United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1920
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
KEITH MATERAS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella, and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
Frank L. Bruno, for appellant.
Terry L. Ollila, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Thomas P. Colantuono, United States Attorney, and Aixa Maldonado-
Quiñones, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for
appellee.
April 10, 2007
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Keith
Materas appeals the district court's denial of his motions to
suppress evidence seized and statements made during the search that
led to his arrest for possession with intent to distribute ecstasy
and methamphetamine. We agree with the district court that Materas
was not entitled to a Franks hearing1 on the suppression of the
evidence, and that Materas was not entitled to suppression of
statements made after he waived his Miranda rights.
I. Background
A. The Search Warrant
On October 14, 2004, Detective Frank Bourgeois of the
Nashua Police Department applied for a no-knock search warrant for
374 Thornton Street, Manchester, New Hampshire, which he alleged
was Materas's residence. In his supporting affidavit, Detective
Bourgeois relied on the following events as a basis for the
warrant.
In January 2004, a man complained to the Manchester
Police Department that his boyfriend was being held against his
will by Materas and Peter Deprisco at 374 Thornton Street. He
expressed his belief that Materas and Deprisco were supplying large
1
A defendant who believes that the police included false
statements or material omissions in an affidavit underlying a
search warrant may request an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).
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amounts of methamphetamine to dealers in Manchester, and eventually
admitted that he had bought drugs from them in the past.
Six months later, another man told the Manchester Police
Department that he had been held against his will at 454 Hanover
Street in Manchester. He claimed that he had smoked what he
believed to be methamphetamine with several people, including one
named Keith. The police responded to the same address and
identified "Keith" as Keith Materas.
In September 2004, the Manchester Police Department
responded to a domestic dispute at 374 Thornton Street, where
Materas and Deprisco identified themselves as co-owners and
residents of that address.
During the same month, the New Hampshire Drug Task Force,
of which Detective Bourgeois was a member, received information
that an individual named Keith, a homosexual man who lived in
Manchester, was the largest supplier of methamphetamine in the
state. In an unrelated incident, the Nashua Police Department also
learned from a cooperating individual in its custody that two men
named Keith and Peter of 454 Hanover Street were selling
methamphetamine.
On October 12, 2004, Detective Bourgeois arranged a
controlled purchase of a small amount of methamphetamine by a
confidential informant at 374 Thornton Street. The informant
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entered the residence and returned with methamphetamine, which he
claimed to have bought inside from Materas.
B. The Search
After the Manchester District Court issued the no-knock
warrant on October 14, 2005, the police executed the warrant the
same day, led by Detective Bourgeois. Ten to fifteen officers
entered the residence with guns drawn2 and proceeded directly
toward the basement, where they believed Materas and Deprisco were
residing while the upper floors of the residence were under
construction. In fact, Materas did not reside at 374 Thornton
Street; he had been living at 454 Hanover Street for more than
three months prior to the application for the search warrant.
Nonetheless, the officers found Materas and Deprisco standing in
the hall, where they were apprehended and handcuffed. Materas
maintains that he was under the influence of methamphetamine at the
time of entry.
Detective Bourgeois proceeded into the basement, where he
found Materas's dog. Materas claims that the detective threatened
to shoot the dog if he did not keep him under control. Detective
Bourgeois denied making such a threat, testifying that he put the
dog in a closet in order to allow the officers to search the room.
2
Detective Bourgeois's affidavit included information from a
confidential informant that Deprisco possessed a firearm.
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The officers then moved the two men into the basement,
where Deprisco became uncooperative. After Deprisco was removed
from the room, and while approximately six other officers searched
the room, Detective Bourgeois told Materas, who was still
handcuffed, that if he would tell them where the drugs were, it
would save them from having to tear the place apart. Detective
Bourgeois testified at trial that his intent was to make the
process easier for everyone, given the clutter in the room and his
belief that the drugs were there. Materas then indicated that the
drugs were located in a clear plastic case behind Detective
Bourgeois.
At some point, Detective Bourgeois searched Materas, and
in the process asked him to undo his pants. Because he was not
wearing underwear, his genitals were exposed for a brief period.
After the drugs were found, Materas was removed upstairs
to the kitchen area, where he was read his Miranda rights and
questioned further. Detective Bourgeois testified that Materas did
not exhibit signs of being under the influence of any substance,
although Materas did tell the detective that he was a
methamphetamine addict, using one to two grams a day. No guns were
drawn during Materas's interrogation.
Materas was cooperative and answered Bourgeois's
questions, as well as those of a DEA agent also present. Materas
stated that he received just under a pound of methamphetamine every
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six to eight weeks, which he used and distributed to friends. He
admitted that most of the drugs found in the search were his. Some
of the drugs, however, he attributed to Deprisco, with whom he had
lived at the 374 Thornton Street residence for twelve years. He
indicated that he and Deprisco had broken up, but were recently
reunited.
