Interface Partners International Ltd. v. Hananel

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 08-1983

INTERFACE PARTNERS INTERNATIONAL LTD.,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

MOSHE HANANEL,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Siler,* and Howard,
Circuit Judges.

Andrew H. Schapiro, with whom Christopher H. Houpt and Mayer
Brown LLP, were on brief for appellant.
Lawrence G. Green, with whom Burns & Levinson LLP, was on
brief for appellee.

August 5, 2009

*
Of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
 TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Interface Partners

International Ltd. ("IPI") filed a complaint in the United States

District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Moshe

Hananel ("Hananel"), IPI's former employee and manager of its

office in Israel. In its complaint, IPI accused Hananel of

breaching his contract with IPI.1 In this case, which is similar

to a prior case we decided, see Adelson v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43

(1st Cir. 2007), IPI appeals the district court's granting of

1
The complaint alleges that Hananel breached his contract with
IPI by continuing to work at his prior job despite "represent[ing]
[in his employment contract] that he would stop his prior work
(except for occasional consulting) and devote his full time to the
business of [IPI]"; by "conduct[ing] other personal business while
being paid by [IPI] to devote his full time to [IPI's] business";
by "using [IPI's] monies to hire employees and others to work on
his private enterprises"; by "engaging in numerous instances of
international travel, which were for personal business and which he
paid for with [IPI's] funds"; by "using [IPI's] monies to make
charitable contributions (in his own name)"; by "mak[ing] payments
to groups of which he was a member which provided no benefit to
[IPI]"; and by "pay[ing] personal expenses, and wrongfully pay[ing]
himself for vacation days to which he was not entitled."

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Hananel's motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds.2

After careful consideration, we affirm.

I. Background

The following facts are relevant to this appeal.3 IPI is

a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in

Needham, Massachusetts. IPI also has offices in Nevada and Israel.

Hananel is a citizen and resident of Israel. Sheldon Adelson,

IPI's sole owner and only shareholder, established IPI for the

purpose of making business investments in Israel.

In 1995, Adelson and Hananel, while in Israel, "got to

the general terms of the understanding" that Hananel would work as

2
As we make clear infra, the instant case is distinguishable from
our earlier opinion. Although the current suit and Adelson refer
to the same employment contract between Hananel and Adelson, the
forum non conveniens issue in each case involves different facts,
respectively. The dispute upon which the earlier opinion was based
pertained to the particular rights granted to Hananel by the terms
of the contract, whereas IPI's complaint here focuses on Hananel's
performance as a manager. For example, Hananel's alleged
misappropriation of IPI funds and the fact that he allegedly did
not dedicate himself full-time to work on behalf of IPI were not
germane to the resolution of the forum non conveniens issue in the
earlier case. Based on its consideration of different facts, in
the present case, the district court found that the private and
public interest factors relevant to the forum non conveniens
analysis strongly favor the Israeli forum, as opposed to the
relevant facts in Adelson, which led the district court to find
these factors to be "in equipoise." Moreover, the instant case is
distinguishable from our earlier opinion because we concluded in
Adelson that the district court impermissibly considered the
existence of concurrent litigation in Israel in its forum non
conveniens analysis, an error the district court did not make here.
3
A more detailed recounting of the relationship between the
parties can be found in our prior opinion, id. at 46-48, and in the
district court's opinion below.

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IPI's general manager in Israel. According to Adelson, on

