United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 07-1599
MOHAMMAD JAMAL,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
Campbell and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges.
Peter A. Allen for petitioner.
Jesse M. Bless, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
United States Department of Justice, Peter D. Keisler, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, and David V. Bernal, Assistant
Director, on brief for respondent.
June 27, 2008
CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. Petitioner Mohammad
Jamal, a native and citizen of Pakistan, seeks review of a March
19, 2007 decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board" or
"BIA") affirming an immigration judge's denial of his application
for asylum and withholding of removal under sections 208 and 241(b)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158,
1231(b)(3) and protection under the Convention Against Torture
("CAT"), 1465 U.N.T.S.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2006)
(implementing the convention). Jamal argues that his right to due
process was violated by the IJ's conclusion that his asylum
petition was untimely filed, and he challenges the IJ's conclusion
that he was not subjected to past persecution and would not be
likely to suffer future persecution. We deny the petition.
Facts
Jamal entered the United States on July 30, 2000. On
March 21, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") charged
Jamal with removability because he had stayed in the United States
without authorization. Jamal conceded his removability but applied
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.
The IJ denied his applications on August 9, 2005, and the Board
affirmed that decision on March 19, 2007.
The following facts were developed at the IJ's hearing
held on August 9, 2005. Jamal joined the Pakistani Muslim League-
Nawaz ("PML-N"), a political party which supported a movement
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toward democracy, in 1973. In 1998, according to Jamal, he was
named secretary general of his village. As secretary-general, he
held meetings, talked with party members, and recruited others to
join the PML-N. For nine months of each year from 1973-2000, Jamal
worked as a seaman. When not at sea, he worked as a farmer and
agriculturist. In October 1999, Pakistan's President Nawaz Sharif,
who was also the leader of the PML-N, removed the chief of the
army, General Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf retaliated by fomenting
a successful military coup against Sharif and his cabinet.
On November 16, 1999, Jamal participated in a meeting
advocating democracy and criticizing Musharraf's new military
regime. During the meeting, the police beat Jamal and others
present. Jamal testified that he sustained injuries to his hands,
back and feet but said nothing about injury to his abdominal
organs. Jamal said he sought medical treatment, and a doctor's
letter he submitted said he had sustained "blunt injuries to his
abdominal organs" and described his condition as "pretty serious."
When asked during the hearing whether he had suffered blunt
abdominal injuries, as the letter said, Jamal responded, "When you
are beaten with, with sticks and rock, surely you're going to get
injuries inside your system." The IJ observed that the doctor's
letter was dated October 29, 1999, several days before the meeting
when Jamal was supposed to have sustained the injuries. Jamal
testified that the date of the letter was an error. The IJ further
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observed that "the respondent does not appear to have suffered
blunt injuries to his abdominal organs."
At the hearing, Jamal submitted a document, translated
from Urdu into English, entitled "First Investigation Report," that
appeared to be a local police report dated November 16, 1999
accusing Jamal and others of disturbing the peace and stating that
Jamal and the others were fighting hand to hand with police.
Jamal asserted that after November 16, he resumed
participation in political activities and suffered other beatings
by the police. In all, he said that he suffered between five and
ten beatings between November 16, 1999 and November 30, 1999, when
he left the area. He did not, however, claim to have sustained
injuries subsequent to the beating on November 16; he testified as
to the latter incidents, "No, no, not really injuries." After
leaving the area on November 30 to go to Karachi, Jamal suffered no
further harm. In December of 1999, Jamal returned to his work as
a seaman and traveled out of Pakistan with government-issued
documentation. There was no evidence of his conviction of any
criminal offense, of the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, or
of any specific threat by authorities to his safety should he
return to Pakistan.
The 2001 State Department Country Conditions report
submitted by Jamal's counsel to the IJ stated there were
significant amounts of corruption and sectarian violence in
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Pakistan and that the government's human rights record was poor.
The 2001 report also observed that while the government permitted
all existing political parties to function, including the PML-N,
the government had essentially prevented the PML-N from electing
former President Sharif.
The country conditions report stated that on April 6,
2000, former President Sharif was convicted of hijacking and
terrorism because he had in 1999 refused to permit a commercial
flight on which Musharraf was a passenger to land in Karachi. On
December 10, 2000, Musharraf pardoned the former president, who
flew to exile in Saudi Arabia and promised to stay out of politics
for two decades. After the coup, the PML-N chose not to call for
the restoration of the Sharif government because it believed it
would be a mistake to challenge the military directly.
