In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
C ATHLEEN S CHANDELMEIER-B ARTELS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Cross-Appellee,
v.
C HICAGO P ARK D ISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee,
Cross-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 07 C 00922—David H. Coar, Judge.
A RGUED M AY 28, 2010—D ECIDED F EBRUARY 8, 2011
Before M ANION, W ILLIAMS, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
H AMILTON, Circuit Judge. While employed by the
Chicago Park District, Cathleen Schandelmeier, a Cauca-
sian, reported to her immediate supervisor that she had
witnessed a possible incident of child abuse against an
African-American child by his African-American aunt.
2 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
Schandelmeier’s African-American supervisor exploded
in a racial tirade, and Schandelmeier was fired from
the Park District within hours. A jury heard this evi-
dence and ruled in favor of Schandelmeier on her claim
of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, awarding her $200,000 in compensatory
damages. The Park District moved for judgment as a
matter of law and, alternatively, for a new trial. The
district court ruled in favor of the Park District on its
motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that the
supervisor’s demonstrated racial bias could not have
infected the Park District’s termination decision, and
that the jury’s finding otherwise was therefore unrea-
sonable. Schandelmeier appeals, and the Park District
cross-appeals from the district court’s conditional denial
of its motion for a new trial.1
We reverse the district court’s grant of the Park
District’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and
reinstate the jury verdict for the plaintiff as to liability. We
affirm in part and remand in part the district court’s
conditional denial of the Park District’s motion for a
1
Technically, the Park District’s cross-appeal is unnecessary.
See Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(1) (“The
party in whose favor judgment n.o.v. was entered below may,
as appellee, besides seeking to uphold that judgment, also
urge on the appellate court that the trial court committed error
in conditionally denying the new trial. The appellee may
assert this error in his brief, without taking a cross-appeal.”).
Although the Park District’s chosen vehicle is unnecessary, it
has properly presented the issues that we address on the merits.
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 3
new trial, affirming with regard to the jury instructions
and the improper statements made during plaintiff’s
counsel’s closing argument, but we remand with instruc-
tions to enter a judgment for a reduced amount of com-
pensatory damages.
I. The Rule 50 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allows a district court to enter judgment against a party
who has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial
if “a reasonable jury would not have a legally suf-
ficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that
issue.” The stringent standard for a judgment as a
matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50
is the same whether the verdict under review was
for the plaintiff or the defendant, and regardless of the
underlying legal issues of the case. Under Rule 50, both
the district court and an appellate court must construe
the facts strictly in favor of the party that prevailed at
trial. See Tart v. Illinois Power Co., 366 F.3d 461, 464 (7th
Cir. 2004), citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). Although the court ex-
amines the evidence to determine whether the jury’s
verdict was based on that evidence, the court does not
make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.
See Waite v. Board of Trustees of Illinois Community College
Dist. No. 508, 408 F.3d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 2005), citing
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150.
4 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
A. The J.J. Incident and Schandelmeier’s Termination
Schandelmeier began working for the Chicago Park
District on April 23, 2006 as Cultural Coordinator for
the South Shore Cultural Center. Her immediate super-
visor was Andrea Adams, who worked as the facility’s
Center Director. Adams, in turn, reported to Alonzo
Williams, who was responsible for the daily manage-
ment of the Park District programs for the South
Lakefront Region. Williams reported to Megan
McDonald, who was Director of Lakefront Operations
for the Park District. Mary Ann Rowland was human
resources manager for the Lakefront region. Adams and
Williams are African-American, and McDonald and
Rowland are Caucasian.
Schandelmeier was responsible for supervising the
Cultural Center’s after-school program and its summer
camp. Her job duties included creating and adhering to
a program schedule, following program rotations, docu-
menting all “incidents” involving children, and super-
vising children and staff. At trial, the Park District took
pains to prove to the jury that Schandelmeier was far
from a perfect employee. She struggled with some
of the administrative tasks required in her job, and
Adams documented those issues in several memos to
Schandelmeier. Those memos and other examples of
Schandelmeier’s administrative failings were presented
to the jury. But Schandelmeier did not claim to be a
perfect employee, and perfection is not a requirement
for protection under Title VII.
Viewing the evidence through the Rule 50 lens, in the
light most favorable to Schandelmeier, the pivotal event
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 5
in her employment occurred on July 31, 2006, the day
before her termination. An African-American child, “J.J.,”
was suspended from summer camp for misbehavior,
and his aunt came to pick him up. While J.J. and his
aunt were in a different room, Schandelmeier heard the
sound of flesh being struck and a child screaming. She
followed the sounds and saw J.J.’s aunt kneeling over
him with her arm raised above her head, a belt looped in
her hand. J.J. had a welt on his arm and was crying.
Schandelmeier told J.J.’s aunt to stop, and the aunt left
the Cultural Center with J.J. in tow.
Schandelmeier reported what she had seen and heard
to Adams. Adams explained the J.J. incident as “a
cultural thing,” because “this is the way we discipline
children in our culture.” (Schandelmeier assumed, rea-
sonably, that Adams intended to refer to African-
American culture.) Adams also told her that, before
Hillary Rodham Clinton wrote the book, It Takes a
Village, “that was the philosophy that her culture had
abided by.” Adams then explained to Schandelmeier
that she (Adams) had the “unspoken permission” of the
parents of the African-American junior counselors at
camp “to grab them and put them back into line.” 2
2
When Adams testified at trial, she denied referring to Mrs.
