United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-1964
CHARLES SANTANA-CASTRO; FÉLIX SANTANA-CARMONA;
AIDA SANTANA-CASTRO,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PEDRO TOLEDO-DÁVILA, Superintendent of the
Puerto Rico Police Department; JOSÉ RAMOS-GONZÁLEZ,
Commander of the Fajardo Region; JOSÉ LEBRÓN-ALICEA,
Supervisor; NELSON TORRES-GONZÁLEZ, Commander of the
Special Operations Unit; JESÚS SÁNCHEZ-ZAVALA, Police Officer;
ISRAEL CANDELARIA-VÉLEZ, Police Officer; JOHN DOE;
DIONISIO MOLINA-PADRÓ, Police Officer,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jaime Pieras, Jr., U.S. Senior District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
and Ebel,* Senior Circuit Judge.
Guillermo Ramos-Luiña, with whom Harry Anduze-Montaño and
José A. Morales-Boscio, were on brief for appellants.
Rosa Elena Pérez-Agosto, Assistant Solicitor General, with
whom Irene S. Soroeta-Kodesh, Solicitor General, Leticia Casalduc-
Rabell, Deputy Solicitor General, and Zaira Z. Girón-Anadón, Deputy
Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees.
August 27, 2009
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellants Charles
Santana-Castro ("Santana") and his grandparents Félix Santana-
Carmona and Aida Santana-Castro filed an action in the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico against
defendant-appellees Puerto Rico Police Department ("PRPD") officers
and their supervisors. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs
alleged violations of their constitutional rights under the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as claims
under Puerto Rico's constitution and civil law.
In their complaint, plaintiffs specifically alleged that
four PRPD officers illegally arrested, beat, and incarcerated
Santana, causing him physical injuries, and causing him and his
grandparents emotional distress. They also claimed that PRPD
supervisors were liable under a theory of supervisory liability and
that Santana was illegally fired from the PRPD in retaliation for
bringing legal action against the PRPD. In response, defendants
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The
district court initially dismissed some of the claims, and upon a
subsequent motion for reconsideration, it dismissed all remaining
claims as time-barred. Plaintiffs appeal. After careful
consideration, we affirm the district court's dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint as untimely.
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I. Background
As this case comes to us as a motion to dismiss, "'we
must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true.'"
Maldonado v. Fontánes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)). The following
facts are based on Santana's complaint and the extrajudicial claim
letter he sent to PRPD Superintendent Pedro Toledo-Dávila
("Toledo"), which was attached to the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 10(c) ("A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a
pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes."); Blackstone
Realty LLC v. FDIC, 244 F.3d 193, 195 n.1 (1st Cir. 2001).
Santana worked as a police officer in the PRPD from 2002
to 2007. On June 8, 2006, while off-duty, he had dinner at a
restaurant in Luquillo, Puerto Rico. While at dinner, his car was
vandalized and his car radio stolen. Upon discovering the damage
to his car, Santana met an individual on the street named Angel
Cruz-García ("Cruz"), who informed Santana that he had seen two
suspicious men in the area with a bag. Thinking they might have
been the individuals who damaged the car, Santana and Cruz went to
a housing project to look for the men Cruz had seen.
When they could not find the two men Cruz suspected
vandalized the car, Santana and Cruz left the housing project.
They were then pulled over by Officers Jesús Sánchez-Zavala
("Sánchez") and Israel Candelaria-Vélez ("Candelaria"). A few
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minutes later, Officers Dionisio Molina-Padró ("Molina") and José
Lebrón-Alicea ("Lebrón") also arrived at the scene. The four
officers searched Santana's car and arrested him and Cruz for
possession of crack cocaine. During the arrest, Sánchez and Molina
allegedly hit Santana and handcuffed him tightly, causing Santana
severe pain and several hematomas. The officers also humiliated
Santana, calling him a corrupt officer and a junkie. The officers
then brought Santana to the Luquillo Police Station where they kept
him incarcerated for fifteen hours without food or medical
attention.
The following day, on June 9, 2006, Santana was taken to
San Juan Superior Court and charged with possession of illegal
drugs and driving without a vehicle registration plate. On
July 21, 2006, Santana was suspended from the PRPD without pay. He
never returned to work.1 On February 7, 2007, in a preliminary
hearing, a state court judge held that the PRPD officers who
stopped Santana and searched his car lacked probable cause. The
court dismissed the charges against Santana.
On May 18, 2007, Santana and his grandparents sent a
letter through their lawyer to PRPD Superintendent Toledo, who
received the letter on May 21, 2007. The letter described the
events of June 8 and 9, 2006, including Santana's arrest, beating,
1
Santana received an official letter of termination on
September 12, 2007.
