United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1013
United States,
Appellee,
v.
Freddy Martinez,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Lipez, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
John H. LaChance, for appellant.
Rachel E. Hershfang, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom
Michael J. Sullivan, U.S. Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
June 23, 2006
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Freddy Martinez was convicted by
a jury of conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics. On
appeal, Martinez challenges his conviction, asserting that the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
obtained through the use of wiretaps on three cellular telephones.
Martinez claims that the government did not meet the strict
requirements for obtaining such wiretaps set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
2518. He also appeals his sentence, in the aftermath of the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005). We affirm.
I.
Given that the central issue in this appeal is the
validity of certain wiretaps obtained by the government, we begin
by describing the relevant facts of Martinez's conviction,
including the history of the wiretaps.
A. The original investigation leading to Martinez
An initial multi-district investigation by the Drug
Enforcement Administration ("DEA") targeted two men, known as
"Hercules" and "Pachito". Court-authorized electronic surveillance
used during this investigation (the "Pachito wires") intercepted
communications with a Dominican male identified only as "Gallo".
In November 1999, after authorization for the Pachito wires
expired, the DEA persuaded Hercules to cooperate with authorities.
Hercules provided the DEA with information about his drug-
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trafficking activities in Massachusetts, including information that
Hercules and Pachito had supplied hundreds of kilograms of cocaine
to "Gallo".
The DEA's investigation of "Gallo" commenced in
January/February 2000. Through physical surveillance, the DEA
identified "Gallo" as Martinez. With Hercules's assistance, the
DEA placed consensually1 recorded calls to Martinez, and recorded
and monitored a meeting between Martinez and Hercules. At the
meeting, the two discussed different prices per kilogram of
cocaine; however, a deal was never consummated.
During the same time period -- January/February 2000 --
the DEA in New Hampshire apprehended an individual referred to as
"CW-2". CW-2, one of Martinez's cocaine customers, also agreed to
cooperate with law enforcement officials. CW-2 told the DEA that
he had been purchasing approximately one kilogram of cocaine from
Martinez every three weeks since February 1999. CW-2 also
identified an individual known as "Lulu," a/k/a Luis Melendez, as
Martinez's partner in the drug business.
CW-2 also made a series of recorded phone calls to
Martinez in February 2000. In these calls, CW-2 and Martinez
discussed the amount of money CW-2 owed Martinez for a kilogram of
cocaine CW-2 had in his possession when the DEA apprehended CW-2.
1
"Consensual" simply means that Hercules consented to the
recording of the conversation.
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At the DEA's direction and under its surveillance, CW-2 made three
partial payments to Martinez for the cocaine. The first payment
was made to Claudia Sanchez ("Sanchez"), Martinez's live-in
girlfriend; the second to Sanchez and Martinez; and the third to
Martinez.
B. The Martinez wiretaps
Contemporaneous with their use of Hercules and CW-2, the
DEA agents used a number of traditional law enforcement
investigative techniques -- including physical surveillance, pen
registers, and telephone toll records -- to some effect.
Meanwhile, the DEA rejected the use of other techniques --
including search warrants, grand jury subpoenas, and witness
interviews -- for fear that they could compromise the
investigation. As detailed in the affidavits in support of the
three wiretaps at issue here, the DEA asserted that traditional
investigative techniques were incapable of meeting the DEA's
longer-term goals for the Martinez investigation. These goals
included: identifying Martinez's current source(s) for his supply
of cocaine, his other management-level co-conspirators, and major
customers; learning how Martinez was disposing of the proceeds from
his operation; locating additional stash locations; and
understanding the use of already-identified stash locations. A
federal judge approved the three wiretaps.
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C. The suppression motion and trial
As a result of the wiretap investigation, Martinez and
ten co-defendants were charged on May 17, 2000, in a one-count
indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute,
and to distribute, cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and 846. Searches executed the following day at the homes of the
defendants pursuant to search warrants uncovered cocaine and other
controlled substances, money, and paraphernalia used to cut and
prepare cocaine for distribution. In subsequent proceedings,
Martinez moved to suppress the electronic surveillance evidence
obtained from the three wiretaps on the ground that DEA Special
Agent Samuel J. Masiello's ("Masiello") affidavits in support of
the wiretaps on the three cellular telephones used by Martinez did
not satisfy the "necessity" requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c).2
The district court denied the motion to suppress "for the reasons
stated in the government's memorandum." On February 12, 2003,
following an 11-day jury trial, Martinez was found guilty. The
verdict included a finding that the conspiracy had involved five or
more kilograms of cocaine.