Clinton’s book and stated that although she had asserted
her ability to discipline the junior camp counselors in any way,
she had made that statement on a different occasion. The jury
was entitled to disbelieve Adams’s testimony. On review
under Rule 50, we must construe the evidence in Schandel-
(continued...)
6 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
Schandelmeier asked what she should do. Adams told
her that under Illinois law, if she believed she had ob-
served child abuse, she was obligated to report it to the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services. But,
Adams said, because she had not seen what Schandel-
meier saw, Adams would leave the decision to
report or not to report to Schandelmeier. That night,
Schandelmeier made her decision. She called DCFS
and was advised that she also had to call the police
within 24 hours of the incident so they could conduct a
“well child check.” The next morning Schandelmeier
called the police and requested such a check.
At approximately 11:15 a.m. on August 1st, Adams called
Schandelmeier into her office. J.J.’s aunt was in the room.
Adams confronted Schandelmeier, saying, “You sent the
police to this woman’s house?” When Schandelmeier
tried to explain, and Adams learned that Schandelmeier
had not seen the aunt’s belt connect with J.J.’s flesh,
Adams screamed and “went ballistic.” She said, “you
didn’t see the impact of the belt? You saw nothing!” By
way of illustration, Adams told Schandelmeier that she
had once tried to hit her daughter with a belt but hit
the wall instead, and her daughter still screamed. She
reiterated that “this is the way we discipline children
in our culture,” and she told Schandelmeier that it was
a cultural difference that Schandelmeier did not under-
2
(...continued)
meier’s favor and rely on her testimony about what was said
at the time of the incident.
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 7
stand. Adams then demanded, “who [was Schandelmeier]
to try to tell this woman how to raise her child?”
Schandelmeier responded that she had friends who
were black and who did not beat their children. Adams
countered, “[Y]our friends who are black tell you that
they don’t beat their children and then they go home
and beat their children.” She then ordered Schandelmeier
to leave her office, saying “I can’t stand the sight of
you, Cathleen.” Schandelmeier testified that she had
never been yelled at like that in her adult life, and that
Adams was “violently angry” and “spitting mad” during
this exchange.
Adams then put fingers to keyboard and wrote a
memo to McDonald, copying Williams. The memo was
dated August 1st and its subject was “Cathleen
Schandelmeier.” It began with the sentence: “Per our
conversation, Cathleen has no order over camp.” Adams
then recounted certain events to demonstrate Schandel-
meier’s poor performance. She accused Schandelmeier
of failing to properly supervise children at camp (i.e.,
she was “not watching the group”) and described an
instance in which Schandelmeier had failed to report an
emergency to Cultural Center security so they could
direct first responders to the scene. Adams wrote that
Schandelmeier had had to rewrite incident reports
because her originals were not thorough or did not
make sense, or because necessary information was
either omitted or scratched out. Adams recounted that
under Schandelmeier’s watch, the camp’s food program
had received write-ups, and she accused Schandelmeier
of being difficult to locate when Adams needed her.
8 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
Finally, Adams recounted the “J.J. incident,” calling it
“the last straw,” but leaving out any reference to the
racial tirade described by Schandelmeier:
Yesterday and today was the last straw. . . . A child
had several write-ups. He has been suspended and
we agreed upon being expelled from camp. She
called and spoke to the mother. The aunt came to
pick him up. The aunt was upset about her nephew’s
behavior but in control. She took the child to another
room and apparently gave the child a spanking.
Cathleen saw the belt and heard the child crying.
Cathleen reported to me that she saw the aunt “abus-
ing” the child and the child had bruises on his
arm. Hollee spoke with Cathleen about how some
families believe in spankings. After extensive con-
versation with Hollee, Cathleen spoke to me. She
stated that she is mandated to report abuse and that
she must report it. I told her that yes, we are man-
dated. Since I did not see the incident, she is in a
better position to know whether or not it should be
reported.
Based on my conversation with Cathleen, I trusted
that being expelled was the best corrective action. As
it turns out, of eight conduct reports, only half had
ever been discussed with the parent. Cathleen men-
tioned this to me after the fact. The day was long so
I suggested we review everything the next day (Tues-
day).
The aunt came in today (Tuesday) to speak with me.
She stated that the police [came] to her home. They
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 9
checked out the living environment and examined
the child. They found no signs of any abuse. They
found a well and happy child. I asked Cathleen to sit
with us and talk (she did not remember meeting the
aunt the day before). Bottomline, Cathleen admitted
that she did not see the aunt strike the child. Cathleen
made assumptions that this child was being abused
simply based on the loud screams.
It is difficult working with someone that does not
follow instructions and continuously follows their
own directive. The reputation of this camp is now
being questioned by both parents and staff. We had
a parent state that she waited for two years to get
her child in and [is] disappointed at the operation
of camp. Something has to give.
The same day, human resources director Rowland
drafted Schandelmeier’s termination letter. Williams and
Adams delivered the letter at 6:00 p.m. on August 1st,
ending Schandelmeier’s employment immediately.
