United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1318
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JHON JAIRO ARANGO,
Defendant, Appellant.
No. 06-1319
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
DARÍO OSORIO-NORENA
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Court]
Before
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges,
and Stafford, Jr.,* Senior District Judge.
Mark Diamond for appellant Osorio-Norena.
David Abraham Silverman for appellant Arango.
*
Of the District of Northern Florida, sitting by designation.
Patrick Hamilton, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
November 15, 2007
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Although co-defendants Jhon Jairo
Arango ("Arango") and Dario Osorio-Norena ("Osorio") pled guilty to
money laundering and drug distribution charges, they contested the
amount of money and the quantity of drugs involved in the crimes.
After a fourteen-day evidentiary hearing, the district court found
them responsible for laundering $1.8 million in drug proceeds and
for participation in a conspiracy involving sixty-seven kilograms
of cocaine. Each received a sentence of 262 months of imprisonment
and a $2 million fine. For Arango, the sentence was at the bottom
of the applicable range under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. For Osorio, that sentence corresponded to a downward
departure of thirty months because he had a prior conviction
placing him in a higher Criminal History Category ("CHC") than
Arango.
Both defendants appeal their sentences on multiple
grounds. Their primary argument is that the district court erred
in failing to state the reasons for their sentences in open court,
as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Although the sentencing
explanations are not as fully stated as they might have been, we
conclude that in the circumstances of this case there was no error.
Both defendants also contend that the court erred in
granting them only a two-level, rather than a three-level,
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, and Osorio alone
raises a number of other claims. In his primary brief, he asserts
-3-
that the court: (1) improperly based his sentence on facts not
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt and, even under the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, incorrectly calculated the
quantity of drugs and the amount of laundered money for which he
may be held responsible; (2) failed to consider the sentencing
factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and (3) failed to properly
determine whether a fine should be assessed against him. In a pro
se brief, Osorio elaborates on some of those claims and adds two
more: that the government breached a plea agreement and that the
court improperly found that he played a leadership role in the drug
conspiracy. We reject all of Osorio's individual claims, along
with the joint claim that the district court erred in granting only
a two-level reduction in offense level for defendants' acceptance
of responsibility. We therefore affirm the sentences.
I.
In August 2004, a federal grand jury returned a fourth
superseding indictment against defendants Arango and Osorio,
charging each of them with three counts: conspiracy to distribute
five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(Count One); conspiracy to launder drug proceeds, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Two); and distribution of five or more
kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count
Three). A jury trial was scheduled to begin on March 21, 2005. On
-4-
March 16, Arango notified the government that he intended to plead
guilty. Osorio did the same on the morning of March 21.
At a change of plea hearing, Arango pled guilty to all
three charges in the indictment, and Osorio pled guilty on the
first two counts but entered an Alford plea as to the third count.
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) ("An
individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and
understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even
if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts
constituting the crime."). Both defendants admitted that the
conspiracy involved five kilograms of cocaine, but contested any
quantity above that amount. They did not concede any dollar amount
on the money-laundering count. Arango admitted responsibility for
the seven kilograms of cocaine charged in the distribution count;
Osorio, through the Alford plea, denied responsibility for that
specific distribution of cocaine.
The district court held a fourteen-day evidentiary
hearing to establish the quantities of drugs and amount of money
involved in the crimes. Law enforcement officers testified that
the defendants were arrested and extradited to Massachusetts from
Colombia as part of an investigation that also led to the
indictment of fourteen other individuals. Among them were two
cooperating witnesses who testified at the hearing, Liliana Cruz
and Jorge de Jesus Vallejo Alarcon ("Vallejo"). Cruz's direct
-5-
testimony occupied eight days of the hearings and her cross-
examination spanned an additional two. She testified in detail
about her role in transporting drugs from New York to Massachusetts
on behalf of Arango and Osorio between 1998 and mid-August 1999 and
her later involvement in laundering money for the defendants from
early 2000 until her arrest in June of that year.
Of particular relevance, she testified that she
transported cocaine from New York to Boston at Osorio's request on
five separate occasions. According to her testimony, she picked up
the drugs in Queens and in the Bronx. On each trip to Queens, she
called Osorio upon arriving at a designated location. Shortly
thereafter, the person who was delivering the drugs called her cell
phone. She would then meet with that person, inspect the drug
quantity, take delivery of the drugs, and transport the narcotics
to Massachusetts. Cruz would then phone Osorio and tell him where
he could pick up the car, and she would leave the drugs in the
unlocked vehicle. The car would be returned to her in the morning,
without the drugs. The Bronx trips occurred in roughly the same
manner except that Cruz received the drugs by leaving her unlocked
car in a pre-arranged location and returning later, after the drugs
had been delivered. She also testified that Osorio named Arango as
the source of the drugs she picked up in Queens on her first trip
there, and she supposed that the second shipment from Queens also
came from him because she met with the same people in Queens on
-6-
that trip. She did not know whether the deliveries from the Bronx
were related to Arango.