December 5, 1995, in IPI's Needham, Massachusetts office, Hananel

and IPI executed an oral employment contract confirming that

Hananel would become IPI's general manager at a salary of $100,000

per year and would receive a percentage share in net profits

arising from investment gains during his time with IPI.4

During Hananel's tenure with IPI, he was based in Israel

and responsible for finding investments in Israel. In April 2000,

IPI terminated Hananel after about four and one-half years of

service. In 2002, IPI sued Hananel in Israel claiming that Hananel

had misused IPI funds. This suit was litigated for nearly four

years in Israel. In July 2006, IPI requested the Israeli court to

dismiss its case without prejudice so that it could re-file in the

United States. The Israeli court granted IPI's motion, but ordered

IPI to pay Hananel's costs of litigation.5

4
The facts of the December 5, 1995 meeting are disputed.
5
IPI argued to the district court that it had asked the Israeli
court to dismiss its case because Hananel had claimed, in one of
his lawsuits against IPI, that Adelson was subject to Israeli
jurisdiction, and IPI feared that pursuing its claims in an Israeli
court would help Hananel establish jurisdiction over Adelson in
that separate proceeding. The district court was unpersuaded by
this justification, and stated that the only evidence in the record
that supported IPI's argument was a one-sentence assertion it made
at a hearing before the Israeli court. At this hearing, IPI's
counsel stated that it was withdrawing the suit "[i]n view of
claims that have been made in other proceedings, whereby by
Interface's filing of the present claim Mr. Sheldon Adelson had
subjected himself to the international jurisdiction of Israel
. . . ."

-4-
 IPI subsequently filed the instant lawsuit in the

Superior Court of Massachusetts and Hananel removed the case to

the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.

In its complaint, IPI alleged that Hananel had breached his

employment contract and claimed that Hananel "wrongfully took and

or destroyed corporate documents leading to many months of delay

before [IPI] could determine the full range of [Hananel's] various

wrongful breaches of his employment agreement." Hananel moved to

dismiss the action on grounds of forum non conveniens.

The district court granted Hananel's motion.6 It

concluded that IPI's decision to move for dismissal of its Israeli

action "was motivated by a desire to vex and to oppress Hananel

and, accordingly, that IPI is not entitled to the heavy presumption

ordinarily accorded to a Plaintiff's choice of forum." The

district court then applied the two-part test for forum non

conveniens cases first articulated by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil

Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). It found that the

Israeli forum was an "adequate alternative forum" and that

"considerations of convenience and judicial efficiency strongly

favor litigating the claim in Israel." IPI appeals.

6
The district court adopted, in full, a magistrate judge's report
and recommendation granting the motion to dismiss.

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 II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

"The decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss for

forum non conveniens is generally committed to the district court's

discretion." Adelson, 510 F.3d at 52 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v.

Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981)). "We will find an abuse of

discretion if the district court (1) failed to consider a material

factor; (2) substantially relied on an improper factor; or (3)

assessed the proper factors, but clearly erred in weighing them."

Id. (citing Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 12 (1st

Cir. 2000)). We are mindful of the fact that we must "neither

substitute [our] judgment for that of the district court nor strike

the balance of relevant factors anew." Iragorri, 203 F.3d at 12.

Errors of law are reviewed de novo. Adelson, 510 F.3d at 52.

B. Applicable Law

"When a defendant moves for dismissal on forum non

conveniens grounds, it bears the burden of showing both that an

adequate alternative forum exists and that considerations of

convenience and judicial efficiency strongly favor litigating the

claim in the alternative forum." Iragorri, 203 F.3d at 12. The

first condition is usually met "if the defendant demonstrates that

the alternative forum addresses the types of claims that the

plaintiff has brought and that the defendant is amenable to service

of process there." Id. (citing Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22).

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 To determine whether the defendant satisfies the second

condition, a more involved inquiry is required as "the defendant

must show that the compendium of factors relevant to the private

and public interests implicated by the case strongly favors

dismissal." Id. (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09). Guided by

the Supreme Court in Gilbert, we have stated that:

[c]onsiderations relevant to the litigants'
private interests include "the relative ease
of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; [the]
possibility of view of premises, if view would
be appropriate to the action; . . . [and the
trial judge's consideration of] all other
practical problems that make trial of a case
easy, expeditious and inexpensive."

Id. (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508).

With respect to the public interest factors, we have

stated that the district court should consider "such things as the

administrative difficulties of docket congestion; the general goal

of 'having localized controversies decided at home,' and

concomitantly, ease of access to the proceedings on the part of

interested citizens; the trier's relative familiarity with the

appropriate rules of decision; and the burdens of jury duty." Id.

(quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09).

