United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1179
MIGUEL A. DIAZ-REYES,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MINERVA FUENTES-ORTIZ, in her official capacity and personal
capacity; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP DOE-FUENTES; REYMUNDO RIVERA-
VIERA, in his official and personal capacity; CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP RIVERA-DOE; LUIS A. FELICIANO-CARRERAS, in his
official and personal capacity; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FELICIANO-
DOE; ALIDA GUZMÁN-RIVERA, in her official and personal capacity;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP DOE-GUZMÁN; LILLIAN SÁNCHEZ-PÉREZ, in her
official and personal capacity; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP DOE-SÁNCHEZ;
MANUEL DÍAZ-SALDAÑA, in his official and personal capacity;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP DÍAZ-DOE; WILLIAM VAZQUEZ-IRIZARRY;
MARA REYES-ALFONSO, in her official and personal capacity;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP DOE-REYES; MARÍA BETANCOURT, in her official
and personal capacity; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP DOE-BETANCOURT;
FRANCISCO PÉREZ-NEWMAN, in his official and personal capacity;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PÉREZ-DOE; INSURANCE COMPANY XYZ;
NYDIA I. HERNÁNDEZ; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP DOE-HERNÁNDEZ;
ROBERTO DE-JESÚS; FERNANDO MORETTA; ZENIA MORETTA;
ROBERTO SANCHEZ,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U. S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Jose M. Casanova Edelman on brief for appellant.
Ruperto J. Robles and Rafael J. Lopez on brief for appellees
Manuel Díaz-Saldana, Comptroller for the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Reymundo Rivera-Viera, Lillian Sánchez Pérez, Mara Reyes
Alfonso, María Betancourt, Minerva Fuentes Díaz, Francisco Pèrez
Newman, Luis A. Feliciano Carreras, Alida Guzmán-Rivera, Nydia I.
Hernández, Roberto De Jesús and Fernando Moretta, all in their
personal and official capacities as well as in representation of
their respective conjugal partnerships.
Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts, Solicitor General, Maite D.
Oronoz-Rodríguez, Deputy Solicitor General and Susana I.
Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, Department of
Justice, on brief for appellee Roberto Sanchez-Ramos, in his
official capacity.
December 27, 2006
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Miguel Diaz-Reyes, an employee of
the Puerto Rico Office of the Comptroller, brought an employment
discrimination action against several employees of the Office of
the Comptroller, in their individual and official capacities, and
against the Secretary of the Puerto Rico Department of Justice, in
his individual and official capacity. The complaint asserted
claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and various
Puerto Rico statutes.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Title VII claims to the
extent that they asserted individual liability on the ground that
such claims are unavailable under Title VII.1 They also moved to
dismiss the remaining claims on various other grounds. The
Comptroller defendants did not, however, move to dismiss the
official capacity claims under Title VII.2 The district court
agreed with all of the defendants' arguments. Accordingly, it
ordered the dismissal of the Title VII claims against the
Comptroller defendants "in their individual capacities" and the
rest of Diaz's claims. Two weeks after the court issued this
1
The parties agreed to litigate this case before a magistrate
judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
2
The Secretary of Justice did argue that the official-capacity
Title VII action against him had to be dismissed because Diaz had
not exhausted administrative remedies by naming him in the Equal
Opportunity Commission charge.
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order, the district court clerk entered a "judgment" dismissing
"the case . . . with prejudice." Diaz filed a notice of appeal ten
days later. For the reasons that follow, we lack jurisdiction to
consider Diaz's appeal.
Neither party has challenged our appellate jurisdiction,
but we have an obligation to inquire into it sua sponte. Global
Naps, Inc. v. Mass. Dep't of Telecomms. & Energy, 427 F.3d 34, 41
(1st Cir. 2005). Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here,
Congress has limited the courts of appeals to reviewing final
judgments of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291;3 see
Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 203-04 (1999)
(explaining that the final judgment rule serves several purposes
including the prevention of piecemeal appeals, the avoidance of
obstruction to just claims, and the promotion of efficient judicial
administration).
A judgment is "any order from which an appeal lies."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a). For an order to constitute a final
judgment, there must be "some clear and unequivocal manifestation
by the [district] court of its belief that the decision made, so
far as the court is concerned, is the end of the case." Goodwin v.
United States, 67 F.3d 149, 151 (8th Cir. 1995); see also United
States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227, 232 (1958)
3
The statute actually uses the term "final decision," but a
final decision is equivalent to a final "judgment." Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003).
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(holding that a pronouncement amounts to a final judgment where it
"clearly evidences the judge's intention that it shall be his final
act in the case").
It is important to distinguish between the judgment
itself under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) and the entry of the judgment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. The judgment is "the act of the court."
Ex Parte Morgan, 114 U.S. 174, 175 (1885). The entry of the
judgment "is the ministerial notation of the judgment by the clerk
of the court." 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2651, at 11 (3d. ed.
1998). While the entry of judgment is crucial to its effectiveness
and to measuring the time to file an appeal, "the mere entry of a
notation by the clerk under Rule 58 does not create a judgment
unless the court intended it to have that effect." Id.; see also
In re Forrester, 177 F.2d 572, 576 (1st Cir. 1949) (stating that
"the rules differentiate between a judgment and the entry of the
judgment, with the implication that the judgment must pre-exist
before the clerk can perform the ministerial act of entering it")
(internal quotation omitted).
Here, the clerk entered a judgment, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 58, two weeks after the district court issued the order
allowing the defendants' motion to dismiss.4 But a review of the
4
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, "unless the court orders otherwise,
the clerk must, without awaiting the court's direction, promptly
prepare, sign, and enter the judgment when the court denies all
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district court's order reveals that the court did not intend this
order to be a final judgment disposing of the litigation. The
order stated that the Title VII claims against the Comptroller
defendants were dismissed only to the extent that they asserted
individual capacity claims. These defendants did not move for
dismissal of the official capacity Title VII claims, and the order
did not mention them. Moreover, the court's order did not purport
to end the case, as it merely listed the claims that were
dismissed. Thus, the clerk's entry of judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 58 appears to have been a clerical error and is without
effect. See Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 544, 548
(7th Cir. 1977) ("Entry of judgment involves a ministerial duty by
the clerk. If the clerk fails to stay within the authority given
him . . . entry of judgment by the clerk is void.") (citations
omitted). Accordingly, there is no judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(a), and we lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Burke
v. Comm'r, 301 F.2d 903, 903-04 (1st Cir. 1962) (per curiam)
(concluding that there was no appellate jurisdiction, despite the
clerk having entered judgment, where it appeared that the district
court did not intend a judgment to issue).5
relief." See generally 11 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2783.
5
A district court may issue a partial judgment to permit an
interlocutory appeal, where, as here, it has dismissed certain
claims or certain parties in their entirety. Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b); see generally Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737,
742-44 (1976). But to do so, the court must make "an express
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Appeal dismissed. The district court, on remand, should
vacate the judgment as void and conduct further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. No costs are awarded.
determination that there is no just reason for delay" and direct
the entry of judgment as to the dismissed claims or parties. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b); see Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts Coll., 843 F.2d
38, 42-44 (1st Cir. 1988) (discussing the elements of a proper Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification). There is no indication that the
district court intended to issue such a partial judgment here.
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