United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 07-1293
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY LIPSCOMB,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
O'Connor,* Associate Justice (Ret.),
and Torruella, Circuit Judge.
George J. West, for appellant.
Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Robert Clark Corrente, United States Attorney, and Stephen G.
Dambruch, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for
appellee.
August 21, 2008
*
The Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Anthony Lipscomb was indicted
by a federal grand jury on three counts: possession with the intent
to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base, possession of a
gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of
a gun as a convicted felon. After a three-day jury trial, he was
convicted on all counts and sentenced to 195 months' imprisonment.
Lipscomb now appeals his conviction and sentence on various
grounds. After careful consideration of each of his arguments, we
affirm his conviction, but remand for resentencing.
I. Background
Because Lipscomb questions the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction, we recite the facts in the
light most favorable to the jury's guilty verdict. See United
States v. Colón-Díaz, 521 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2008). We begin by
recounting the basic underlying facts and leave further
elaboration, as necessary, for the analysis of Lipscomb's several
other claims.
On December 30, 2004, Lipscomb was talking on his cell
phone outside an auto repair shop when he was approached by
Providence Police Detectives Scott A. Partridge and Joseph
Colanduono. Lipscomb took several steps away from them and began
to run; the detectives chased after him. As he fled, Lipscomb
reached into his jacket and retrieved a clear plastic bag, which he
threw to the ground. The bag was later found to contain thirty-
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five grams of crack cocaine. While continuing to run, Lipscomb
also removed a fully-loaded 9 mm gun from his waistband and tossed
it under a nearby car. The gun was found to have one round in the
chamber ready to fire. As the police closed in, Detective
Colanduono grabbed Lipscomb's jacket, but Lipscomb was able to slip
out of it and continue fleeing.
Lipscomb was eventually tackled by Detective Partridge
and arrested. He was taken to the hospital to treat the cuts and
bruises on his face that resulted from the struggle. On his
person, he was found to be carrying a cell phone, $1,471 in cash,
and a quantity of marijuana.
Lipscomb was indicted by a grand jury on three counts:
(1) possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of
crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B); (2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and
(3) felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1).
Lipscomb moved to suppress the gun and crack cocaine
found by the police. On April 13, 2005, the district court held a
hearing on the motion to suppress and heard testimony from
Detectives Colanduono and Partridge, as well as from Lipscomb.
Lipscomb identified Colanduono and Partridge and testified that
they tackled and beat him without provocation or warning. When
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asked about the crack cocaine and the gun, he testified that
neither was his. Upon further cross-examination, he reiterated
that he did not possess a gun and denied any knowledge regarding
the bag of crack cocaine that the Government claimed he had
discarded during the pursuit. He denied wearing a jacket that day
and repeated his assertion that the police "did not seize the items
from me." He testified that he was carrying $1,471 in cash, which
he claimed was from his landscaping and handyman businesses.
The district court denied the motion to suppress and
admitted the evidence. In its written order, the court concluded
that because Lipscomb had testified that he had never possessed
either the gun or the crack cocaine at issue, he lacked standing to
assert a Fourth Amendment violation. The court went on to provide
two other grounds for its decision, concluding that even if it were
to accept the Government's version of the facts, Lipscomb's motion
to suppress would still fail because he had abandoned his property
prior to the seizure and the officers had reasonable suspicion to
approach Lipscomb in the first instance.
On October 5, 2005, following a three-day trial, a jury
convicted Lipscomb on all counts. Lipscomb moved for a new trial,
asserting that his counsel had been ineffective. The court denied
the motion. One month later, in December 2005, Lipscomb filed a
motion to reconsider, in which he argued that the court had failed
to rule on his pro se request for substitute counsel; the request
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had been communicated to Lipscomb's counsel and the Government by
letter several months before trial. He also asserted that his
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial had been violated because
the courtroom had been locked for a portion of closing arguments.
The court denied the motion to reconsider and the case was set for
sentencing.
The Government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 851 requesting the imposition of an enhanced mandatory minimum
sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), based on Lipscomb's prior
state felony drug convictions. After hearing argument from
counsel, calculating the appropriate sentencing guidelines range,
and considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the court
sentenced Lipscomb to 135 months for Count One, to run concurrently
with 120 months for Count Three, and sixty months for Count Two, to
run consecutively to the 135 months' sentence; Lipscomb was
sentenced to a total of 195 months' incarceration. Lipscomb timely
appeals, alleging numerous errors by the district court.