D. Sentencing
The Presentence Report ("PSR") concluded that Martinez
was responsible for 205 kilograms of cocaine and 74.84 kilograms of
2
18 U.S.C. § 2518 was enacted as part of Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which is
codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 ("Title III").
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marijuana, yielding a base offense level of 38. The PSR also
recommended that Martinez should receive a four-level upward
adjustment because of his supervisory role in the offense, pursuant
to USSG § 3B1.1, resulting in a total offense level of 42. Because
he fell within Criminal History Category II, the PSR calculated
Martinez's guideline sentence range to be 360 months to life.
Martinez was also subject to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence
of 10 years pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
Martinez was sentenced on December 11, 2003. He did not
contest the PSR's calculations, and he did not move for a downward
departure or advance an argument for leniency. The district court
accepted the guideline recommendation in the PSR in its entirety.
The district court then sentenced Martinez to a term of 360 months
of imprisonment, the bottom of his applicable guideline range, and
five years of supervised release. Martinez did not object to the
sentence.
II.
A. Legal background
Martinez contends that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the three
Title III wiretaps. The statutory requirements for a Title III
wiretap, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., include what is
commonly referred to as the "necessity" requirement. In an
application for a Title III wiretap, the government must include "a
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full and complete statement as to whether or not other
investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). In United States v.
Villarman-Oviedo, 325 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003), we held § 2518(1)(c)
"to mean that the statement should demonstrate that the government
has made a reasonable, good faith effort to run the gamut of normal
investigative procedures before resorting to means so intrusive as
electronic interception of telephone calls." Id. at 9 (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). In such a statement, "[i]t
is not necessary . . . to show that other methods have been
entirely unsuccessful." Id.
The court authorizing the Title III wiretap "must satisfy
itself that the government has used normal techniques but it has
encountered difficulties in penetrating a criminal enterprise or in
gathering evidence -- to the point where (given the statutory
preference for less intrusive techniques) wiretapping becomes
reasonable." United States v. Abou-Saada, 785 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir.
1986). On appeal, the sufficiency of the government's statement
proffered to satisfy the necessity requirement is reviewed under a
substantially deferential standard. In United States v. Santana,
342 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2003), we stated that "[w]hen reviewing the
government's showing of necessity, our role is not to make a de
novo determination of sufficiency as if we were the issuing judge,
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but to decide if the facts set forth in the application were
minimally adequate to support the determination that was made."
Id. at 65 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations
omitted).
B. Martinez's arguments
Defendant challenges the use of wiretap evidence in this
case on two grounds. First, he argues that "a fair reading of the
affidavits reveals that the statements of necessity are largely
boilerplate and do not relate specifically to the Martinez
investigation." Second, Defendant claims that the government has
"manufacture[d] necessity by defining its investigative goals so
broadly and so generally that a wiretap could be obtained in any
drug investigation." We analyze these assertions in turn.
i. Boilerplate
Martinez says that the affidavits are too general, i.e.,
they do not specifically relate the request for Title III
surveillance to the specific case at hand. This characterization
of the affidavits is inaccurate. The Masiello affidavits describe
in case-specific detail the DEA's use, or consideration and
rejection, of eight traditional investigative techniques: (1)
physical surveillance; (2) cooperating witnesses; (3) undercover
officers; (4) witness interviews; (5) grand jury subpoenas; (6)
search warrants; (7) pen registers; and (8) telephone tolls.
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For example, as to physical surveillance, the affidavits
stated that, while partially successful in advancing the
investigation -- i.e., identifying "Gallo" as Martinez and
tentatively identifying two locations used as "stash houses" or
"money houses" -- physical surveillance was of limited additional
value because it could only tell the DEA what they could see, e.g.,
the contents of opaque black bags could not be ascertained.
Furthermore, the affidavits explained that prolonged surveillance
was not advisable because, in general, it is often detected by the
targets of an investigation.
As to the use of the grand jury, the affidavits explained
that such use would be largely ineffective because the true
identities or actual whereabouts of many of the targets of the
investigation remained unknown. Additionally, the affidavits
opined that if the principals of the conspiracy, their co-
conspirators, and other participants were called to testify before
the grand jury, they would likely be uncooperative and invoke their
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Furthermore, the
affidavits noted that granting immunity to individuals already
identified might insulate highly culpable members of the conspiracy
from prosecution, and premature use of the grand jury could alert
the members of the conspiracy to the investigation.