Materas was then moved to the Manchester Police
Department. There, Detective Bourgeois read him his Miranda rights
again, and asked Materas to sign a form waiving his rights, which
he did. Later, Detective Bourgeois relayed a message to Materas
that his attorney had called and was trying to reach him. Materas
voluntarily signed another form waiving his rights and indicated
that he wanted to continue to cooperate. During his questioning at
the police station, Materas reiterated the statements he had
previously made after waiving his Miranda rights at the residence.
C. Proceedings
On March 23, 2005, a federal grand jury returned a three-
count indictment against Materas. Count 1 charged Materas with
distribution of methamphetamine, and Counts 2 and 3 charged him
with possession with intent to distribute ecstasy and five or more
grams of methamphetamine, respectively, all in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
On July 18, 2005, Materas filed a motion to suppress the
statements he made during the search. He asserted that he should
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have been read his Miranda rights before being questioned on the
location of the drugs and that he was interrogated under coercive
circumstances while the police knew that he was under the influence
of methamphetamine. Materas also filed a separate motion to
suppress the evidence seized as a result of the search. He argued
that the search was invalid because Detective Bourgeois failed to
provide proof of his informant's credibility, which was undermined
by the informant's failure to tell the police that Materas did not
reside at 374 Thornton Street.
On August 19, 2005, the district court heard and denied
both motions. The court ruled that the circumstances of the
controlled buy at 374 Thornton Street constituted adequate probable
cause to justify the search, whether or not the warrant contained
other material omissions or false statements. The judge clarified
at the defense's request that Materas was not entitled to a Franks
hearing because even if he could prove everything that he claimed,
it still would not be enough to support suppression.
With respect to Materas's statements subsequent to being
read his Miranda rights, the court specifically determined that
there was nothing "unusually coercive about the circumstances"
surrounding Materas's waiver of his Miranda rights. It also
concluded that Detective Bourgeois had acted "entirely in good
faith" and that his initial question about the location of the
drugs was not intended to undermine Materas's rights. The court
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went on to note that Materas's intitial statement concerning the
location of the drugs would be suppressed and that the government
had no intention of using the statement in its principal case.
Finally, the court deferred the determination of whether the
statement could be used for impeachment purposes.
Following the denial of his motions to suppress, Materas
changed his plea to guilty on the two counts of possession,
reserving his right to appeal the court's suppression rulings. On
May 24, 2006, the court dismissed Count 1 and sentenced Materas to
seventy months imprisonment on each of Counts 2 and 3, to be served
concurrently.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Materas argues that the district court erred
in imposing too high a burden for his preliminary showing that he
was entitled to a Franks hearing. He further argues that the
police coerced him into making his initial statement indicating
where the drugs were located, and that suppression of only that
initial statement, rather than all statements made to the police
thereafter, is an inadequate remedy for the violation of his
constitutional rights. After carefully considering Materas's
arguments, we affirm the district court's denial of his motions to
suppress.
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A. Franks Hearing
We review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear error.
United States v. Nelson-Rodríguez, 319 F.3d 12, 34 (1st Cir. 2003).
Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), a defendant
may request an evidentiary hearing to challenge police misconduct
in drafting an affidavit in support of a search warrant. The
defendant "must make a 'substantial preliminary showing' that the
affidavit included a false statement which was made either
knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the
truth, and that this misstatement was necessary to the finding of
probable cause." Nelson-Rodríguez, 319 F.3d at 34 (quoting Franks,
438 U.S. at 155-56).
Materas first challenges the constitutionality of the
standard set forth in Franks. He cursorily argues that this
"overly burdensome requirement" essentially demands that the
defendant prove his case before having an opportunity to obtain the
testimony necessary to prove his case. We do not find the Franks
standard particularly burdensome, and we note that the Supreme
Court would not have announced an unconstitutional standard for
challenging an affidavit in support of a search warrant when it
decided the Fourth Amendment issue in Franks.
Materas then asserts that he made a sufficient showing to
afford him a full Franks hearing. He argues that the police knew
that he did not live at the address for which the search warrant
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was issued, and that they purposefully misled the magistrate into
issuing the warrant based on a non-existent nexus between the drugs
sought and the location to be searched. See United States v.
Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 1997) ("A nexus between the
objects to be seized and the place to be searched for them is
established when the circumstances set out in the affidavit would
warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the articles
sought would be found at the place to be searched.").
We, however, agree with the district court that an
evidentiary hearing was not required. Even if Materas could prove
that the police intentionally misrepresented that Materas lived at
374 Thornton Street, the affidavit describes a controlled buy that
took place two days earlier at the same location involving Materas.
The controlled buy from Materas alone provided sufficient probable
cause for issuing the search warrant. Common sense dictates that
evidence of Materas's possession could probably be found in the
location where he sold drugs two days before. United States v.
Ribeiro, 397 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[T]he application must
give someone of 'reasonable caution' reason to believe that
evidence of a crime will be found at the place to be searched.").
In addition, the affidavit contained other information linking
Materas to the address, even though he no longer lived there.
Therefore, there was no error at all in the district court's
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decision to deny the Franks hearing on the basis that probable
cause existed independent of the alleged flaws in the affidavit.3
Finally, Materas claims that the district court imposed
too high a burden on him by requiring him to show that suppression
was warranted as a result of the alleged flaws in the affidavit.
