United States v. Gobbi

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 06-1643

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY GOBBI,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Boudin, Chief Judge,

Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

Judith H. Mizner, Assistant Federal Defender, for appellant.
Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Robert Clark Corrente, United States Attorney, James H. Leavey
and Adi Goldstein, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on
brief, for appellee.

December 28, 2006
 SELYA, Circuit Judge. In a split decision, a jury

acquitted defendant-appellant Anthony Gobbi on three counts of a

five-count indictment but convicted him of conspiracy and one

substantive drug-trafficking charge. On appeal, Gobbi mounts a

three-pronged attack, challenging (i) the sufficiency of the

evidence underpinning one of the two counts of conviction; (ii) an

evidentiary ruling; and (iii) two sentencing enhancements.

Concluding, as we do, that Gobbi's arguments are devoid of merit,

we affirm the judgment below.

I. BACKGROUND

This case grows out of a reverse sting operation

conceived by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We

rehearse the relevant facts in the light most hospitable to the

jury's verdict on the counts of conviction, consistent with record

support. See United States v. Maldonado-García, 446 F.3d 227, 229

(1st Cir. 2006).

On June 29, 2000, an FBI agent, Michael McGowan, posing

as a wealthy businessman, met with Robert Nardolillo (a suspected

underworld figure). McGowan said that his business partner

("Manny") wanted to enter the New England drug trade and could

supply Nardolillo with copious amounts of drugs. Nardolillo

expressed interest and acknowledged that he could handle two to

three kilograms of cocaine per week, and possibly more. The men

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agreed to meet again so that McGowan could introduce his apocryphal

partner to Nardolillo.

That fall, Nardolillo and Gobbi traveled to Ft.

Lauderdale, Florida. They met McGowan there on September 28.

After McGowan explained that "Manny" was unavoidably detained,

Gobbi left. McGowan and Nardolillo nonetheless proceeded to

discuss the planned venture.

Thereafter, McGowan and Nardolillo spoke regularly by

telephone about the prospects of doing business together.

Nardolillo instructed McGowan to contact him through his associates

(including Gobbi), and Gobbi in fact acted as an intermediary for

sixteen of the seventeen contacts between McGowan and Nardolillo in

January of 2001.

On January 15, 2001, Nardolillo and Gobbi finally came

face to face with "Manny" (in reality, another undercover FBI

agent). This meeting took place at Centerfolds, a Providence strip

club. Following the initial introduction, Nardolillo spoke

privately with "Manny" for about an hour.

On January 22, McGowan approached Nardolillo about a

possible drug-protection detail. The idea was that Nardolillo and

his crew would guard a cache of cocaine temporarily located in

Rhode Island en route to distribution throughout New England.

Nardolillo readily agreed. McGowan and Nardolillo settled on

remuneration at the rate of $500 per kilogram for the protective

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detail. On March 15, Nardolillo assured McGowan that "I'll put my

guys there, don't worry. There'll be somebody there to watch

[Manny's] stuff all the time." Switching to a different topic,

McGowan informed Nardolillo that "Manny" did not yet have five

kilograms of cocaine that Nardolillo had expressed interest in

buying for his own distribution network.

On April 1, McGowan, Nardolillo, and Gobbi met at a

funeral. Because law enforcement officers were surveilling the

scene, Gobbi escorted McGowan into an office so that he (McGowan)

could confer privately with Nardolillo about the particulars of the

drug-protection detail. Later that month, Nardolillo told McGowan

that he would assign "two guys" to the drug-protection detail; that

both would be well-rested; that the man directly guarding the drug

cache would be prepared to kill if necessary; and that he

(Nardolillo) would divide the agreed payment between the two

operatives. McGowan informed Nardolillo that "Manny" wanted a gun

displayed for a show of force, but that it was not to be fired.

The drug-protection detail was scheduled for April 30.

According to Clifford Falla, Gobbi recruited him for this job. On

the assigned date, Gobbi and Falla met with Nardolillo at

Centerfolds. Nardolillo told the pair that he had arranged for a

drug-protection detail at a local hotel and that Falla was to guard

the drugs. In Gobbi's presence, Nardolillo gave Falla a nine-

millimeter pistol and directed him to display it while on guard.