II. Discussion
A. Motion to Suppress
Before reaching the merits of a suppression challenge,
the defendant carries the burden of establishing that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the area searched
or, as in this case, the items seized. See United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1980); accord United States v. Lewis,
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40 F.3d 1325, 1333 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Such an expectation of privacy
is a threshold standing requirement that a defendant must establish
before a court can proceed with any Fourth Amendment analysis.").
While the Supreme Court noted that this threshold analysis is "more
properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment
law than within that of standing," Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S.
83, 88 (1998) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978)),
courts continue to refer to it as an issue of "standing," see,
e.g., United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2004).
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Lipscomb
repeatedly asserted that neither the crack cocaine nor the gun was
his. He claimed no interest in the items and denied that the
government seized them from him. In cases involving defendants who
fail to establish or claim ownership of an item, we have concluded
that they lack a sufficient privacy interest to assert a Fourth
Amendment violation. See, e.g., United States v. García-Rosa, 876
F.2d 209, 219-20 (1st Cir. 1989) (no standing because the defendant
failed to claim that he possessed the box at issue), vacated on
different grounds sub nom. Rivera-Feliciano v. United States, 498
U.S. 954 (1990); United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 857 (1st
Cir. 1988) (no standing because there was no evidence that the
defendant owned or leased the car at issue). In the instant case,
Lipscomb actively disowned any interest in any of the seized
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items;1 thus, according to his own testimony, he lacks the
expectation of privacy required to challenge the seizure of the
crack cocaine and gun. We therefore affirm the district court's
motion to suppress on this basis, and we need not reach any of the
alternate grounds identified by the court.
B. Trial Challenges
Lipscomb argues that the district court made several
errors leading up to and during trial. We address each in turn.
1. Disclosure of Confidential Informant
Lipscomb challenges the court's decision to deny his
request for disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant.
We need not tarry long on this argument, because Lipscomb failed to
raise the issue before the district court.
After a hearing on the motion, the magistrate judge
issued a written opinion denying the request for disclosure of the
informant's identity. Lipscomb failed to timely appeal the
magistrate judge's ruling to the district court.2 Lipscomb cannot
1
We note that any fear that Lipscomb may have felt that claiming
ownership of the crack cocaine or the firearm would have been used
against him at trial is without support in our case law. See
García-Rosa, 876 F.2d at 219 (noting the well-settled case law
establishing that "testimony given to meet the standing
requirements cannot be used as direct evidence against the
defendant at trial on the question of guilt or innocence"); see
also Lewis, 40 F.3d at 1333.
2
Rhode Island District Court Local Rule 57.2(c)(1) allows parties
ten days to seek review with the district court of a magistrate
judge's order.
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bypass the district court and bring this appeal to us directly.
See, e.g., United States v. Lugo Guerrero, 524 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir.
2008); Teamsters Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co.,
Inc., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) ("If any principle is settled
in this circuit, it is that, absent the most extraordinary
circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the lower
court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal."); United
States v. Akinola, 985 F.2d 1105, 1108-09) (1st Cir. 1993); cf.
Rule 3(b), Rules for U.S. Magistrate Judges in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts ("[F]ailure to file timely
and appropriate objections to that report and recommendation . . .
will result in preclusion of the right to appeal the district
court's order to the United States Court of Appeals.").
2. Rule 16 Notice Requirement
Lipscomb next argues that Detectives Colanduono and
Partridge testified as experts without providing the necessary
notice and disclosures prior to trial. Specifically, Lipscomb
contests their testimony as to the connection between firearms and
drug trafficking and the amount of crack cocaine that is consistent
with an intent to distribute. We review the admission of witness
testimony for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hatch, 514
F.3d 145, 163 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Cormier, 468
F.3d 63, 72 (1st Cir. 2006)).
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) requires
that "[a]t the defendant's request, the government must give to the
defendant a written summary of any testimony that the government
intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial."3 Such a request was
made by defense counsel in this case. The Government avers that
two months prior to trial, it informed defense counsel of its
intention to call Detectives Partridge and Colanduono to testify
to:
the street value of the crack cocaine and
that, based on their training and experience,
the quantity of crack cocaine seized in this
case is consistent with possession for
distribution to others and not for personal
use . . . [and] the methods of operation of
narcotics distributors, including . . . the
utilization of firearms as part of the drug
trade.
After receiving the information from the Government, defense
counsel neither made additional requests for information nor sought
any clarification. It was not until Detective Partridge took the
stand at trial that Lipscomb's counsel objected to the testimony
and raised the Rule 16 notice issue at sidebar.
