Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1744
WILLIAM PIMENTAL,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
LUIS SPENCER, SUPERINTENDENT,
MCI NORFOLK,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges.
William Pimental on brief pro se.
Scott A. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, and Martha
Coakley, Attorney General, on brief for appellee.
January 9, 2009
Per Curiam. In this petition for habeas relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254, we affirm the judgment substantially for the reasons
recited in the district court's decision, adding only the following
comments.
Although petitioner filed a formal notice of appeal
outside the normal 30-day appeal period, he filed a COA application
and an accompanying affidavit within that period. We find these
documents to be the "functional equivalent" of a notice of appeal,
since they gave the "pertinent information" and "plainly
evidence[d] an intention to appeal." Campiti v. Matesanz, 333 F.3d
317, 320 (1st Cir. 2003). As respondent acknowledges, the appeal
is thus timely.
Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
showing that he was in constructive possession of a stash of
cocaine, which was found in the basement of the house in which he
and his wife lived. Proof of constructive possession under
Massachusetts law requires two elements: (1) knowledge, and (2) the
ability and intention to exercise dominion and control. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Sespedes, 810 N.E.2d 790, 793 (Mass. 2004). At
trial, petitioner sought to rebut this theory by arguing that the
house was a two-family dwelling and the basement was a common area.
The Appeals Court held that the evidence on this point, although
"somewhat inconsistent," was sufficient to warrant submission to
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the jury. Commonwealth v. Pimental, 2006 WL 2355482, at *2 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2006).
As an aside, we note that petitioner's challenge would
likely fall short even on the arguendo assumption that the house
was a two-family dwelling. Cf. Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 718
N.E.2d 398, 402 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) ("That others in the building
also had access to the basement and might have hidden drugs in the
basement does not require a finding of not guilty in favor of
Velasquez."); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 571 N.E.2d 1372, 1383
(Mass. 1991) (similar). But no such assumption need be made here,
for when the record "supports conflicting inferences," a federal
habeas court "must presume ... that the trier of fact resolved any
such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that
resolution." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979). We
can thus proceed on the assumption that the house was a one-family
dwelling.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
governed by the constitutional standard set forth in Jackson:
"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at
319 (emphasis deleted). As the district court properly observed,
"the inquiry is not whether the Appeals Court was correct in
finding the evidence of constructive possession sufficient to
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support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather whether
its judgment amounted to a decision that unreasonably applied
Jackson." Pimental v. Spencer, 2008 WL 2066967, at *3 (D. Mass.
2008) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)); accord, e.g., Hurtado v.
Tucker, 245 F.3d 7, 14-20 (1st Cir. 2001). For the reasons
enumerated by the district court, the Appeals Court cannot be said
to have unreasonably applied the Jackson standard. See Pimental,
2008 WL 2066967, at *3-*4 (describing circumstantial evidence of
guilt and noting lack of any indication "that the Appeals Court
ignored material evidence or failed to give appropriate weight to
all of the evidence").
Petitioner properly acknowledges in his brief that he
faces a "heavy burden" in seeking habeas relief based on a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. In Hurtado, we
stated that, "as a general rule,"
federal courts should be particularly cautious
about issuing habeas, on grounds of the
objective unreasonableness of a state court's
conclusion that the evidence is sufficient,
where there has been a verdict of guilt by a
jury of a defendant's peers, where the
defendant's credibility was evaluated by the
jury hearing his testimony, where that verdict
has been affirmed on appeal in the state
system, and where there is no claim of
constitutional error in the conduct of the
trial.
245 F.3d at 19-20. Although one distinguishing factor is that
petitioner here did not testify, we nonetheless find this
cautionary note equally applicable in the present case.
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Affirmed.
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