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Nardolillo explained that Gobbi would lead Falla to the hotel and

wait outside.

During the course of the day, McGowan and Nardolillo met

several times. At 2:00 p.m., McGowan told Nardolillo that a

fifteen-kilogram shipment of cocaine was en route from Boston; that

once the drugs arrived, two men working for "Manny" would measure,

subdivide, and package the cocaine in the hotel room; and that

another man working for "Manny" would team up with Nardolillo's man

to stand guard inside the room. Nardolillo replied: "I trust my

two people." He also remarked that he would have preferred to have

"both my guys" in the room but that, given the arrangement devised

by "Manny," Falla would be the one to stand guard.

Around 6:55 p.m., Nardolillo told McGowan that his two

henchmen were on their way to Centerfolds for a last-minute

briefing. After Nardolillo received a telephone call (later traced

to Gobbi's cell phone), he informed McGowan that his henchmen were

outside the club. Nardolillo proceeded to leave the building,

presumably to convey his final instructions.

When Nardolillo finished, Falla (driving his own car)

followed Gobbi (driving his own car) to a nearby Marriott hotel.

In caravan fashion, Gobbi's nephew (Brian King) and another man

(Christopher Chapman) followed Falla in a third vehicle. Once in

the hotel parking lot, Gobbi gave Falla the keycard to the room and

reminded him to display his gun. Falla, King, and Chapman entered

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the hotel, while Gobbi took up a position at a gas station across

the street.

Once inside the room, Falla displayed his gun and then

placed it in plain view on the bed. The undercover agents posing

as drug packagers spent the next five hours measuring out seventeen

kilograms of what appeared to be cocaine1 and transporting

containers out of the room. When one of the agents asked Falla

about the black Cadillac sedan parked outside (a reference to

Gobbi's automobile), Falla explained: "I basically work for the guy

in the Cadillac and . . . him and I are under [Nardolillo]."

At some point during the evening, Nardolillo learned that

Falla wanted to leave his post. Nardolillo instructed Gobbi to

deny this request. He then told McGowan that "Tony" — which the

jury reasonably could have found was a reference to Gobbi — wanted

to discuss exactly what should be done about Falla.

Immediately thereafter, Gobbi repaired to Centerfolds and

conferred with Nardolillo and McGowan outside the club. Nardolillo

directed Gobbi to input a telephone number into his cell phone;

this number, provided by McGowan, linked to one of the undercover

agents who was toiling in the hotel room. Then, still using

Gobbi's telephone, Nardolillo called the room and spoke with Falla.

1
In point of fact, the substance was not cocaine but a mere
imitation. For ease in exposition, however, we nonetheless refer
to it as cocaine.

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Gobbi thereafter placed four separate calls to the same number over

the course of the evening.

The drug-protection detail concluded just after 1:00 a.m.

on the morning of May 1. Falla called Gobbi, who instructed him to

return to Centerfolds. Nardolillo debriefed Falla and Gobbi, and

then forked over $1,500 (to be divided as they saw fit). Falla and

Gobbi later hid the gun in a barn owned by Gobbi's girlfriend.

On the same day, McGowan paid Nardolillo $4,500 (somewhat

less than the agreed $500 per kilogram). Nardolillo talked freely

with McGowan about his arrangements for the prior evening's drug-

protection detail. Pertinently, he mentioned that Gobbi's role was

to keep an eye on things from outside the hotel, while Falla's role

was to stand guard inside the room. Nardolillo described Gobbi as

"one of my right-hand" men and recounted how Gobbi had responded

when it appeared that Falla might abandon his post. Nardolillo

also said that he would pass along the evening's profits to his

crew (Gobbi, Falla, King, and Chapman).

A second, somewhat similar drug-protection detail took

place on August 22. On this occasion, Gobbi once again recruited

Falla; Nardolillo once again gave Falla a handgun in Gobbi's

presence. The detail was to take place at the Crowne Plaza hotel

in Warwick, Rhode Island. On the assigned date, McGowan handed a

keycard for the designated room to Nardolillo, who gave it to Gobbi

and instructed him to proceed with Falla to the hotel.

