United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2467
ÁNGEL O. ALVARADO AGUILERA, EMMA I. BÁEZ LÓPEZ, IRIS Y.
BLANCO RESTO, GLORIA I. CÁLIZ PABELLÓN, VIRGEN DEL S.
COLÓN GONZÁLEZ, DEBORAH ORTIZ PÉREZ, DAPHNE Y. PAGÁN
ORTIZ, BRENDA E. PAGÁN RIVERA, MAGDA E. QUIRÓZ PAGÁN,
MIGUEL RODRÍGUEZ GONZÁLEZ, LUIS A. RODRÍGUEZ ORTIZ,
ARIADNE RODRÍGUEZ VELÁZQUEZ, ANNETTE SAEZ VARGAS, OLGA J.
SALDAÑA TORRES, and EMMA L. TORRES SANTIAGO,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
JOSÉ R. NEGRÓN, ALBA N. CORA, and CARMEN GONZÁLEZ FUSTER,
all in their personal capacities,
Defendants, Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lipez, Circuit Judge,
Baldock, * Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Julio Nigaglioni Arrache on brief for appellants. **
Susana I. Peñagarícano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor
General, with whom Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts, Solicitor
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
**
Mr. Nigaglioni Arrache failed to appear for oral
argument. In his absence, the Court chose to hear the
appellees’ argument in accordance with Fed. R. App. P.
34(e).
General, Mariana D. Negrón-Vargas, Deputy Solicitor General,
and Maite D. Oronoz-Rodríguez, Deputy Solicitor General,
were on brief for appellees.
December 5, 2007
BALDOCK, Senior Circuit Judge. The district court
disposed of the present case via a motion to dismiss,
concluding that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be grated. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Our review of a Rule 12(b)(6)dismissal is de
novo. See Diaz-Ramos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 501 F.3d 12, 15
(1st Cir. 2007). “[W]e, like the district court, must
assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the
plaintiff[s] the benefit of all reasonable inferences
therefrom.” Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496
F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007). Consequently, we proceed to
summarize the facts of this case as they appear in
plaintiffs’ complaint. See id. at 4.
I.
From October 1998 to January 2003, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico’s Administration of Juvenile Institutions (AJI)
contracted with Southwest Key Program (Southwest) to run the
Ponce Detention and Training School Center for Girls.
Plaintiffs served as custody officers or technicians in the
Ponce Detention Center during this period. In January 2003,
the AJI decided to reassume direct responsibility for the
center’s operations. On January 17, 2003, Defendant Negrón,
who served as the AJI’s administrator, came to the center
and met with Southwest’s employees. At this meeting, Negrón
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informed Southwest’s employees that they would be able to
continue working at the center under temporary government
appointments. Thereafter, Negrón assured Southwest’s
employees that they would receive permanent appointments to
government positions at the center.
Plaintiffs did receive temporary appointments to their
prior positions. These appointments commenced on January
17, 2003, and ended on June 30, 2003. Although plaintiffs
did not receive further temporary appointments, they
continued working at the center until April 2004. During
this interim period, plaintiffs applied for permanent
government positions with the AJI. Despite Defendant
Negrón’s promise that they would receive permanent
government positions at the center, plaintiffs were
terminated on April 30, 2004.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Negrón’s promise gave
them a legitimate claim of entitlement to permanent
government employment under Puerto Rico law. In addition,
plaintiffs claim a right, under Commonwealth law, to
notification of the identities of the individuals who were
ultimately placed in the permanent positions for which they
applied. Plaintiffs claim that the Commonwealth’s failure
to grant them permanent positions of employment at the
center, or notify them of the identity of the individuals
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selected to replace them, amounts to a procedural and
substantive violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
II.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
establish “a plausible entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007). Plaintiffs
claim the Commonwealth violated their rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to
state a valid claim for a procedural or substantive
violation of the Due Process Clause, plaintiffs must
“exhibit a constitutionally protected interest in life,
liberty, or property.” Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v.
Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005). In
this case, plaintiffs assert a violation of their
“proprietary rights.” Property interests are created and
defined by “existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law.” 1 Hatfield-Bermudez
v. Aldanondo-Rivera, 496 F.3d 51, 59 (1st Cir. 2007). In
order to qualify as a property interest, state law must give
an “individual a legitimate claim of entitlement to some
sort of benefit.” Id.
1
“For purposes of section 1983, Puerto Rico is the
functional equivalent of a state.” Pagan v. Calderon, 448
F.3d 16, 31 n.6 (1st Cir. 2006).
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A.
We first address plaintiffs’ claim that Negrón’s promise
gave them a property interest in a permanent position of
government employment. Puerto Rico law provides for the
appointment of temporary or “transitory employees.” Dept.
of Natural Res. v. Correa, 18 P.R. Offic. Trans. 795, 801
(1987). A transitory employee does not have a “legitimate
job retention expectancy once his appointment expires.” Id.
at 804. The question in this case is whether Negrón’s
promise effectively altered the status quo. See id.
(inquiring whether a transitory government employee’s
“particular circumstances” gave him “a legitimate expectancy
of continuity” in his job).
In Correa, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico answered
this question. In that case, the Court found an employee
who was given several temporary appointments, as well as a
promise of permanent employment, did not have a legitimate
expectation of continued employment with a government
agency. See id. at 805-06. Reasoning the employee was
“aware of the fact that the position he occupied was
transitory,” the Court concluded that “[a] simple offer of
a permanent position without any action on the part of the
government agency clearly showing an agreement to make good
on the promise cannot, by itself, give [an employee]
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anything beyond a unilateral expectation of job retention.”
Id. at 806.
The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s holding in Correa
clearly demonstrates that Negrón’s promise did not give
plaintiffs a legitimate claim of entitlement to a permanent
government position under Puerto Rico law. See Ruiz-Roche
v. Lausell, 848 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that a
“naked-and vague-promise” of a permanent position “was not
enough,” under Puerto Rico law, to give a plaintiff “a
legitimate expectation of continued employment” with the
Commonwealth). The agency’s invitation to plaintiffs to
fill out applications for permanent employment, as alleged
in the complaint, did not indicate the agency’s intent to
make good on Negrón’s promise. Therefore, plaintiffs’
attempt to distinguish Correa is unavailing.
B.
We now turn to plaintiffs’ argument that Puerto Rico law
gave them a property interest in notification of the
identity of the candidates selected to fill the permanent
positions for which they applied. Assuming Puerto Rico law
provides plaintiffs a procedural right to such notification,
the “simple fact that state law prescribes certain
procedures does not mean that the procedures thereby acquire
a federal constitutional dimension.” Slotnick v. Staviskey,
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560 F.2d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 1977). On the contrary, the
Supreme Court has clearly held that the “categories of
substance and procedure are distinct.” Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). “‘Property’
cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its
deprivation . . . .” Id. Plaintiffs’ allegation that they
were deprived of a right to a notification procedure related
to their termination thus fails to amount to an allegation
of a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
III.
Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege facts sufficient
to establish they possessed a constitutionally protected
property interest. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to
assert a “plausible entitlement to relief” under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rodriguez-Ortiz
v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007). The
district court, therefore, properly granted defendants’
motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).
AFFIRMED.
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