After taking over, Musharraf consolidated a number of
governmental roles and assumed more power for himself. His actions
included suspending the constitution, jailing several justices and
lawyers of the supreme court, and shutting down independent
television stations.1
1
While we look solely to facts in the record in determining
whether to sustain the decision below, we take note that history
has not stood still since this matter was decided. Press reports
indicate that former Prime Minister and leader of the opposition
Pakistan People's Party ("PPP") Benazir Bhutto was assassinated as
she campaigned in anticipation of January 2008 parliamentary
elections. When elections were finally held, both the PPP and the
PML-N won the majority of seats in the Parliament and formed an
alliance. Musharraf, who remains the president of Pakistan but is
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Jamal testified to the IJ that if he returned to the area
of his home, he would be beaten by the local police. He also
submitted an affidavit asserting that "the leaders of these
extremist organizations know me and would kill me if I returned to
Pakistan." Since Jamal entered the United States, however, his
wife and six children have continued to live without incident in
Pakistan. There is no independent evidence of anyone looking for
Jamal or threatening to hurt him if he returns home, nor is there
evidence of such conduct by the authorities relative to other PML-N
adherents because of their opposition to the coup against Sharif.
IJ's Decision and Board Appeal
In denying Jamal's applications for asylum, the IJ
concluded that Jamal was statutorily ineligible for asylum because
he had neither filed his application for asylum within one year of
his arrival in the United States nor shown the existence of changed
or extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify the lateness
of his application. The uncontested record evidence shows that
Jamal arrived in the United States on July 30, 2000 and sought
asylum only on January 5, 2004, some three and a half years later.
The IJ rejected Jamal's contention that his illiteracy and asserted
ignorance of the availability of asylum were exceptional
circumstances justifying the lateness of his application. She also
no longer the chief of the military, has said he would work with
the new Parliament. Sharif has returned to the country and is
expected to run for Parliament in June of this year.
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rejected any contention that the country conditions had changed in
a way that materially affected his reasons to fear harm upon his
return.
In evaluating Jamal's claims for withholding of removal
and protection under the CAT, the IJ concluded that Jamal's
contention that he was beaten by police for political reasons at
and after the meeting on November 16, 1999 was insufficient
evidence to establish past persecution. While the IJ found Jamal's
narrative of the November 16 beating was credible, and that the
harm he then suffered was "inflicted on account of his political
opinion and his political activities," she observed that Jamal had
been physically able to return to his political activities
immediately and had joined in other protests without additional
injuries. She further observed that the date of the doctor's note,
some days before the claimed beating, and the apparent lack of
blunt abdominal injury suffered by Jamal, also raised a question as
to the injuries inflicted. The IJ noted that the purported
translation of a document naming Jamal as fighting with police and
disturbing the peace on November 16, 1999 was unsigned by another
except the notary and was unaccompanied by the original. The IJ
found that it did not result in a warrant for Jamal's arrest and
did not interfere with his ability to travel or to leave the
country.
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The IJ additionally concluded that despite the violence
in Pakistan, Jamal had failed to establish that he would more
likely than not be persecuted on his return to the country because
of his prior opposition to the coup against Sharif. The IJ based
this decision on the facts that Jamal's wife and children were
still living unharmed in Pakistan, that Jamal did not claim that
anyone had threatened him or looked for him since he left Pakistan,
and that he did not show that any supporter of Sharif had been
harmed since 2000. She concluded there was no evidence that the
uncertain conditions in Pakistan would affect Jamal any more than
any other citizens of Pakistan. The IJ denied Jamal's applications
for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT.
The BIA dismissed Jamal's appeal of the IJ's decision on
March 19, 2007, affirming both her conclusion that Jamal had filed
an untimely application for asylum not subject to any of the
exceptions and that he had not established past persecution or
likelihood of future persecution or of torture.
Discussion
We turn to Jamal's arguments that the BIA violated his
right to constitutional due process of law by upholding the IJ's
conclusion that his asylum application was time-barred, and also to
his challenges to the IJ's conclusion that he failed to establish
past persecution or threat of future persecution or torture.