In addition, while certainly "a plaintiff enjoys some

degree of deference for his original choice of forum," Adelson,

510 F.3d at 53 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508), we note some

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tension in our case law regarding whether a district court, before

conducting the aforementioned two-part forum non conveniens

analysis, should accord a plaintiff's choice of a home forum

"heightened deference." Notably, in Adelson, we cited to the

Supreme Court's holding that "when the plaintiff has chosen his

home forum, he should not be deprived of it absent a 'clear

showing' of either 'oppressiveness and vexation' or evidence that

the chosen forum is 'inappropriate.'" 510 F.3d at 53 (quoting

Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524

(1947)). Yet, in Iragorri, we remarked that "[t]he Koster Court's

use of the term 'oppressiveness and vexation' neither created an

independent standard nor raised the bar for dismissal in forum non

conveniens cases." 203 F.3d at 15. Instead, the Iragorri court

viewed "the 'strongly favors' standard as a distillation of the

'oppressiveness and vexation' language." Id.

What is clear amidst this uncertainty, however, is that

even if a heightened deference standard were to apply to a

plaintiff's choice of a home forum, there is no automatic right to

the presumption, and as explained below, the district court should

deny the presumption to plaintiffs acting with a vexatious and

oppressive motive. As the Supreme Court has instructed, "[a]

citizen's forum choice should not be given dispositive weight" and

"dismissal should not be automatically barred when a plaintiff has

filed suit in his home forum." Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.23.

-8-
 C. Hananel's Burden for Dismissal on Forum Non
Conveniens Grounds

1. Presumption in Favor of Plaintiff's Choice of
Forum and Heightened Deference

We need not reconcile our precedent today regarding

whether a plaintiff's choice of her home forum carries a

presumption of heightened deference because, even if this

presumption were to apply, the district court did not commit error

here. We disagree with IPI's contention that our case law would

preclude a district court, if it found substantial support in the

record for its conclusion, from considering a plaintiff's vexatious

or oppressive motive for bringing suit in an alternative forum.7

Thus, in the present case, we cannot conclude that the

district court erred in finding IPI's choice of its home forum to

be undeserving of heightened deference. The district court

requested IPI to point to evidence in support of its purported

explanation for requesting dismissal from the Israeli court, and

IPI could not do so save for citing to a one-sentence claim it made

during a hearing before the Israeli court. The fact that IPI could

not provide this evidence, taken together with the fact that, here,

IPI engaged in nearly four years of discovery in an Israeli forum

7
Specifically, IPI argues that a defendant cannot overcome a
plaintiff's presumption of heightened deference without a clear
showing that the plaintiff's forum choice had a vexatious or
oppressive effect on defendants. Here, IPI faults the district
court for mistakenly focusing on whether plaintiff had a vexatious
or oppressive intent.

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-- a forum it initially chose8 --, and that IPI, according to the

district court, subsequently moved to dismiss its suit "on the

verge of being ready for trial," adequately support the district

court's determination that IPI was operating with a vexatious and

oppressive motive.9

We conclude that even if a presumption of heightened

deference were to apply to a plaintiff's choice of a home forum,

the district court did not err in denying the presumption to IPI.

Further, as we discuss infra, because we hold that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the public

and private interest factors strongly favor the Israeli forum, we

conclude that the district court did not err in finding that a

8
Notably, the Adelson court stated that "a heavy presumption
weighs in favor of [a U.S. citizen plaintiff's] initial forum
choice." 510 F.3d at 53 (emphasis added).
9
Even if the district court had found IPI's stated reason for
moving for dismissal in Israel persuasive, we still would not be
able to conclude that the district court erred as there is ample
evidence in the record to conclude that, at best, IPI was engaged
in forum shopping. As our sister court has noted, "the more it
appears that the plaintiff's choice of a U.S. forum was motivated
by forum-shopping reasons -- such as attempts to win a tactical
advantage resulting from local laws that favor the plaintiff's case
. . . -- the less deference the plaintiff's choice commands and,
consequently, the easier it becomes for the defendant to succeed on
a forum non conveniens motion by showing that convenience would be
better served by litigating in another country's courts." Iragorri
v. United Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
Here, we agree with the district court that the "sole reason IPI
advances to explain its choice of forum is a matter of litigation
strategy," and, thus, the district court, even if it believed that
IPI was not operating with an oppressive or vexatious motive, could
have concluded, on this basis, that IPI's choice of forum was not
entitled to heightened deference.

