United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2586
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JUSTIN WOODBURY,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
and Schwarzer,* Senior District Judge.
Michael B. Whipple, with whom Thomas F. Hallett Law Offices,
P.A. was on brief, for appellant.
Margaret D. McGaughey, Appellate Chief, with whom Paula D.
Silsby, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.
December 26, 2007
*
Of the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. On September 5, 2005, federal
authorities obtained a search warrant for the home of Justin
Woodbury located at 7 Leisure Lane, Windham, Maine, "believed to
be" the bottom-floor left apartment. The warrant named Woodbury as
the occupant and authorized a nighttime no-knock entry. Federal
and local authorities, directed to his second-floor apartment by
the occupant of the bottom-floor apartment, executed the warrant
and seized a .40 caliber pistol and drug paraphernalia. Woodbury
entered a plea of not guilty to a federal indictment for a single
count of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and filed
a motion to suppress, alleging that for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, the warrant (1) lacked probable cause and (2) was
insufficiently particular. Woodbury's suppression motion was
denied, and he now appeals. After careful consideration, we
affirm.
I. Background
On May 5, 2005, Sgt. R. Michael Denbow, a state police
officer, told federal agent Earnest MacVane that an informant had
reported that he planned to deliver cocaine to Woodbury at an
apartment on Lamb Street in Windham. Two days later, the informant
stated that Woodbury had claimed to have purchased a .40 or .44
caliber pistol and even bragged that he was a convicted felon. The
informant had previously provided the police with truthful
information.
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On September 9, 2005, Windham police office Robert Hunt
stopped a speeding car. The driver was noticeably anxious and said
that he had just come from Woodbury's apartment. He informed the
police that Woodbury dealt in cocaine and possessed a .40 caliber
handgun which he did not carry outside of his apartment. Based
both on this information and that provided by the prior police
informant in May, MacVane believed there was probable cause that
Woodbury was trafficking at 7 Leisure Lane.
On September 9, 2005, a Maine state court judge granted
MacVane's request for a search warrant. The person, place, or
location to be searched read:
#7 Leisure Lane Windham, Maine believed to be
the bottom floor left apartment. Said
structure is a white multi-unit dwelling with
a covered front porch, and a grey shingled
roof.
The warrant unmistakably identified the appellant in the warrant as
"Justin WOODBURY/ DOB: 05-15-1981, White male 5'9" / 175 pound,
with brown hair and blue eyes," and authorized a nighttime no-knock
entry.
The warrant was based on a September 9 application and
affidavit submitted by MacVane. The affidavit named Woodbury as
the occupant of 7 Leisure Lane, but also described Woodbury's
apartment as being on Lamb Street.1 Attached to the affidavit was
1
The reference to Lamb Street came from information the driver of
the speeding car gave Hunt when he stopped the car as it was
entering Route 35 from Lamb Street. Leisure Lane is the name of a
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a black and white photograph of 7 Leisure Lane. The affidavit
provided a rough physical description of Woodbury, but stipulated
that it did not contain all of the information that MacVane
possessed in relation to Woodbury's alleged cocaine trafficking.
That same evening, federal and local authorities
attempted to execute the warrant at the location specified therein,
which directed them to the bottom-floor left apartment at 7 Leisure
Lane. Woodbury did not reside there. The agents were redirected
by the unknown occupant of the bottom-floor left apartment to the
second-floor left apartment, where the occupant believed Woodbury
resided. After knocking and waiting approximately twenty to thirty
seconds, the officers heard a commotion and movement inside of the
apartment. The agents forced open the door and saw Woodbury run
from the kitchen to the bedroom where they apprehended him.
Pursuant to the warrant, the officers searched the apartment and
found a .40 caliber pistol in a shoe box in the bedroom closet.
The shoe box also contained a copy of a bail slip issued to
Woodbury from a prior arrest which specified that one condition of
his release was a prohibition on possessing firearms. Elsewhere in
Woodbury's apartment, the police found drug paraphernalia laced
with cocaine residue. MacVane read Woodbury his Miranda rights,
which Woodbury chose to waive. Woodbury admitted to being the sole
driveway off of Lamb Street. It is clear from the application and
the affidavit that the application was for a unit on Leisure Lane.
