Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 05-2031
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
LOUIS SEGALLA,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Robert M. Greenspan on brief for appellant.
Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, Lee H.
Vilker, Assistant United States Attorney, and Robert Clark
Corrente, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
September 6, 2006
Per Curiam. After pleading guilty to being a felon in
possession of a gun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and
after admitting that the offense involved shooting the gun in a
residential area to scare someone, defendant Louis Segalla was
sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment, the statutory maximum, which
fell in the middle of the advisory guidelines range.1 In the
district court, Segalla sought a below-guidelines sentence of 72
months, under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
primarily on the ground that he had been physically abused as a
child. On appeal, he argues, in addition, that the 120-month
sentence imposed was unreasonable in light of the nature of the
offense, which he characterizes as relatively minor, that the
sentence is longer than necessary to deal with his admitted need
for rehabilitation, and that his criminal history category
overstates the seriousness of his criminal record. Finally, he
argues that United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514 (1st Cir.
2006) (en banc), which articulated the sentencing protocols to be
followed by the district courts in this circuit and the standards
1
That range, which was ultimately undisputed in the district
court and is not challenged on appeal, was computed as follows:
total offense level of 25 (base offense level of 24, U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(2); plus 4 levels for possessing the gun in connection
with another felony offense--i.e., assault with a dangerous weapon,
id. § 2K2.1(b)(5); minus 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility,
id. § 3E1.1(a) & (b)), combined with a criminal history category of
VI (27 criminal history points, id., ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing
Table)), resulting in a guidelines sentencing range of 110 to 137
months, id.
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of appellate review of sentences post-Booker, was wrongly decided.2
For the reasons detailed below, we find the sentence to be
adequately explained and substantively reasonable in light of the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Accordingly, we reject
Segalla's arguments to the contrary and affirm the sentence.
The district judge expressly took into account each of
the mitigating factors that defense counsel brought to her
attention but found them unpersuasive or outweighed by other
legitimate considerations. As to Segalla's history of child abuse,
the judge stated that, "although [she] was very familiar with the
kind of childhood [he] had[,] [t]hat information . . . only goes so
far. There comes a point in one's life where you have to take
responsibility for your own actions." As to the nature of the
offense, which involved riding a motorcycle while drunk and firing
a gun in a residential area, the judge repeatedly commented on the
danger that conduct posed to the public and to Segalla himself,
which made it significantly more serious than the ordinary felon-
in-possession case. As to Segalla's need for rehabilitation, the
sentence imposed was expressly designed to address Segalla's
recognized need for mental health and substance abuse treatment.
Finally, as to Segalla's criminal history--which included several
instances of violence, particularly against women, and resulted in
2
As Segalla concedes, this panel is powerless to overrule the
court's en banc opinion in Jiménez-Beltre. We therefore do not
address his criticisms of that decision.
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more than twice as many criminal history points as needed to place
him in the highest criminal history category--the judge commented
that Segalla's history makes him a "menace to society," and that,
if her discretion were not limited by the statutory maximum, she
would have imposed a higher sentence based on that factor alone.
In addition, the judge expressly considered the statutory factors,
including the need for punishment, deterrence, and public
protection. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(d)(A), (B), (C).
In sum, because we find the court's reasoning to be
plausible, and the resulting sentence, at least, defensible,
Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 519, we summarily affirm the sentence.
See 1st Cir. R. 27(c).
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