IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-40809
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTHONY CARMOUCHE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:98-CR-149-1
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February 25, 2000
Before JONES, DUHÉ, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Anthony Carmouche has appealed the sentence which he received
upon pleading guilty of possessing lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)
with intent to distribute it. We AFFIRM.
Carmouche contends that the district court clearly erred by
attributing to him, as relevant conduct, a quantity of
methamphetamine which he possessed about 17 months prior to his
commission of the offense of conviction. The district court did
not err by crediting the uncontradicted statement of the
confidential informant that he had regularly purchased LSD from
Carmouche during the two-year period preceding the date of the
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
offense of conviction. See United States v. Lokey, 945 F.2d 825,
839 (5th Cir. 1991). Carmouche’s methamphetamine possession was
relevant conduct because it was part of the same course of conduct,
i.e., his trafficking in controlled substances. See U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a)(2); United States v. Robins, 978 F.2d 881, 889-90 (5th
Cir. 1992).
Carmouche contends that the district court reversibly erred by
denying him sentencing credit for acceptance of responsibility, as
provided by U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The district court based its ruling
on findings that Carmouche had failed to truthfully admit the full
extent of his involvement in the offense of conviction; that he
falsely denied relevant conduct, i.e., another sale of LSD; and
that Carmouche made false representations concerning a pistol which
was in a vehicle where some of the negotiations occurred. These
findings are amply supported by the testimony of the undercover
officer at Carmouche’s sentencing hearing, which also corroborated
relevant information provided by the confidential informant. Such
misrepresentations disqualify a defendant from receiving credit for
acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Salinas, 122
F.3d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1997).
AFFIRMED.