United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 07-2233
TIENG SOK,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Selya and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Vanthan R. Un on brief for petitioner.
Brendan P. Hogan, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, and Michelle Gorden Latour, Assistant Director,
Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, on
brief for respondent.
September 10, 2008
LYNCH, Chief Judge. Tieng Sok, a native and citizen of
Cambodia, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") denying her application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture ("CAT"). We deny the petition for review.
I.
Sok entered the United States on March 28, 2003, as a
non-immigrant visitor for pleasure. She was authorized to remain
in the United States through September 27, 2003, but overstayed.
On April 13, 2004, the Department of Homeland Security initiated
removal proceedings against Sok. Through counsel, Sok conceded her
removability, but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the CAT. A hearing was held before an Immigration
Judge ("IJ") on March 17, 2006.
We recount her testimony, cutting to its essence. Sok
testified that she was 52 years old, a widow with one child, and
that she had suffered persecution in Cambodia on account of her
political activity. She and her husband sold shoes in a market in
Phnom Penh. In 1995, she became involved with the Khmer Nation
Party ("KNP"), campaigning and collecting donations on its behalf.
A member of the rival Cambodian People's Party ("CPP") threatened
her for this, saying that "someday [her] life would be in danger."
In 1997, Sok and her husband fled from Phnom Penh during
a coup. She testified that when they returned to the city, they
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found their shop had been vandalized. Sok believed this was in
retaliation for supporting the KNP.1
Sok testified that in 1998 she became an active member of
the Sam Rainsy Party ("SRP"), which was challenging the CPP in an
upcoming election. After the CPP won the election, Sok and her
husband participated in a demonstration calling on Hun Sen, the
CPP's leader, to step down. Sok saw police beat and arrest her
husband. She was struck with a rifle butt and fell to the ground,
but managed to escape and run home.
Some time after that, a government official came to Sok's
home and questioned her about her involvement in the protest. He
told her she must cease her support for the SRP. In another
incident, Sok said she and her husband were followed by two men on
a motorcycle. The men fired shots, but Sok and her husband managed
to escape without injuries.
On November 17, 2002, Sok's husband was struck by a car
and died. A friend who witnessed the accident told her the car
belonged to the CPP and that it hit Sok's husband from behind. Sok
believed her husband was killed for being active in the SRP. She
testified that twice thereafter she was threatened by police and
warned not to make any report or to blame the CPP for her husband's
death. Sok also said she fears if she returned to Cambodia, she
1
In the affidavit accompanying her asylum application, Sok
stated that a security guard at the market told her "this was a
consequence for anyone who was not a member of the CPP."
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would be killed because of her connection to her husband.
The IJ determined that Sok had not met her burden of
proof required to establish eligibility for asylum, withholding of
removal, or protection under the CAT. While he did not find Sok
non-credible, he characterized her testimony as "lost," "confused,
superficial, hesitant and inconsistent." Specifically, the IJ was
troubled by Sok's "halting" responses to questions about the
demonstration in which Sok and her husband were injured and Sok's
inability to answer questions on this subject without prompting
from her lawyer. The IJ concluded that Sok "simply did not know
what the basis of her political asylum claim was until she was
refreshed." Beyond this, he found the details surrounding the
death of Sok's husband to be "very flimsy, at best." It is not
believable, he said, that the police would bring Sok in to tell her
"not to make a report with respect to an accident that she didn't
even witness."
Even though he assumed that most of the events described
by Sok took place, and examined Sok's testimony "in the best
possible light," the IJ concluded that Sok had failed to carry her
burden of proof on any of her claims. The IJ rejected Sok's claims
and granted her voluntary departure.
The BIA rejected Sok's appeal on July 12, 2007. It noted
the "numerous examples of . . . deficiencies" identified by the IJ
in Sok's testimony and determined that the IJ had properly
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concluded that Sok failed to meet her burden of proof. The BIA
stated that "although testimony may in some cases be the only
evidence available to prove an asylum applicant's claim, it must be
believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed." It concluded
that her testimony did not meet this standard. Sok also argued to
the BIA that her due process rights were violated because purported
translation problems during the hearing caused her testimony to
appear deficient. The BIA rejected this claim. It pointed out
that Sok did not complain about the interpreter during the hearing
and found that she had failed to show how any alleged inadequacies
would have affected the outcome of the proceedings. Sok petitioned
this court for review.
II.
Sok argues that the denial of her claims was not
supported by substantial evidence and that translation problems in
the hearing before the IJ violated her right to due process. Both
arguments lack merit.