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 What followed was substantially similar to what had

transpired on April 30, except that Gobbi did not remain at the

site but, rather, called Falla several times during the course of

the detail. When the job was completed, Gobbi picked up Falla and

drove to Centerfolds. With Gobbi nearby, McGowan paid $3,300 to

Nardolillo. Nardolillo, in turn, paid $750 apiece to Gobbi and

Falla, who then stashed the gun in the same barn.

In due season, a federal grand jury returned a five-count

indictment charging Nardolillo, Gobbi, and Falla with conspiracy to

distribute and possess cocaine with intent to distribute (count 1),

two counts of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to

distribute (counts 2 and 4), and two counts of possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (counts 3 and

5). See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c). Both

of Gobbi's codefendants eventually entered guilty pleas to multiple

counts, but Gobbi stalwartly maintained his innocence.

During the trial, the government called several

witnesses, including McGowan and Falla. Gobbi, testifying to his

own behoof, admitted that he knew of the April 30 drug-protection

detail but denied that he had participated in it. In that

connection, he provided a murky explanation for the multiple calls

made from his cell phone to Nardolillo and Falla on April 30 and

May 1. As to the August 22 detail, he claimed not to have known of

that undertaking at all.

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 After both sides rested, the jury found Gobbi guilty on

count 1 (which charged that Gobbi, Nardolillo, and Falla conspired

to distribute and possess with intent to distribute in excess of

five kilograms of cocaine) and count 2 (which charged that the same

threesome, on or about April 30, 2001, "did knowingly and

intentionally attempt to possess with intent to distribute in

excess of five kilograms" of cocaine).2 The jury acquitted Gobbi

on the remaining three counts.

On April 7, 2006, the district court sentenced Gobbi to

a 160-month incarcerative term. This timely appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Gobbi advances three assignments of error.

These relate, respectively, to the sufficiency of the government's

proof, an evidentiary ruling, and the sentence imposed. We

consider each claim in turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Gobbi — who does not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence underlying his conspiracy conviction (count 1) — maintains

that the proof adduced at trial did not permit his conviction on

count 2. He argues, in effect, that while there may have been

evidence of an overall intent to distribute, there was no evidence

2
The charge was one of attempted possession of cocaine, rather
than possession simpliciter, because the agents used sham cocaine
instead of real cocaine. See, e.g., United States v. Medina-
Garcia, 918 F.2d 4, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1990).

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to establish that any of the three named defendants ever attempted

to possess the cocaine. He emphasizes that there was no evidence

(a) that he, personally, had an intent to possess cocaine or that

he took a substantial step toward that end; (b) that either of his

codefendants had such an intent; or (c) that the cocaine was

destined for any of the three men.

We review preserved objections to evidentiary sufficiency

de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Hernández, 218 F.3d 58, 64

(1st Cir. 2000). Under that standard of review, we will affirm a

conviction as long as the "total evidence, with all reasonable

inferences made in the light most favorable to the government, [is]

such that a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt." United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586, 590 (1st

Cir. 1994). In this undertaking, we consider both direct and

circumstantial evidence, upholding the jury's verdict when it is

"supported by a plausible rendition of the record." United States

v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711 (1st Cir. 1992).

Here, however, Gobbi made no timely motion for judgment

of acquittal below. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. In the absence of

such a motion, we can provide relief on a sufficiency challenge

only if the verdict threatens to work a clear and gross injustice.

See Maldonado-García, 446 F.3d at 230; United States v. Hadfield,

918 F.2d 987, 996 (1st Cir. 1990). As we explain below, the

evidence in this case suffices to sustain the conviction under the

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ordinary standard of review and, a fortiori, the conviction

survives review under the latter standard.

With respect to count 2, the district court instructed

the jury, without objection, that it could find Gobbi guilty based

on any of three theories: a standard attempt formulation, aiding

and abetting, or Pinkerton liability.3 The jury returned a general

verdict on count 2. The law is crystalline that, when the

government has advanced several alternate theories of guilt and the

trial court has submitted the case to the jury on that basis, an

ensuing conviction may stand as long as the evidence suffices to

support any one of the submitted theories. See, e.g., Griffin v.

United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49-51, 55-60 (1991); United States v.

Moran, 393 F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2004). Here, the aiding and

abetting theory appears to be the government's strongest, so we

start there.

To prove attempt, the government must show that a

defendant intended to commit the substantive offense and that he

took a substantial step toward its commission. United States v.

