United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 07-1447
RYAN PADILLA-MANGUAL,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
PAVÍA HOSPITAL, ET AL.
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges,
and Smith,* District Judge.
Antonio Bauzá-Torres and Rubén Morales, for appellant.
Mirta Rodríguez-Mora, with whom Látimer, Biaggi, Rachid &
Godreau, were on brief for appellee Pavía Hospital, and Nuyen
Marrero-Bonilla, with whom Montijo & Montijo Law Offices, were on
brief for appellees Dr. Miguel De La Cruz and his conjugal
partnership.
February 14, 2008
*
Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.
SMITH, District Judge. In this case, a challenge to the
diversity jurisdiction claimed by a plaintiff requires us to
examine the presumption of domicile and what it takes to overcome
it where the plaintiff forges none of the typical ties to his new
home. Ultimately, we conclude that the task is one better left to
the district court, with the benefit of an evidentiary hearing.
Plaintiff-appellant, Ryan Padilla-Mangual (“Padilla”),
brought an action in the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico against defendant-appellee Pavía Hospital,
and defendants-appellees Dr. Miguel De La Cruz Castellanos and his
conjugal partnership (collectively, “Dr. De La Cruz”), for damages
stemming from allegedly negligent medical treatment.1 Padilla’s
complaint, which was premised on Puerto Rico’s general tort
statute, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 (2004), alleged federal
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The complaint
alleged that Padilla was a resident of the State of Florida.2
On July 17, 2006, Dr. De La Cruz moved to dismiss for
1
The complaint originally named Nicole Freire (or, Freyre),
Padilla’s then-fiancée, as an additional plaintiff. However, she
subsequently was voluntarily dismissed from the case.
2
Although Padilla’s complaint actually alleged that he was a
“resident” of Florida, rather than a “citizen” or “domiciliary” of
Florida, the district court’s analysis of domicile moots any
concern as to whether Padilla’s allegations, if defective, should
preclude a finding of diversity jurisdiction. See Cantellops v.
Álvaro-Chapel, 234 F.3d 741, 742-743 (1st Cir. 2000) (district
court’s analysis of domicile reviewed for clear error even where
complaint specifically alleged residency instead of domicile).
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that diversity
of citizenship was lacking.3 Dr. De La Cruz claimed that as of
January 30, 2006, the date that Padilla filed his complaint,
Padilla actually was a domiciliary of Puerto Rico, not Florida. On
October 3, 2006, Pavía Hospital moved for summary judgment on
Padilla’s claims, also arguing that the district court lacked
diversity jurisdiction. The district court granted both motions in
a single order on February 1, 2007, without holding an evidentiary
hearing. Padilla timely filed this appeal. While the district
court’s analysis ultimately may prove to be correct, because we
find that the record has not been adequately developed, we reverse
and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the question of diversity
of citizenship.
Federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship
requires that the matter in controversy be between citizens of
different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2006). For purposes of
diversity, a person is a citizen of the state in which he is
domiciled. Lundquist v. Precision Valley Aviation, Inc., 946 F.2d
8, 10 (1st Cir. 1991); Rodríguez-Díaz v. Sierra-Martínez, 853 F.2d
1027, 1029 (1st Cir. 1988); Valedón Martínez v. Hospital
3
Dr. De La Cruz’s motion also requested that the district
court abstain from deciding the action based on the abstention
doctrine set forth in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The district court did not
discuss the issue of abstention in light of its decision to dismiss
the complaint for lack of diversity jurisdiction.
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Presbiteriano de la Comunidad, Inc., 806 F.2d 1128, 1132 (1st Cir.
1986). “A person’s domicile ‘is the place where he has his true,
fixed home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he
is absent, he has the intention of returning.’” Rodríguez-Díaz,
853 F.2d at 1029 (quoting Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller,
& Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3612 (2d ed.
1984)). Domicile is determined as of the time the suit is filed.
Lundquist, 946 F.2d at 10; Valedón Martínez, 806 F.2d at 1132;
Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 598 F.2d 698, 701 (1st Cir.
1979).
In contesting Padilla’s assertion of diversity
jurisdiction, the appellees point out that only four days before
filing his action in the district court, Padilla filed a complaint
in Puerto Rico state court, essentially making the same allegations
as in his federal complaint, but alleging him to be a resident of
Puerto Rico.4 Once challenged, “the party invoking subject matter
jurisdiction [here Padilla] has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the facts supporting jurisdiction.”
Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Montle, 964 F.2d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted); see also Lundquist, 946 F.2d at 10 (plaintiff
must support allegation of jurisdiction by “competent proof”);
4
The complaint filed in Puerto Rico state court on January
26, 2006, was actually an amended complaint. The original
complaint, which also alleged that Padilla was a resident of Puerto
Rico, was filed on August 22, 2005.
