Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 05-2289
05-2360
CHARLES N. WATSON, JR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TRANS UNION LLC; NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Gene Carter, Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lipez, Circuit Judge,
Campbell and Selya, Senior Circuit Judges.
Charles N. Watson, Jr., on brief pro se.
Mark E. Kogan and Kogan, Trichon & Wertheimer, P.C., on brief
for appellee Trans Union LLC.
Peter D. Klein and Eaton Peabody, on brief for appellee New
Cingular Wireless Services, Inc.
March 1, 2007
Per Curiam. Plaintiff Charles N. Watson, Jr. is a federal
prisoner who claims to be a victim of identity theft. Invoking the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 - 1681x, as
well as state law, he brought this pro se action against a credit
reporting agency and a telephone company. He there complained,
inter alia, that credit had been extended in his name to an
imposter and that, as a result, his credit report contained
unfavorable, inaccurate information. The district court, finding
plaintiff's jumbled claims difficult to follow, ordered him to file
an amended complaint within 20 days setting forth his allegations
in intelligible fashion. When plaintiff appeared to miss that
deadline, the court dismissed the state claims (for a separate
reason cited by a magistrate judge), but gave plaintiff one more
opportunity to delineate his FCRA claims. The amended complaint
that was subsequently proffered, however, was also deemed to lack
the requisite clarity. The court accordingly dismissed the federal
claims as a sanction for noncompliance with its earlier order.
Plaintiff now appeals.
The challenge to the dismissal of the FCRA claims fails
for lack of any sustained argument. Plaintiff's entire discussion
on appeal boils down to the following two assertions: (1) in
response to the court's order, he submitted a "clear" and
"comprehensible" and "concise" amended complaint that set forth
"valid arguments" in "chronological order" stating "cognizable
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claims" that "warrant relief"; and (2) such a pro se filing
deserved liberal construction. Plaintiff offers no description of
his claims and no analysis of why dismissal was an inappropriate
sanction. Instead, he has "merely ... mention[ed] a possible
argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do [his]
work." United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
As we have repeatedly held, "issues adverted to in a perfunctory
fashion, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,
are deemed waived." Id. (quoted in United States v. Casas, 425
F.3d 23, 30 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1397
(2006)). And while pro se litigants are held to a less stringent
standard, see, e.g., Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st
Cir. 1997), they are not immune from these requirements, see, e.g.,
United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir. 2003);
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 172 (1st Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff's challenge to the dismissal of his state
claims fails for the same reason. The magistrate judge recommended
that these claims be dismissed on preemption grounds, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681h(e); the district judge held that recommendation in abeyance
pending the filing of an amended complaint within 20 days; when no
complaint was received by that deadline, the district judge
dismissed these claims as recommended; and the amended complaint
arrived in the mail shortly thereafter. On appeal, plaintiff
protests that the court acted prematurely, inasmuch as application
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of the "mailbox rule" rendered his submission timely. Cf. Casanova
v. Dubois, 304 F.3d 75, 78-80 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying mailbox rule
in § 1983 context). Whatever the merit of that argument, his brief
presents no substantive challenge to the preemption ruling itself.
This matter too has thus been forfeited.
We add that no reason exists to afford plaintiff any
special solicitude in this regard. Given his failure fully to
comply with the court's June 17, 2005 order, it is not immediately
apparent that the sanction of dismissal was an abuse of discretion.
But even if it were, plaintiff's prospects of ultimately
establishing injury would have been minimal. For example, he
admits that he has not applied for credit during the relevant
period and will not do so during his remaining years of
incarceration. His principal grievance involves an inaccurate
listing that has been removed from his credit report. None of his
claims consists of an allegation that creditors are seeking to hold
him personally liable for the fraudulent charges. And his
reference to "mental duress" is entirely conclusory.
In No. 05-2360, the judgment is affirmed. No. 05-2289,
an earlier interlocutory appeal, is dismissed for lack of appellate
jurisdiction.
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