The Masiello affidavits explained in similar detail the
problems, both actual and potential, with the other six listed
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investigative techniques. Aware of these explanations, Martinez
claims that "[e]ven when they are specific to this investigation,
the problems recited are common to most, if not all, drug
investigations. The affidavits simply do not explain why this
investigation is different from the ordinary drug investigation and
thus warrants use of electronic surveillance while others do not."
In support of this argument, he cites the Tenth Circuit case of
United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 1997)
(overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ramirez-
Encarnacion, 291 F.3d 1219, 1222 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002)). There, the
Tenth Circuit upheld a district court's decision to suppress
evidence obtained from a number of wiretaps because the supporting
affidavits "simply failed to contain any evidence, other than
conclusory evidence that would apply to virtually all drug
conspiracy investigations, that 'normal investigative procedures'
-- particularly 'standard visual and aural surveillance' -- would
have been unlikely to succeed." Id. at 1195 (emphasis omitted).
The affidavits here do not simply reiterate "conclusory
evidence". They explain in detail how and why other normal
investigative techniques were either exhausted or not feasible.
Moreover, Martinez is misguided in his insistence that the
government can meet the Title III necessity requirement only by
showing that the particular investigation at issue is "different
from the ordinary drug investigation". There is no requirement
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that the government establish such a difference. Necessity is a
function of the specifics of the case, not its uniqueness. If a
seemingly "ordinary" drug investigation requires a Title III
wiretap, and the government establishes that necessity with the
particulars of a given investigation, no more is needed. The
ordinariness of the investigation does not preclude a finding of
necessity for the use of wiretaps to further the investigation. In
this instance, we are satisfied that the affidavits provided
sufficient detail to meet the "necessity" requirement of Title III.
ii. Broad investigative goals
Martinez also argues that "the government may not
manufacture necessity by defining its investigative goals so
broadly and so generally that a wiretap could be obtained in any
drug investigation." Specifically, he claims that "the government
clearly and intentionally defined the goals of the Martinez
investigation in such broad terms so as to insure that normal
techniques of investigation were incapable of achieving them."
In support of this position, Martinez cites the Ninth
Circuit case of United States v. Blackmon, 273 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir.
2001). Specifically, he quotes the Ninth Circuit's statement that
the:
generic nature [of the problems of police investigation]
does not dissipate simply because the government claims
a vast investigative purpose. Wiretaps themselves could
little achieve the investigative goals stated in the
government's application. The government may not cast
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its investigative net so far and so wide as to
manufacture necessity in all circumstances.
Id. at 1211.
Blackmon is easily distinguishable. There, the wiretap
application for one defendant, Blackmon, was duplicated -- or to
use the court's phrase "carbon copied" -- from the wiretap
application of another defendant. As a result, there were material
omissions in the affidavits in support of the wiretap on Blackmon.
Moreover, the government did not target any individualized
investigation at Blackmon before applying for a wiretap. See id.
at 1208. Stripped of the language duplicated from the other
affidavit, the affidavit at issue in Blackmon only contained the
"lofty goals", leaving the court with no reason to believe the
government's proffer of necessity as to Blackmon. Here, in
contrast, the government conducted an extensive investigation of
Martinez before applying for a Title III wiretap, and described
that investigation in the affidavits.
More importantly, while Martinez has categorized the
goals of the investigation into his dealings as "impossibly broad
and unrealistic," the goals contained in the Masiello affidavits
are neither. In his first affidavit, Masiello identified the
following investigative objectives: (1) identifying all of the
individuals who were supplying Martinez with cocaine; (2)
identifying the manner in which the organization transported
cocaine; (3) identifying the manner in which payment was made to
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the sources of supply for the cocaine that was distributed by
Martinez; (4) identifying all of the locations where cocaine was
stored by the organization; and (5) identifying the manner in which
Martinez and his associates laundered and invested their drug
proceeds. These are all discrete and realistic goals for a
criminal drug investigation that has legitimately cast a wide net.
They are similar to goals that we have approved for wiretaps in
previous cases.
