United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 08-2089
UNITED STATES,
Appellant,
v.
VINCENT CHANEY,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, U. S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, John R. Gibson,* and Howard,
Circuit Judges.
William E. Morse for appellant.
Robert Herrick for appellee.
October 15, 2009
*
Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge. Vincent Chaney was indicted
for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2). Chaney moved to suppress the
majority of the government’s evidence against him, arguing that it
was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district
court granted Chaney’s motion to suppress and the government filed
this interlocutory appeal. We reverse.
I. Background
At 1:35 on the morning of Friday, June 28, 2007, Officer Aaron
Brown of the Hooksett, New Hampshire Police Department, patrolling
alone, observed a motor vehicle being operated without a working
driver’s side headlight. Officer Brown turned on his flashing
lights to initiate a traffic stop and the driver complied by
pulling to the side of the road. Officer Brown approached the
driver’s side of the vehicle, which was occupied by the driver and
two other individuals. He explained to the driver, Renee
LaFontaine, the reason for the stop and requested her driver’s
license and vehicle registration, which she provided. Officer
Brown, while still standing at the driver’s side door of the van,
also asked the passenger, later identified as Vincent Chaney, for
his identification and learned from the driver that the adolescent
boy in the back seat was her son, Michael. At this point, only a
minute or two had passed since Officer Brown initiated the traffic
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stop. Officer Brown testified that although Chaney had not done
anything to suggest that he was dangerous, he requested Chaney’s
identification “as an officer safety function.”
In response to Officer Brown’s request, Chaney replied that he
had left his identification at home. Officer Brown then asked
Chaney what jurisdiction had issued the identification and Chaney
replied that he believed it was Massachusetts, but he was not
certain. Chaney gave the name, later determined to be false, of
Jacob Williams and claimed his date of birth was July 5, 1972.
Officer Brown found it unusual that Chaney did not know what
jurisdiction issued his official identification. He then asked
Chaney for his social security number, or the last four digits of
it, which Chaney could not provide. Officer Brown next asked
Chaney for his current address, or at least the most recent of his
addresses that he could recall. Once again, Chaney could not
remember the requested information. Based on his experience,
Officer Brown again found Chaney’s inability to recall such
information unusual. Chaney’s demeanor during this exchange was
“uninvolved” and Officer Brown testified that Chaney primarily
“stared straight ahead” and was “meek” in his behavior and
mannerisms. By contrast, Officer Brown testified that people in
these situations generally make eye contact or at least engage in
some sort of conversation with the officer.
Approximately seven minutes after the traffic stop was
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initiated, Officer Brown returned to his cruiser to verify the
information he received from the driver and Chaney. Officer Brown
radioed the information to dispatch and requested a records check
for license status and any outstanding warrants. He received the
results of both records checks simultaneously, approximately ten
minutes after he made the request. Officer Brown testified that
the records checks could not be run simultaneously and that
therefore approximately five of the ten minutes it took dispatch to
respond were attributable to the check of Chaney’s information.
After he obtained the results of the records check, Officer Brown
was able to verify the driver’s information but was unable to match
the information given by Chaney to any records in Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, or New York.
Officer Brown returned to the driver’s side of LaFontaine’s
vehicle and returned her license and vehicle registration to her.
He then asked LaFontaine if she would mind stepping out of the van
and speaking to him at the rear of the vehicle. Officer Brown
testified that he asked LaFontaine out of the vehicle because he
wanted to obtain her independent account of the passenger’s
identity. LaFontaine agreed, and the two stepped to the rear of
her vehicle. Officer Brown questioned LaFontaine about the front
passenger’s identity, how she knew him, where they were coming
from, and what they were doing. LaFontaine indicated that she knew
the passenger as Jake, and did not know his last name. She
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explained that she met “Jake” around five years earlier, but had
lost touch with him until recently. Lafontaine said that when she
recently spoke with “Jake” they decided they would hang out, go for
a ride, and talk. She stated that when the officer pulled them
over, they were headed to drop “Jake” off at his home on Spruce
Street. Officer Brown then left LaFontaine and approached the
passenger side of the van to speak with the passenger, Chaney.
Officer Brown explained to Chaney that the information he
provided did not check out. Officer Brown also told Chaney that,
based on his nervous demeanor and inability to provide an address
or social security number, that he suspected Chaney of providing a
false name. Chaney continued to assert that his name was Jacob.
He became increasingly nervous, fidgety, and continued to avoid eye
contact. As Officer Brown was talking with Chaney, he shined his
flashlight into the car and observed a significant bulge, about the
size of a fist, in the right front pocket of Chaney’s jeans. At
this point, Officer Brown was concerned that the bulge might be a
weapon. He was also suspicious of criminal activity, given his
belief that Chaney had provided false information.
Officer Brown pointed out the bulge to Chaney and asked what
was in that pocket. At first, Chaney didn’t respond and became
increasingly nervous. Officer Brown repeated his question, at
which point Chaney shifted his weight, reached into his right rear
pocket and produced a big wad of napkins. He then said that
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nothing was in his pocket and fumbled with the napkins in his hand.