Cruz also testified to specific drug quantities. She
reported that she delivered fifty kilograms of cocaine in her first
trip from Queens to Massachusetts and ten kilograms on her second
trip. She also recounted that she delivered fifty and twenty-five
kilograms, respectively, on her two trips from the Bronx. Cruz
testified that she made a fifth trip between New York and
Massachusetts at Osorio's request involving an additional fifty
kilograms of cocaine; however, she recalled that Arango was in
Colombia at the time of that trip and she could not be sure who
supplied the drugs.
Cruz testified that she began laundering proceeds from
the drug transactions in 2000. She reported that, at defendants'
request, she transported money from New York to Massachusetts on
three separate occasions, in the amounts of $500,000, $600,000, and
$500,000, respectively. She also testified that she received
deliveries of smaller amounts of money from two brothers with the
surname "Cataño" and from Alonso Tavarez, and that Arango or Osorio
called to inform her of each such delivery before it occurred. The
defendants also instructed her as to the distribution and mailing
of those monies, which together totaled $699,000. Osorio also
instructed her on how to hide money in electronic toys so that she
could ship it to Colombia undetected. In addition to sending money
-7-
in this manner, she also occasionally wired small amounts of money
to defendants and, at their direction, delivered money to other
members of the conspiracy in the United States. Cruz testified
that she kept careful records of the amounts of money collected and
delivered to various parties and she retained her shipping receipts
until either Arango or Osorio confirmed receiving the money.
Finally, Cruz testified that she bought seven kilograms
of cocaine from Alonso Tavarez shortly before her arrest and that
Tavarez told her the cocaine came from Arango and Osorio. Cruz
intended to use this cocaine as part of a ten-kilogram sale to
Camilo Aguirre. Unbeknownst to Cruz, Aguirre was the target of a
United States Drug Enforcement Administration investigation and,
after she delivered the first five kilograms of cocaine to Aguirre,
she was arrested. A subsequent investigation of her house produced
the remaining five kilograms, along with extensive records related
to her drug and money laundering activities. Shortly after her
arrest, Cruz became a cooperating witness and allowed the
government to record her phone calls.
Cruz's testimony was corroborated by various forms of
evidence, including receipts and other records found at her house,
tape-recorded phone calls, and the testimony of law enforcement
officials and Vallejo, who reported that he was sent by Arango and
Osorio to aid Cruz in collecting money owed by a distributor. In
one taped conversation between Cruz and Arango, Arango reviewed the
-8-
amounts of money that had been delivered to her from the Cataños
and Tavarez and how that money had been distributed. Those amounts
matched Cruz's written records. In addition, Cruz had receipts for
two Avianca shipments, mailed to Arango and his wife, in which she
had concealed $160,000 from her first money laundering trip to New
York but which had been intercepted by U.S. Customs officials.
Customs documents confirmed that two packages matching these
shipping receipts were intercepted at the relevant time.
At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the district
court made a number of factual findings. Deeming Cruz a credible
witness, it found the defendants responsible for "at least" sixty-
seven kilograms of cocaine on the drug charges and for $1.8 million
on the money laundering charge. It arrived at the sixty-seven
kilogram figure by adding together fifty kilograms from one trip
and ten kilograms from a second trip Cruz made to Queens on behalf
of defendants, along with the seven kilograms she purchased from
Tavarez, who received the cocaine from Arango and Osorio. The
court arrived at the money laundering figure by adding together
$500,000 and $600,000 that Cruz testified she retrieved from New
York at defendants' request in the spring of 2000, plus the roughly
$700,000 that was delivered to her in small amounts by the Cataño
brothers and Tavarez.1
1
Cruz actually testified that she made three trips to
retrieve money from New York: two for $500,000 and one for
$600,000. The government noted the discrepancy in the $1.8 million
-9-
The district court also found that the facts supported a
sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) because defendants
were leaders or organizers in a criminal activity that involved
five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. Although the
court applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in making
these findings, it stated that it "would have no difficulty in
making . . . all of the findings beyond a reasonable doubt."
The Presentence Report ("PSR") prepared by the Probation
Office calculated a base offense level of 41 for Arango and
Osorio.2 The court granted both defendants a two-level downward
adjustment in their offense levels for acceptance of
responsibility, but found they did not qualify for the additional
one-level reduction that is given for timely notification of the
intent to plead guilty. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)(2). Arango had no
prior criminal history and therefore was assigned a criminal
history score of "I"; Osorio's criminal history score was "II,"
based on his failure to pay a fine and complete the probationary
period related to a drunk driving incident in 1994. Under the
Guidelines, Arango was subject to a sentencing range of 262 to 327
months, and Osorio's range was 292 to 365 months.
figure, which was a result of its own calculation error, but the
court declined to correct its finding, explaining that the
Guidelines sentencing range would remain the same.