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and incarceration by the four officers at the scene, who are all
mentioned by name. It also noted that Santana was "summarily
expelled" from his job "as a result" of the charges filed against
him. The letter stated that "[t]hese actions and/or omissions by
the aforementioned agents caused damages and losses," including
"severe mental anguish" to Santana's grandparents who had to
witness "the injustices committed against their grandson." The
letter alleged that "[t]he blows that [Santana] received, the
filing of unfounded criminal charges against him, and the
publication of all this in the news media, constitute a violation
of his civil rights."2 The letter then requested $1.5 million in
damages "as an indemnity for the damages and losses caused by the
police officers referred to above."
On September 7, 2007, Santana and his grandparents filed
a complaint in federal court against the four officers who had been
at the scene of the arrest and also against three supervising
officers - Superintendent Toledo, José Ramos-González ("Ramos"),
Commander of the Fajardo Region of the PRPD, and Nelson Torres-
González ("Torres"), Commander of the Special Operations Unit of
the PRPD. On November 21, 2007, the three supervising officers
filed a motion to dismiss. On December 21, 2007, plaintiffs filed
2
The letter stated that the claim is "made under the protection
of . . . the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and
the United States of America, articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto
Rico Civil Code, 32 LPRA, secs 5141 and 5142 and the federal Civil
Rights Law, 42 USC 1983."
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an opposition to the motion to dismiss and leave to file an amended
complaint, which was granted by the district court. On January 4,
2008, plaintiffs filed the amended complaint, which again stated
claims against the on-scene officers for violating Santana's civil
rights and against the supervising officers for supervisory
liability. It also included a claim alleging that Santana was
fired as a result of his arrest and the charges brought against
him, which constituted an illegal termination because the PRPD did
not investigate the events of June 8 and 9, 2006 prior to
terminating Santana. On April 4, 2008, Lebrón and Molina joined
their co-defendants' earlier filed motion to dismiss. On May 7,
2008, Candelaria and Sánchez also joined the motion to dismiss.
On or about May 12, 2008, the district court issued a
partial dismissal of the complaint, dismissing the following
claims: (1) all claims alleged against the supervising officers;
(2) all claims brought under the First, Fifth, and Tenth
Amendments; (3) all claims brought against the on-scene officers in
their official capacities as police officers; and (4) all claims
brought by Santana's grandparents pursuant to § 1983. This order
left the claims against the on-scene officers in their personal
capacities, pursuant to § 1983 for violations of Santana's Fourth
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and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as all claims brought
under Puerto Rico law against the on-scene officers.3
Following the partial dismissal, both parties filed
motions for reconsideration. The district court granted
defendants' motion and issued an amended opinion and order,
dismissing all of plaintiffs' remaining claims with prejudice as
time-barred. Plaintiffs timely appeal. For the reasons stated
below, we affirm the district court and hold that plaintiffs'
extrajudicial letter did not toll the statute of limitations under
Puerto Rico law, rendering his complaint untimely.
II. Discussion
We first consider whether plaintiffs' complaint was
properly time-barred. Defendants argue that plaintiffs filed the
original complaint after the applicable statute of limitations had
run. They further argue that the extrajudicial letter plaintiffs
sent to Toledo failed to toll the limitations period. Defendants
contend that the letter notified Toledo that he might be sued only
in his official capacity as an employee of the PRPD, which is
precluded by the Eleventh Amendment. We agree with defendants that
the complaint was time-barred, albeit for different reasons.
3
This order did not mention the illegal termination claim raised
in the amended complaint.
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A. Applicable Law Governing Statute of Limitations
We review de novo the district court's dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim based on statute of
limitations grounds. López-González v. Municipality of Comerío,
404 F.3d 548, 551 (1st Cir. 2005). "Affirmative defenses, such as
the statute of limitations, may be raised in a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), provided that "the
facts establishing the defense [are] clear 'on the face of the
plaintiff's pleadings.'" Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting
Blackstone Realty LLC, 244 F.3d at 197). "Where the dates included
in the complaint show that the limitations period has been exceeded
and the complaint fails to 'sketch a factual predicate' that would
warrant the application of either a different statute of
limitations period or equitable estoppel, dismissal is
appropriate." Id.
Plaintiffs' complaint brought claims under § 1983, which
borrows the forum state's statute of limitations for personal
injury claims. Rodríguez-García v. Municipality of Caguas, 354
F.3d 91, 96 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Wilson v. García, 471 U.S. 261,
277-80 (1985)). The parties agree that Puerto Rico's one-year
prescriptive period governing tort actions is the statute of
limitations applicable to plaintiffs' claims. See id. (citing P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298(2)). While we look to Puerto Rico law to
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determine the applicable prescriptive period, "federal law
determines the date on which the claim accrued." Id. at 96. The
limitations period "begins to run when the plaintiff 'knows or has
reason to know of the injury which is the basis for his claim.'"