The rule requires that the Government's written summary
include "the witness's opinions, the bases and reasons for those
opinions, and the witness's qualifications." Fed. R. Crim. P.
3
Prior to 2002, the rule was found in Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16(a)(1)(E).
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16(a)(1)(G). At sidebar, Lipscomb's counsel conceded that the
Government's notice was adequate with respect to the witnesses'
opinions. Thus, there is no dispute that Lipscomb was on notice
with respect to the particular conclusions drawn by the witnesses
regarding the role of firearms and the quantity of crack cocaine at
issue. Cf. United States v. Duvall, 272 F.3d 825, 828-29 (7th Cir.
2001) (finding insufficient a general list of topics that lacked
the witness's actual opinion).
Lipscomb's Rule 16 objection is instead based on an
alleged failure to provide notice regarding the "bases for [the
witnesses'] ultimate opinion[s]." The district court overruled the
objection and concluded that there was no Rule 16 violation,
stating that "the Government could [have] be[en] more precise in
setting forth the basis of the officer's opinion, but I don't
believe it rises to the level of [a] violation of Rule 16. Even if
it did, I think the case law . . . makes clear that suppression of
the evidence, or exclusion of the evidence, is clearly not the
sanction that is called for." Lipscomb disagrees and renews his
argument on appeal.
In response, the Government makes two separate arguments:
(1) neither the testimony regarding the connection between drug
trafficking and firearms, nor the testimony regarding the quantity
of drugs typically involved in distribution crimes, constitutes
expert testimony and therefore the notice requirement was not
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triggered; and (2) in any event, the notice provided was adequate.
We need not address the first argument, as it is clear in this case
that irrespective of whether it was expert testimony, the
Government provided sufficient notice to comply with Rule 16.4
The Government's notice, while by no means detailed, was
enough to satisfy the requirements. The Government informed
defense counsel that the officers would be testifying on the basis
of their "training and experience." The notice clearly stated that
the officers' testimony would make conclusions regarding the
presence of firearms and the connection between the quantity of
crack cocaine seized from the defendant and drug distribution, and
that those conclusions were based on the officers' experience
working in the police department. The inferential step necessary
to go from the notice provided by the Government to the actual
testimony given at trial is not one requiring more notice. Given
that the defense had full notice of the actual opinions to which
the detectives intended to testify, we are unpersuaded by the
defendant's criticism of the lack of detail regarding the bases for
those opinions. In the factual context of this case, we conclude
4
With respect to the connection between firearms and drug
trafficking, we have held that such testimony is not expert
testimony. See United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 29
(1st Cir. 2005) ("It required no special expertise for Officer
Mulero to conclude, based on his observations, that places which
sell drugs are often protected by people with weapons."). We have
not made such a ruling regarding the amount of drugs consistent
with personal use versus distribution, and we have no occasion to
do so now.
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that the proffered notification -- that the testimony would be
based on knowledge gained from formal training and years of
experience as police officers -- is sufficient.
Had the testimony involved a more complex subject matter,
as found in cases involving technical or scientific evidence, more
detailed notice may have been required. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16
1993 amend. advisory committee's note (observing that in more novel
and complicated areas, greater disclosure may be required,
including "written and oral reports, tests, reports, and
investigations, [and] any information that might be recognized as
a legitimate basis for an opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence
703"). This is not such a case. Moreover, the bases for the
detectives' conclusions were adequately probed by defense counsel
on cross-examination with no particular difficulty. See id.
(stating that the goal of Rule 16 is "to provide the opponent with
a fair opportunity to test the merit of the expert's testimony
through focused cross-examination"). Accordingly, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the
defendant's objection.
3. Limitations on Cross-Examination
Lipscomb's next assignment of error concerns the limits
placed on his ability to impeach the detectives' testimony. We
review a district court's imposition of "reasonable limits on
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cross-examination" for abuse of discretion.5 United States v.
Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v.
González-Vázquez, 219 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The district court rejected the defendant's request to
call witnesses and offer exhibits to establish inconsistencies
regarding Lipscomb's license plate. The two detectives testified
that they observed Lipscomb driving a green Jaguar with the license
plate "XM-82" on the day of his arrest.6 Defense counsel sought to
call three witnesses who would testify that on the day of his
arrest, Lipscomb's green Jaguar was registered under a vanity
license plate, "SOVRN." The court concluded that because the
license plate identification is not material to Lipscomb's guilt or
innocence, it is a collateral issue on which extrinsic evidence is
inadmissible. We agree and find no abuse of discretion here.