B. The “Cat’s Paw” Theory
To prevail on her Title VII claim, Schandelmeier had
to prove that she was terminated because of her race.
Specifically, she had to “provide direct or circumstantial
evidence that the decisionmaker has acted for a pro-
hibited reason. A decisionmaker is the person ‘responsible
for the contested decision.’ ” Rogers v. City of Chicago,
320 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original),
quoting Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group, Inc., 129 F.3d 391,
10 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
396 (7th Cir. 1997). The evidence clearly supports the
conclusion that Adams, Schandelmeier’s immediate
supervisor, harbored an illegal racial animus, but
Adams was not the person who pulled the trigger to end
Schandelmeier’s employment. The person who did—
either McDonald or Rowland (the evidence is incon-
sistent on that point)—did not harbor a racial animus
against her. Schandelmeier therefore had to demonstrate
some causal connection between Adams’s bias and Mc-
Donald’s or Rowland’s decision to terminate her em-
ployment. She had to bridge that gap.
The existence of such a link between an employment
decision made by an unbiased individual and the imper-
missible bias of a non-decisionmaking co-worker has
become known in this circuit as the “cat’s paw” theory.
The name is based on an old fable in which a scheming
monkey convinces an unwitting cat to fetch roasting
chestnuts from a fire. The cat burns its paw and the
monkey gets the chestnuts.3 In employment discrimina-
tion cases, the “cat’s paw” is the unwitting manager or
supervisor who is persuaded to act based on an-
other’s illegal bias. With sufficient evidence, we permit
juries to draw an inference that another employee’s
impermissible bias infected a decision when a plaintiff
is able to show that the biased employee had some
degree of influence over the ultimate decision. Deciding
the degree of influence required to permit that infer-
ence, however, is not so simple.
3
“The Monkey and the Cat” by Jean de La Fontaine (1621-1695).
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 11
Recent cases from this circuit suggest that liability for
an employment decision may be imputed to the
employer only if a biased employee had a “singular
influence” over the ultimate decisionmaker. See, e.g.,
Martino v. MCI Communications Services, Inc., 574 F.3d 447,
452-53 (7th Cir. 2009) (biased comments of non-deci-
sionmaker relevant only if he had “singular influence”
over decisionmaker); Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647,
656-57 (7th Cir. 2009) (employer not liable “based on a
nondecisionmaker’s animus unless the ‘decisionmaker’
herself held that title only nominally”; evidence of
illegal bias of non-decisionmakers should be excluded
from trial without showing that biased employees
exerted “singular influence” over decisionmaker), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010); Metzger v. Illinois State
Police, 519 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 2008) (employee’s re-
taliation claim could not survive summary judgment
where employee did not come forth with evidence
that biased non-decisionmaker’s comments actually
influenced decisionmaker, much less were the “singular
influence” that cat’s paw theory requires); Brewer v.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 479 F.3d 908, 917 (7th
Cir. 2007) (actions of biased employee can be imputed
to the employer under Title VII where biased employee
without formal authority to materially alter terms and
conditions of plaintiff’s employment uses “singular
influence” over decisionmaker by supplying misinfor-
mation or failing to supply relevant information, and
plaintiff is harmed); Rozskowiak v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 415 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2005) (no evidence
that police commander who was a member of the com-
12 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
mand staff that recommended to terminate plaintiff
had “singular influence” over the command staff’s deci-
sion); Lucas v. Chicago Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 730-31
(7th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment for em-
ployer where the statement given by employee alleged
to harbor racial animus was only one element of a com-
prehensive investigation into incident that was cause
of plaintiff’s discipline). It was under this high “singular
influence” standard that the district court granted the
Park District’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
The court found that the decision to terminate Schandel-
meier was not “controlled” by, “singularly influenced”
by, or made in “blind reliance” on Adams’s bias. See
Schandelmeier v. Chicago Park Dist., 2009 WL 2916858,
at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2009), citing Martino, 574 F.3d at
452-53, Staub, 560 F.3d at 655-59, and Brewer, 479 F.3d
at 916-20.4
Other cases from this court indicate that a lesser degree
of influence is sufficient to impute liability to the
employer for a non-decisionmaker’s bias. See, e.g., Lust
v. Sealy, 383 F.3d 580, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that “cat’s paw” theory of liability is not intended to
be taken literally and it is enough to show that non-
4
Conflicting evidence was presented at trial as to whether
McDonald or Rowland made the ultimate decision to
terminate Schandelmeier. There is no way to know how the
jury resolved that question, although both the parties and the
trial court seemed to assume that McDonald was the
decisionmaker. As explained below the correct identity of
the decisionmaker is not decisive either way.