Officer Brown observed that as Chaney moved, the bulge in his right
front pocket remained rigid. Officer Brown then redirected Chaney
to his right front pocket and Chaney again indicated that nothing
was in the pocket. Chaney then took the napkins in his right hand
and shoved them in his right front pocket. As he did, Officer
Brown observed that the bulge in Chaney’s pocket moved lower into
the pocket.
Officer Brown opened the door and asked Chaney to step out of
the vehicle. He informed Chaney that he was going to conduct a
“Terry pat” on him. Officer Brown brought Chaney to the rear of
the vehicle to conduct the pat-down search. At this point, another
officer, Officer Megowan, had arrived on the scene. Officer Brown
explained to Chaney that he was only going to pat down his outer
person by touching and feeling his pockets. Chaney’s body language
then became extremely rigid, and he began to clench his teeth.
Officer Brown asked Chaney a third time what was in his pocket.
This time Chaney responded that there were syringes in his pocket
because he is a diabetic. Officer Brown asked if the syringes were
capped, and Chaney stated that he was unsure. Officer Brown
informed Chaney that he was going to retrieve the syringes.
Because of Chaney’s change in body language, Officer Brown feared
that he might fight or flee, and he placed Chaney in handcuffs. He
emphasized to Chaney that he was not under arrest, and Chaney
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indicated that he understood.
Officer Brown then went directly to pat-down Chaney’s right
front pocket and he squeezed the item in question. He told Chaney
that the item did not feel like syringes, and Chaney responded that
it must be his diabetic kit. Officer Brown removed the item, which
was a small black pouch with the word “KELTEC” on the side.
Officer Brown recognized the container as a firearm pouch and
opened it. Inside was a loaded Keltec pistol. Officer Brown asked
Chaney if he had a permit to carry the weapon and Chaney indicated
that he did not. Chaney was placed under arrest and eventually
provided his actual name and date of birth.
Chaney entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon
in possession of a firearm, preserving his motion to suppress
evidence obtained during the traffic stop. The district court
granted Chaney’s motion to suppress, and this interlocutory appeal
by the government followed.
II. Discussion
The government argues that the district court erred in
granting Chaney’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during the
stop. The district court concluded that Officer Brown’s inquiries
into Chaney’s identity unreasonably expanded the scope of the
traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. When reviewing
a district court’s grant of a motion to suppress, “[w]e review the
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court's findings of fact for clear error and the application of the
law to those facts de novo.” United States v. Siciliano, 2009 WL
2605704, at *8 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A
traffic stop constitutes a seizure of “everyone in the vehicle” for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment and thus must be supported by
reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. See
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007). During an
otherwise valid traffic stop, “[a]n officer's inquiries into
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, [the
Supreme] Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into
something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries
do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Arizona v.
Johnson, 129 S.Ct. 781, 788 (2009). “To justify a patdown of the
driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, . . . the
police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected
to the frisk is armed and dangerous.” Id. at 784.
Here, Chaney does not dispute that the traffic stop was
valid at its inception. Rather, he challenges Officer Brown’s
inquiries into his identity, claiming that those actions
unreasonably extended the duration of the traffic stop. In
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response, the government argues that Officer Brown’s original
request for Chaney’s identification, and the first few follow-up
questions that ensued, did not unreasonably extend the duration of
the stop and were justified based on officer safety concerns.
Following Chaney’s implausible answers to Officer Brown’s initial
requests, the government argues, Officer Brown had reasonable
suspicion to investigate further into Chaney’s identity. All of
the officer’s subsequent actions, according to the government, were
individually justified as the situation unfolded. The district
court rejected the government’s assertions as foreclosed by this
Court’s decision in United States v. Henderson, 463 F.3d 27 (1st.
Cir. 2006), and granted Chaney’s motion to suppress. Specifically,
the district court concluded that Henderson prohibited Officer
Brown from making any inquiry into Chaney’s identity based solely
on concerns of officer safety and without reasonable suspicion. We
disagree.
In Henderson, an officer initiated a routine traffic stop at
about ten o’clock in the evening. 463 F.3d at 28. During the
course of the stop, the officer “demanded” the passenger’s driver’s
license. Id. at 29. When the passenger stated that he did not
have a license, the officer demanded that he write down his name,
date of birth, and social security number. There was testimony
that the officer refused to explain why he was requesting the
information and that he cursed repeatedly during the encounter.
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Id. at 36-37. The officer gave conflicting testimony as to his
reasons for demanding the passenger’s identification, including
that he was going to issue the passenger a seatbelt citation and
that he wanted to determine whether the passenger could drive the
vehicle. Id. at 34-35. The officer did not cite, nor did the
government assert, “officer safety” as a justification for
requesting the passenger’s identification at trial. On appeal, the
Henderson Court found the officer’s testimony wholly incredible
concerning the reasons he gave for demanding the passenger’s
identification and conducting the subsequent records check. Id. at
45. With the justifications given at trial discredited, the
government urged the court to nonetheless conclude that the
officer’s actions were justified based on concerns of officer
safety. Id. at 45.