5
Normally, a preserved challenge to a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to confront adverse witnesses is evaluated in two steps.
First, we review de novo a district court's decision to limit
cross-examination to determine whether the defendant was given
"sufficient leeway to establish a reasonably complete picture of
the witness' veracity, bias, and motivation." United States v.
González-Vázquez, 219 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2000). If satisfied
that this constitutional threshold was met, we then review the
district court's limitations for abuse of discretion. In this
case, no argument is made that the district court's actions were
constitutionally infirm, nor indeed is there basis on the record
for such an allegation.
6
There is no dispute that Lipscomb's green Jaguar had previously
been registered under the license plate "XM-82."
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The thrust of Lipscomb's argument is that the detectives'
testimony is key to the Government's case and evidence of
inconsistency regarding the license plate undermines the
detectives' credibility. Lipscomb thus argues that the district
court abused its discretion by invading the jury's role in making
credibility determinations. The testimony regarding the license
plate is, however, a collateral issue; a party is barred from
impeaching a witness on a collateral matter through the use of
extrinsic evidence. See United States v. Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1993) ("[W]hen a witness testifies to a collateral
matter, the examiner 'must take [the] answer,' i.e., the examiner
may not disprove it by extrinsic evidence."). The determination of
whether an issue is collateral or not turns on whether it is
"relevant for a purpose other than mere contradiction of the in-
court testimony of the witness." 1 McCormack on Evidence § 45, at
169; see also United States v. Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d 983, 988
(1st Cir. 1997) ("The evidence must have an independent purpose and
an independent ground for admission." (quoting United States v.
Payne, 102 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 1996))). Specifically, the
"offered testimony must not only contradict a statement of [the
witness], but must also be material to [the defendant's] guilt or
innocence." Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d at 988.
Here, Lipscomb failed to establish any independent and
material ground for admitting the testimony and evidence regarding
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the license plate; the evidence of the license plate did not relate
to Lipscomb's guilt on either the drug or firearm charge. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the
defendant's ability to present testimony and evidence on the issue,
which was only relevant to impeaching the detectives' credibility
on a topic immaterial to Lipscomb's guilt.
4. Motion for Acquittal
At the end of the Government's case-in-chief, Lipscomb
moved for a judgment of acquittal on Counts One and Two; the
district court denied the motion. We review a district court's
denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo.
United States v. O'Shea, 426 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 2005).
Viewing the evidence in the light most flattering to the jury's
guilty verdict, we assess whether a reasonable factfinder could
have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. We have described this standard of review as "formidable,"
id. (quoting United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586, 589 (1st Cir.
1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and "[d]efendants
challenging convictions for insufficiency of evidence face an
uphill battle on appeal." Id. (quoting United States v. Hernández,
218 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Lipscomb argues that the Government failed to present
sufficient evidence to convict him under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
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(b)(1)(B). He contends that the Government presented no evidence
that someone was coming to pick up drugs from Lipscomb and that
there were no witnesses who testified to observing Lipscomb
involved in any drug transactions. Furthermore, Lipscomb argues
that the Government's case hinges on the testimony of Detectives
Partridge and Colanduono, who testified that thirty-five grams of
crack cocaine was an amount consistent with an intent to
distribute; on cross-examination, however, they admitted that it
was possible for that quantity to be consistent with personal use.
Lipscomb thus argues that no reasonable jury could have found him
guilty. The Government challenges Lipscomb's myopic view of the
trial evidence.
First, with respect to the thirty-five grams of crack
cocaine, both Detectives Partridge and Colanduono testified that
the amount was consistent with distribution. Whether the jury
found the detectives credible is a decision we leave to the jury.
Credibility determinations are squarely within the jury's province,
and we will not disturb them unless there is no reasonable way a
jury could have found the witnesses believable. See Hernández, 218
F.3d at 64; see also United States v. Gómez-Pabón, 911 F.2d 847,
853 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that a jury's assessment of a
witness's credibility will not be disturbed unless the testimony is
"incredible or insubstantial on its face" (quoting United States v.
Aponte-Suárez, 905 F.2d 483, 489 (1st Cir. 1990))) (internal
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quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the jury heard during cross-
examination that this quantity of crack cocaine could have been for
personal use. The jury could have discounted the detectives'
testimony, but it chose not to do so.
