In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-2134
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
B RAD C OOPMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:07-cr-196—Rudy Lozano, Judge.
A RGUED F EBRUARY 11, 2010—D ECIDED A PRIL 19, 2010
Before K ANNE, W OOD , and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
K ANNE, Circuit Judge. Brad Coopman was charged with
possession of child pornography and receipt of child
pornography. He pled guilty to the receipt charge with-
out the benefit of a plea agreement. At the outset of
Coopman’s sentencing hearing, the district court adopted
the factual findings in the pre-sentence investigation
report (PSR) without objection from the parties. After the
government presented its witness, Coopman offered expert
2 No. 09-2134
witness testimony in an effort to mitigate his sentence.
At the conclusion of Coopman’s evidence, the district
court calculated a sentencing range of 151 to 188 months’
imprisonment. The court then sentenced Coopman to
151 months’ incarceration and 10 years’ supervised release.
Coopman now challenges his sentence by alleging that
the district court improperly placed presumptive weight
on the guidelines, failed to consider non-frivolous argu-
ments, and misapplied 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Coopman also
argues that the district court imposed an unreasonable
sentence. We affirm.
I. Background
Because the issues raised in this case stem from
Coopman’s sentencing hearing, we need not explain in
detail the circumstances surrounding his conviction. It is
sufficient to note that in 2007 the Indiana State Police dis-
covered that Coopman was using a peer-to-peer inter-
net network to share three child pornography videos. After
seizing his computer, the police discovered approximately
thirty-five additional child pornography videos saved
on his hard drive. This conduct formed the basis for
Coopman’s indictment and guilty plea.
In early March 2009, Coopman filed two sentencing
memoranda with the district court. In one memorandum,
Coopman addressed a perceived lack of empirical
evidence supporting sentences derived from U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.2 and urged the court to give the guideline little
weight in sentencing him. In the second memorandum,
No. 09-2134 3
Coopman addressed the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
In support of his sentencing argument, Coopman in-
cluded a letter on his own behalf, letters from his family,
grades for a college-level course he completed while in
detention, and a vitae for his psychologist, William Hill-
man. Coopman urged the court to adopt the mandatory
minimum sentence—sixty months’ imprisonment—as
required by 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).
A few days later, Coopman appeared for sentencing. As
there were no objections to the PSR, the district court
adopted the factual statements in the report as its
findings of fact. It then heard witnesses in considera-
tion of the § 3553(a) factors. The government first pre-
sented its witness, Lafayette Police Officer Paul Huff,
who had examined Coopman’s home computer and
found the child pornography videos on his hard drive.
Officer Huff also testified regarding an earlier, unrelated
incident involving Coopman, during which a Purdue
University employee reported discovery of pornography
websites accessed from a campus computer; most of
the websites accessed had been adult pornography
sites, but a few had been identified as child pornography
sites. Coopman was later discovered to be the person
who initiated the searches, although admittedly, the
investigation could only trace Coopman’s involvement
to search terms that he deliberately typed; it could not
differentiate between pop-ups and sites that Coopman
actively sought. Nonetheless, testimony demonstrated
that some of the search terms attributable directly to
Coopman clearly sought access to child pornography.
4 No. 09-2134
At the close of the government’s presentation, Coopman
presented his own witness, Dr. Hillman, a psychosexual
evaluative expert. Significantly, Dr. Hillman’s expertise
is in the area of sexually violent offenders, not in
child pornography or internet pornography. Dr. Hillman
testified that it was his belief that Coopman was unlikely
to exhibit sexual predatory behavior, and that with ther-
apy, Coopman’s pornography addiction could be abated
substantially. In addition to his witness, Coopman
also submitted exhibits proving that while in pre-trial
custody he had completed several rehabilitation
programs, including “Inside-Out Dad” and substance
abuse treatment. He also proffered evidence of his training
in electrical wiring with the Stafford Career Institute,
which qualified him as a commercial, residential, and
industrial electrician. At the close of the parties’ submis-
sions, the district court imposed a sentence of 151 months’
imprisonment followed by 10 years’ supervised release.