A. Substantial Evidence
We review the BIA's findings under the deferential
substantial evidence standard. See, e.g., Kechichian v. Mukasey,
No. 07-1584, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 2814789, at *3 (1st Cir. July
23, 2008). We uphold the BIA's findings if they are "supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole." Sharari v. Gonzáles, 407 F.3d 467, 473
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(1st Cir. 2005) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We reverse only if
"any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also, e.g., Chikkeur v.
Mukasey, 514 F.3d 1381, 1382-83 (1st Cir. 2008). "When the BIA
adopts the IJ's opinion and discusses some of the bases for the
IJ's decision, we have authority to review both the IJ's and the
BIA's opinions." Ouk v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 108, 110 (1st Cir.
2006). Here, the findings of the IJ, adopted by the BIA, are
supported by substantial evidence.
To qualify for asylum, an alien must demonstrate that she
"suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future
persecution." Chikkeur, 514 F.3d at 1382 (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). The IJ determined that Sok had not met this
burden in showing past persecution. Sok established that she and
her husband were beaten at a protest in 1998. But this alone does
not rise to the level of persecution. See Palma-Mazariegos v.
Gonzales, 428 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[P]ersecution requires
more than a showing of either episodic violence or sporadic
abuse."); Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258, 263-64 (1st Cir. 2000) ("To
qualify as persecution, a person's experience must rise above
unpleasantness, harassment, and even basic suffering."). As for
the death of Sok's husband, the BIA and IJ permissibly found the
evidence presented by Sok was too vague to meet the burden of
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proof. See Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 571 (1st Cir.
1999). They could reasonably conclude that even if the car that
struck Sok's husband had been owned by the CPP, this did not
establish that Sok's husband was purposefully killed for his
political activity.2 The record does not compel a finding of past
persecution.
Nor was it unreasonable for the IJ to conclude that Sok
had failed to prove a well-founded fear of future persecution. Sok
claimed she fears she would be killed if she returned to Cambodia.
But the record does not compel the conclusion that this fear is
objectively reasonable. See Nelson, 232 F.3d at 264-65. The
evidence the government had targeted her husband was not strong --
the connection between the government and the death of Sok's
husband is far from clear. The IJ could also reasonably conclude
that the government would be unlikely to take action six years
later against Sok.
Sok argues that the IJ failed to consider the evidence
submitted on the nature of Cambodia's government in determining
that Sok lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution. But the
IJ did not ignore this evidence. He explicitly acknowledged "the
harshness of the government in Cambodia" in his oral decision and
2
Similarly, absent more evidence the BIA and IJ were not
compelled to conclude that the incident involving the two men on
the motorcycle was connected to her political activity or to the
government.
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stated during the hearing that he had read and would consider the
State Department Country Reports on Cambodia. In his opinion, the
IJ is not required to dissect every piece of evidence presented.
See Pulisir v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 302, 310 (1st Cir. 2008); Pan v.
Gonzales, 489 F.3d 80, 87 (1st Cir. 2007).
The IJ also properly rejected Sok's claims for
withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. Sok failed to
meet the burden of proof required to establish an asylum claim and
therefore necessarily failed to meet the more stringent burden
required for a withholding of removal. See Makhoul v. Ashcroft,
387 F.3d 75, 82 (1st Cir. 2004); Khalil v. Ashcroft, 337 F.3d 50,
56 (1st Cir. 2003). The CAT does not apply because Sok has not
alleged that she has suffered any treatment that could constitute
torture, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a), nor has she established that it
is more likely than not that she would be tortured if she returned
to Cambodia, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
The BIA's denial of Sok's claims for relief was supported
by substantial evidence.
B. Due Process
Sok argues that the BIA erred in rejecting her claim that
a poor translation during her hearing was what caused her testimony
to sound halting and unbelievable and that the IJ's failure to take
this into account violated her due process rights. This claim is
weak, since no meaningful complaint about the interpreter was
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raised during the hearing.3 See Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972,
978 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 375
(1st Cir. 2003). Moreover, Sok has not shown she was prejudiced by
the alleged deficiency. See Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 20-21
(1st Cir. 2004); see also Gishta, 404 F.3d at 979. The halting and
confused nature of Sok's testimony gave the IJ pause as to the
veracity of some of Sok's claims. But he ultimately made his
determination while considering the evidence "in the best possible
light for [Sok]." Even assuming that most of the events Sok
described actually took place, the IJ concluded that Sok could not
meet her evidentiary burden. Thus it is not clear how the alleged
deficiency could have affected the outcome of the proceedings. Sok
received a full and fair hearing.
III.
The petition for review is denied.
3
At one point, Sok's counsel raised the general contention
that everything Sok said was filtered through translation, so it
was impossible to know the exact words she was using. But this is
unrelated to the deficiencies in Sok's testimony discussed by the
IJ -- namely its vagueness and Sok's failure to discuss major bases
of her claim without prompting from counsel.
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