Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1825
FRANK IGWEBUIKE ENWONWU,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Frank Igwebuike Enwonwu, on brief pro se.
Dana Gershengorn, Assistant United States Attorney, and
Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, on Motion for Summary
Disposition.
September 26, 2006
Per Curiam. Frank I. Enwonwu, an alien who was convicted
of drug trafficking in 1986 and faces deportation on that ground,1
sought relief from that conviction by petitioning for a writ of
coram nobis.2 On the government's motion, the district court
denied the petition, and Enwonwu has appealed that denial to this
court. After Enwonwu filed his appellate brief, the government
moved for summary affirmance under 1st Cir. R. 27(c). For the
reasons detailed below, we grant that motion and affirm the
district court's judgment.
Since the district court did not set forth its reasons
for denying the petition, "we may affirm based on any dispositive
issue that is both readily evident and sufficiently supported by
the record." In re Pub. Offering PLE Antitrust Litig., 427 F.3d
49, 52 (1st Cir. 2005). We by-pass the threshold argument raised
by the government concerning the timeliness of the petition, which
turns on disputed facts not resolved by the district court, and
proceed to consider whether the petition states a claim for coram
nobis relief. To the extent that the district court denied the
1
For background on the deportation proceedings, see Enwonwu v.
Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2006). Those proceedings are still
ongoing as a result of this court's remand of Enwonwu's claim for
relief under the Convention Against Torture to the Board of
Immigration Appeals for further consideration. Id. at 35.
2
Alternatively, Enwonwu sought relief under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b), which applies only to civil cases, Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, and
therefore cannot serve as a means of seeking relief from a criminal
conviction.
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petition on that ground, our review of that denial is de novo.
United States v. Sawyer, 239 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 2001).
Assuming, without deciding, that coram nobis relief is
available to correct legal, as opposed to factual, errors, see id.
at 38 (citing Supreme Court dicta to the contrary but finding it
unnecessary to decide that issue), this "'extraordinary remedy'
[is] allowed 'only under circumstances compelling such action to
achieve justice,'" id. (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S.
502, 511 (1954)). Indeed, given the other statutory remedies
available in criminal cases, the Supreme Court found it "difficult
to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where
[a writ of coram nobis] would be necessary or appropriate."
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996). Accordingly,
to invoke the writ to vacate a conviction based on a guilty plea,
as Enwonwu seeks to do here, the petitioner must "demonstrat[e]
that an error of 'the most fundamental character,' relevant to the
plea decision, occurred." Hager v. United States, 993 F.2d 4, 5
(1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512).
Here, the only error Enwonwu relies upon is the purported
ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. This run-of-the-mill ground
for collaterally attacking a conviction, even if meritorious, is
hardly so extraordinary as to warrant coram nobis relief. Indeed,
it is doubtful that Enwonwu's primary claim--that his counsel was
ineffective in failing to advise him of the deportation
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consequences of his plea--constitutes error at all, see United
States v. Gonzales, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000), much less
"error of the most fundamental character" necessary to warrant such
relief.3
Affirmed.
3
Given this conclusion, we need not address the other two
prerequisites for coram nobis relief: justification for failure to
seek relief from his conviction earlier and demonstration of
continuing collateral consequences of the conviction. Sawyer, 239
F.3d at 38.
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