Doyon, 194 F.3d 207, 210 (1st Cir. 1999). Here, the substantive

offense — possession of drugs with intent to distribute — is

3
In Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), the
Supreme Court ruled that a defendant could be found guilty for a
substantive criminal act of a coconspirator that was reasonably
foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at
647-48.

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criminalized by 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). For purposes of that

statute, possession may be either actual or constructive. See

United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 518 (1st Cir. 1994).

Actual possession is "the state of immediate, hands-on physical

possession." United States v. Zavala Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 6 (1st

Cir. 1994). Constructive possession occurs when "a person

knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise

dominion and control over an object, either directly or through

others." United States v. Ocampo-Guarin, 968 F.2d 1406, 1409-10

(1st Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Constructive possession of drugs may be "inferred from a

defendant's dominion and control over an area where narcotics are

found." United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir.

1993).

Aided by these abstract principles, we must determine

whether a reasonable jury could have found that Gobbi aided and

abetted an attempt to possess cocaine on April 30, 2001 (the

distribution element is obvious, and so it need not be examined).

Since there is no suggestion of actual possession, the question

reduces to one of constructive possession. This question demands

an affirmative answer: the evidence, taken in the light most

favorable to the verdict, supports a conclusion that one of Gobbi's

accomplices, Falla, intended constructively to possess the ersatz

cocaine handled during the April 30 drug-protection detail; that he

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took substantial steps in that direction; and that Gobbi aided and

abetted him in that endeavor. We elaborate below.

On this record, the jury reasonably could have found that

Falla understood the purpose of a drug-protection detail; that he

took a handgun to the hotel room in order to advance that goal;

that he displayed the weapon to establish his dominion and control

over the cocaine; that no one else in the room made a similar show

of force; and that he remained in the room until the job ended.

Although Falla did not have exclusive possession of the cocaine,

the government did not need to prove that he did; culpable

possession, whether actual or constructive, may be either exclusive

or joint. Zavala Maldonado, 23 F.3d at 6. Falla could be found to

have had joint constructive possession of the cocaine, and to have

intended to exclude others, not in the room, from possessing it.

No more was exigible.

Of course, there was no cocaine (only a substance that

resembled cocaine), so Falla could be found guilty only of

attempted possession. See supra note 2. The question, then, is

whether the jury reasonably could have found that Gobbi aided and

abetted Falla in this attempted possession. We think that it could

have done so.

A defendant may be convicted of aiding and abetting when

the evidence shows "(1) that the underlying offense was committed

by a principal; (2) that the defendant consciously shared the

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principal's knowledge; and (3) that he willfully associated himself

in some way with the crime and willfully participated in it as he

would in something he wished to bring about." United States v.

Keene, 341 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Viewing Falla as the principal, the

first prong of this three-part paradigm was satisfied. So, too,

was the second: the jury reasonably could have found that Gobbi

consciously shared Falla's guilty knowledge. After all, there was

evidence that Gobbi recruited Falla for the venture and stood by

while Nardolillo armed him and described how the job was to be

done.

The third part of the paradigm was also satisfied. The

record readily supports a finding of Gobbi's culpable

participation. To mention only a few items, there was evidence

that Gobbi led Falla to the hotel, provided the keycard to the

room, kept watch from the street, relayed information to and from

Nardolillo during the course of the drug-protection detail, and

spoke several times with Falla in an effort to ensure the

successful completion of the operation.

The short of it is that the evidence was ample to ground

a finding of guilt on an aiding and abetting theory. See, e.g.,

United States v. Harris, 397 F.3d 404, 415 (6th Cir. 2005). Gobbi,

however, endeavors to blunt the force of this reasoning, citing a

covey of inapposite cases. See, e.g., United States v.

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Yossunthorn, 167 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v.

Harris, 733 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1984). He also seeks to exploit a

perceived discrepancy in the government's proof. We briefly

discuss that discrepancy.

A video surveillance record introduced into evidence

indicated that Falla entered the hotel room at 8:19 p.m. (around

twilight on April 30). A law enforcement officer testified,

however, that Gobbi left the gas station before dark. Gobbi

strives to convince us that this seeming inconsistency is of great

moment. We are not persuaded.