He bases his argument on the trial judge's statement at the
suppression hearing that Materas had not shown "a sufficient basis
to justify a conclusion that the evidence seized as a result of the
warrant should be suppressed based on the warrant containing
material omissions or material false statements." Our prior
conclusion that the affidavit supported probable cause independent
of the alleged flaws, however, renders this argument toothless.
Regardless of the district court's language, it correctly
determined that Materas was not entitled to a Franks hearing.
B. Motion to Suppress Materas's Statements
We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo as
to questions of law, and for clear error as to questions of fact.
United States v. Vongkaysone, 434 F.3d 68, 73 (1st Cir. 2006). We
3
Materas also makes a cursory argument that "the affidavit's sole
reliance on the information provided by a previously unproven
confidential informant provided the magistrate with [an
insufficient] basis upon which to make a determination as to the
informant's credibility," citing United States v. Barnard, 299 F.3d
90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Where an affidavit relies on the reports
of unnamed informants, it must provide some information upon which
the issuing justice can assess the credibility of the informant's
information."). As we stated above, however, the detective's own
report on the controlled buy was sufficient to establish probable
cause for the search warrant.
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will uphold the district court's decision if "any reasonable view
of the evidence supports the decision." United States v. Hawkins,
279 F.3d 83, 85 (1st Cir. 2002).
Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966),
evidence obtained as a result of police interrogation prior to the
defendant being read his "Miranda rights" cannot generally be used
against the defendant in the prosecution's case in chief. The
consequences of a Miranda violation, however, are limited. For
instance, the Miranda rule is not subject to the "fruits of the
poisonous tree" doctrine.4 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630,
642 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 307 (1985) ("[T]he Miranda presumption . . . does not require
that the [unwarned] statements and their fruits be discarded as
inherently tainted."). As another example, the prosecution can use
uncompelled statements obtained without Miranda warnings for
impeachment purposes. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307-08 (citing Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
No one disputes that Materas's initial statement
regarding the location of the drugs was obtained in violation of
Miranda. Although the government agreed not to use the statement,
Materas argues that suppression of only that statement is not an
4
This doctrine requires the exclusion "not only [of] illegally
obtained evidence itself, but also . . . other incriminating
evidence derived from the primary evidence." Nix v. Williams, 467
U.S. 431, 441 (1984).
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adequate remedy to redress the violation of his rights. He claims
that use of the statement for impeachment purposes would deny a
defense that he did not know the drugs were present. Further, he
urges us to consider his entire interrogation as one ongoing event
resulting from the hostile circumstances surrounding his initial
statement, and asks us to suppress all statements made during that
time. He describes his initial coercion as "turning on a spigot"
that led to his continued confessions.
Materas's arguments are unpersuasive. As to Materas's
second argument that all of his statements should be suppressed
because of the coercive nature of his initial divulgement, the
district court correctly limited the consequences of the Miranda
violation to the one statement elicited prior to reading the
defendant his rights. The district court found that there was
nothing particularly coercive about the circumstances of the waiver
of Materas's Miranda rights and that Detective Bourgeois acted in
good faith. These factual findings are firmly grounded in the
record and therefore not clearly erroneous.
Based on these findings, we agree with the district
court that there is no evidence that the police were attempting to
undermine the purposes of the Miranda rule to gain subsequent
Mirandized confessions. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616
(2004). Other than asking where the drugs were located, the police
did not ask any other questions before explaining to Materas his
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rights in another location, fifteen minutes later. As the court
found, "the first questioning was not at all systematic" or
extensive. See id. at 615-16 (discussing a number of factors
related to the effectiveness of Miranda warnings, including "the
completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first
round of interrogation, . . . and the degree to which the
interrogator's questions treated the second round as continuous
with the first."). The district court believed that Materas
understood his rights and voluntarily waived them, and therefore
the court was justified in limiting the scope of the Miranda
violation to its usual consequences, i.e., excluding only the pre-
Miranda statement. See United States v. Esquilín, 208 F.3d 315,
319 (1st Cir.) ("A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to
a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement
ordinarily . . . suffice[s] to remove the conditions that precluded
admission of the earlier statement." (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314)); see also Patane, 542
U.S. at 642 ("'[T]he exclusion of unwarned statements . . . is a
complete and sufficient remedy' for any perceived Miranda
violation." (quoting Chávez v. Martínez, 538 U.S. 760, 790 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
We also reject Materas's purely hypothetical argument
that his initial statement should have been disallowed for
impeachment purposes. Because Materas's subsequent Mirandized
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statements would not have been suppressed, it would make no sense
for Materas to have claimed any kind of lack of knowledge defense.
After waiving his Miranda rights, he repeatedly admitted that the
drugs seized during the search were his. With this direct
evidence, the government would have had no reason to use his
initial statement for impeachment purposes. Furthermore, we will
not assist a defendant in using "[t]he shield provided by Miranda
. . . [as] a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from
the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances."
Harris, 401 U.S. at 226.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district
court's denial of Materas's motions to suppress.
Affirmed.
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