2
Arango and Osorio were sentenced under the November 2000
version of the Guidelines and all references in this opinion
correspond to that edition.
-10-
The court sentenced Arango to 262 months of imprisonment
on the drug counts and 240 months on the money laundering count, to
run concurrently and to be followed by five years of supervised
release. It also imposed a fine of $2 million and a special
assessment of $300. The court imposed the same sentence on Osorio,
explaining that it viewed both men to be equally culpable and that
Osorio's criminal history, though not insignificant, did not
warrant a sentencing disparity between the two men. The court
noted that it viewed the 262-month term as "sufficient to meet the
sentencing factors outlined in the statute" – a reference to 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), which sets out various factors courts should
consider in sentencing.3
Arango and Osorio appeal these sentences on multiple
grounds. They claim that the district court failed to adequately
explain the basis for the sentences it imposed, as required by 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c), and also erred in denying them a three-level
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)(2). Osorio raises several additional
challenges: (1) that the court improperly failed to consider the
3
Those factors include: the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; the
need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment; to
afford adequate deterrence; to protect the public; to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
and the kinds of sentences available.
-11-
factors laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); (2) that the calculations
of drug quantity and laundered money were flawed either because the
court's findings were not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence or because they should have been found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt; and (3) that the court abused its discretion in
imposing a $2 million fine on Osorio without considering his
ability to pay. In his pro se supplemental brief, Osorio also
argues that the government breached a plea agreement and that the
court improperly enhanced his sentence based on his leadership role
in the charged conspiracies.
II.
A. Acceptance of Responsibility
Arango and Osorio contend that the district court erred
in granting them a two-level, rather than three-level, reduction in
offense level for acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines
provide for a two-level downward adjustment "if the defendant
clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense,"
§ 3E1.1(a), and an additional one-level reduction is available if
the defendant "has assisted authorities in the investigation or
prosecution of his own misconduct by . . . timely notifying
authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby
permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and
-12-
permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently."
§ 3E1.1(b)(2).4
The defendants argue that, by pleading guilty on all
counts of the indictment, they allowed the government to avoid the
time and expense of preparing for and conducting a trial and that
they therefore met the criteria for the additional reduction. The
government counters that, although both defendants pled guilty to
the charged crimes, their pleas were "untimely" and did not save
the government significant time or expense, as it had already
engaged in substantial trial preparation by the time they agreed to
enter their pleas.
The parties thus dispute the district court's
determination that defendants' pleas were "untimely" under
§ 3E1.1(b)(2). We review this determination for clear error,
United States v. Ortiz-Torres, 449 F.3d 61, 76 (1st Cir. 2006),
noting that the Guidelines commentary specifies that such
determinations are "context specific," and that "conduct qualifying
for [the third level of decrease] will occur particularly early in
the case . . . so that the government may avoid preparing for trial
and the court may schedule its calendar efficiently." § 3E1.1,
cmt. 6.
4
In order to qualify for the additional decrease in offense
level under § 3E1.1(b)(2), the defendant must qualify for the two-
level decrease under § 3E1.1(a) and his original offense level must
be at least sixteen.
-13-
Here, Osorio notified the government of his intent to
plead guilty on the morning trial was scheduled to begin. We have
repeatedly upheld the denial of an adjustment under § 3E1.1(b)(2)
when a defendant provides notice of an intent to plead guilty on
either the eve or first day of trial. See United States v. Mateo-
Espejo, 426 F.3d 508, 511 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding denial of
adjustment where guilty plea entered on date scheduled for jury
selection); United States v. Morrillo, 8 F.3d 864, 872 (1st Cir.
1993) (same); United States v. Donovan, 996 F.2d 1343, 1345 (1st
Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (upholding denial of adjustment where plea
agreement was reached on the eve of the second scheduled trial
date).
Arango gave the government slightly more notice,
announcing his intention to plead guilty the Wednesday before his
Monday trial was to begin. However, in the context of this complex
case, there is little evidence that these additional days of notice
saved the government significant trial preparation. The docket
indicates that the government had already filed a trial brief, a
proposed voir dire, a motion in limine, a list of exhibits and
witnesses, and proposed jury instructions before the defendants
announced their intended change of plea. At the sentencing
hearing, the government reported that it already had spent
significant time translating and transcribing phone conversations
and preparing witnesses for the trial and that - because it
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expected the matter to be contested at trial - it had already gone
through a process of generating voice exemplars to authenticate
Arango's voice on the audiotapes expected to be presented into
evidence.