Taking a narrow view of this supposed discrepancy,

Gobbi's argument is undermined by points he himself raises: the

officer's testimony that he first noticed Gobbi's car at the gas

station after Falla had entered the hotel, and Falla's testimony

that he had a conversation with Gobbi in the hotel parking lot just

before entering the hotel. The testimony is not perfectly

consistent but, taking a more global view, we are constrained to

note that trial testimony often is a notoriously imperfect means of

reproducing past events. Exactitude is desirable, but it is not a

necessary condition to a finding of credibility. Minor

inconsistences are common, unavoidable, and virtually always grist

for the factfinder's mill. It was ultimately the province of the

jury to assess the significance of any contradictions in the

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evidence — particularly a contradiction as petty as this one. See

United States v. Thomas, 467 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2006).

We have said enough on this score. Having reviewed the

record with care, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to

support Gobbi's conviction on count 2 of the indictment on an

aiding and abetting theory. That conclusion, in terms, renders it

unnecessary for us to consider either of the government's alternate

theories of guilt.

B. Admission of Evidence.

Gobbi's next claim of error is that the district court

improperly admitted evidence of discussions about a possible drug

sale from "Manny" to Nardolillo. The main thrust of this claim is

that the conspiracy charge (count 1) centered around a drug-

protection detail rather than a drug-purchasing scheme and that,

therefore, the challenged conversations (which spanned a seven-

month period from June of 2000 through January of 2001) were

unfairly prejudicial, and unjustifiably injected evidence of other

(uncharged) bad acts into the case.

We set the stage. On the first day of trial Gobbi,

relying on Evidence Rule 404(b) and arguably on Evidence Rule 403

— for purposes of this appeal, we give Gobbi the benefit of the

doubt — objected to evidence of a January 15 conversation relating

to the drug-purchasing phase of the investigation. The district

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court overruled the objection. The court later extended its ruling

to cover this entire line of testimony.

The two rules upon which Gobbi relies are familiar. The

former rule prohibits evidence of other uncharged crimes or bad

acts to "prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The latter rule

provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative

value is substantially outweighed" by, inter alia, a "danger of

unfair prejudice." Fed. R. Evid. 403. We examine the force of

each rule separately, mindful that an appellate court customarily

reviews a trial court's rulings admitting or excluding evidence

only for abuse of discretion. See Maldonado-García, 446 F.3d at

231.

1. Rule 404(b). The prohibition against "other acts"

evidence typically refers to evidence that is extrinsic to the

crime charged and introduced for the purpose of showing propensity.

See, e.g., United States v. Epstein, 426 F.3d 431, 438-39 (1st Cir.

2005); United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 155 (1st

Cir. 1989). Here, however, we never reach the question of

propensity; the drug-purchasing evidence in this case is intrinsic

to the conspiracy described in count 1 of the indictment. That is

to say, the evidence comprises part and parcel of the charged

offense. Thus, the evidence is not "other acts" evidence at all

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and, accordingly, Rule 404(b) is not implicated. See United States

v. Villarman-Oviedo, 325 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003).

To be sure, Gobbi calls attention to the prosecutor's

closing argument (which focused narrowly on the two drug-protection

details) and the fact that McGowan did not have a single

substantive conversation with Gobbi about possible drug-purchasing

activity. On this basis, Gobbi suggests that the conversations

about drug purchases do not relate in any way to the conspiracy

with which he was charged and of which he was convicted.4 This is

sheer persiflage.

The short answer to Gobbi's plaint is that the charged

conspiracy was broader than he acknowledges. While there is no

doubt that the lion's share of the government's proof on count 1

centered around the drug-protection phase of the conspiracy, the

government also proffered evidence of an integrated drug-purchasing

phase. Having knowingly joined the overall conspiracy, Gobbi was

criminally responsible for both phases of its illicit endeavors.

United States v. Barnes, 244 F.3d 172, 176 (1st Cir. 2001) ("After

all, a conspiracy is a continuum. Once a participant knowingly

4
In some ways, Gobbi's argument resembles an argument that a
variance existed between the single conspiracy charged in the
indictment and what he views as multiple conspiracies presented at
trial. No such issue was appropriately raised below (say, by
seeking a jury instruction on single versus multiple conspiracies),
nor has such an issue been briefed in those terms on appeal.
Consequently, we treat any "single versus multiple conspiracy"
claim as waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st
Cir. 1990).