Second, the detectives testified that at the time of the
arrest, Lipscomb exhibited no signs of having ingested or being
under the influence of crack cocaine. Furthermore, the detectives
did not find any crack pipes or any other implements used to smoke
crack cocaine on Lipscomb's person. The Government thus argues
that the jury could have made the reasonable inference that the
quantity of crack cocaine attributed to Lipscomb was for
distribution, not personal use.
Third, the Government presented evidence that Lipscomb
was carrying a loaded handgun with one round in the chamber, ready
to fire, and over $1,400 in cash. The Government argued that the
loaded handgun demonstrated that he was in the process of
transacting drug deals and carried the gun for protection; the cash
was the apparent proceeds from those drug deals.
Based on this evidence, we conclude that a reasonable
jury could have found Lipscomb guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of defendant's
Rule 29 motion.
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C. Motion for a New Trial
The jury returned a guilty verdict on October 5, 2005.
On October 17, Lipscomb filed a pro se motion for a new trial in
which he asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective because he
neglected to call certain witnesses, declined to challenge a
particular juror, was ineffective in conducting cross-examination,
and handled two motions poorly. The district court denied the
motion. Lipscomb then filed a second pro se motion for a new
trial, captioned as a motion for reconsideration, on December 5,
2005. In this motion, Lipscomb made two claims: (1) the district
court failed to rule on his pre-trial motion for substitute
appointed counsel; and (2) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right
to a public trial because the courtroom doors were allegedly locked
during a portion of the closing arguments. We review the denial of
a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. See United
States v. Connolly, 504 F.3d 206, 211 (1st Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1689 (2008).
1. Ineffective Counsel
Seven months before trial, Lipscomb crafted a pro se
motion to remove his counsel due to a "conflict of interest and
ineffective counsel." A copy of the motion was mailed on March 3,
2005, to the United States Attorney's Office and to Lipscomb's
counsel. No mention was made of the motion to the court; although
Lipscomb filed other written requests to and appeared before the
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court, he did not ask about the March 3 letter and made no other
mention of a desire to terminate his relationship with counsel.
Lipscomb continued to trial with his same counsel. It was not
until December 5, 2005, (when Lipscomb filed his motion for
reconsideration) that the motion first appeared in the district
court's file.
On appeal, Lipscomb appears to frame the discussion of
his pro se motion for substitute counsel as further support for his
argument that a new trial should have been granted because trial
counsel was ineffective. Lipscomb contends that the filing of the
March pro se motion is further evidence of his counsel's
ineffectiveness, as well as their broken relationship. To the
extent that ineffective assistance is the basis for the new trial
motion, we conclude that the district court properly denied the
motion, observing that an ineffective assistance claim is typically
raised in a collateral proceeding with the benefit of a more fully
developed record. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 251 F.3d
273, 278-79 (1st Cir. 2001); see also generally Massaro v. United
States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003).
With respect to the suggestion that Lipscomb's new trial
motion should have been granted because of the district court's
failure to rule on his pro se motion for substitute counsel, we
find the argument unavailing. Given the undisputed facts regarding
the means by which the district court was made aware of the motion
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-- two months after the end of trial -- we cannot hold the court
responsible for "fail[ing] to rule on" the motion. Thus, the court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial
on the basis of this unfiled motion.
2. Sixth Amendment
In his motion to reconsider, Lipscomb asserts that he
should be granted a new trial because the district court violated
his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. See Owens v. United
States, 483 F.3d 48, 61 (1st Cir. 2007) ("The guarantee of a public
trial is for the benefit for the defendant; a trial is far more
likely to be fair when the watchful eye of the public is
present."). Specifically, he avers that the courtroom was closed
for a period of time during closing arguments. In support of his
claim, Lipscomb submits an affidavit from an individual who states
that he had sought to attend closing arguments, but was unable to
enter the courtroom because the doors were locked.
The Government raises several arguments in response.
First, it argues that the claim is time-barred and, therefore, we
lack jurisdiction. Rule 33 provides two separate time limits for
the filing of a new trial motion: (1) a defendant has three years
to file a motion based on "newly discovered evidence," and (2) a
defendant has only seven days if the motion is "grounded on any
reason other than newly discovered evidence." Fed. R. Crim. P.
33(b). Lipscomb's motion to reconsider, which advances the Sixth
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Amendment argument for the first time, was submitted on December 5,
2005 -- nearly two months after the jury's guilty verdict.