Id. at 96-97 (quoting Rodríguez Narváez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 41
n.5 (1st Cir. 1990)). The "limitations period of actions is a
substantive, not a procedural, matter" in Puerto Rico. Rodríguez
v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 570 F.3d 402, 406 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing
García Pérez v. Corporación de Servicios para la Mujer y la
Familia, etc., 2008 TSPR 114, 2008 WL 2717833, at *4 (P.R. June 30,
2008)). Thus, we apply Puerto Rico's tolling rules.
Puerto Rico's tolling rules provide three ways that a
plaintiff can interrupt the statute of limitations, which, as
relevant here, include the sending of an "extrajudicial" letter.
See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5303. "[A] letter sent by a tort
plaintiff to the tortfeasor, complaining of the tortious conduct
and demanding compensation, is an extrajudicial claim that, if
timely, interrupts the prescription of the cause of action in
tort." Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Pérez y Cía. de P.R., Inc.,
142 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st. Cir. 1998). We note, however, that an
extrajudicial letter will not toll the limitations period "'for all
claims arising out of the same facts.'" Municipality of Caguas,
354 F.3d at 97 (quoting Fernández v. Chardón, 681 F.2d 42, 49 (1st
Cir. 1982)). The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has limited the tolling
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effect of an extrajudicial letter to situations where the letter is
"identical" to a subsequently filed complaint. Id. (citing Cintrón
v. Estado Libre Asociado de P.R., 27 P.R. Offic. Trans. 582
(1990)). This identicality requirement has three components.
First, the extrajudicial letter and subsequent complaint "must seek
the same form of relief." Id. at 98. Second, "[t]he causes of
action asserted [in the complaint] must be based on the same
substantive claims" as asserted in the extrajudicial letter. Id.
Lastly, "provided that other Puerto Rico tolling statutes do not
rescue the claims on other grounds, they must be asserted against
the same defendants in the same capacities; new defendants should
not be added." Id.
Before we proceed to our analysis as to whether the
identicality requirement is met here, we note some tension in the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court's approach to identicality and its
tolling provisions. On the one hand, it has stated, and we have
often repeated, that the "tolling provisions [are] interpreted
restrictively against the party invoking their protection."
Nieves-Vega v. Ortiz-Quiñones, 443 F.3d 134, 137 (1st Cir. 2006)
(quoting Rodríguez Narváez, 895 F.2d at 43); see also Díaz de Diana
v. A.J.A.S., 10 P.R. Offic. Trans. 602, 608 n.1 (1980). On the
other hand, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has also stated that
extrajudicial claims should be analyzed in [their] "totality and in
a liberal fashion," Pitts v. United States, 109 F.3d 832, 835 n.4
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951 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Zambrana Maldonado v. Commonwealth,
129 D.P.R. 740, 1992 WL 755000 (P.R. Jan. 30, 1992)). Also,
consistent with a more liberal approach to tolling, the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court has remarked that it favors conservation of rights as
"the norm." See Kery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 947, 952
(D.P.R. 1995); Galib-Frangie v. El Vocero de Puerto Rico, 138
D.P.R. 560, 1995 WL 905884 (P.R. June 6, 1995) ("The prescription
of the right is the exception, being its exercise or conservation
the norm, because of which the law propitiates the exercise and
conservation of rights through the use of prescription's
interruptive mechanisms.").
Despite this potentially contradictory guidance, however,
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has not departed from the principle
that an extrajudicial letter in order to toll the statute of
limitations with respect to subsequent claims must give fair notice
of the claims that are subsequently raised. It has explained the
term "extrajudicial claim" as follows:
Our Civil Code has not given to the word
"claim" any precise or technical meaning. But
this does not exempt us from trying to find
it. In principle, a claim stands for demand
or notice. That is: it is an act for which
the holder of a subjective right, addresses
the passive subject of said right, demanding
that he adopt the required conduct. The claim
is, then, a pretension in a technical sense.
Cintrón, 27 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 592.
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Likewise, we have recognized this important principle in
our case law, stating that "[t]he identicality requirement prevents
plaintiffs from circumventing the notice function of the statutes
of limitations by asserting different claims in belated federal
court complaints." Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d at 97.
1. Identicality and Plaintiffs' Supervisory
Liability Claims
We first consider whether plaintiffs' extrajudicial claim
letter is sufficiently identical to their subsequent complaint. As
to the first identicality requirement, namely whether the same
relief was sought, there is little question and, in fact,
defendants concede,4 that plaintiffs sought the same form of relief
-- money damages -- both in the letter and in the subsequent
complaint. That the letter requested a different amount in damages
($1,500,000) than the complaint (over $4,000,000) is not a problem
here because the letter put Toledo on notice of a potential lawsuit
for damages. See id. ("Although the amount of damages differs in
the two complaints, the allegation of damages in her state
complaint gave the defendants the requisite 'fair notice that
[they] might be called upon to defend a damages suit . . . .'")