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helps to initiate the agreement and set it in motion, he assumes

conspirator's responsibility for the foreseeable actions of his

confederates within the scope of the conspiratorial agreement . .

. .").

As described in the indictment, the charged conspiracy

spanned a period of approximately fourteen months, from June 29,

2000 through August 22, 2001. Several of the discussions pertained

to the drug-purchasing phase, and the record supports a finding

that Gobbi knew of the full sweep of the conspiracy.5 Given this

configuration, as a whole, we cannot say that the district court

erred in determining that evidence of Nardolillo's interest in

purchasing a supply of cocaine from "Manny" and distributing those

drugs locally with the help of his crew was part of the warp and

woof of the conspiracy charged. See, e.g., Villarman-Oviedo, 325

F.3d at 11; United States v. Escobar-de Jesus, 187 F.3d 148, 167-70

(1st Cir. 1999).

2. Rule 403. Gobbi's claim of prejudice fares no

better. Although the conversations spanned a period of many

months, the testimony about them was relatively brief and its

5
Indeed, there was evidence that Gobbi attended at least two
meetings (on September 28, 2000 and January 15, 2001) that related
to Nardolillo's pursuit of a supply relationship with McGowan's
principal; that he frequently acted as a catalyst for conversations
between Nardolillo and McGowan in early 2001; and that some of
those talks touched upon a proposed drug-purchasing scheme.

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effect was more likely to cast Nardolillo, rather than Gobbi, in a

villainous light.

This does not mean, of course, that there was absolutely

no prejudice. "By design, all evidence is meant to be prejudicial;

it is only unfair prejudice which must be avoided." Rodriguez-

Estrada, 877 F.2d at 156. The trial judge, who saw and heard the

evidence play out, apparently discerned no unfair prejudice here.

That implicit determination was well within the realm of his

considerable discretion. See id. at 155-56 ("Only rarely — and in

extraordinarily compelling circumstances — will we, from the vista

of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot

judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and

unfair effect." (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d

1331, 1340 (1st Cir. 1988))).

C. Sentencing.

In sentencing Gobbi, the district court placed him in

criminal history category II; set his base offense level at 34;

applied a two-level weapons enhancement, see USSG §2D1.1(b)(1); and

added two more levels for obstruction of justice, see id. §3C1.1.

These determinations yielded a guideline sentencing range (GSR) of

262-327 months. At the disposition hearing Gobbi, among other

things, unsuccessfully objected to the two enhancements. Then, on

reasonableness grounds, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,

261 (2005); United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518-19

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(1st Cir. 2006) (en banc), he requested a sentence between 120 and

180 months. After taking into account the factors limned in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court determined that a below-the-range

sentence was appropriate and imposed a 160-month incarcerative

term.

On appeal, Gobbi challenges only the two enhancements.6

These claims are properly before us; even under an advisory

guidelines regime, computation of the guideline sentencing range

remains the starting point for sentencing. See United States v.

Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 203-04 (1st Cir. 2006); Jiménez-Beltre, 440

F.3d at 518-19. Accordingly, the sentencing court is still obliged

to calculate the GSR — and calculate it correctly.7

1. The Weapons Enhancement. We begin with the weapons

enhancement. Gobbi argues that the district court violated his

Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by applying this enhancement.

Since the jury acquitted him on counts 3 and 5 — the counts that

charged Gobbi, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), with possession of a

handgun in furtherance of drug-protection details — he asserts that

6
Since Gobbi does not challenge either his assigned criminal
history category or his base offense level, we leave unelucidated
the facts underpinning those determinations.
7
The fact that a district court operating under an advisory
guidelines regime, as here, imposes a sentence below the GSR does
not moot a defendant's claim of error with respect to the
calculation of the range. Cf. United States v. Gregorio, 956 F.2d
341, 342 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding appellate jurisdiction
where defendant, despite a downward departure, challenged
calculation of GSR).

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a sentencing enhancement for the same alleged conduct is

impermissible. In Gobbi's view, where conduct constitutes a

distinct offense, actually charged as a separate crime and rejected

by the jury, that conduct cannot bear the weight of a sentencing

enhancement.