Defendants argue that the government's efforts were not
wasted because many of the same steps were necessary to prepare for
the evidentiary hearing on the drug quantity and amount of money
involved in the charged conspiracies. However, this argument
misses the point. The Guidelines are clear that a three-level
reduction is warranted only where the defendants' acceptance of
responsibility occurs early in the pre-trial preparation period.
There is substantial evidence that the government had already
invested substantial resources in preparing to try these defendants
when it learned that they would plead guilty. The happenstance
that some of the same evidence proved useful for sentencing
purposes does not qualify these defendants for a reduction based on
a timely notification of their intention to plead guilty.
B. Calculation of Drug Quantity and Amount of Money Laundered
Osorio contends that the district court erred in
sentencing him on the basis of sixty-seven kilograms of cocaine on
the drug charges and $1.8 million on the money laundering charge.
He argues that the court erred in using a preponderance of the
evidence standard and that, even if that standard applies, there
-15-
were insufficient facts to support the court's findings. We
disagree on both counts.5
Osorio argues that, "where life in prison is the
authorized maximum sentence, the finding of fact used to determine
the sentence must be arrived at by proof beyond a reasonable doubt
by a jury or a defendant's admission." The Supreme Court held in
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), and confirmed in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005), that any fact
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum
(other than a prior conviction) must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant. This standard does
not help Osorio because he pled guilty to charges that carried a
statutory maximum sentence of life in prison. See Obershaw v.
Lanman, 453 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2006).
Osorio argues – for the first time on appeal – that the
higher evidentiary standard also should apply where the sentencing
range includes life imprisonment because the defendant has more at
risk, and his rights to due process and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt thus carry more weight. Osorio cites no precedent in support
of this proposition, and our case law is to the contrary. We have
stated unequivocally that, under the advisory Guidelines, judicial
fact-finding on drug quantity is constitutionally permissible,
5
It appears that Osorio challenges the standard of review
only with respect to the drug calculation. Our discussion would,
in any event, apply to both findings.
-16-
within Apprendi's limits, see, e.g., United States v. Pierre, 484
F.3d 75, 88 (1st Cir. 2007), and we have applied that principle
even when defendants were subject to life imprisonment, see, e.g.,
United States v. González-Vélez, 466 F.3d 27, 40-41 (1st Cir.
2006). The district court's fact-finding was thus not error, plain
or otherwise.
Osorio's contention that the evidence does not support
the court's factual findings is also unpersuasive. His arguments
mischaracterize the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing
and the court's calculations based on that evidence. In his brief,
Osorio describes Cruz's testimony about the drugs transported from
Queens to Massachusetts as follows:
In her first trip, which was for [Osorio], she
sold 50 kilos. In her second trip, which was
for co-defendant Ar[]ango, she sold 10 kilos.
Thus, according to the prosecutor's key
witness, Mr. Osorio was responsible for just
fifty kilos of cocaine, not sixty kilos.
However, Cruz testified that she brought cocaine from New York to
Massachusetts in five separate trips, all of which were arranged at
Osorio's request. Cruz also testified that Osorio told her that
the first fifty kilograms she brought back from Queens was supplied
by Arango. She met with the same people who had been involved in
the first Queens trip on the second trip, when she transported ten
additional kilograms. In two trips to the Bronx, she picked up
twenty-five and fifty kilograms. She further testified that on a
subsequent trip to New York, Osorio met her in Queens, transferred
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fifty kilograms to her, and directed her to transport the drugs to
Massachusetts. Thus, Cruz's testimony indicated Osorio's
involvement in a total of 185 kilograms: the sixty kilograms picked
up in Queens in two trips involving the same people; the seventy-
five kilograms picked up in two trips to the Bronx; and the fifty
additional kilograms that she received directly from Osorio during
her third trip to Queens.6 Thus, the evidence amply supported the
court's finding that Osorio was responsible for the transport of at
least sixty kilograms of cocaine from New York to Massachusetts.
Osorio also contends that neither Cruz's nor Vallejo's
testimony linked him to the seven kilograms of cocaine Cruz bought
from Tavarez to sell to Camilo Aguirre. Again, this contention
mischaracterizes the evidence. When asked what connection the
defendants had to these seven kilograms of cocaine, Vallejo
responded that "they had sold it to . . . Alonso Tavarez, and then
Alonso Tavarez had handed it to Liliana Cruz." Cruz also testified
that the drugs she bought from Tavarez were supplied by the
defendants and that, because the defendants did not want the same
person to handle the money laundering and the drug sales, she and
Tavarez had not mentioned the details of this particular
transaction to defendants until after her arrest. Thus, the record
6
Cruz's testimony suggested that Arango may not have been
involved in these additional incidents, but it was clear that
Osorio was involved in all five deliveries.
