United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2284
MARTA CARRASQUILLO; GILBERTO RIVERA-RIVERA;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP RIVERA-CARRASQUILLO,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, through its Justice Department;
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION;
MIGUEL PEREIRA-CASTILLO, Secretary and Administrator of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the
Corrections Administrator; JORGE L. RAÍCES, Assistant to the
Secretary; CARIDAD COLÓN-TORRES, Human Resources Officer;
RAFAEL SANTIAGO-TORRES, Sub-Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation; NORBERTO JIMÉNEZ-BURGOS,
Special Assistant to the Secretary and in his personal/
individual capacity,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Héctor M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges,
and Stafford, Jr.,* Senior District Judge.
Yvette De Luna-Colón, for appellants.
Leticia Casalduc-Rabell, Assistant Solicitor General, with
whom Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts, Solicitor General, Mariana
Negrón-Vargas, Deputy Solicitor General, and Maite D. Oronoz-
Rodríguez, Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief, for appellees.
June 28, 2007
*
Of the District of Northern Florida, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Marta Carrasquillo, an
employee at the Puerto Rico Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (the "DCR"), brought a civil rights action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the DCR, and
various DCR officials (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging
political discrimination in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, a
decision Carrasquillo now appeals. After careful consideration, we
affirm.
I. Factual Background
The DCR hired Carrasquillo in 1992. In October 1994,
Carrasquillo was promoted to Investigating Agent I, and was
assigned to work in the Intelligence Unit of the Auxiliary
Secretariat for the Investigation of the Correctional System (the
"SAISC," for its Spanish acronym). Between 1998 and 1999,
Carrasquillo worked under the supervision of one of the defendants,
Norberto Jiménez, an investigative agent in the SAISC. In March
1999, Jiménez resigned from the DCR, and Carrasquillo took his
place as supervisor of the Intelligence Unit of the SAISC.
On September 7, 2000, Carrasquillo was again promoted,
this time to Investigative Agent II to reflect her added
supervisory responsibilities. Among other duties, Carrasquillo was
responsible for disciplining employees and authorizing vacation
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time, sick leave, adjustments to time-keeping records, and
overtime.
In August 2003, Jiménez returned to the DCR after being
appointed Special Assistant to the Secretary of the DCR. Upon his
return, Jiménez again assumed the supervision of the SAISC
Intelligence Unit, thereby replacing Carrasquillo.
Carrasquillo alleges that, as supervisor of the SAISC
intelligence unit, Jiménez took away many of the professional
responsibilities she had before his return to the unit. For
example, Carrasquillo alleges that Jiménez ordered her to perform
clerical duties until he could hire a secretary. She also claims
that he had her name removed from reports filed by investigative
agents. Carrasquillo states that she was generally not allowed to
participate in field operations, and that when she was asked to
participate in an operation, she was told to show up at an hour
after the operation had concluded. She also alleges that after
Jiménez took over the supervision of the Intelligence Unit, there
were a number of days in which Carrasquillo was not given work
assignments.
Carrasquillo further states that in April 2004, Jiménez
took over her office space. She claims that when she was
transferred to a new work area, she was asked to return several
items, including official license plates, a radio, a vest, keys to
a governmental vehicle, and a gas card for a governmental vehicle.
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Carrasquillo alleges that she complained to Jiménez about the fact
that he had divested her of supervisory functions and assigned her
menial job tasks and told him that she felt marginalized, harassed,
and discriminated against as a result. Carrasquillo also testified
that at some point, "[Jiménez] called [her] into his office and
told [her] . . ., 'We are in power now -- meaning the members of
the Popular Democratic Party -- and I have the power to kick out of
here anybody I want.'"
Although Carrasquillo alleges that her professional
duties and office location changed after Jiménez's return to the
DCR, she admits that her job title and salary scale were not
altered. The record shows that the only change affecting her
salary was that after Jiménez replaced Carrasquillo as supervisor
of SAISC, she became eligible for overtime pay, whereas she had not
been entitled to such pay as supervisor.
Carrasquillo is a member of the New Progressive Party
("NPP") in Puerto Rico, while Jiménez is a member of the Popular
Democratic Party ("PDP"). Carrasquillo claims that her affiliation
and activism in the NPP were well known within the DCR because she
was listed in the party's roster, openly participated in political
campaigns, raised campaign funds for a mayor of Canóvanas, worked
as an electoral officer, regularly attended NPP rallies, and worked
tallying votes during election time. Carrasquillo further contends
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that when she was replaced by Jiménez, she suffered a de facto
demotion on the basis of her membership in the NPP.
On June 10, 2004, Carrasquillo filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
alleging political discrimination in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, age discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), and violation of
various state law provisions. On July 13, 2004, Defendants filed
a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
Before the district court addressed its Rule 12(c) motion, the DCR
filed a motion for summary judgment on September 16, 2005.
Carrasquillo did not respond to Defendants' Rule 12(c)
motion within the time prescribed. Carrasquillo sought an
extension to file the opposition, but on October 12, 2005, the
district court denied Carrasquillo's request as untimely and deemed
Defendants' motion unopposed. Thereafter, Carrasquillo timely
filed an opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion.