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occupant of the apartment and to knowing that a gun was in his
closet. He denied owning the gun but refused to disclose how he
had acquired it. Woodbury was then arrested for possession of a
firearm by a felon.
On March 31, 2006, Woodbury moved to suppress the
evidence resulting from the search on three separate grounds: (1)
the warrant did not authorize entry into the upstairs apartment
that was actually searched; (2) regardless, there was no probable
cause to search the Leisure Lane premises because the informants
only connected Woodbury to Lamb Street; and (3) there was no
probable cause because the informants' information was
uncorroborated and unreliable.2
On May 24, 2006, the Magistrate Judge ("MJ") recommended
that the district court deny Woodbury's motion to suppress.
Addressing each argument in turn, the MJ found that (1) considered
in a common sense manner, the warrant made clear that the apartment
occupied by Woodbury was the target of the search; (2)"the
references in the affidavit to an apartment on Lamb Street were
sufficiently vague that it was reasonable to conclude that the Lamb
Street apartment was the same as #7 Leisure Lane"; and (3) a
sufficient number of factors were present to permit MacVane's
conclusion that the informants' information was reliable. Finally,
2
On appeal, Woodbury does not directly challenge the informants'
reliability.
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the MJ concluded that even if the warrant was invalid, the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply under United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Woodbury then modified his suppression motion, alleging
that the executing officers knowingly acted outside the scope of
the warrant. In response, the MJ stated that when "most sensibly
read," the warrant was "not so facially deficient that executing
officers could not reasonably have presumed it to be valid."
Accordingly, the MJ recommended that the motion be denied. On
July 27, 2006, the district court entered an order adopting the
MJ's report and recommendation. The district court's order
concluded that the Leon good faith exception applied to this case
and found that the warrant was legally executed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Woodbury challenges the validity of the
warrant and the district court's denial of his motion to suppress,
contending that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. His
argument is without merit. The warrant meets the probable cause
requirement, and its execution is valid under the Leon good faith
exception.
A. Standard of Review
"In this Circuit, appellate review of a suppression
motion is bifurcated." United States v. Charles, 213 F.3d 10, 18
(1st Cir. 2000). We review de novo the legal conclusions of the
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district court, "including the determination that a given set of
facts constituted probable cause." Id. at 18 (quoting United
States v. Khounsavanh, 113 F.3d 279, 282 (1st Cir. 1997)). We also
review the applicability of the Leon good faith exception de novo.
See United States v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2001). By
contrast, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear
error. Charles, 213 F.3d at 18. "A clear error exists only if,
after considering all of the evidence, we are left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (quoting
United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 529 (1st Cir. 1996)).
"[W]e will uphold a district court's decision to deny a suppression
motion provided that any reasonable view of the evidence supports
the decision." Id. 213 F.3d at 18 (quoting McCarthy, 77 F.3d at
529).
B. Probable Cause
The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement is meant to
protect people from unreasonable intrusion by the government into
their homes. The Warrant Clause guarantees that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "Any
search intruding upon [an individual's] privacy interest must be
justified by probable cause and must satisfy the particularity
requirement, which limits the scope and intensity of the search."
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United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 867 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing
United States v. Heldt, 688 F.2d 1238, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
"When investigators fail to limit themselves to the particulars in
the warrant, both the particularity requirement and the probable
cause requirement are drained of all significance as restraining
mechanisms, and the warrant limitation becomes a practical
nullity." United States v. Ferreras, 192 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir.
1999). The issuance of a warrant must satisfy two requirements for
constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. "A warrant
application must demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a
crime has been committed--the 'commission' element, and (2)
enumerated evidence of the offense will be found at the place to be
searched--the so-called 'nexus' element." United States v. Feliz,
182 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Zayas-
Díaz, 95 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 1996)). Woodbury does not
challenge the commission element, so we need not address it here.