The sentencing guidelines provide that a two-level

enhancement is proper if "a dangerous weapon (including a firearm)

was possessed" in the course of the offense. USSG §2D1.1(b)(1).

This provision is applicable whether the weapon is possessed by the

defendant himself or by one of his coconspirators. See United

States v. Ortiz-Torres, 449 F.3d 61, 77-79 (1st Cir. 2006); see

also USSG §1B1.3 (specifying that "all reasonably foreseeable acts"

by a defendant's confederates that are "in furtherance of the

jointly undertaken criminal activity" may be attributed to the

defendant for sentencing purposes as relevant conduct). The

enhancement should attach if the weapon was present during the

commission of the crime "unless it is clearly improbable that the

weapon was connected with the offense." USSG §2D1.1 cmt. n.3.

It is true that the jury acquitted Gobbi of possession of

a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Nevertheless, the

pre-Booker case law made plain that acquitted conduct, proved to

the sentencing court by a preponderance of the evidence, may form

the basis of a sentencing enhancement. See, e.g., United States v.

Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997); United States v. Caba, 241 F.3d

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98, 101 (1st Cir. 2001). Post-Booker, the law has not changed in

this regard; acquitted conduct, if proved by a preponderance of the

evidence, still may form the basis for a sentencing enhancement.

See United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(collecting cases); see also United States v. Baskin, 424 F.3d 1,

4 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005) (adumbrating this result).

That closes the book on this aspect of Gobbi's appeal.

The record contains a surfeit of evidence that Falla used a handgun

in performing guard duty during the April 30 drug-protection

detail; that Gobbi was present when Nardolillo supplied Falla with

the gun for that use; that Gobbi encouraged Falla to display the

gun as a show of force; that Falla followed these instructions; and

that Gobbi helped dispose of the gun following the completion of

the job. That is more than enough to ground a finding, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that a dangerous weapon was

possessed by a coconspirator during and in furtherance of the

commission of the offense of conviction. The sentencing court's

fact-based determination that the enhancement pertained was,

therefore, not clearly erroneous. See Ortiz-Torres, 449 F.3d at 77

(delineating applicable standard of review).

2. Obstruction of Justice. Gobbi's remaining challenge

is to the sufficiency of the district court's findings in

connection with an obstruction of justice enhancement. The

district court invoked this enhancement after it determined that

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Gobbi had committed perjury when he testified in his defense. See

USSG §3C1.1; id. cmt. n.4(b). We review this finding for clear

error. See United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 229 (1st Cir.

1991).

At the disposition hearing, the district court stated

that, upon review of the record, it had discerned a stark

contradiction between Gobbi's trial testimony and the reality of

the relevant events. With specific reference to the counts of

conviction (counts 1 and 2), the court commented that Gobbi's

wholesale denial of any involvement in either the conspiracy or the

April 30 drug-protection detail constituted a web of lies. On that

basis, the court determined that he had committed perjury and,

accordingly, deployed the two-level obstruction of justice

enhancement.

Post-Booker, it remains the province of the sentencing

court to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether a

factual basis for a finding of perjury (and, thus, for an

obstruction of justice enhancement) exists. United States v.

O'Brien, 435 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2006). It is, of course,

improper to impose such an enhancement mechanically, merely because

an evidentiary conflict exists or because the jury rejects the

defendant's explanation of the facts and finds him guilty. See

Akitoye, 923 F.2d at 228-29. The sentencing court must make an

independent judgment, see United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87,

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95 (1993), and in doing so must give the defendant the benefit of

any plausible doubt, see Akitoye, 923 F.2d at 228-29.

Here, the trial judge carried out that mandate. He made

a careful evaluation of Gobbi's veracity, specified particular

concerns, and concluded that Gobbi had lied. Giving due heed to

both the trial judge's unique coign of vantage and the deferential

standard of review, we uphold his determination that Gobbi

deliberately prevaricated about material events in an effort to

gain his freedom. The enhancement here was evidenced by more than

a garden-variety conflict in trial testimony or a jury's rejection

of a defendant's protestation of his innocence.

III. CONCLUSION

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,

we affirm the judgment below in all particulars.

Affirmed.

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