UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 99-60144
DOUGLAS BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BUNGE CORPORATION; CLAUDE ROSE,
individually and as operations
manager, Vicksburg Facility,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Mississippi
March 28, 2000
Before GARWOOD, WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
DENNIS, Circuit Judge:
Douglas Brown, the plaintiff/appellant, filed suit against
Bunge Corporation (Bunge) alleging discrimination on the basis of
his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and alleging state law tort claims
of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and
breach of contract. The district court granted Bunge’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissed Brown’s claims with prejudice. For
the reasons assigned, we affirm the decision of the district court.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Brown began working for Bunge’s Soybean Processing Plant in
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Vicksburg, Mississippi in 1966.1 The Vicksburg plant has three
departments – maintenance, processing, and shipping and receiving
– each of which is managed by a superintendent. In 1975, Brown was
promoted to the position of superintendent of the shipping and
receiving department. He served in this capacity until January
1997.
Claude Rose served as operations manager of Bunge’s South
Central region where he was responsible for monitoring four of
Bunge’s soybean processing facilities including the Vicksburg
plant. The Vicksburg plant was the least profitable of Bunge’s
soybean processing facilities. In 1996, Rose became operations
manager of the Vicksburg plant and was directed to improve plant
operations. As operations manager, Rose supervised the three
superintendents at the Vicksburg plant: Brown; Roger Blades,
superintendent of the processing department; and Paul Buford,
superintendent of the maintenance department.
Rose stated that he regularly met with Brown, Blades and
Buford concerning problems at the Vicksburg plant. Rose concluded
that Brown’s department was the most poorly managed department at
the plant because of Brown’s inability to solve problems, train and
supervise employees, and deal with uncooperative employees.
According to Rose, he held individual meetings with Brown where he
informed Brown of the need to correct these deficiencies. Rose
kept no documentation of these meetings, however.
1
The Anderson Clayton Company owned the Vicksburg plant when
Brown became an employee in 1966; Bunge subsequently purchased the
Vicksburg plant from the Anderson Clayton Company.
2
During a meeting on January 22, 1997, Rose met with Brown to
implement a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), a disciplinary
program for salaried Bunge employees who were experiencing
performance problems. Brown received a PIP letter listing his
performance deficiencies and directing him to prepare a written
response with suggestions for correcting each deficiency. The PIP
letter stated that if Brown failed to show “immediate and sustained
improvement in all areas of [his] performance” he might be unable
to continue working at Bunge. The PIP letter also stated that
Brown and Rose were to meet on January 27 to discuss Brown’s
response to the PIP.
Brown was shocked when he received the PIP letter because he
was unaware that Rose had any problems with his performance prior
to this meeting. While Brown acknowledged that he had discussed
problems in the shipping and receiving department with Rose, Brown
believed the problems were caused by insufficient financial
resources rather than deficiencies in his management skills.
According to Brown, the problems could not be corrected without
additional staff and equipment but Bunge had rejected his requests
for more resources.
Brown was also surprised that the PIP letter focused on
problems with his management skills because he had received a raise
in January 1996 and January 1997. The last increase was awarded
several weeks before Brown received the PIP letter. In addition,
Rose praised Brown at a Bunge function honoring long-term employees
in December 1996. Brown stated that Rose would not have
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recommended that he receive a raise or publicly compliment him if
Rose was displeased with his performance.
Brown was aware that a similar letter had been given to
another Bunge employee who had ultimately been terminated. Brown
believed that PIP letters were used by Bunge to “get rid of”
employees and that he had received a PIP letter because the company
wanted to humiliate him in an effort to coerce him to retire or
resign. Brown became very upset after meeting with Rose on January
22 because he believed he was incapable of correcting the problems
in his department without additional resources which Bunge failed
to provide. The next day, Brown gave Rose a letter announcing his
retirement. Rose told Brown that the PIP letter was not designed
to lead to Brown’s retirement and that he was willing to help Brown
become a more effective manager. Despite Rose’s assurances, Brown
requested permission to take a four week vacation and reiterated
his decision to retire. Rose granted Brown’s leave request and
began to process his written request to retire.