The Henderson Court rejected the government’s post-hoc
“officer safety” rationalization which had no basis in the record.
Id. at 46-47. In doing so, the court focused on the entire delay
caused by the questioning and records check, amounting to
approximately twenty minutes, and found no reasonable justification
for the officer’s actions in extending the stop by that much. Id.
at 46.
Here, unlike in Henderson, the officer testified that he
requested the passenger’s identification based on safety concerns.
Officer Brown was the only officer on the scene and was outnumbered
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three to one by occupants of the vehicle. The stop occurred in the
early morning hours and Officer Brown was one of only three
officers on duty, with each being assigned to different sections of
town. Officer Brown also indicated that requesting identification
allowed him to know more about who he was dealing with and protect
not only himself, but also the other occupants of the car. Officer
Brown’s testimony was consistent and his credibility was not
meaningfully challenged.
Although Henderson at times spoke more broadly, its holding
was limited to a conclusion that a delay of approximately twenty
minutes to perform a records check on a passenger of a vehicle,
without a basis for individualized suspicion, unreasonably extended
the duration of an otherwise valid traffic stop. This case is
distinguishable. Here, Officer Brown had developed reasonable
suspicion to investigate Chaney further after only a minute or two,
and all of his actions thereafter were justified as the situation
unfolded. Therefore, the delay of approximately two minutes that
occurred prior to Officer Brown developing reasonable suspicion to
further investigate Chaney’s identity was de minimus and did not
unreasonably extend the duration of the traffic stop.
Nonetheless, Chaney argues that Henderson prohibits an officer
from making any inquiry into a passenger’s identity, including
asking for official identification, unless the officer has
reasonable suspicion that the particular passenger is dangerous or
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involved in criminal activity. Chaney’s interpretation of
Henderson, however, relies on dicta and is in conflict with Supreme
Court precedent. The Supreme Court has explained that it is “too
plain for argument” that the justification of officer safety is
“both legitimate and weighty.” See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.
106, 110 (1977). Noting the inherent dangers of a traffic stop,
the Supreme Court has allowed officers to, as a matter of course,
take the arguably more intrusive step of ordering passengers out of
a vehicle during a valid traffic stop without any individualized
suspicion or justification. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,
415 (1997). More recently, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[a]n
officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for
the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the
encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as
those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”
Johnson, 129 S. Ct. at 788.
Here, the officer’s initial inquiries into Chaney’s identity
took at most a minute or two and did not measurably extend the
duration of the stop. Any additional delay, including that
attributable to the records check, was independently warranted by
the officer’s reasonable suspicion, based on Chaney’s implausible
answers and nervous demeanor, that Chaney was giving a false name
and might be involved in other criminal activity. See United
States v. Smith, 164 Fed. Appx. 825, 828 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[t]he
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continued detention of the vehicle . . . reasonably warranted the
intrusion” where officer suspected passenger of giving false name
based on passenger’s body language and inability to provide social
security number). In addition, Officer Brown testified that in his
experience, people sometimes give a false name when they are
carrying a concealed weapon without the required permit. Officer
Brown’s actions continued to be justified after learning that the
information Chaney gave did not match records in any of the
surrounding jurisdictions. Under the circumstances, then, it was
reasonable to undertake further questioning of Chaney and
LaFontaine to determine Chaney’s identity and the reasons he might
have given false information. See United States v. Decker, 292
Fed. Appx. 752, 753 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished decision)
(upholding denial of motion to suppress where officer questioned
passenger about identity, records check demonstrated passenger gave
false name, and officer observed contraband after returning to
vehicle to further question passenger about his identity).
When Officer Brown saw the bulge in Chaney’s pocket, he was
justified in questioning Chaney about the pocket’s contents. See
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110 (finding reasonable suspicion that
individual may be armed based solely on officer’s observance of
bulge in defendant’s jacket). Chaney’s evasiveness and failure to
identify what was in his pocket, coupled with the size and rigid
nature of the object, gave Officer Brown a specific articulable
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basis for suspecting that Chaney might be armed, thereby justifying
a pat-down search. See United States v. Greene, 129 F.3d 1252
(Table), 1997 WL 642275 at *2 (1st Cir. Oct. 14, 1997) (finding
reasonable suspicion to support pat-down search of passenger where
passenger was nervous and officer observed bulge in passenger’s
right front pants pocket). Chaney then indicated that he had
uncapped needles in his pocket, further justifying that he be
handcuffed during the search. Officer Brown went directly for
Chaney’s pocket, where he had observed the bulge, and recovered a
firearm.
We conclude that Officer Brown’s actions were reasonable at
all times during the stop. His initial few questions concerning
Chaney’s identification were allowable officer safety measures, not
themselves requiring any individualized suspicion of Chaney, but
rather justified based on the inherent dangers of the motor vehicle
stop and the officer’s need to orient himself to who and what he
may be dealing with. His actions thereafter were each justified by
reasonable suspicion warranting further investigation and were
related in nature and scope to dispelling the officer’s legitimate
concerns. The Fourth Amendment was not violated.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is reversed and this case is remanded for further
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proceedings.
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