The Government argues further that Lipscomb's Sixth
Amendment argument is not based on "newly discovered evidence,"
because it is not "evidence" in the context of Rule 33(b)(1). The
Government urges us to adopt a narrow definition of "evidence" that
is limited to evidence pertaining to guilt or innocence, as opposed
to evidence relating to collateral issues. See, e.g., United
States v. Hall, 324 F.3d 720, 722-23 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing cases
on both sides of a circuit split). The Government thus contends
that the information upon which Lipscomb's Sixth Amendment argument
is based is "only information" and not evidence for purposes of
Rule 33(b)(1) because it does not bear on guilt or innocence; thus,
his claim is time-barred. The Government argues that while such
collateral information constitutes evidence for purposes of Rule
33(b)(2), it does not constitute evidence for purposes of Rule
33(b)(1). We are unpersuaded and decline to give the term
"evidence" two different meanings within the same evidentiary rule.
The Government next contends that Lipscomb's argument is
meritless, lacking any competent evidence that the door was in fact
locked. In support of his argument, Lipscomb presented only a two-
sentence, unsworn, handwritten letter from an individual.7 The
7
The magistrate judge was unable to read the last name of the
declarant. She surmised that the name was "Emmanuel Antonio."
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letter stated: "On the date of 10-5-05 I went to the federal court
building to attend the closing arguments for Anthony Lipscomb.
Arriving alittle [sic] late, when I got to the court room the door
was locked and I wasn't able to enter." The letter was dated
December 5, 2005, and was received by the court on January 9, 2006.
Other than this two-sentence letter, Lipscomb provides no
other support for his Sixth Amendment claim. At a hearing on his
motion, Lipscomb offered no further proof: he did not produce the
declarant as a witness; he proffered no explanation for his
inability to do so; and he provided no affidavits or testimony from
court personnel to corroborate the declarant's statement. On the
basis of this letter alone, Lipscomb urges us to find that he
satisfies his burden to establish a constitutional violation. See
Owens, 483 F.3d at 63 (observing that the party asserting the claim
carries the burden of demonstrating the Sixth Amendment violation);
cf. Borges Colón v. Román-Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2006)
(party claiming First Amendment violation has the burden of proof).
We refuse to do so.
This unsworn and unsubstantiated declaration, alone, is
not sufficient competent evidence to demonstrate that Lipscomb's
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated. Indeed,
Lipscomb does not purport to show that the alleged closure was
intentional or that it occurred during the evidentiary phase of his
trial. The letter offered by Lipscomb states that the declarant
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was seeking to "attend closing arguments"; at most, the closure
occurred after the end of witness testimony and the submission of
trial evidence. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the
district court properly denied Lipscomb's motion for a new trial.
D. Sentencing8
A sentencing hearing was held over the course of two days
in January and February 2007. At the hearing, Lipscomb challenged
the Sentencing Guidelines' disparate treatment of crack and powder
cocaine. Lipscomb was sentenced prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007), in
which the Court held that "it would not be an abuse of discretion
for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular
defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence
'greater than necessary' to achieve § 3553(a)'s purposes, even in
a mine-run case." Id. at 575.
Because the district court sentenced Lipscomb before
Kimbrough was announced, the court had no reason to express any
disagreement with the Sentencing Guidelines' 100:1 crack/powder
sentencing ratio. See United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53 (1st Cir.
2006). The district court sentenced Lipscomb to 135 months'
8
In his brief, Lipscomb argues that the court's use of the 21
U.S.C. § 851 information as a sentencing enhancement was
unconstitutional. At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that
the argument is clearly foreclosed. See Almendárez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998); United States v. Fink, 499 F.3d
81, 85-87 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2007).
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imprisonment, a sentence at the low end of the applicable
guidelines, but fifteen months above the mandatory minimum. The
court might have imposed a lesser sentence had it known that it was
permissible to deviate from the 100:1 crack/powder ratio based on
a disagreement with policy. Lipscomb preserved the issue, and the
Government is not opposed to a limited remand on this basis. Thus,
we shall remand to permit the district court to reconsider the
sentence in light of Kimbrough.9
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Lipscomb's
conviction, but remand to the district court for the limited
purpose of resentencing in light of Kimbrough.
Affirmed and Remanded.
9
Lipscomb also makes reference to the recent amendment to the
Sentencing Guidelines that reduces the base offense level for crack
cocaine offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. To the extent that
Lipscomb urges us to simply impose the new base offense level, we
decline. Lipscomb may file the appropriate motions in district
court under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.
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