Brown went into a deep depression during his four week
vacation which required psychological therapy. When the vacation
ended, Brown was unable to return to work given his emotional
condition. Brown’s psychologist notified Rose that Brown was
suffering from major depression which rendered him unable to work
so Bunge placed Brown on paid disability leave. Brown’s extended
absence left the shipping and receiving department without a
superintendent from January 27, 1997 to April 1, 1997. Bunge
management decided that the department needed a superintendent so
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Rose appointed Joe Branch as temporary superintendent in April
1997. Branch was named permanent superintendent of the shipping
and receiving department in June 1997; Rose said he made this
appointment since he did not know if Brown would be able to return
to work. According to Brown, Rose knew he was going to return to
work when Branch became the permanent superintendent. Bunge had a
policy of terminating any employee who was unable to work after 26
weeks of disability during any 52 week period. Brown’s 26 week
period was scheduled to expire on September 5, 1997; if he did not
return to work by that date, he would be forced to either retire or
face termination. Brown’s wife stated that she informed a Bunge
manager that Brown was going to return to work by September 5. She
asserts that this conversation took place before Rose appointed
Branch as permanent superintendent.
Brown was 55 years old in 1997. Branch, who replaced him as
superintendent of the shipping and receiving department, was 41
years old at the time of his appointment. After Branch was named
permanent superintendent, Brown filed an age discrimination charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Brown
returned to work on Friday, September 5 and was given the job of a
supervisor in the processing department under the direction of
Blades. According to Bunge managers, they thought Brown might be
overwhelmed by the responsibilities and stress associated with
managing a department so they selected a less taxing position.
Brown’s new position involved a reduction in responsibilities but
not in salary or benefits.
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On the morning of September 5, shortly after Brown returned to
work following an eight month absence, he had a meeting with Rose.
Rose informed him that he was still subject to the terms of the PIP
letter he had received in January 1997, which would be revised to
reflect his new duties in the processing department. Brown
completed his assignments that day but had difficulty eating and
sleeping that weekend. Brown was unable to return to work on
Monday, September 8 because the symptoms associated with his
depression returned. Brown believed he suffered a relapse as a
result of his meeting with Rose which was designed to intimidate
him into retiring. Following a three week absence, Brown notified
Bunge in writing that he was retiring on September 29, 1997.
In November 1997, Brown filed an additional charge with the
EEOC alleging that Bunge and Rose retaliated against him when he
returned to work on September 5. Brown sued Bunge and Rose and the
district court granted Bunge’s motion for summary judgment. After
the district court entered a final judgment, Brown appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.
See Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 725 (5th Cir.
1995). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Questions of fact are viewed in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant while questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
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Title VII prohibits an employer from failing or refusing to
hire or discharge an individual “because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1). The ADEA proscribes similar treatment on the basis of
age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The same evidentiary procedure for
allocating burdens of production and proof applies to
discrimination claims under both statutes. See Meinecke v. H & R
Block, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Initially, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct.
1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To establish this prima facie
case, the plaintiff must prove that he is a member of a protected
class, he was qualified for the position that he held, he was
discharged, and after his discharge was replaced with a person who
is not a member of the protected class. Meinecke, 66 F.3d at 83
(citation omitted). The first three elements of a prima facie case
of age discrimination under the AEDA and discrimination under Title
VII are identical. See Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d
955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993). For the fourth element in an age
discrimination case, the plaintiff must show that “he was either i)
replaced by someone outside the protected class, ii) replaced by
someone younger, or iii) otherwise discharged because of his age.”
Id.
Establishing a prima facie case creates a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. See St.
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 525, 113 S.Ct. 2742,
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125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981);
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc). This presumption places on the defendant the burden of
producing evidence that the challenged employment action was taken
for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at
507, 113 S. Ct. 2742; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S. Ct. 1089;
Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 992-93. The defendant must clearly set forth,
through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its
actions which, “if believed by the trier of fact,” would support a
finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the
employment action. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S. Ct. 2742;
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S. Ct. 1089; Rhodes, 75 F.3d at
993.