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 13
decisionmaker’s bias was a cause of employment deci-
sion); Maarouf v. Walker Mfg. Co., 210 F.3d 750, 754 (7th
Cir. 2000) (summary judgment for defendant upheld
where plaintiff was unable to show that perception
of his poor work performance was based upon biased
supervisor’s input because performance was also inde-
pendently noted by other supervisors); Hoffman v. MCA,
Inc., 144 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (7th Cir. 1998) (liability
can be imputed where non-decisionmaker’s bias
“tainted the decision maker’s judgment”); Wallace v. SMC
Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1400 (7th Cir. 1997) (“the
prejudices of an employee, normally a subordinate but
here a coequal, are imputed to the employee who has
formal authority over the plaintiff’s job . . . where the
subordinate, by concealing relevant information from
the decisionmaking employee or feeding false informa-
tion to him, is able to influence the decision”); Willis
v. Marion County Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th
Cir. 1997) (judgment for defendant as a matter of law
affirmed where plaintiff did not present evidence that
the biased employees were “able to manipulate the
decisionmaking process and to influence the decision”);
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404-05 (7th Cir. 1990)
(if review committee unaware of manager’s age-based
animus acted “as the conduit of [manager’s] prejudice—
his cat’s paw—the innocence of its members would not
spare the company from liability”).
The statutory language of Title VII and the standard jury
instructions in this circuit weigh against too stringent a
standard of proof for the cat’s paw theory. Title VII is
14 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
written in terms of what the employer is prohibited from
doing: it is unlawful “for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The focus is on the em-
ployer entity as a whole, not on individual managers or
supervisors, who are not individually liable for an em-
ployer’s violations of federal discrimination statutes.
See, e.g., Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 553-54 (7th Cir.
1995). The statute is also written broadly in terms of
cause: “because of such individual’s race.” This circuit’s
pattern jury instructions in employment discrimination
cases focus on causation. They leave plenty of room for
counsel to argue a “cat’s paw” theory as a question of
fact. The district judge gave the appropriate standard
instruction here: “To determine that Ms. Schandelmeier-
Bartels was terminated because of her race, you must
decide that the Park District would not have terminated
Ms. Schandelmeier-Bartels had she been non-Caucasian
but everything else about Ms. Schandelmeier-Bartels
had been the same.” See Seventh Circuit Pattern Civil
Jury Instructions No. 3.01; see also Achor v. Riverside Golf
Club, 117 F.3d 339, 340-41 (7th Cir. 1997); Gehring v. Case
Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 1994). It is not necessary
to instruct the jury about the intricacies of various doc-
trines the courts have developed for digesting summary
judgment motions in employment discrimination
cases. The court may and should simply ask the jury the
counter-factual question, and the parties may argue
whether, for example, the plaintiff’s race made the
critical difference, regardless of which of the employer’s
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 15
agents made or influenced the decision, or exactly
how they did so.
C. Applying the Cat’s Paw Theory
The Supreme Court has not yet resolved the circum-
stances under which an employer may be held liable
based on the discriminatory intent of employees who
influence but do not actually make the ultimate employ-
ment decision. See Ricci v. DeStefano, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct.
2658, 2688-89 (2009) (Alito, J. concurring). However, the
Court has granted certiorari and heard argument in Staub,
see 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010), and may soon offer guidance
on the issue. In the meantime, we need not decide in this
case whether the influence must be “singular” or whether
a less demanding causation standard is sufficient.
Here, interpreting the conflicting evidence in favor of
the plaintiff, the jury could reasonably conclude that
when the decision was made to fire Schandelmeier,
only Adams’s biased voice mattered. Whether it was
McDonald or Rowland who made the nominal decision
to fire Schandelmeier, there was sufficient evidence at
trial from which the jury could have concluded that
Adams had the decisive input in the decision. The jury
could conclude that any “investigation” conducted by
McDonald or Rowland was irrelevant because Adams
was the sole source of nearly all the pertinent informa-
tion. Because a reasonable jury could have found that
Adams’s influence over the termination decision was
singular, we must reverse the grant of judgment as a
matter of law.
16 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
1. McDonald as Decisionmaker
McDonald, who was three supervisory levels removed
from Schandelmeier, testified that she had very little
contact with Schandelmeier during her employment.
She did not personally observe Schandelmeier’s job
performance, and McDonald’s office was located off-site.
In evaluating Schandelmeier’s performance, she relied
entirely on information from others, including their oral
descriptions of Schandelmeier’s performance and docu-
ments such as samples of her improperly completed
incident reports.
According to the employer’s version of events, about
a week before the J.J. incident, McDonald, Rowland,
Williams and Adams met in McDonald’s office to
discuss Schandelmeier’s possible termination. No
formal decision was made in that discussion, although
McDonald testified that Adams “certainly” had input,
and that the decision ultimately was a “joint” decision.
Even though it was a “joint” decision and the group
did not reach a consensus, McDonald testified, she
had decided by July 24th that Schandelmeier should
be terminated. On that day, McDonald sent the fol-
lowing e-mail to Rowland under the subject line “CAM
request,” short for “Corrective Action Meeting request”:
Cathleen Schandelmeier has had several ongoing
problems at South Shore in the past few weeks that
are pretty serious. Andrea [Adams] and Alonzo
[Williams] have both had several conversations with
her about the various issues. Things are not working
out with her—and I know she is still within her proba-
tionary period. Andrea has already put together a
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 17
memo regarding the issues and struggles, and I believe
that you also have a copy.
Because she is non union, and because she is still
within her probationary period—do we have to even
schedule a CAM, or can we release her from her
duties?
If we need to schedule a CAM, please do that as soon
as possible. If we don’t—can you please check with
Beka and confirm that we are able to release her?
No responsive e-mail from Rowland was introduced
into evidence. McDonald also testified that she informed
both Williams and Adams of her decision to terminate
Schandelmeier sometime between July 24th and
August 1st.