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I. Timeliness
Under INA § 208(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3),2 courts are
denied jurisdiction to review the Attorney General's determination
that an alien has filed an untimely petition and has not
established changed or extraordinary circumstances to excuse the
late filing. See Heng v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir.
2
The statute reads, in relevant part:
(a) Authority to apply for asylum
(1) In general
Any alien who is physically present in the United
States or who arrives in the United States . . . may
apply for asylum in accordance with this section . . . .
(2) Exceptions
. . .
(B) Time limit
Subject to subparagraph (D), paragraph (1)
shall not apply to an alien unless the alien demonstrates
by clear and convincing evidence that the application has
been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien's
arrival in the United States.
. . .
(D) Changed circumstances
An application for asylum of an alien may be
considered, notwithstanding subparagraphs (B) and (c), if
the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General either the existence of changed
circumstances which materially affect the applicant's
eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances
relating to the delay in filing an application within the
period specified in subparagraph (B).
. . .
(3) Limitation on judicial review
No court shall have jurisdiction to review any
determination of the Attorney General under paragraph
(2).
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
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2007); Pan v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 80, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding
no jurisdiction to review a timeliness determination for asylum).
Jamal does not dispute that his petition was, in fact,
untimely filed but challenges on purported constitutional grounds
the IJ's factual finding that he did not demonstrate changed or
extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant an exception to
the one-year rule. He argues in his brief that "the failure of the
IJ to make an individualized analysis in order to determine whether
evidence exists in the record sufficient to qualify the Petitioner
for an exception from the (one) 1-year asylum ban on the basis of
changed circumstances or extraordinary circumstances . . . was a
violation of due process . . . ."
On the record before us, this claim of
unconstitutionality is frivolous. "To trigger our jurisdiction,
the putative constitutional or legal challenge must be more than a
disguised challenge to factual findings." Pan, 489 F.3d at 84.
The IJ acted reasonably in giving little credence to Jamal's
contention that, having overstayed his visa, he had justifiably
remained unaware for over three years from the time he arrived in
the United States of the one-year period within which to file for
asylum. She noted the existence of various legal aid sources where
advice was available and found that, "although not being able to
read or write, [he] is [an] otherwise seemingly intelligent,
oriented, and sane individual. Therefore, I find that the mere
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inability to read or write does not, under these circumstances,
cause the Court to conclude that the respondent is suffering from
a disability." Finally, she concluded that "the Court does not
believe that country conditions have changed since the respondent's
arrival in the United States so as to materially affect his reasons
for fearing harm." Nothing about these findings suggests that
Jamal's right to constitutional due process was infringed. We
accordingly lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision
affirming the IJ's conclusion that Jamal's asylum petition was
untimely and that he has not demonstrated changed or extraordinary
circumstances excusing his delay.
II. Denial of Claim for Withholding of Removal and Protection
Under the CAT
An alien scheduled for deportation may avoid removal if
the Attorney General concludes that "the alien's life or freedom
would be threatened in [the destination] country because of the
alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A). Jamal challenges the IJ's findings of fact that
he established neither past persecution nor threat of future
persecution should he be returned to Pakistan and also was not
eligible for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT.
If the Attorney General concludes that the alien was a
victim of past persecution, there is a presumption of future
persecution should the alien be returned to the country. 8 C.F.R.
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§ 1208.16(b)(1)(i). But an alien who has not demonstrated past
persecution must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that
he will be subject to future persecution upon returning to the
country. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). Under the CAT, an alien may
not be returned to his country if "there are substantial grounds
for believing [he] would be in danger of being subjected to
torture." Pub. L. No. 104-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822
(1998). The alien must show that he will more likely than not be
tortured upon returning to his country. Ang v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d
50, 55, 58 (1st Cir. 2005).
As the BIA affirmed the basis of the IJ's decision, we
review both the IJ and the BIA's decisions. Butt v. Keisler, 506
F.3d 86, 89 (1st Cir. 2007). Their conclusions "must be upheld if
supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole." INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S.
478, 481 (1992) (internal quotation omitted). Our review is
deferential. Their findings of fact are "conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary." INA § 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Jamal
must demonstrate the evidence in the record not only supports a
contrary conclusion but compels it. Da Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d
1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2005). He has not done so here.3
3
The government argues that Jamal's argument regarding past
persecution and likelihood of future persecution has been abandoned
because they have been "advanced in skeletal form, unaccompanied by
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a. Past Persecution
In rejecting Jamal's claim of past persecution, and its
accompanying presumption of future persecution should he return to
Pakistan, the IJ concluded that the evidence of police beatings in
November of 1999 following the military coup did not rise to the
level of persecution.