For example, in Villarman-Oviedo, we upheld a wiretap
where the goals of the investigation were to "uncover[] the full
scope of the potential crimes under investigation, as well as the
identities of those responsible" and to "obtain[] evidence of the
totality of offenses in which the targets of the investigation were
involved." 325 F.3d at 10. In United States v. Santana, 342 F.3d
60 (1st Cir. 2003), we upheld a wiretap that investigators asserted
"was necessary to uncover the full scope of the conspiracy,
including conclusive proof of identity[,] and information as to how
the drug sales were made." Id. at 66; see also United States v.
David, 940 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Ashley, 876
F.2d 1069 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Abou-Saada, 785 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1986). As in those cases, the major goals of the
investigation at issue here were both legitimate and attainable.
The district court properly denied Defendant's motions to suppress.
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III.
Finally, Martinez contends that his sentence should be
vacated and the case remanded for re-sentencing as a result of the
Supreme Court's Booker decision. Because he did not raise a claim
under either Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), or
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and because he did not
challenge the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines below,
his Booker claim is unpreserved. Hence, we review his claim for
plain error only. See United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d
68, 80-81 (1st Cir. 2005).
Under Antonakopoulos, the first two parts of plain error
review are satisfied when a defendant was sentenced under a
mandatory guidelines system.3 Id. at 77. But the defendant must
go on to show that there was prejudice. Id. at 80. That is, he
must show that there was a "reasonable probability" that his
sentence would have been more favorable to him under an advisory
guidelines system. Id. at 78-79. A defendant cannot satisfy this
burden by "the mere assertion that the court might have given the
defendant a more favorable sentence." Id. at 80.
Here, Martinez fails to demonstrate that there is a
reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome on remand. He
3
"The first two prongs of the Olano [plain-error] test as to
Booker error are satisfied whenever defendant's Guidelines sentence
was imposed under a mandatory Guidelines system. There was 'error'
and it was 'plain' at least at the time of appellate
consideration." Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 77.
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cites only one concrete fact -- the district court's decision to
sentence him at the bottom of the applicable guideline range. We
have said repeatedly that reference to a district court's decision
to sentence a defendant at the bottom of the guideline range is not
enough. See, e.g., United States v. Sánchez-Berríos, 424 F.3d 65,
80 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that the fact that defendant was
sentenced at the bottom of the guidelines range, “standing alone,
is manifestly insufficient to satisfy the third element of the
plain error test”); United States v. Guzmán, 419 F.3d 27, 33 (1st
Cir. 2005) ("The fact that the district court imposed a sentence at
the bottom of the guideline sentencing range, standing alone, does
not give rise to a reasonable probability that, under advisory
guidelines, it would have imposed a sentence lower than what the
guidelines prescribed."); accord United States v. Figuereo, 404
F.3d 537, 542 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Cacho-Bonilla, 404
F.3d 84, 95 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Serrano-Beauvaix, 400
F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2005).
For the remainder of his sentencing argument, Martinez
describes the types of claims he would have made to the district
court if an advisory guidelines system had been in place. These
claims take three forms: (1) specific arguments he would have made
attacking the way in which the guidelines were applied to him; (2)
arguments for a more lenient sentence in light of the goals of
sentencing; and (3) his good character.
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As to whether the sentencing judge properly applied the
guidelines, Martinez would have argued, for example, that: (1) the
conspiracy was not really hierarchical in nature so the supervisor
enhancement should not have been applied; (2) the quantity of
cocaine attributed to him, while permitted by the guidelines,
improperly included estimates by cooperating witnesses on
quantities not actually recovered; and (3) his record for a
Category II offender was minor. Martinez did not make any of these
available arguments at sentencing. They do not depend on the
advisory nature of the guidelines. He cannot make these arguments
now on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda-Santiago, 96
F.3d 517, 531 (1st Cir. 1996).
As for his second type of argument, Martinez would have
argued, for example, that a sentence of 30 years without parole for
drug offenses not related to death, bodily injury, or use of force
is too high to accomplish the goals of sentencing. This type of
generality does not provide the specific facts that might persuade
us that there is a "reasonable probability" that his sentence might
have been more favorable under advisory guidelines.
Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 75.
Finally, Martinez asserts that, if his case were
remanded, he would inform the district court of the role he played
in obtaining the dismissal of charges against his girlfriend,
Claudia Sanchez. Martinez apparently contends that the assistance
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he rendered on behalf of his girlfriend is a "mitigating factor
[that] existed but was not available for consideration" pre-Booker.
Although the facts were different, the district court had similar
evidence in mitigation before it when it made its sentencing
decision. This additional fact does not establish a reasonable
probability of a different sentencing outcome.
Affirmed.
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