If McDonald really was the decisionmaker, and if her
decision was already made on July 24th, it would be
more difficult to conclude that Adams’s exhibition of
racism on July 31st tainted McDonald’s already-made
decision to fire Schandelmeier. The most basic problem
for the Park District is that the evidence does not point
consistently in that direction. McDonald herself de-
scribed the decision as a “joint” one (and one in which
Adams “certainly” had input), but the supervisory
group had not reached a “joint” decision about
Schandelmeier’s employment as of July 24th. Both Wil-
liams and Adams testified that they had no idea
that Schandelmeier would be terminated until she was
actually terminated on August 1st. If McDonald had
actually reached a decision before then—especially the
“joint” decision she described in her testimony—the jury
18 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
could reasonably infer that she would have informed
Schandelmeier’s direct supervisors—Williams and Adams,
who supposedly participated in the “joint” decision—of
her decision. Also, the language McDonald used in her
“CAM request” e-mail is not absolute and does not
state that any decision—hers or anyone else’s—had been
made. The jury could have reasonably read McDonald’s
message as only a request for information in case a deci-
sion was made to terminate Schandelmeier. The jury
had reasonable grounds for discounting McDonald’s
testimony that her mind was made up on July 24th and
that her mind was the only one that counted.
The Park District also attempted to show that
McDonald did not know about the J.J. incident until
after Schandelmeier’s termination. McDonald testified
that she had no knowledge of the J.J. incident until after
August 1st, and Adams testified that she did not
discuss the J.J. incident with anyone on July 31st. But the
jury also had Adams’s “last straw memo,” drafted on
August 1st and addressed to McDonald, which began
with the words “per our conversation.” Here again, the
jury had sufficient evidence from which it could have
concluded that, contrary to her testimony, McDonald
knew about the J.J. incident before she decided to fire
Schandelmeier, and that Adams had decisive influence
over that decision.
2. Rowland as Decisionmaker
During her deposition, Rowland testified that she
fired Schandelmeier, that no one else fired Schandel-
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 19
meier, and that no one else recommended to her that
Schandelmeier be fired. At trial, however, Rowland
testified that McDonald had recommended that Schan-
delmeier be fired, although Rowland did not know
what information McDonald considered or why she
recommended termination. Rowland also testified at
trial that she fired Schandelmeier because, two or three
weeks before August 1st, she had witnessed Schandel-
meier not interacting with day-campers. She testified that
Schandelmeier had failed to prepare camp schedules
and that parents were complaining. When pressed,
though, Rowland admitted that no parent had actually
spoken to her or complained about the availability of
camp schedules. Nevertheless, Rowland claimed she
drafted Schandelmeier’s termination letter on August 1st
as soon as she arrived in the office because “this was an
important thing that needed to get done that morning,
so that was the first thing that I did when I got into my
office.” As in McDonald’s version, Rowland testified
that she acted without knowledge of the J.J. incident or
Adams’s “last straw” memo.
But Rowland also was confronted by—and the jury
heard—her earlier deposition testimony in which she
stated that she discussed the J.J. incident with Williams
on the morning of August 1st. Also, Adams testified that
she was certain that she had called and spoken to
Rowland on July 31st. The jury was not obligated to
believe Rowland’s explanation for why she decided to
fire Schandelmeier, or even that she was the decision-
maker at all, let alone that the timing was innocently
coincidental. To the contrary, given all of the conflicts
20 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
in the evidence, including the conflicts between the
different defense witnesses’ testimony, the jury heard
sufficient evidence to have concluded that it was more
likely than not that Rowland knew of the J.J. incident
when she drafted the termination letter, and that Adams
had a decisive influence on the termination decision.
Regardless of whether McDonald or Rowland was the
actual decisionmaker, the parties’ briefs have focused on
pinpointing the details of who, what, and when about
the J.J. incident, as though all discriminatory bias in
this case stems from that one event. The jury, however,
was not required to see it that way. The J.J. incident
provided strong evidence of Adams’s racial bias, but the
jury was not required to assume that Adams’s bias
affected her only at that specific time with respect to
that single incident. Nor was the jury required to
assume that the termination decision could have been
tainted by Adams’s influence—singular or not—only if
the decision could be connected to that one incident.
Under the cat’s paw theory, the appropriate inquiry is
whether the biased Adams had influence over the deci-
sion to terminate Schandelmeier, and, if so, how much
influence she had, without limiting the inquiry to
the single incident where that bias was displayed so
flagrantly.
3. Lack of an Independent Investigation
Under any formulation of the cat’s paw standard, the
chain of causation can be broken if the unbiased
decisionmaker conducts a meaningful and independent
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 21
investigation of the information being supplied by the
biased employee. See, e.g., Martino, 574 F.3d at 453
(decisionmaker’s independent investigation defeated
effort to rely on cat’s paw theory); Willis v. Marion County
Auditor’s Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547-48 (7th Cir. 1997) (same).
Here, however, Schandelmeier presented ample evi-
dence from which the jury could have concluded that,
whether the decisionmaker was McDonald or Rowland,
the Park District’s “investigation” into Schandelmeier’s
job performance was not independent of Adams’s in-
put. The jury could find that, in fact, the supposed in-
vestigation was based almost entirely on Adams’s input.