Woodbury asserts that the warrant was not supported by
probable cause because there was no evidence of a nexus between his
alleged criminal activities and 7 Leisure Lane. Specifically,
Woodbury contends that the officers had no personal knowledge that
he lived at 7 Leisure Lane, and he points to the discrepancy in the
affidavit over a reference to Lamb Street. He claims that because
there was not "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime [would] be found in a particular place," namely, his
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apartment, there was no probable cause to support the warrant.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
Woodbury argues that MacVane's determination that
Woodbury resided at 7 Leisure Lane was the only link, and that the
resulting issuance of a warrant was a "mere ratification of the
bare conclusions of others." Id. at 239. Woodbury maintains that
conclusory statements in MacVane's affidavit could not constitute
a "substantial basis" for the issuing judge's determination of
probable cause. United States v. Caswell, 436 F.3d 894, 897 (8th
Cir. 2006) (interpreting Gates to require something more than a
"bare bones" recitation of conclusory statements by the affiant for
a substantial basis to exist).
The Government argues that the link between Woodbury's
drug trafficking and his place of residence could reasonably have
been inferred from the facts. We agree. See United States v.
Materas, 483 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Common sense dictates
that evidence of [defendant's] possession could probably be found
in the location where he sold drugs two days before."); Feliz, 182
F.3d at 88. The warrant clearly identified Woodbury to be the
occupant of the searched premises and also provided a physical
description of him. While MacVane's affidavit in support of the
warrant did mention that Woodbury's activities occurred at Lamb
Street, the affidavit and application for the warrant clearly
indicate that the warrant was specifically being sought for
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Woodbury's apartment, which the police determined to be on Leisure
Lane.3 The Government informants' mistake as to the actual street
name is not enough to invalidate the warrant. See United States v.
Cruz, 594 F.2d 268, 273-73 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding warrant valid
where mistake of key fact was understandable and unintentional
misstatement and not necessary to finding of probable cause since
affidavit on its face established probable cause for search of
defendant's residence).
The application for the warrant clearly indicates that
according to the informants' statements, at least part of the
criminal activity occurred at "his (WOODBURY'S) apartment." The
police were provided two first-hand accounts of criminal activity
at Woodbury's apartment by law enforcement informants. One of the
informants had just left the apartment the night the officers
sought the warrant, and told police that he had been a frequent
visitor there and personally observed Woodbury receiving drugs.
This same informant also told police that Woodbury showed him a .40
caliber handgun and that Woodbury usually kept it in his closet.
See United States v. Capozzi, 347 F.3d 327, 333-34 (1st Cir. 2003)
(finding police had probable cause where warrant sought was based
on tip from informant and corroborated with first-hand knowledge of
weapons used in a crime).
3
Leisure Lane is the name of a driveway off of Lamb Street.
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We "examine [an] affidavit in a practical, commonsense
fashion," Feliz, 182 F.3d at 86, and give "considerable deference"
to the issuing magistrate's conclusion that probable cause has been
established, id. (quoting Zayas-Díaz, 95 F.3d at 111). The
relevant inquiry is "whether the facts presented in the affidavit
would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution' to believe that
evidence of crime will be found." Feliz, 182 F.3d at 87 (quoting
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)). We do not require "that
the belief be shown to be necessarily correct or more likely true
than false." Id. We find that the facts MacVane presented in his
affidavit and application demonstrate that he reasonably believed
the evidence of a crime would be found at Woodbury's apartment.
In Feliz we urged a weighing of the factors in
determining probable cause while reiterating that such weighing
"may result in the inference of probable cause to believe that
criminal objects are located in a particular place, such as a
suspect's residence, to which they have not been tied by direct
evidence." Id. at 88. Even without direct evidence, "common
sense, buttressed by affiant's opinion as a law enforcement
officer," might permit the inference "that [the defendant] would be
likely to keep [evidence] relating to drug transactions at his
apartment." Id. Here, the informants actually recounted criminal
activity at Woodbury's place of residence. In light of these facts
and "the experience and training of the affiant," United States v.
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Jordan, 999 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1993), a sufficient basis existed
to find probable cause for the warrant.