Coopman appealed.
II. Analysis
Coopman alleges that the district court made substan-
tial procedural and substantive errors and that the sen-
tence it imposed is unreasonable. We address each argu-
ment in turn.
A. Procedural and Substantive Errors
Whether a district court followed proper procedures in
imposing a sentence is a question of law that we review
No. 09-2134 5
de novo. United States v. Smith, 562 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir.
2009). In this case, Coopman alleges three procedural
and substantive errors. We find that each is without merit.
First, Coopman argues that the district court impro-
perly presumed that the guidelines were reasonable. As
evidence of this, Coopman points to one stray remark
made by the district court, where it commented that “the
guidelines [are] fair and reasonable based on the facts
of this case.” (App. at 13.) But just because a court
thinks that a guideline sentence is reasonable in a given
circumstance does not mean that the court applied a
presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Diaz, 533
F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The court did not say that a
sentence within the guidelines range was always rea-
sonable; it stated that such a sentence was reasonable
‘here.’ ”). Further undermining Coopman’s argument is
the fact that at the outset of its sentencing pronounce-
ment, the court noted that it had considered the guide-
lines “even though they [were] only advisory. . . .” (App.
at 12.) And although we recognize that a court’s proclama-
tion that the guidelines are advisory does not always
accord with its application of them, see United States v.
Schmitt, 495 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 2007), there is no
evidence that the court’s statement about the advisory
nature of the guidelines was cursory. There is more
than enough evidence to show that the court considered
the guidelines only in their advisory capacity. Coopman’s
argument thus fails.
Coopman next argues that the court improperly failed
to consider evidence in mitigation of his sentence. A court
6 No. 09-2134
must address a defendant’s non-frivolous sentencing
claims by providing reasonable justification for the sen-
tence imposed. United States v. Kilgore, 591 F.3d 890, 893
(7th Cir. 2010). We think it is abundantly clear that the
court did address Coopman’s arguments—it merely
reached a conclusion different than the one for which
Coopman had hoped.
Coopman alleges that the court failed to consider both
Dr. Hillman’s testimony and Coopman’s argument that
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 is not based on empirical evidence. But
the transcript indicates otherwise. With regard to
Dr. Hillman’s testimony, it is evident that the judge
harbored serious concerns about the doctor’s specific
experience, methods, and analysis. One issue the judge
raised involved Dr. Hillman’s expertise. Dr. Hillman
was not an expert in child pornography. His speciality
was in violent sex offenders. This may have been the
reason that Dr. Hillman struggled to differentiate
between recidivist offenders that commit contact offenses
and those that view child pornography. (See Tr. 2:104, 140-
41.) Most of his testimony focused on the likelihood
that Coopman’s conduct would elevate to physical
contact rather than on the likelihood that he would con-
tinue viewing child pornography. As the court implied,
one of its primary concerns was with the harm that is
caused by the making of child pornography. (See id. at
2:143-44, 147-48.) But Dr. Hillman failed to recognize
child pornography as a harm in and of itself, and this
failure undermined the relevance of his testimony.
The district court judge also seemed particularly con-
cerned with Dr. Hillman’s methodology and analysis. In
No. 09-2134 7
fact, the judge questioned Dr. Hillman extensively in
an effort to alleviate these concerns. As the judge noted,
Dr. Hillman’s primary basis for his conclusions was
Coopman’s own veracity, yet his veracity was shown to
be lacking. Coopman had told Dr. Hillman that he had
never viewed or attempted to view child pornography
while employed at Purdue. The government showed that
this statement was not true. (Id. at 1:84, 2:120-21.) And
when the judge asked Dr. Hillman about his conclusions,
Hillman admitted that his answers might change if
Coopman were being dishonest with him. (Id. at 2:142-43.)