McDonald testified that she did not personally ob-
serve Schandelmeier’s performance and that she relied
entirely on information she got from other people. She
never saw the food service write-ups.5 Prior to drafting
her July 24th “CAM request” e-mail, she discussed
Schandelmeier’s performance with Adams, Williams, and
Rowland, and her e-mail referred to Adams’s memo.
This was the full extent of McDonald’s “investigation.”
Williams testified that he observed some issues with
Schandelmeier’s employment, but neither he nor McDon-
ald testified as to what Williams may or may not have
conveyed about Schandelmeier’s performance to McDon-
ald. His testimony was specific, however, that he never
5
McDonald testified that she spoke with the chief adminis-
trator of food services in early July about problems with food
service at the lakefront parks. There was no testimony that
this discussion focused specifically on Schandelmeier’s perfor-
mance.
22 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
recommended that Schandelmeier be fired. Adams, on
the other hand, papered Schandelmeier’s file with per-
formance-related memos, in particular the August 1st
“last straw” memo. McDonald did not attempt to
observe Schandelmeier’s work performance herself, nor
did she attempt to speak to Schandelmeier about her
performance issues. The jury could easily conclude from
this evidence that the only meaningful information Mc-
Donald acquired in her “investigation” came from
Adams, the racially biased source.
Even if the jury concluded that Rowland was the
decisionmaker instead of McDonald, that additional
layer of supervision did not improve the quality of the
investigation into Schandelmeier’s job performance.
Rowland’s “investigation” was even less thorough
and independent than McDonald’s. She testified at trial
that her termination decision was based on input
she received from McDonald—whose own opinion, as
noted, was based almost entirely on information
garnered from Adams. Rowland testified, too, that two
or three weeks before Schandelmeier’s termination, she
had witnessed Schandelmeier not interacting with day-
campers, and that parents were complaining because
Schandelmeier had not prepared a schedule for camp.
Rowland was the human resources manager, however,
and the jury was entitled to find that her statements
regarding Schandelmeier’s performance were not
entirely credible, particularly after she admitted that
no parents actually complained to her about the missing
camp schedules. Rowland did not testify that she
sought additional input from Williams, Schandelmeier
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 23
herself, or even Adams. This evidence, again, does not
diminish the pervasive influence of Adams and her
bias. Keeping in mind the Rule 50 standard, we find
sufficient evidence in the record to support the con-
clusion that the decisive influence on the decision was
Adams’s bias, regardless of whether McDonald or
Rowland was the formal decisionmaker.
By way of illustration, compare this evidence to the
lack of similar evidence in Willis v. Marion County
Auditor’s Office, in which judgment as a matter of law
in favor of an employer was affirmed. Willis was a re-
taliatory discharge case. No evidence was presented
from which the jury could have concluded that the
decisionmaker harbored an impermissible racial or re-
taliatory bias against the plaintiff. Willis, 118 F.3d at 546.
But evidence was presented to suggest that two non-
decisionmakers did. Despite a jury verdict for the plain-
tiff, judgment as a matter of law for the defense was
upheld because it was shown that, rather than accepting
the biased supervisors’ word regarding the plaintiff’s
performance problems, the actual decisionmaker per-
mitted the plaintiff to explain her deficiencies, which
she was unable to do. The decisionmaker also aired the
plaintiff’s suspicions that she was being targeted for
impermissible reasons and permitted the plaintiff to try
(unsuccessfully) to substantiate her claim. Also, the
decisionmaker’s termination decision was based ulti-
mately on the plaintiff’s undisputed violations of objec-
tive performance standards. See id. at 547-48. Because of
these factors, we agreed with the district court that the
causal chain had been broken in Willis as a matter of law.
24 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
Similar factors are not present here, at least beyond
reasonable factual dispute, so the jury could find that the
causal chain remained intact. Schandelmeier’s race dis-
crimination case survived summary judgment because
the district court found that disputed issues of material
fact existed as to whether the decision to terminate
Schandelmeier was made before or after Adams sent
the August 1st “last straw” memo, among other things.
The court found that if that fact were resolved in
Schandelmeier’s favor at trial, “a jury could believe
that Adams objected to Plaintiff in her employment
capacity because of her race and perceived inability to
understand allegedly African-American social mores,
leading her to write the August 1 memorandum that
may have caused Plaintiff to be fired later that same
day,” and that even if McDonald were the sole deci-
sionmaker, Adams’s “prejudices could be imputed to
McDonald if it can be shown that Adams concealed
relevant information from McDonald or fed false infor-
mation to her in order to influence her decision.” See
Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chicago Park Dist., 2008 WL 4855649,
at *6, n.3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2008), citing Lust, 383 F.3d at 585.
We agree with that analysis. If that evidence had not
materialized at trial, and if Schandelmeier had not intro-
duced other evidence in its place, this court would
be obligated to affirm the grant of the Park District’s
Rule 50 motion. See Filipovich v. K&R Express Systems,
Inc., 391 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 2004). However, Schandel-
meier offered sufficient evidence at trial to connect Ad-
ams’s racial bias to the Park District’s decision to ter-
minate her employment. The district court’s entry of
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 25
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Park District
is reversed, and the jury’s finding of liability is reinstated.