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presumption in favor of any ordinary deference to a plaintiff's

choice of forum was overcome. See Iragorri, 203 F.3d at 17-18

(holding that presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of

forum is overcome "where the [trial] court has considered all

relevant public and private interest factors, and where its

balancing of these factors is reasonable" (quoting Piper, 454 U.S.

at 257)).

2. Adequate Alternate Forum

The district court found that "Israel is an adequate

alternative forum because its courts address the sort of breach of

contract claim asserted in this case, and because Hananel, an

Israeli citizen is amenable to service there." We agree and see no

reason to disturb this finding as this matter has been litigated

for nearly four years in the Israeli forum, a forum in which IPI

initially chose to pursue its claims. Further, IPI does not

contend either that "the remedy provided by the alternative forum

is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at

all," Piper, 454 U.S. at 254, or that the Israeli forum "does not

permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute," id. at 254

n.22. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in conditioning its dismissal on Hananel's agreement not

to oppose reinstatement of the Israeli proceeding. See Ahmed v.

Boeing Co., 720 F.2d 224, 225 (1st Cir. 1983) (upholding

conditional dismissal in forum non conveniens case).

-11-
 3. Public and Private Interest Factors

We turn to the second requirement and analyze whether the

district court abused its discretion in applying the private and

public interest factors as set forth in Gilbert, 330 U.S. at

508-09, recognizing that "the list of factors is illustrative

rather than all-inclusive." Iragorri, 203 F.3d at 12.

i. Private Interest Factors

a. Relative Ease of Access to Sources of
Proof

With respect to the ease of access to sources of proof,

the district court stated that although the parties dispute whether

the contract was formed in Massachusetts, it is undisputed that

"Hananel's performance pursuant to the contract occurred in

Israel." The district court explained as follows:

[Hananel] was in charge of the IPI office in
Israel. He searched for investment
opportunities in Israel on IPI's behalf. He
received his pay in Israel. He spent IPI's
funds in Israel. He was not summoned to the
IPI headquarters in Needham to report on his
activities in Israel; indeed, he never
returned to the Needham office after the
December 5, 1995, meeting, although he did
return to the United States once or twice.

In addition, the district court noted that "Hananel was almost

always in Israel both when he was working for IPI and when he was

speaking with Adelson," who supervised him from both the United

States and Israel; that "Hananel's alleged breaches of the contract

occurred in Israel"; the affiants upon which IPI relied to develop

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its affidavits during the pretrial litigation phase in Israel are

"all Israeli witnesses testifying to events that occurred in

Israel"; the "related documents" which include credit card receipts

and internal corporate documents and would need to be translated

into English "are located in Israel"; and that Hananel anticipates

calling twenty-nine Israeli witnesses.

Given these factors, the district court concluded as

follows:

On balance, the factor concerning access to
sources of proof substantially favors the
Israeli forum. The locus of the alleged
misconduct is in Israel. The majority of the
witnesses are in Israel. The most significant
testimony on behalf of each party comes from
Israel (i.e., the testimony of Israeli-based
witnesses regarding Hananel's actions in
Israel). While IPI's evidence suggests that
the contract was formed in Massachusetts,
other evidence clearly establishes that many
of the terms were negotiated in Israel. In
addition, the Parties' subsequent course of
conduct –- much of which occurred in Israel -–
may bear upon the terms of the Parties'
relationship given the oral nature of the
contract and the heated disputes over the
terms of the contract. Moreover, the
presentation of evidence in the bilingual
courts of Israel is simpler for the Parties
than our English-only court.

IPI disagrees with the district court's conclusion that

the availability of witnesses and documents strongly favor

dismissal. IPI argues that there is "little reason to believe that

Hananel would even benefit from the proffered testimony" from the

witnesses he intends to call. IPI maintains that "the record

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simply does not show that the proposed Israeli witnesses are even

relevant, let alone so critical to Hananel's defense that

proceeding in the United States would cause 'manifest injustice.'"