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O’Toole v. Arlington Trust Co., 681 F.2d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1982);
Hawes, 598 F.2d at 702; Lugo-Viña v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 574 F.2d
41, 44 (1st Cir. 1978). Padilla contended that the allegations of
residency contained in his Puerto Rico pleadings were “clerical
errors” and that he had, by December 31, 2004, permanently
relocated from Puerto Rico to Florida.5
There is, ordinarily, a presumption of continuing
domicile, Hawes, 598 F.2d at 701; see also Mitchell v. United
States, 88 U.S. 350, 353 (1874) (“domicile once acquired is
presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed”).
Because Padilla was raised in Puerto Rico and lived there until his
apparent relocation to Florida, it is presumed that he was a
domiciliary of Puerto Rico. To sustain his burden, Padilla was
required to show two things in order to establish a change in his
domicile from Puerto Rico to Florida: (1) presence in Florida, and
(2) an intent to remain there. Bank One, 964 F.2d at 50; Valedón
Martínez, 806 F.2d at 1132; Hawes, 598 F.2d at 701. We have stated
previously that the factors relevant to determining a party’s
intent include:
the place where civil and political rights are
exercised, taxes paid, real and personal
property (such as furniture and automobiles)
5
Padilla’s representation that he relocated to Florida on
December 31, 2004 appears to be contradicted by his own appellate
brief, in which he asserts that he was flown (apparently from
Puerto Rico) to the Mayo Clinic in Jacksonville, Florida, on or
about January 18, 2005.
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located, driver’s and other licenses obtained,
bank accounts maintained, location of club and
church membership and places of business or
employment.
Bank One, 964 F.2d at 50 (citation omitted). While no single
factor is controlling, some courts have presumed domicile in a
state is established where a party is registered to vote. Id.
This Court has not recognized such a presumption, but we have said
that the place a person is registered to vote is a “weighty” factor
in determining domicile. Lundquist, 946 F.2d at 12.
The district court’s conclusion that Padilla failed to
meet his burden of proving that he changed his domicile to Florida
at the time he filed his federal complaint is a “mixed question of
law and fact and as such may not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous.” Bank One, 964 F.2d at 51; Lundquist, 946 F.2d at 11;
Valedón Martínez, 806 F.2d at 1132; O’Toole, 681 F.2d at 98; Hawes,
598 F.2d at 702. “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)
(citation omitted). Though this presents a high hurdle for
Padilla, we believe it has been cleared here - if only just - and
we therefore cannot sustain, on the present record, the district
court’s finding of a lack of diversity jurisdiction. See Fredyma
v. AT & T Network Sys., Inc., 935 F.2d 368, 370 (1st Cir. 1991)
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(reversing district court judgment for error in procedure, but
expressing no opinion on “ultimate viability” of complaint).
The record before us reveals that Padilla offered several
pieces of evidence to show that he had changed his domicile from
Puerto Rico to Florida prior to filing his federal lawsuit: (1) two
declarations, one his and the other his mother’s, made under
penalty of perjury, that he is a resident of Florida and has no
intention of returning to Puerto Rico; (2) copies of four ledgers
detailing payments and charges from four different addresses in
Florida where Padilla claims to have resided since January 2005;6
and (3) a copy of a driver’s license issued to Padilla on January
20, 2005, by the state of Florida. In his declaration, Padilla
stated that he moved to Florida on December 31, 2004 and has never
returned to Puerto Rico. He also declared that he intends to
continue living in Florida, has no intention of ever returning to
Puerto Rico, and that all of his personal contacts are in Florida,
with the exception of his mother in Puerto Rico who provides him
with financial support. Padilla’s mother’s declaration echoed
6
As the district court noted, only one of the ledgers records
Padilla as a co-tenant with Nicole Freire, Padilla’s then-fiancée.
Two others show only Freire as the tenant, and the fourth shows
Padilla’s mother as the tenant. The ledger recording Padilla as a
cotenant overlaps with the date that Padilla filed his federal
complaint, i.e. Padilla apparently was the cotenant of a Florida
residence as of the day that he filed his federal complaint on
January 30, 2006.
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Padilla’s claims and clarified that she pays all of Padilla’s
expenses since he is unable to work or study.7
Based on these submissions, as well as the Puerto Rico
state court pleadings alleging that Padilla was a domiciliary of
Puerto Rico, the district court found that, “[g]iven the totality
of the circumstances, the Court simply cannot find that Padilla has
established his domicile in Florida for diversity purposes.” The
district court reasoned that, ultimately, “Padilla has not shown .
. . that he has taken any affirmative steps to establish a domicile
7
While Padilla argued in opposition to the motion to dismiss
and motion for summary judgment that his Puerto Rico pleadings
contained erroneous allegations of residency, he submitted no
actual evidence to support this specific claim until he submitted
the declaration of his former counsel with his surreply. This
relates to an additional concern that we would prefer to see
alleviated before terminating Padilla’s right to seek relief in a
federal forum. The district court apparently granted Padilla an
extension of time to February 6, 2007 to file a surreply.