II. The Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial
When the Park District filed its motion for judgment
as a matter of law, it also moved for a new trial on three
separate grounds. The district court conditionally denied
that motion, and the Park District argues that the denial
was erroneous. We review the denial of a motion for a
new trial for abuse of discretion. See Kapelanski v.
Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2004). The issue is not
how the reviewing court would have ruled in the first
instance but whether the district court’s judgment was
a reasonable one under the circumstances. See EEOC v.
Century Broadcasting Corp., 957 F.2d 1446, 1460 (7th Cir.
1992). The district court is in the best position
to evaluate the effects of arguable confusion in jury in-
structions and prejudicial comments during closing
arguments, and we defer to its sound discretion.
E.g., Mayall v. Peabody Coal Co., 7 F.3d 570, 572 (7th Cir.
1993) (affirming denial of new trial).
We consider the three issues raised by the Park District
in the following order. First, we examine the court’s
rejection of the Park District’s proposal to advise the
jury during deliberations to omit the reference to
August 1, 2006 in Jury Instruction 17; second, we con-
sider plaintiff’s counsel’s insinuation in closing argument
that the Park District fabricated the July 24th e-mail;
and third, we address the jury’s $200,000 compensatory
damage award.
26 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
A. Jury Instructions
During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking the
court to clarify an apparent inconsistency between Jury
Instruction 17 and the verdict form. Jury Instruction 17
read:
Ms. Schandelmeier-Bartels claims that on August 1,
2006, she was terminated from her position as
Cultural Program Director for the South Shore
Cultural Center because of her race.
To succeed on this claim against the Chicago Park
District, Ms. Schandelmeier-Bartels must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that she was ter-
minated by the Park District because of her race.
To determine that Ms. Schandelmeier-Bartels was
terminated because of her race, you must decide that
the Park District would not have terminated
Ms. Schandelmeier-Bartels had she been non-Cauca-
sian but everything else about Ms. Schandelmeier-
Bartels had been the same.
If you find that Ms. Schandelmeier-Bartels has
proved this by a preponderance of the evidence, then
you must find for Ms. Schandelmeier-Bartels. How-
ever, if you find that Ms. Schandelmeier-Bartels did
not prove this by a preponderance of the evidence,
then you must find for the Park District.
The verdict form, in contrast, asked only “Did Plaintiff
Cathleen Schandelmeier-Bartels prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that she was terminated by
the Chicago Park District because of her race?” without
referring to a particular date.
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 27
The jury’s note referred to this difference and asked,
“are we considering the date as a factor of the termina-
tion (per jury instruction) or are we taking into consider-
ation the entire span of Miss Schandelmeier’s employ-
ment per written complaint?” (Emphasis in original.) The
Park District asked the court to respond by deleting the
reference to August 1, 2006 from Jury Instruction 17,
arguing that its proposal would correct the arguable
discrepancy between Jury Instruction 8’s mandate to
“consider all of the evidence bearing on the question” and
the jury’s question about the importance of the date of
August 1, 2006. The court rejected the Park District’s
proposal and directed the jury to follow the instructions
as initially given.
The Park District describes the prefatory language in
Jury Instruction 17 referring to Schandelmeier’s termina-
tion date as a “latent ambiguity that confused and misled
the jury to focus exclusively on that date.” Def. Br. 53.
Because of that ambiguity, the Park District argues, the
jury “likely ignored evidence of incidents occurring
on or before August 1, 2006,” such as the earlier docu-
mentation of Schandelmeier’s poor performance. In
support, the Park District points only to the question
submitted by the jury during the deliberations. It argues
that the court’s instruction that the jury “consider all the
evidence” in response to the jury’s question was insuf-
ficient to cure the jury’s supposed confusion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(b)(2) requires the
court to offer the parties an opportunity to object to
instructions before the instructions and arguments are
28 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
delivered, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(c)(2)
specifies that an objection to an instruction is timely if
the objection is delivered within the time frame pro-
vided by Rule 51(b)(2), i.e., before instructions and argu-
ments are delivered. Here, the Park District did not
object until the jury was in the middle of its delibera-
tions, so its objection was not timely.
We have discretion to review instructions for plain
error under Rule 51(d)(2), but there was no plain error
here. Jury Instruction 17 provided August 1st as the
date that Schandelmeier was terminated, a correct state-
ment of the facts of this case. The instruction did not
require the jury to limit its review of the evidence to
that date. Instead, Jury Instruction 8 explicitly directed
the jury to consider all of the evidence in the case. We
assume that the jury followed the instructions as they
were provided. See Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 702
(7th Cir. 2007). Here, whatever confusion might have
remained after the court’s clarification was cured suffi-
ciently by Jury Instruction 8, which told the jury to
“consider all of the evidence bearing on the question [of
whether any fact has been proved] regardless of who
produced it.” The Park District only speculates that the
jury remained confused after the court responded to its
inquiry, but its speculation is not sufficient to support
its motion for a new trial. The district court’s denial of
the Park District’s motion for a new trial on this ground
is affirmed.