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supports the district court's finding as to the seven kilograms of
cocaine from this transaction.7
Osorio also challenges the court's finding regarding the
amount of money involved in the money-laundering conspiracy. By
his own accounting, Osorio contends that there was testimony as to
only $1.35 million – consisting of $500,000 and $600,000 that Cruz
transported from New York to Massachusetts at the defendants'
behest, plus $250,000 related to the sale of the seven kilograms of
cocaine to Camilo Aguirre - rather than the $1.8 million on which
his sentence was based. This calculation misstates the evidence
and the court's finding in two respects. First, money from the
sale of the seven kilograms of cocaine was not, in fact, included
in the money laundering total. Second, Osorio's calculation
ignores Cruz's testimony that she received approximately $700,000
from Tavarez and the Cataños in the first several months of 2000,
and that she distributed these funds at the defendants' direction.
Correctly totaling this quantity of money yields $1.8 million.8
7
In his pro se brief, Osorio contends that the court erred in
sentencing him on the basis of drug quantities that were not a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of his participation in the
conspiracy. However, Cruz's testimony establishes Osorio's direct
involvement in the transportation of more than sixty-seven
kilograms of cocaine.
8
As noted earlier, this figure in fact understates the
testimony because it omits a second $500,000 transport of funds
from New York. Osorio also argues that the court calculated the
$1.8 million by multiplying the number of kilograms of cocaine by
an inflated price of $29,000 per kilogram. This is yet another
misstatement of the facts. The court calculated the $1.8 million
-19-
In addition to Cruz's testimony, the court also reviewed
corroborating documentary evidence in the form of package receipts,
wire transfer receipts, and Cruz's own accounting records. Also,
the government presented transcripts of recorded telephone
conversations in which Cruz and Arango went over the amounts of
money she had received from the Cataños and Tavarez. In sum,
overwhelming evidence supported the court's finding that $1.8
million was involved in the money-laundering conspiracy.
C. Fine
Osorio also claims that the court erred in imposing a $2
million fine on him without first considering his ability to pay.
Our review is for plain error as Osorio raises this argument for
the first time on appeal.9 We find no error. Indeed, Osorio's
contention that the court must first consider the defendant's
ability to pay before imposing a fine reflects a misunderstanding
of the law. Section 5E1.2(a) of the Guidelines provides that
"[t]he court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the
separately from its drug quantity finding, as described above.
Moreover, sixty-seven kilograms multiplied by a price of $29,000
per kilogram does not yield $1.8 million.
9
Not only did Osorio fail to object at sentencing to the
imposition of the fine, but he also did not object to these
statements in the presentence report regarding his ability to pay:
"No verifying information regarding the defendant's financial
condition has been submitted to the Probation Office. Accordingly,
the defendant has not demonstrated an inability to pay a fine. It
should be noted that the defendant has retained counsel in this
case, indicating that he does have financial resources." He did
object to several other provisions in the PSR.
-20-
defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to
become able to pay any fine." We consistently have interpreted
this language to place the burden on the defendant to provide
evidence of inability to pay the required fine. See United States
v. Uribe-Londono, 409 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.
Cunan, 152 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Peppe, 80
F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1996).10
D. Failure to State the Reasons for Defendants' Sentences
Arango and Osorio both argue that their sentences should
be vacated and their cases remanded for resentencing because the
court did not state "in open court," at the time of sentencing, its
reasons for the sentences imposed, as required by 18 U.S.C. §
3553(c). That provision also requires the court to explain why it
imposed a sentence at a "particular point within the range" if the
range exceeds twenty-four months, as it did here. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c)(1).
A joint sentencing hearing was conducted in January 2006,
approximately eight months after the conclusion of the fourteen-day
evidentiary hearing on the defendants' involvement in the charged
10
Osorio also characterizes the PSR as stating that "defendant
reports no assets and no prospect of any increase in assets while
incarcerated," and he argues that "[n]othing in the record
indicates that Mr. Osorio was not indigent." However, this
misstates the PSR's contents. The PSR reports that Osorio claims
no assets or income, but, as previously noted, it also indicates
that Osorio has provided no information to verify his financial
status and that he has retained counsel.
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crimes. To explain our conclusion that no § 3553(c) error occurred
with respect to either defendant, we begin by describing the
sentencing proceeding in some detail.
1. The Sentencing Colloquy
Near the outset of the sentencing hearing, the district
court explained that it would stay with the miscalculated $1.8
million figure for the money laundering count, see supra note 1,
and it then engaged in a lengthy exchange with counsel about the
defendants' request for a three-level, rather than two-level,
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. The court considered
carefully whether Osorio's Alford plea should make him ineligible
for the acceptance of responsibility benefits, but it ultimately
concluded that both defendants were entitled to the two-level
credit. The court next explored Osorio's criminal history, which
consisted of a drunk driving incident thirteen years earlier and
his failure to complete payments on the related fine, and found
that Osorio properly was placed in CHC II based on that episode.
The court then proceeded to impose sentence on Arango.