Nonetheless, the district court entered its judgment dismissing
Padilla’s complaint one day sooner, on February 5. Padilla’s
surreply, filed on February 6, included the declaration from his
former counsel, in which counsel stated that he inadvertently
copied Padilla’s mother’s address into the Puerto Rico pleadings,
as well as additional documentation purporting to evidence
Padilla’s Florida domiciliary. That same day, Padilla also filed
a motion for reconsideration of the district court’s decision,
which the district court denied on February 7. In denying the
motion for reconsideration, the district court stated that it
reviewed Padilla’s surreply and found “no reason to change its
previous ruling.” We are troubled by this apparent sub silentio
reversal of the district court’s decision to grant Padilla the
opportunity to file a surreply. It is not inconceivable that the
previous day’s dismissal of Padilla’s complaint colored the
district court’s review of his surreply. We think these events
support our view that the best approach is for the district court
to take a fresh look at all the evidence submitted and conduct an
evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of the declarants.
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in Florida.” Specifically, the district court focused on Padilla’s
apparent failure to cultivate the sort of ties traditionally viewed
as manifesting an expression of domicile:
Padilla does not work nor has he indicated
that he is looking for work in Florida. He
does not go to school. He does not own or
rent any real property in Florida. He does
not belong to any clubs or groups, nor does he
attend a church. He does not have any bank
accounts. He has not registered or exercised
the right to vote. Other than his driver’s
license and a stated desire to stay there,
Padilla doesn’t seem to have established any
real presence in Florida.
The district court also believed it to be contradictory
that Padilla stated his physical condition prevented him from
working or attending school, and yet Padilla also professed to live
alone and far from family, to care for himself, and to drive a car.
In other words, the district court found that Padilla’s
declaration was not credible because he largely had not taken the
affirmative steps described in Bank One, e.g. opening a bank
account or obtaining employment. However, nothing we have said in
our prior decisions implies that the typical indicia of domicile
are required in order to change one’s domicile; rather, we have
described these as examples of indicia of intent.
We recognize that the mode of proving diversity is
normally left to the district court, but its discretion is not
unfettered. Bank One, 964 F.2d at 51; O’Toole, 681 F.2d at 98.
While the district court may rely on documentary evidence to
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establish whether jurisdiction attaches, and while the same clearly
erroneous standard applies to findings based thereon, the
presumption that the court reached a correct result is somewhat
lessened relative to findings based on oral testimony. Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500
(1984). In Prakash v. American University, 727 F.2d 1174 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), the District of Columbia Circuit, remanding for further
proceedings on the question of diversity, stated:
[i]n many instances, and perhaps in most, a
party’s intent will appear, at least in part,
from facts established by documents. When,
however, as here, a party expressly declares
his intent, and the opposing written
submissions do not demonstrate the falsity of
the declaration with reasonable certainty, the
issue necessarily becomes one of the
declarant’s credibility. In that event, the
court cannot rest its decision simply on the
paper record, but must hold a hearing in order
to adequately assess credibility. Only in that
way is a sound decision on intent possible.
Id. at 1180 (citations omitted); see also Rubin v. Buckman, 727
F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1984) (remanding for further proceedings on
whether diversity might exist); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,
414 (5th Cir. 1981) (where subject matter jurisdiction is attacked
“the district court must give the plaintiff an opportunity for
discovery and for a hearing that is appropriate to the nature of
the motion to dismiss”); Shahmoon Indus., Inc. v. Imperato, 338
F.2d 449, 451-52 (3d Cir. 1964) (remanding case for further inquiry
into the jurisdictional facts where the court had “serious doubts”
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as to the district court’s jurisdiction based on the factual record
and where the factual record only raised doubts as to the accuracy
of one of the parties’ affidavits). It is certainly possible that
one might change his residence with no intent of returning, but not
make those connections described in Bank One. Any number of
explanations are possible -- physical or mental incapacity,
religious objections, to name a few. The point is that where a
party has declared his intent to change and remain in his new
domicile, and the opposing written submissions do not demonstrate
the falsity of the declaration with reasonable certainty, the
absence of typical indicia of domicile is not determinative. More
is required of the district court before it concludes that a
plaintiff has not met his burden and overcome the presumption. We
agree with our sister circuits that in these circumstances an
evidentiary hearing is appropriate.
Thus, while we note that the district court’s decision is
by no means wholly unsupported by the record, we are persuaded, for
the reasons stated above, that Padilla’s complaint should not be
dismissed in the absence of an evidentiary hearing that will allow
the district court to assess fully Padilla’s credibility and
resolve certain unanswered questions implicated by the parties’
briefing.
We stress that we are not predetermining the ultimate
findings of the district court. In conducting a jurisdictional
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inquiry, the court enjoys broad authority to order discovery,
consider extrinsic evidence, hold an evidentiary hearing, and hear
testimony in order to determine its own jurisdiction. Valentín v.
Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 363 (1st Cir. 2001). We do not
pretend to know what the district court may determine as a result
of its inquiry; we request only that the inquiry be sufficiently
thorough to assure that all parties receive a full and fair
opportunity to be heard.8
Reversed and Remanded.
8
As a final note, we emphasize that, on remand, Padilla must
establish by preponderance of the evidence that as of January 30,
2006, the date he filed his complaint, he was domiciled in Florida.
García Pérez v. Santaella, 364 F.3d 348, 351-52 (1st Cir. 2004).
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