(quoting Hernández del Valle v. Santa Aponte, 575 F.2d 321, 324
(1st Cir. 1978) (alteration in original)).
4
Defendants acknowledge that "the letter does meet the first
requirement regarding the same form of relief, since money damages
are sought in both the extrajudicial claim letter and the
complaint."
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Plaintiffs, however, do not fare as well with respect to
the second identicality requirement, namely whether the causes of
action in the extrajudicial claim and subsequent complaint are
based on the same substantive claims. As we have previously
stated, Puerto Rico law requires sufficient detail "to put
defendant on notice of the general nature of their claims." Id. at
100. Here, we conclude that the extrajudicial letter did not
assert a claim of supervisory liability in sufficient detail to
meet the second prong of the identicality requirement. We explain.
Plaintiffs' complaint asserted that the subordinate
officers had a propensity of violence, that their supervisors knew
of this propensity, and they did not act to correct it through
retraining, psychological evaluation, or remedial action. As part
of the allegation of the subordinate officers' propensity for
violence, the complaint referred to "incidents of unwarranted
physical violence against citizens."5 Although the extrajudical
letter was addressed to Superintendent Toledo and mentioned § 1983
5
In Maldonado, we noted that "[s]ome recent language from the
Supreme Court may call into question our prior circuit law on the
standard for holding a public official liable for damages under
§ 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability." 568 F.3d at 275 n.7
(citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937). This concern is not implicated
here because plaintiffs do not even allude to supervisory liability
in their extrajudicial letter. Further, plaintiffs concede that
they do not meet the Iqbal standard with respect to their
supervisory liability claim in their complaint.
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in its penultimate sentence6 -- the letter failed to assert, even
remotely, the factual allegations supporting supervisory liability
that ultimately were raised in the complaint. Instead, the letter
recounted plaintiffs' version of the events of June 8 and 9,
alleging that the actions and/or omissions of the officers who
perpetrated the violence against him caused damages and losses.
Further, plaintiffs claimed that the arrest and filing of charges
against Santana "tarnished his reputation and violated his dignity"
because they were published in the newspapers and broadcast on the
radio. Even if we took a "liberal" approach in assessing this
second prong, analyzing the letter in its "totality," we cannot
conclude that Toledo, or any of the other defendant supervisors,
would have been on sufficient notice to defend a supervisory
liability claim.
Thus, we conclude that because plaintiffs' extrajudicial
letter fails to satisfy the second identicality requirement, the
supervisory liability claim as to all defendant supervisors is
time-barred.7
2. Plaintiffs' Claims Against the On-Scene
Officers
As to plaintiffs' claims against the on-scene officers,
the extrajudicial letter states with "precis[ion] and
6
Once again, the letter states that the claim is "made under the
protection of . . . federal Civil Rights Law, 42 USC 1983."
7
We need not reach the third identicality prong.
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specific[ity]," see Fernández, 681 F.2d at 53, the allegations of
Santana's arrest, beating, and incarceration without proper medical
treatment. However, the letter was addressed only to Toledo and
plaintiffs do not allege that the on-scene officers accused of
perpetrating the attack knew about the letter or its contents.
This is fatal to plaintiffs' claim. Puerto Rico law is clear that
the extrajudicial letter "must be addressed to the . . . passive
subject of the right, not to third party." See Velilla v. Pueblo
Supermarket, 11 Offic. Trans. 732, 734-35 (1981); see also Pitts,
109 F.3d at 835 (citing same principle); Rodríguez-Narváez, 895
F.2d at 44 (same). Plaintiffs have not pointed to any case, nor
are we aware of one, where subordinate officers are held to be on
constructive notice of claims made against them in an extrajudicial
letter to a supervising officer.8
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district
court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims as time-barred.9
8
Moreover, plaintiffs do not allege that the subordinate officers
"affirmatively induce[d] [plaintiffs] to address the extrajudicial
claim to the wrong party," potentially excusing plaintiffs from the
requirement to address the extrajudicial letter to the correct
party. Campos-Matos v. Evanstone Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 170,
173-74 (D.P.R. 2002) (citing Velilla for this proposition of law).
9
We also affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs' other claims,
including their malicious prosecution and wrongful termination
claims. First, malicious prosecution cannot be implicated on these
facts against these defendants because, although they arrested
Santana, the officers were not responsible for bringing charges
against him. Second, plaintiffs have waived their wrongful
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Affirmed.
termination claim by failing to sufficiently brief the argument in
general (or, in specific, their "continuous and uninterrupted
violations" theory with respect to this issue) on appeal. See
Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302,
309 (1st Cir. 2002); see McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d
13, 23 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that "the plaintiff has an
affirmative responsibility to put his best foot forward in an
effort to present some legal theory that will support his claim").
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