If the defendant succeeds in carrying its burden of
production, the presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing
the defendant to come forward with some response, simply drops out
of the picture, and the trier of fact proceeds to decide the
ultimate question of whether the plaintiff has proved that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against him. See Hicks, 509
U.S. at 511, 113 S. Ct. 2742; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S. Ct.
1089; Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993. The plaintiff now must have “‘the
full and fair opportunity to demonstrate,’ through presentation of
his own case and through cross-examination of the defendant’s
witnesses, ‘that the proffered reason was not the true reason for
the employment decision’”, and that unlawful discrimination was.
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Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (quoting Burdine, 450
U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct. 1089); see Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993.
Bunge argues that Brown did not establish his prima facie case
of age discrimination because neither Bunge nor Rose discharged
Brown. Brown submitted a letter of resignation in January 1997
after meeting with Rose to discuss some deficiencies in his
performance. Although Rose attempted to assure Brown that the
company did not want him to resign, Brown refused to withdraw his
resignation. Following an eight month leave of absence, Brown
returned to work for one day before taking three additional weeks
of leave and announcing his retirement for a second time. We agree
with Bunge that Brown did not meet the elements of his prima facie
case because he was not discharged by the company.
Although Brown was unable to prove that Bunge fired him, the
fact that he resigned does not end our analysis. When an employee
resigns, he may satisfy the discharge requirement by proving
constructive discharge. See Barrow v. New Orleans Steamship Ass’n,
10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994). To prove constructive discharge:
an employee must offer evidence that the employer made
the employee’s working conditions so intolerable that a
reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign.
Stated more simply, [Brown’s] resignation must have been
reasonable under all the circumstances. Whether a
reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign
depends on the facts of each case, but we consider the
following factors relevant, singly or in combination: (1)
demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job
responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading
work; (5) reassignment to work under a younger
supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by
the employer calculated to encourage the employee’s
resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement [or
continued employment on terms less favorable than the
employee’s former status] . . . .
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Id.
According to Barrow, the constructive discharge factors are
considered “singly or in combination.” Brown clearly proved two of
the constructive discharge factors: when he returned to work as a
supervisor in the processing department, this represented a
demotion and involved fewer job responsibilities than serving as
superintendent of a department. On the other hand, four of the
constructive discharge factors were not present. Brown did not
experience a reduction in salary or benefits in his new position.
Brown’s reassignment did not involve menial or degrading work; he
still supervised staff although fewer people reported to him.
Although Brown was assigned to work under a younger supervisor,
this factor lacks any substantial weight under the particular
circumstances of this case. In his new position, Brown was
supervised by Blades, who was three years younger than him. Blades
was essentially Brown’s peer given that he was 52 years old and he
was also a personal friend of Brown. Because Brown was not forced
to report to a much younger supervisor but to a peer and friend of
longstanding, this factor was not significant in affecting Brown’s
working conditions. Cf. Guthrie v. Tifco Industries, 941 F.2d 374,
377 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 908 (1992) (stating
employee proved prima facie case by showing constructive discharge
where he was demoted, his salary was cut and he was reassigned to
work for a man 17 years younger whom he had helped train).
Brown argues that because of Rose’s harassment he was forced
to choose between alternatives that were both less favorable than
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his former status. Brown contends that Rose met with him the day
he returned from an extended leave of absence in order to harass
him into resigning. Although the timing of Rose’s actions may have
been insensitive, there is no objective evidence that Rose intended
to badger, harass or humiliate Brown. The original PIP letter
noted problems with Brown’s ability to supervise his subordinates.
Since his new position involved supervising several employees, Rose
reminded Brown that the problems noted in January 1997 would still
need to be corrected, as modified by the demands of his new
position. The evidence of record does not support a reasonable
inference that the discussion between Rose and Brown constituted
harassment or humiliation. After considering the record, briefs
and the parties’ oral arguments, we cannot conclude that Brown’s
working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee
would have felt compelled to resign.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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