After confirming with both parties that it had properly calculated
the Guidelines range to be 262 to 327 months, the court asked the
government for its recommendation. The government proposed a term
of 262 months and a $2 million fine. Defense counsel urged the
court to accept that recommendation – the low end of the range –
offering various reasons why his client should be treated
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leniently.11 Arango also addressed the court personally, seeking
to refute his leadership role in the conspiracy.12 The government
then asked for an opportunity at some point "to just address the
question of a guideline sentence versus a non-guideline sentence,
the factors of 3553(a)," and the court invited the prosecutor to do
so immediately.
The prosecutor spoke at length about the statutory
factors, pointing out that the crime of drug trafficking is
dangerous to "users, their families, and American society as a
whole," and that the court had heard evidence that "Colombian drug
traffickers are particularly dangerous." He detailed the
leadership role played by the defendants and the extensive nature
of the conspiracies. In examining the defendants' history and
characteristics, the prosecutor acknowledged that "[e]ach has a
family and friends who love them and will miss them," but urged the
court to take into account the evidence that they earned
substantial income from dealing drugs in the United States,
returning to Colombia "to live fairly comfortably," but nonetheless
11
Among other points, counsel minimized Arango's control over
other participants in the conspiracy, noted that he had been
kidnapped for a time in Colombia, and continued to have threats
made against him.
12
He told the court: "We never were in charge of giving any
orders to this woman or to Mr. Tavarez. The only thing that we did
was earn a commission, a certain percentage. And we're being given
four points as leaders, and we never – I was never this woman's
boss."
-23-
"continued to supervise and direct other people in the distribution
of drugs here in the United States."
The prosecutor also emphasized the need to "send a
message to other people who might think of doing the same things
they are." He continued:
It's necessary to let people know that if
they're going to stay in Colombia and direct
other people in distributing cocaine or other
drugs in the United States, the government's
going to find them, the government's going to
extradite them, the government is going to get
them back here, the government is going to
prove its case; and they're going to be facing
very long sentences, sentencing conceivably so
long that it might make somebody think twice
about whether or not it's worth ruining all
that money given the length of the sentences
they're going to be serving.
That's why the government feels that
the conservative sentence under the guidelines
at the low end is at least what's called for
as to these defendants, your Honor.
Thereafter, the court, without explanation, imposed the 262-month
term and a $2 million fine on Arango.
The court then addressed Osorio's circumstances,
rejecting the view that CHC II overstated his criminal history and
finding that his sentencing range therefore was 292 to 365 months.
The government again recommended the low end of the range – 292
months. Osorio's counsel, stating that he had intended to seek a
sentence of sixteen years, ultimately asked the court to "just
impose a sentence substantially less than the 292 months." He
urged the court to take into consideration the § 3553(a) factors,
-24-
noting that he had "carefully consider[ed] the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of
the defendant, the need for the sentence imposed, and why the
guidelines are much more than should be imposed on this case." He
pointed to Osorio's separation from his family, including two young
children, continuing threats from another member of the conspiracy,
and his lack of prior criminal involvement. Osorio also spoke at
length, asking forgiveness and addressing his family circumstances,
his fear of an attack on his family by Vallejo, his difficult time
in jail, and his view that Cruz had not told the truth about his
involvement in the conspiracy.
Osorio's counsel concluded the colloquy by asking the
court to factor in his discussions with the government about
Osorio's willingness to cooperate and the possibility of a so-
called "safety valve" reduction,13 for which he later was found
ineligible. The court then announced its sentencing decision:
I am not going to impose a guideline sentence
. . . . [T]he low end of the guideline
sentence is 292 months, which is I guess 30
months above the sentence that I've imposed on
Mr. Arango, and that 30 months is a
consequence of this criminal history category
two, which is the drunk driving offense. And
while I don't minimize that offense, the
offense involved here of these two defendants
as far as I can tell are not substantially
different in commission of this offense. And
13
The "safety valve" provision of the Sentencing Reform Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5), allows courts to impose sentences below
the statutory minimum in certain drug cases.
-25-
it seems to me that they should not have a
different outcome on the basis of that – that
drunk driving offense in Mr. Osorio's case.
So I'm going to – and also because I think
that the 262 months that I've imposed on Mr.
Arango, and which I propose to impose on Mr.
Osorio, itself is sufficient to meet the
sentencing factors outlined in the statute,
and for that reason I'm going to impose that
sentence as the term of imprisonment on Mr.
Osorio.
2. Compliance with the Explanation Requirement
Our description of this sentencing history makes it
apparent that the district court gave no contemporaneous
explanation at all for Arango's sentence. For Osorio, the court
explained only why it did not impose a longer sentence, not why it
had rejected a shorter one. In most circumstances, this approach
would be inadequate to satisfy the court's obligation under §
3553(c) to "state in open court the reasons for its imposition of
the particular sentence." Although we do not require that the
sentencing court's explanation "be precise to the point of
pedantry, . . . the court ordinarily should identify the main
factors on which it relies." United States v. Turbides-Leonardo,
468 F.3d 34, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2006). Here, the court's only
explanation was for Osorio, and it said nothing about why such a
long sentence was appropriate, other than to say it was long enough
"to meet the sentencing factors outlined in the statute."