These deficiencies in Dr. Hillman’s testimony certainly
could serve as the basis for the court’s discounting of that
testimony. And, in fact, that was precisely the court’s
reasoning when it explained: “I do question what in this
particular case [Dr. Hillman] relied on. I find that the
testimony is somewhat suspect because it heavily
relied on the truthfulness of the defendant.” (App. at 13.)
Because the court adequately explained its reasons for
rejecting Coopman’s proffer of Dr. Hillman’s testimony,
we find no merit to Coopman’s claim.
Coopman also claims that the district court failed to
explain its reasons for rejecting Coopman’s § 2G2.2 argu-
ment. We note initially that although Kimbrough allows
a court to disagree with the guidelines based on policy
grounds, it does not require a court to do so. Kimbrough
v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 107-09 (2007). In fact, we
held exactly that in United States v. Huffstatler, 571
F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2009): “[W]hile district courts
perhaps have the freedom to sentence below the child-
8 No. 09-2134
pornography guidelines based on disagreement with the
guidelines . . . they are certainly not required to do so.” The
district court said that it considered the argument
Coopman proffered, and that it considered the govern-
ment’s response. It simply reached the conclusion that
the guidelines were appropriate in the particular case
before it.
Coopman attempts to distinguish the cases of United
States v. Aguilar-Huerta, 576 F.3d 365, 367-68 (7th Cir.
2009), and Huffstatler, 571 F.3d at 623-24, where we held
that a court need not address a defendant’s argument that
the guidelines are unworthy of application. Coopman’s
basis for distinction is that in those cases the defendants
argued for full-scale rejection of the guidelines, whereas
in his case, Coopman only argued for leniency in
applying the guidelines. We find this argument to be a
distinction without a difference. Although Coopman
states that he only argues for leniency in applying the
guidelines, what he is in fact arguing is that the court
should ignore the guidelines because they are methodo-
logically flawed. Thus, in essence, Coopman is arguing
that the guidelines are unworthy of application, at least
full application. The district court was not required to
accept Coopman’s argument, and its explanation was
sufficient.
The last procedural error Coopman alleges is that the
district court failed to consider properly the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. In imposing a sentence, “[t]he court
need not address every § 3553(a) factor in checklist
fashion, explicitly articulating its conclusions regarding
No. 09-2134 9
each one. . . . Instead the court may simply give an ade-
quate statement of reasons, consistent with § 3553(a), for
thinking the sentence it selects is appropriate.” United
States v. Shannon, 518 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, we think it is abundantly
clear that the district court considered Coopman’s argu-
ments in light of § 3553(a). In fact, the coup de grâce
to Coopman’s argument is that the court announced its
sentence at the culmination of two pages of transcript
detailing the factors that the court considered. Those
factors included the facts of Coopman’s particular case,
the harm to the victims, the harm to society, Coopman’s
history and characteristics, the seriousness of the
offense, the deterrent value of punishment, protection
of the public from the defendant’s future crimes, and the
need to rehabilitate the defendant. (Tr. 2:191-92.) Because
the court considered the § 3553(a) factors, we reject
Coopman’s argument.
B. Reasonableness of Sentence
Finally, Coopman argues that the sentence imposed
was unreasonable. Once a court is satisfied that the
district court committed no significant procedural error,
a court will then review the reasonableness of the sen-
tence imposed under an abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Gordon, 513 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 2008). On
appeal, the reviewing court applies a presumption of
reasonableness to a within-guidelines sentence. United
States v. Nitch, 477 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2007).
10 No. 09-2134
In support of this argument, Coopman merely recites
reasons we have already rejected above. He points to his
age, lack of criminal record, vocational training while
incarcerated, and Dr. Hillman’s testimony. As we ex-
plained, the district court was well within its discretion
to reject all of these arguments offered in mitigation of
Coopman’s sentence. Because the district court acted
reasonably in imposing Coopman’s sentence, this argu-
ment is without merit.
III. Conclusion
The district court committed no procedural or sub-
stantive error in sentencing Coopman and it imposed a
reasonable sentence. Accordingly, Coopman’s sentence
is A FFIRMED.
4-19-10