C. The Leon Good Faith Exception
Woodbury contends that the warrant fails the Fourth
Amendment's particularity requirement as it is particularized only
with respect to the Lamb Street apartment. The Government admits,
and it is plain from the face of the warrant, that the wrong unit
was specified on the warrant. We need not address Woodbury's
particularity arguments because we find that the Leon good faith
exception applies. "The usual remedy for seizures made with [a
defective warrant is suppression] in order to deter future
violations of the Fourth Amendment." Brunette, 256 F.3d at 19
(citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93, (1914)).
Suppression, however, is not always necessary. "This exclusionary
rule does not obtain . . . where an objectively reasonable law
enforcement officer relied in good faith on a defective warrant
because suppression in that instance would serve no deterrent
purpose." Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21).
Woodbury argues that the Leon good faith exception to
suppression cannot apply because (1) the officers acted outside the
scope of the warrant, United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 177
(1st Cir. 1987), and (2) the warrant was "so lacking in indicia of
probable cause," Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part))
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(internal quotation marks omitted), that "no reasonably well
trained officer should rely on" it, id. Woodbury overstates the
alleged problem with the warrant. The warrant was not "so facially
deficient" that the officers could not have presumed it valid. Id.
The police officers mistook which apartment within the multi-unit
dwelling belonged to Woodbury, but it was reasonable for them to
believe that the warrant was valid. See Bonner, 808 F.2d at 868
(upholding scope of warrant and validating search where warrant
"did not leave so much to the discretion of the officers executing
the warrant").
Under Leon, the good faith exception applies when
government agents rely on a warrant in objective good faith and in
the interest of justice suppression is generally inappropriate.
See Brunette, 256 F.3d at 19. We find that to be the case here.
Although the good faith exception applies in some cases, it is
inapplicable in certain circumstances. The Leon good faith
exception does not apply where an officer's good faith reliance on
a warrant was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable," or a
warrant that is "'so facially deficient--i.e. in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized--
that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be
valid.'" United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 745 (1st Cir. 1999)
(quoting Leon, 486 U.S. at 923). The facts here and the analysis
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above, however, demonstrate that the warrant was issued with
probable cause. The police also reasonably presumed the warrant
to be valid.
"The good fath exception 'assumes . . . that the officers
properly executed the warrant and searched only those places and
for those objects that it was reasonable to believe were covered by
the warrant.'" Fuccillo, 808 F.2d at 178 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S.
at 918 n.19). The police officers acted within the scope of the
warrant in searching Woodbury's apartment. The warrant specifies
that it is for Woodbury's apartment. Though the warrant listed
what MacVane "believed to be" the bottom-floor left apartment, with
reasonable effort and without mistakenly searching the wrong
apartment, the police were able to execute the warrant against
their intended target. After knocking on the door to the bottom-
floor left apartment, the police were told by the occupant that
Woodbury did not live there but lived in the second-floor left
apartment. The police immediately proceeded upstairs and executed
the warrant there. By refraining from searching the wrong
apartment, the officers made clear their good faith in the
warrant's limitations and their understanding that it was
restricted to the search of Woodbury's apartment. See Bonner, 808
F.2d at 866.
We cannot say that the search warrant for Woodbury's
apartment was so facially deficient that it failed the standard
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outlined in Leon and as applied by this Court. See Owens, 167 F.3d
at 745; United States v. Díaz, 841 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1988).
Though listing the wrong unit, the warrant made clear reference to
the apartment occupied by Woodbury. Woodbury's claims of facial
deficiency do not rise to the level that we have found in other
cases. See United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 16 (1st Cir.
1993) (invalidating a warrant that "contained non-technical defects
readily observable to experienced postal inspectors and . . . that
the inspectors' omissions in the warrant-application process
constituted a second, independently sufficient ground for
distinguishing this case from Leon").