However, in her opposition, Carrasquillo did not provide a
statement admitting, denying, or qualifying Defendants' statement
of uncontested facts, as required by Local Rule 56(c). See D.P.R.
L. Civ. R. 56(c) ("A party opposing a motion for summary judgment
shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise
statement of material facts. The opposing statement shall admit,
deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph
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of the moving party's statement of material facts and unless a
facts is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a
record citation . . . ."). Instead, Carrasquillo filed her own
statement of uncontested facts, which did not reference or relate
to Defendants' filing.
On March 29, 2006, the court granted in part and denied
in part Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
court dismissed Carrasquillo's ADEA claim for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. In addition, upon finding that the DCR is
an arm of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and no indication that
Puerto Rico has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court
also dismissed all claims for monetary damages against the
Commonwealth, the DCR, and the individual defendants in their
official capacities. Carrasquillo's First Amendment, Fourteenth
Amendment, and supplemental claims survived the early dismissal.
Only Jiménez, who was sued in his personal capacity, remained as a
defendant.
On July 31, 2006, the court granted Jiménez's request for
summary judgment. The court found that Carrasquillo had failed to
specifically deny, qualify, or otherwise object to Jiménez's
statement of uncontested facts in her opposition, as was required
by Local Rule 56(c). The court concluded that, under these
circumstances, the facts submitted by Jiménez, including sworn
affidavits stating that Jiménez did not know about Carrasquillo's
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political affiliation, were to be deemed uncontested, and therefore
admitted by Carrasquillo. The court held that, having failed to
rebut the assertion that Jiménez lacked any knowledge of
Carrasquillo's political affiliation, Carrasquillo could not
establish a prima facie case of political discrimination.
The district court went on to hold that Carrasquillo's
political discrimination claim failed even if it were to consider
her nonconforming supplemental statement of uncontested facts
because her factual assertions "[were] not sufficient to
demonstrate a causal connection linking Defendants' allegedly
discriminatory acts to Carrasquillo's political beliefs or
association."
II. Discussion
We review the district court's order granting summary
judgment de novo, construing the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, with all reasonable inferences drawn in her
favor. See Rodríguez v. SmithKline Beecham, 224 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 2000).
The right to associate with the political party of one's
choice is an integral part of the basic constitutional freedom to
associate with others for the common advancement of political
beliefs and ideas protected by the First Amendment. Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973). Public employees therefore
generally enjoy protection from adverse employment actions based on
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their political affiliations. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,
517-19 (1980). This protection extends to changes in employment,
which, although not as extreme as dismissal, result in working
conditions "'unreasonably inferior' to the norm for the position"
at issue. Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1218
(1st Cir. 1989). To prevail on a claim of political discrimination,
a public employee must at a minimum show that she engaged in
constitutionally-protected conduct and that this conduct was a
substantial factor in the adverse employment decision. See Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977); see also Padilla-García v. Guillermo Rodríguez, 212 F.3d
69, 73 (1st Cir. 2000).
The district court granted summary judgment in Jiménez's
favor on the ground that Carrasquillo failed to establish a prima
facie case of political discrimination. Noting Carrasquillo's
failure to dispute Jiménez's statement of uncontested facts, the
district court held that Jiménez's facts, including his assertion
that he lacked knowledge of Carrasquillo's political affiliation,
were admitted. See Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.
2000) ("[N]oncompliance with [Local Rule 56(c)], as manifested by
a failure to present a statement of disputed facts, embroidered
with specific citations to the record, justifies the court's
deeming the facts presented in the movant's statement of undisputed
facts admitted and ruling accordingly."). As such, the district
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court held that "Carrasquillo . . . failed to establish a prima
facie case of political discrimination because she [did] not
produce[] sufficient evidence demonstrating that any defendant knew
of her political affiliation."
On appeal, Carrasquillo does not address the district
court's decision to deem Jiménez's submitted fact that he did not
know Carrasquillo's political affiliation admitted, much less argue
that this holding was in error. Because Carrasquillo has failed to
appeal this ruling, we deem the issue waived and accept Jiménez's
submitted fact as true. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1,
17 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that arguments not raised on appeal are
deemed waived); see also Rivera-Gómez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631,
635 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[A] litigant has an obligation 'to spell out
its arguments squarely and distinctly,' or else forever hold its
peace." (quoting Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec.
Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990 (1st Cir. 1988))). As such, we affirm the
district court's holding that Carrasquillo failed to establish a
prima facie case of political discrimination given Jiménez's lack
of knowledge of Carrasquillo's political affiliation; if Jiménez
did not know Carrasquillo's political views, they could not have
been a substantial factor motivating any adverse employment action.
Because we affirm the district court's dismissal of
Carrasquillo's political discrimination claim on its merits, we
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need not reach her argument that defendants are not entitled to
sovereign or qualified immunity.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district
court's dismissal of Carrasquillo's claim of political
discrimination.
Affirmed.
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Carrasquillo v. PUERTO RICO EX REL. JUSTICE DEPT.
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date filed: 2007-06-28
Citations: 494 F.3d 1
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