encounters between

domestic abusers and their victims, "a person who is subject to such

[a domestic restraining order] would not be sanguine about the legal

consequences of possessing a firearm." 175 F.3d at 226.

Coccia's final due process/Tenth Amendment challenge is also

unavailing. This court has held that "section 922(g)(8) is totally

devoid of Tenth Amendment implications" and does not intrude upon

state actors in administering their domestic relations laws. See

Meade, 175 F.3d at 225; see also Bostic, 168 F.3d at 723-24.

Further, 18 U.S.C. § 226513 and the analogous Massachusetts

provision are consistent rather conflicting; registration is not a

mandatory prerequisite to enforcement of another state's restraining

order in Massachusetts. See M.G.L.A. 209A § 5A. Therefore, there

is no fundamental unfairness in applying § 922(g)(8) to Coccia.14

raised before the district court are reviewed for plain error
only). Coccia presents no reason why the Pennsylvania statute
should apply to his conduct in Massachusetts and, more
fundamentally, how the Pennsylvania statute can trump a federal
statute addressing the same issue. Further, the restraining order
form at issue only included a confiscation provision for weapons
that had been used in an act of abuse by the defendant.
13
This section provides that any protection order issued by a state
in compliance with certain procedural standards will be accorded
full faith and credit in all other states and that such orders will
be enforced by the other states without prior registration. See 18
U.S.C. §2265.
14
We have also considered the pro se supplemental brief that Coccia
submitted after argument. The arguments raised therein are
duplicative of those asserted by his counsel or are otherwise
unpersuasive.

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 III.

For the reasons stated above, Coccia's conviction is affirmed.

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