Nonetheless, we have recognized that "[e]ven silence is
not necessarily fatal; 'a court's reasoning can often be inferred
-26-
by comparing what was argued by the parties or contained in the
presentence report with what the judge did.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006)); see
also García-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d 124, 134 n.15 (1st Cir. 2007)
("[W]e reject any defense argument that we cannot uphold a
reasonable sentence if the district court does not make an explicit
statement of its reasons on the record. Our precedent is
exceedingly clear that we can look to the record to clarify the
judge's reasoning."). Multiple factors persuade us that the
court's deficient explanation did not constitute error.
First, neither defendant has challenged on appeal the
reasonableness of his sentence. Even with the knowledge obtained
from the statement of reasons contained in their written judgments
of conviction,14 they point to no factors the court allegedly over-
emphasized or neglected, and do not argue that their sentences are
disproportionate to their crimes. Indeed, Arango is foreclosed
from making any such claims, having asked the court to impose the
very sentence that he received. Given that the explanation
requirement is primarily intended to ensure meaningful appellate
review of the reasonableness of a sentence, see, e.g., United
14
Because we typically view the statement of reasons as a non-
public document, we do not discuss their contents here. See 1st
Cir. R. 28(c) (noting that "sealed or non-public items – including
a presentence investigation report or statement of reasons in a
judgment of criminal conviction – . . . should be filed in a
separate, sealed addendum").
-27-
States v. Mangual-Garcia, Nos. 05-2275, 05-2412, slip op. at 30
(1st Cir. Sept. 18, 2007), the need for an explicit statement is
measurably reduced where – as in Arango's case – the court imposes
the term the defendant has requested. With respect to Osorio, the
court similarly may have believed that defense counsel's request
for a below-Guidelines sentence was satisfied by the thirty-month
downward variance and, for that reason, explained only why it
rejected the higher term requested by the government. The absence
of a reasonableness challenge by Osorio supports the logic of such
an assumption.
However, enabling the appellate court to assess the
parties' arguments about reasonableness is only one purpose of the
explanation requirement. An explanation in open court also
furthers the weighty goals of transparency and credibility for the
justice system. As the Third Circuit recently commented:
The rationale by which a district court
reaches a final sentence is important. It
offers the defendant, the government, the
victim, and the public a window into the
decision-making process and an explanation of
the purposes the sentence is intended to
serve. It promotes respect for the
adjudicative process, by demonstrating the
serious reflection and deliberation that
underlies each criminal sentence, and allows
for effective appellate oversight.
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 572 (3d Cir. 2006) (en banc);
see also United States v. Molina, 356 F.3d 269, 277 (2d Cir. 2004)
(noting that purposes of § 3553(c) include "to enable the public to
-28-
learn why defendant received a particular sentence"). In every
case, therefore, a purpose is served when the court publicly
articulates its rationale for the sentence imposed, and our
willingness to excuse summary explanations must therefore have
limits. See United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 446 (1st Cir.
2007) ("While we have on occasion gone to significant lengths in
inferring the reasoning behind, and thus in affirming, some less-
than-explicit explanations by district courts, there are limits.")
(citations omitted); cf. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 521 ("[T]he
district court's obligation to explain is not excused by our
discretion to discern its reasoning from the record on appeal.")
(Torruella, J., concurring). Such restraint is of no help to
appellants, however, because we believe the court's reasoning was
sufficiently transparent in the circumstances of this case that our
limits were not transgressed.
As our detailed description of the hearing reveals, the
district court's sentencing decisions came after considerable
deliberation. Before pronouncing sentence, the court addressed at
length two significant issues that were specifically contested –
the propriety of a three-level adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility (including whether Osorio should be given any
adjustment in light of his Alford plea), and Osorio's criminal
history. The court's rulings on those issues immediately followed
the colloquies in which the government and defense counsel set out
-29-
their respective positions. Although the court did not explicitly
say so, it clearly was persuaded by the government's argument that
the timing of the defendants' pleas foreclosed the third point for
acceptance of responsibility. The court did explain both why it
granted Osorio the two point-reduction and why it refused to alter
his criminal history category.15
In addition, the court elaborated during the hearing on
its earlier decision to use the miscalculated $1.8 million as the
money laundering figure and confirmed the accuracy of its
Guidelines calculations with all parties. The court heard
extensive argument regarding the § 3553(a) factors from the
government, and both Osorio and his attorney responded.