With respect to the documents, IPI challenges the district court's

conclusion that many of the documents created and maintained in

Israel are in Hebrew, pointing out that the district court did not

identify any such documents.

IPI's arguments are unavailing. Consistent with our case

law, the fact that the events relating to Hananel's alleged

misconduct occurred in Israel weighs heavily in favor of the

foreign forum. See Howe v. Goldcorp Invest., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944,

951 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that the balance of conveniences favor

with "unusual strength" the Canadian defendants seeking a Canadian

forum because "[t]he relevant events surrounding both plaintiff's

'misrepresentation' and 'breach of fiduciary duty' claims took

place in Canada, not in the United States"); see also Piper, 454

U.S. at 257-58 (holding that because "[a] large proportion of the

relevant evidence is located in Great Britain" it was not

unreasonable for the district court to conclude "that fewer

evidentiary problems would be posed if the trial were held in

Scotland").

Furthermore, we disagree with IPI's claims that the

district court abused its discretion with respect to its treatment

of the relevance and identity of Hananel's witnesses. As a

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preliminary matter, we have noted, "there is no 'blanket rule' that

a defendant affirmatively demonstrate, by affidavit, the

unavailability of a foreign witness and the significance of the

witness's testimony." Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, Inc. (Mercier

II), 981 F.2d 1345, 1356 (1st Cir. 1992). Regardless of the

existence of such a rule, and contrary to IPI's assertions

otherwise, Hananel has adequately identified the twenty-nine

witnesses he intends to call in the proceedings below, and has

indicated the relevance of at least ten Israeli witnesses. The

district court noted that the "record contains affidavits from

those ten Israeli witnesses, each of whom would testify regarding

Adelson's knowledge of Hananel's activities in Israel . . . or

regarding various facts disputing the allegations of misconduct

asserted by IPI."

In view of the discretion and flexibility we afford to

the district court in conducting its forum non conveniens analysis,

we will not second-guess its judgment where there is strong record

support for its considered conclusion. As we have remarked, "[t]he

trial judge is in the best position to know the interstices of any

particular case and to evaluate both the parties' interests and the

likely efficacy of the truth-finding process." Iragorri, 203 F.3d

at 16 (citing Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508). Consequently, we cannot

say that the district court abused its discretion in concluding

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that testimony from Hananel's Israeli witnesses was relevant and

weighed in favor of the Israeli forum.10

b. Compulsory Process

IPI does not challenge the district court's conclusion

that Hananel would be unable to compel any of his witnesses to

appear in the United States and that live in-person testimony is

preferable to video testimony or live videoconferencing testimony.

We have stated that the ability to produce live testimony can weigh

strongly in favor of a particular forum. See Iragorri, 203 F.3d at

15 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

considering private interest factors in case where neither witness

could be compelled to attend trial in Maine); Mercier II, 981 F.2d

at 1356 (noting that "the fact-finder's opportunity to evaluate

. . . credibility on the basis of in-person testimony could be

crucial to a reliable resolution of these factual disputes" and

that "deposition testimony and letters rogatory, even if available

to the American court, would be less than satisfactory substitutes

10
Admittedly, the district court's determination that many of the
documents maintained in Israel are in Hebrew, thus requiring
translation into English, was somewhat speculative given its
statement that "[n]o evidence expressly establishes whether these
documents are in English or Hebrew." The same is arguably true
with respect to the district court's conclusion that most of the
Israeli witnesses would testify in Hebrew. However, even if the
district court overstated the convenience of bilingual courts in
Israel, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion given the fact that most of the evidence is located in
Israel. See Howe, 946 F.2d at 951 (noting that fact that documents
and witnesses were located in Canada weighed in favor of Canadian
forum).