The only claimed actual injury to Jamal related to his
beating at the November 16, 1999 meeting. He walked home
afterwards, and engaged in further political activism throughout
the remainder of the month which, he said, resulted in further
police beatings, although without injury to himself. He then went
to Karachi without apparent problems and later resumed his work as
a seaman, during which time he traveled freely out of Pakistan
using government-issued documents.
The IJ credited Jamal's testimony as to the November 16,
1999 police beating although, because of the earlier date of the
doctor's report, the discrepancy between Jamal's description of his
injuries and those in the report, and Jamal's ability to walk home
and resume demonstrating thereafter, she found he exaggerated his
injuries. And while Jamal presented what appeared to be a
translation of a local police report verifying his encounter with
police on November 16, 1999, he presented no evidence he was
some developed argumentation." Pan, 489 F.3d at 87. Though there
is force to this argument, we conclude, in any event, that Jamal's
contentions are without substance.
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convicted for his part in the November 16 disturbances, nor that a
warrant for his arrest was issued. Nor was there evidence that
others who had engaged in activism similar to Jamal's were detained
or harmed thereafter by the police. His wife and children have
continued to live in Pakistan without being disturbed by the
authorities. There was evidence that, in general, while the police
at this time used force against demonstrators and sometimes
arrested them, the government usually allowed individuals to
assemble peacefully subject to some restrictions.
We cannot say that this record compelled the IJ to find
that Jamal was subjected to past persecution. The described events
occurring in November of 1999 could reasonably be categorized as
being more in the nature of isolated occurrences than the sort of
systematic threats to Jamal's life or freedom indicative of his
having been persecuted by the authorities. See Topalli v.
Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between
"systematic maltreatment that rose to the level of past
persecution" as opposed to a series of "isolated incidents," and
sustaining a finding of no past persecution where petitioner was
beaten seven times by the police but did not need medical attention
and was able to live in peace for three years following his last
arrest); Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005)
("[M]istreatment ordinarily must entail more than sporadic abuse in
order to constitute persecution," and upholding a finding of no
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persecution after two widely-separated beatings); Nelson v. INS,
232 F.3d 258, 263 (1st Cir. 2000) (three episodes of solitary
confinement of less than 72 hours accompanied by physical abuse
held insufficient to require a finding of persecution). Given
especially the deferential standard governing this court's review
of the IJ's and BIA's determinations of persecution, see, e.g.,
Bocova, 412 F.3d at 263 ("Persecution is a protean word of many
meanings," definition of which is in the first instance the
prerogative of the Attorney General), we are unable to say that a
contrary finding as to past persecution was required here.
b. Likelihood of Future Persecution or Torture
The IJ concluded that Jamal was not likely to be
subjected to future persecution or torture, noting that his wife
and six children still live safely in Pakistan and that despite the
corruption and political turmoil in the country, "there is just
simply no evidence that those conditions would affect the
respondent more than other citizens of Pakistan." Jamal testified
that his wife and children "don't have any problems." "Without
some explanation, the fact that close relatives continue to live
peacefully in the alien's homeland undercuts the alien's claim that
persecution awaits his return." Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d
565, 573 (1st Cir. 1999). Though Jamal expressed concern that "the
leaders of these extremist organizations know me and would kill me
if I returned to Pakistan," he did not provide evidence beyond his
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personal expression of these concerns and fears to support this
allegation. His family's ongoing safe residence in the country, as
well as his own earlier unobstructed passages when traveling to
Karachi and as a seaman, as well as the absence of any outstanding
relevant threats, belie this claim.
This court has said that the prospect "that a country's
politics remain volatile, leaving open the possibility of
deterioration and including some measure of specific violence, does
not necessarily establish an alien's well founded fear of
persecution should he be returned to that country." Chreng v.
Gonzales, 471 F.3d 14, 23 n.3 (1st Cir. 2006). Without evidence of
a specific threat or of an ongoing pattern of persecution against
similarly situated members of his party, Jamal has not shown the
record compels the conclusion that he is likely to be persecuted or
tortured upon returning to Pakistan.
Petition denied.
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