Importantly, the court possessed detailed knowledge of the crimes
from the fourteen-day evidentiary hearing that preceded the
sentencing hearing. Indeed, the one issue personally challenged by
both defendants at the sentencing hearing was their asserted
15
The court stated that, despite Osorio's Alford plea on the
drug distribution charge (Count Three), he would grant the two-
point reduction "because he entered a plea to the conspiracy count,
and that count really drives the sentence." On the criminal
history, the court explained:
Under the circumstances of this history, I cannot
say that operating under and the outstanding warrant
really overstate the criminal history because the conduct
of this defendant includes at least two illegal entries
into the United States; and, of course, there is the
record that has brought him here today. So I will not
grant any departure on the ground that criminal history
category two overstates the seriousness of Mr. Osorio's
criminal history or the likelihood of recidivism.
-30-
leadership roles in the offense, but on that issue the court had
explicitly made a finding at the end of the evidentiary hearing,
ruling that "they were leaders in the activity."16
The full context makes it apparent that, in sentencing
both defendants to the lowest term of imprisonment within the
Guidelines range applicable to Arango, the court was acknowledging
the defendants' arguments for leniency but rejecting their view
that the § 3553(a) factors warranted a sentence outside the
standard range for the crimes they committed. We previously have
recognized that within-Guidelines sentences "require a lesser
degree of explanation than those that fall outside the guideline
sentencing range," Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d at 41, and we think
that observation is all the more true when the sentence is at the
very bottom of the Guidelines range.17 See United States v. Navedo-
Concepción, 450 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2006) ("The more obvious the
reasons for a choice, the less that needs to be explained.").
16
The court stated:
The taped conversations make clear, and the testimony of
Ms. Cruz as well, that her activities as a drug
trafficker were directed by these defendants, and I find
that they were leaders in the activity. Not necessarily
the leader, because the evidence is that they were
responsible to someone higher than they . . . .
17
The requirement that a court explain why it chose a
particular point within a Guidelines range exceeding twenty-four
months, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1), also is less pertinent in such
cases.
-31-
There was, in short, no ambiguity here; the court's reasoning can
be readily inferred from the record.
In sum, against the backdrop of a lengthy evidentiary
hearing, acquiescence to the government's recommendation from one
defendant, and a downward departure for the other defendant – and
no challenge from either defendant to the reasonableness of the
sentences imposed – we conclude that the district court
sufficiently revealed in open court its reasons for imposing the
particular sentences.18
E. Pro Se Arguments
Finally, in a pro se brief, Osorio presents two
additional arguments: that the government breached a plea agreement
in which it promised him a twelve-year, seven-month sentence in
exchange for pleading guilty to the drug and money laundering
charges; and that it erred in sentencing him on the basis that he
played a leadership role in the drug and money laundering
conspiracies. Both arguments fail under any standard of review.
18
Osorio also contends that the court erred because it not
only failed to explain his sentence, but also failed to even
consider the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This
contention is without merit. In imposing sentence on Osorio, the
court stated that it found the 262-month sentence "sufficient to
meet the sentencing factors outlined in the statute." Even if such
a comment ordinarily would not satisfy § 3553(c)'s explanation
requirement, it is sufficient to show that the court did take the
relevant factors into account. This is particularly evident here
given that, just prior to imposing sentence, the court heard
extensive argument from the government about the § 3553(a) factors.
-32-
The evidence directly contradict's Osorio's claim that
the government breached an unwritten plea agreement with him. At
the sentencing hearing, Osorio answered in the negative when asked
if "anyone made any promises to you . . . to get you to enter your
change of plea." When the government outlined the evidence it
would be presenting at the evidentiary hearing and the punishment
it would seek as a consequence, Osorio made no objection indicating
that such a course of action would breach a plea agreement.
Osorio's PSR explicitly stated that "[t]here is no plea agreement
in this case," and yet he lodged no objections to the PSR and no
plea agreement was cited in objection to the government's proposed
punishment at the sentencing hearing. In short, Osorio provides no
documentary evidence that a plea agreement existed, and his
behavior at the hearings belies the existence of such an agreement.
We therefore find no error on this ground.
Osorio also renews the argument – made at the sentencing
hearing – that the court erred in sentencing him on the basis of
his leadership role in the conspiracies because he took orders from
individuals higher in the criminal organization. Even if we credit
Osorio's assertion that he took orders from others, there is ample
evidence in the record that he played a leadership role in relation
to individuals like Cruz, Vallejo, Tavarez and the Cataños. That
he, in turn, reported to others is of no moment in determining
whether he was a leader for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). See
-33-
United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 129 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The
mere fact that [defendant] was subordinate to [a co-conspirator]
does not establish, without more, that [defendant] was not an
organizer or leader of the conspiracy.").
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, we reject
the appellants' assignments of error and affirm the sentences
imposed by the district court.
So ordered.
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