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for in-person testimony"); Howe, 946 F.2d at 952 ("Compulsory

process would seem especially important where, as here, fraud and

subjective intent are elements of the claim, making the live

testimony of witnesses for the purposes of presenting demeanor

evidence essential to a fair trial."). Accordingly, we cannot

conclude that the district court abused its discretion in weighing

this factor.11

ii. Public Interest Factors

a. Judicial Economy

The district court concluded that "judicial economy is

poorly served by repeating in this forum the discovery the Parties

completed in Israel." IPI disagrees with this conclusion and

argues that the "evidentiary discovery that the parties conducted

in Israel could easily be transferred to Massachusetts, allowing

this case to proceed without protracted discovery." However, as

the district court correctly noted, "discovery rules in the United

States differ from those that govern in Israel" and "[f]urther

pretrial proceedings would need to occur here even though all

pretrial proceedings were complete in Israel." Once again, we

cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in

11
The district court also considered other private interest
factors such as costs to the parties and Hananel's health, finding
that these factors did not strongly weigh in favor of dismissal.
The district court's findings as to these factors do not alter our
conclusion that it did not abuse its discretion in finding that an
overall balancing of the private interest factors weigh strongly in
favor of dismissal.

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finding that this factor weighed in favor of the Israeli forum.

The district court "best appreciates [a] case's nuances and the

parties' circumstances," Iragorri, 203 F.3d at 13, and, hence, it

is in the best position to decide whether discovery would be

unnecessarily duplicative and if the goals of judicial efficiency

would favor a particular forum.12 Here, that determination was

reasonable.

b. Familiarity with Applicable Law and
Interest in Deciding Localized Controversies
Locally

The district court acknowledged that if the contract

between Hananel and IPI was formed in Massachusetts, the state has

an interest "in enforcing business transactions consummated within

its boundaries." However, the district court also cited to

undisputed evidence in the record that the parties contemplated

that aspects of the employment relationship would be subject to

Israeli labor law and that the terms of the contract were

negotiated in Israel. IPI argues that the district court erred,

12
The district court also cited the fact that "in this forum it
would be necessary for the Court and the finder of fact to receive
translations of Hebrew language evidence." As we mentioned above,
the district court may have overstated the difficulties posed by
translating evidence given that it could not identify whether the
documents created and maintained in Israel are in Hebrew.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in applying this factor in view of its other
justifications for why duplicating discovery proceedings in the
Massachusetts forum would not be an efficient way to proceed.

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contending that Massachusetts law should govern the contract and

that Massachusetts has an interest in enforcing local contracts.13

Although admittedly this is a closer issue, we conclude

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying

this factor as "this case has a great deal to do with [Israel]."

Howe, 946 F.2d at 953. The events surrounding Hananel's alleged

breach occurred in Israel and evidence exists that Israeli law

governs aspects of the employment relationship.14 See id. (noting

that "plaintiff's claims implicate duties the defendants owed to

the corporation and its shareholders under Canadian law" and that

"at least some significant portion of the adjudication of [the

defendant's] case will involve tasks most easily and appropriately

handled by a Canadian court: interpreting primarily Canadian law

and applying it to matters principally of concern to Canada and

Canadians"). Although the district court correctly acknowledged

that federal courts, if necessary, are capable of interpreting

Israeli law, here, the district court did not err in concluding

that Israel is the preferable forum given Israel's stronger

connection to the instant case. See Mercier II, 981 F.2d at 1355

(concluding in case where performance of contract and alleged

13
IPI also argues that the district court should have made a clear
choice of law ruling. IPI has not cited to any authority for this
proposition nor have we found any support in our case law for IPI's
claim.
14
In the instant case, Hananel supplemented the record with this
evidence.

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breach of contract at issue occurred in Turkey that district court

may consider "any attenuated connection between the particular

United States forum and the matter in litigation"); Howe, 946 F.2d

at 952-53 (noting in its balancing of factors the weak connection

of Massachusetts or any other United States jurisdiction to the

securities fraud at issue in its case).

In any event, even if these public interest factors do

not as decisively favor the Israeli forum as do the private

interest factors, we cannot conclude that the district court abused

its discretion because it reasonably concluded that an overall

balancing of both private and public interest factors strongly

favored Israel as the more convenient and judicially efficient

forum.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in granting Hananel's motion to

dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. "Given the standard of

review, it is not within our proper purview to disturb a trial

court's reasoned, record-rooted determination that justice could be

done more perfectly in a foreign forum than in an American

jurisdiction . . . ." Iragorri, 203 F.3d at 16. Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of the district court.

Affirmed.

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