In Fuccillo, officers seized the contents of an entire
warehouse instead of the cartons of women's clothing specified on
the warrant. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d at 177-78. The facts in Fuccillo
precluded any assumption that the officers "'searched only those
places and for those objects that it was reasonable to believe were
covered by the warrant,'" and we thus declined to apply the Leon
good faith exception. Id. at 178 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 918
n.19). We also said in Fuccillo that where "the agents were
reckless in not including in the affidavit information which was
known or easily accessible to them," we would decline to apply the
Leon good faith exception. Id. There, the agents failed to
"[take] every step that could reasonably be expected of them" by
neglecting to make any effort to obtain information that would have
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identified the criminally related goods and distinguished them from
the rest of the goods in the warehouse. Id. (quoting Massachusetts
v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989 (1984)). In the absence of any
direction for identification of the stolen cartons, the warrant was
"facially deficient" and could not have been presumed valid by the
executing officers. Id. at 178 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
In seizing the contents of the entire warehouse anyway, the
executing officers acted recklessly such that we found application
of the Leon good faith exception to be improper. Id.
The facts of the present case do not rise to the same
level of defectiveness. The warrant was not so facially deficient
that the executing officers could not reasonably have presumed it
to be valid. The Leon good faith exception applies, and the
warrant was therefore legally executed.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment
of the district court denying Woodbury's motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
(Concurrence opinion follows)
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BOUDIN, Chief Judge, concurring. The panel opinion
convincingly resolves the Fourth Amendment challenge by invoking
the Leon doctrine: it shows that the police acted in good faith
even if it were assumed that the warrant itself was in some measure
defective. It may still be useful to say something about the
alleged defect because searches in multi-apartment buildings are
common and the problem of the uncertain apartment number recurs.
In this case there were two different glitches. The
first was whether the building containing Woodbury's apartment was
at 7 Leisure Lane or at Lamb Street. However, this initial
uncertainty was not in any way a defect in the warrant, which
correctly specified that the building was at 7 Leisure Lane. And,
despite the informant's reference to Lamb Street (from which
Leisure Lane is a kind of driveway), there was ample probable cause
for a warrant specifying the Leisure Lane address as the location
of well verified likely drug dealing by Woodbury.
The warrant thus said clearly that it was for a search of
Woodbury's apartment at 7 Leisure Lane--indeed, specifying the
building as "a white multi-unit dwelling with a covered front
porch, and a grey shingled roof"; the arguable defect came in the
further statement that Woodbury's own unit was "believed to be the
bottom floor left apartment." This was an accurate statement of
the officer's belief when the application and affidavit were
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submitted; but, arriving at the building, the agents learned from
a neighbor that Woodbury's apartment was on the second floor.
Under the case law, the Woodbury warrant would be valid
and sufficient even if it had not said anything about the location
of Woodbury's apartment within the building. "[A] warrant has been
considered valid if it specifies the name of the occupant of the
apartment against which it is directed, despite the absence of any
physical description of the particular apartment." United States
v. Bedford, 519 F.2d 650, 655 (3d Cir. 1975).4 That the warrant
added that the apartment was "probably" in a specific location
ought not make it "defective" so as to imply its legal invalidity.
The supposition was correctly stated as merely "probable"
and so it is hardly surprising that the agents made further inquiry
on arriving at the building. In such cases, as where no apartment
number is specified at all, the correct apartment can often be
verified from letter boxes or building directories in the lobby; in
this case, the information was secured from a neighbor. No attempt
was made to enter the apartment until its correct location in the
building had been ascertained.
4
Accord United States v. Vaughan, 875 F. Supp. 36, 42 (D. Mass.
1995) ("The particularity requirement with respect to multiunit
buildings 'may be satisfied by giving the address of the building
. . . and naming the person whose apartment is to be searched . . .
.'") (quoting United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir.
1955)); 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(b) & n.60 (4th
ed. 2004).
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This is thus not a case where a warrant inaccurately
authorized a search of a specific apartment: the search authorized
was of Woodbury's apartment in a specific building. It made sense
to add further information about its probable location just as it
made sense to describe the structure as a white frame building.
But no one would describe the warrant as legally "defective" if the
warrant had said that the building was at 7 Leisure Lane, adding
incorrectly that the building was "probably" gray.
So while Leon is "belt and suspenders," the premise that
there was any defect casting doubt on the validity of the warrant
is merely an arguendo assumption. Leon might well have been
essential if the warrant had definitively misstated the location of
the place to be searched. See United States v. Lora-Solano, 330
F.3d 1288, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2003); cf. United States v. Clement,
747 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir. 1984). In this case, it is merely the
easiest path to affirmance.
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