United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1773
PAULA D. CASAMENTO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY;
BOSTON CARMEN'S UNION, LOCAL 589,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Boudin and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Scott A. Lathrop with whom Scott A. Lathrop & Associates was
on brief for appellant.
Kevin S. McDermott, Assistant General Counsel, MBTA Law
Department, for appellee Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority.
John F. McMahon with whom Angoff, Goldman, Manning, Wanger &
Hynes, P.C. was on brief for appellee Boston Carmen's Union, Local
589.
December 16, 2008
Per Curiam. Paula D. Casamento appeals from the judgment
of the district court in her law suit against her employer, the
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority ("MBTA"), and her union,
Boston Carmen's Union, Local 589 ("Local 589"). The central claim
is one of gender discrimination. Most of the relevant facts are
undisputed and easily recited.
Casamento was hired by the MBTA as a bus driver in the
winter of 1984 and became a member of Local 589. In 1997, due to
medical problems precluding her from driving a bus, Casamento moved
to a position in the MBTA's revenue collection department. On
October 22, 2002, the MBTA posted a notice that a managerial
position--Supervisor of Revenue Sales Operations--was available to
be filled, and Casamento applied.
Ten other applicants sought the position including one
other woman. On June 23, 2003, before anyone was interviewed,
Susan Wolfson, the MBTA's Director of Revenue, informed all the
applicants that the posting of the job was rescinded. The stated
reasons for the position not being filled were primarily budget
constraints and because a new automated fare system might affect
staffing requirements.
In July 2003, Casamento complained that contrary to
Wolfson's announcement, a co-worker, Ralph Schlueter, had in fact
been awarded the advertised position. Casamento was told that
Schlueter had not been given the position but remained in the same
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post he had filled within the Revenue Department for the prior
thirteen years. Unconvinced, Casamento filed a grievance with
Local 589 alleging gender discrimination.
The union declined to act, saying (among other things)
that the supervisor job sought by Casamento was not part of Local
589's bargaining unit. Casamento then filed a charge of gender
discrimination against the MBTA with the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrimination ("MCAD"), which dismissed the charge,
finding no evidence to support it. Casamento also filed claims
against both the MBTA and Local 589 before the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, which granted her a right to sue letter.
Casamento then filed the present law suit. The
complaint, as amended, charged both the MBTA and the union with
gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) et seq. In due course, the
district court granted summary judgment for defendants: even
positing that Casamento had made out a prima facie case warranting
an explanation by defendants, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the court ultimately found no evidence of
gender discrimination.
Casamento now seeks review. In Casamento's favor is the
fact that the district judge refused to decide on summary judgment
whether Schleuter was in fact performing the duties of the
previously posted position; this may have been properly cautious
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since the MBTA said that Schleuter's own longstanding job covered
some of the same duties as the posted position, although it said
that his pay and title had not been changed after the job listing
was rescinded and that he continued in his original position.
In all events, a prima facie case is merely a mechanical
showing that requires the employer (or, arguably, the union) to
come forward with an explanation for its decision--which both the
MBTA and union did. At this point, "the presumption raised by the
prima facie case is rebutted,” Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981), and “drops from the case,” id.,
at 255 n.10, and it is up to the complainant to show that a
forbidden motive was at work. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 508 (1993). To reach a jury, there must be evidence that
would permit a jury to so conclude. Id.
Here, there was no evidence that gender discrimination
motivated the MBTA's action. Whether or not Schlueter was already
performing some of the functions of the advertised job and whether
or not this played a role in the MBTA's decision to rescind the
position, no evidence suggested that the posting was withdrawn
because of gender discrimination; indeed, nothing directly
contradicts the MBTA's original claim that budget concerns and the
advent of automatic fare collection made it reasonable not to go
forward with a new management appointment at that time.
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Nor does it furnish evidence of gender discrimination to
assume (as the district judge admittedly did) that the MBTA's
explanation could be regarded as "pretext" if Schlueter were now
occupying the posted job. Possibly in some contexts a showing of
a false explanation can add weight to a discrimination claim
supported by evidence; but it is hard to imagine such a case where
there is no evidence of a discriminatory motive in the first place;
and, if an exception to this generalization can possibly be
imagined, it is certainly not this case.
The case against the union is equally hopeless. In
addition to its proscription against gender discrimination by
employers, Title VII renders it unlawful for "a labor organization
. . . to discriminate against[] any individual because of . . .
sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1). A union will be found to have
violated Title VII when "it deliberately declines to pursue a
member's claim because of the member's gender." Beck v. United
Food & Comm. Workers Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir.
2007).
Once again, there is no evidence in this case of gender
discrimination. The union explained its refusal to pursue a
grievance on behalf of Casamento, giving colorable reasons entirely
unrelated to the fact that she is a woman. Nothing to which
Casamento points suggests that its given reasons were false, let
alone that the true underlying reason was gender discrimination on
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the part of the union. No court could send such a case to trial
because there was nothing to be tried.
Affirmed.
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