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 29
B. Remarks in Closing Argument
In his closing argument, counsel for the plaintiff chal-
lenged the authenticity of McDonald’s July 24th “CAM
request” e-mail. He stated:
Plaintiff’s Counsel: I would suggest to you that they
put that e-mail up there that supposedly got written
by Rowland. 6 And I would suggest to you that you
should think about, not conclude but think about
the possibility that that document didn’t get created
till after Cathleen Schandelmeier got fired.
Defense Counsel: Objection, your honor.
Court: Overruled.
Plaintiff’s Counsel: And I’ll tell you why you should
think about it this way. Because it’s contradicted
by this document. It just doesn’t make any sense that
the last straw about discharge is out there as we’ve
got to like discharge her and fire her and turn right
over this other document two weeks earlier or a
week earlier saying we’ve already decided to fire
her. They can’t have it both ways. And the other
document, let’s face reality. Even if it is a legit docu-
ment, which I strongly suggest to you that it’s not,
they didn’t do anything about it.
The July 24th e-mail was produced to Schandelmeier
during discovery. She did not seek the electronically-
6
The argument mistakenly attributed McDonald’s e-mail to
Mary Ann Rowland.
30 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
stored version of the e-mail. She did not object to the
authenticity of the e-mail during the pretrial conference
or at any other stage in the litigation. At trial, the e-mail
was introduced to the jury as a joint exhibit.
The Park District argues that plaintiff’s counsel “crossed
the line from zealous advocacy to prejudicial error” by
suggesting to the jury that McDonald’s July 24th e-mail
was created after Schandelmeier was fired. Schandel-
meier concedes that she had no evidence to support her
counsel’s insinuation. She consented to the admission of
the e-mail as a joint exhibit, and she did not present
any evidence to refute McDonald’s testimony that she
created and sent the e-mail on July 24, 2006. Instead,
she contends that her counsel was free to question the
legitimacy of the e-mail, even though it was admitted as
a joint exhibit, so long as the argument presented was
based on evidence admitted at trial. Pl. Reply Br. 36,
citing Jones v. Lincoln Electric Co., 188 F.3d 709, 731 (7th
Cir. 1999). Because the parties presented conflicting time-
lines of the decision-making process, Schandelmeier
argues, her counsel’s closing argument was “well within
the bounds.”
Was counsel’s suggestion that the July 24th e-mail had
been fabricated proper? No. Should the Park District’s
objection been sustained? Yes. Although different wit-
nesses told different versions of the decisionmaking
process, none of the witnesses even hinted that the
July 24th e-mail had been fabricated. No evidence put
before the jury supported that inference. A suggestion
that an opposing party—and, by extension, its coun-
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 31
sel—has put forth falsified evidence is very different
from (and much more serious than) a contention
that one witness’s version of events has a better factual
foundation and thus is more likely to be true than
another witness’s version of the same events, or that one
document is inconsistent with another. Contrary to
Schandelmeier’s description of her counsel’s argument,
what the jury heard in closing argument was not
“founded upon and justified by inconsistent testimony
presented by the Park District in connection with the
alleged creation and intent of that e-mail.” Pl. Reply Br. 39.
It was a baseless argument created from whole cloth
by plaintiff’s counsel, regarding an exhibit that plaintiff
had stipulated was authentic and admissible. The argu-
ment was improper, and the Park District’s objection
should have been sustained.
But the inappropriate suggestion that the e-mail
was fabricated did not rise to a level of error that made
it an abuse of discretion to deny the motion for a new
trial. We have stated repeatedly that improper com-
ments during closing argument rarely amount to re-
versible error. E.g., Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 744 (7th
Cir. 2008), citing Miksis v. Howard, 106 F.3d 754, 764 (7th
Cir. 1997). We presume that curative instructions to the
jury mitigate harm that may otherwise result from im-
proper comments during sometimes heated closing
argument. See Soltys, 520 F.3d at 744, citing Jones, 188
F.3d at 732. Here, the jury was instructed that closing
arguments by counsel were not evidence: “The lawyers’
opening statements and closing arguments to you are not
evidence. Their purpose is to discuss the issues and the
32 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
evidence. If the evidence as you remember it differs from
what the lawyers said, your memory is what counts.”
Again, we presume that juries follow the instructions they
are given. See Chlopek, 499 F.3d at 702. There is no indica-
tion that this jury was unwilling or unable to follow the
court’s instruction not to treat closing argument as evi-
dence. Although plaintiff’s counsel’s commentary re-
garding the July 24th e-mail was improper, it was not
so unfairly prejudicial as to require a new trial.
C. The Compensatory Damage Award
Finally, we address the Park District’s motion for a
new trial on the issue of the amount of the jury’s compen-
satory damages award. The Park District contends that
the jury’s award of $200,000 in compensatory damages
was not reasonably related to any injury that Schandel-
meier suffered, so that either the award should be
reduced or the case should be remanded for a new trial
on damages. Evaluating issues as subjective and elusive
as emotional damages is a task we leave in the first in-
stance to the common sense and collective judgment of
juries. We defer to their judgment unless the award is
“monstrously excessive” or unless “there is no rational
connection between the award and the evidence,” and
we also consider whether the award is comparable to
those in similar cases. Marion County Coroner’s Office v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 612 F.3d 924, 930-
31 (7th Cir. 2010); Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d
593, 611 (7th Cir. 2006); Deloughery v. City of Chicago, 422
F.3d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 2005). It may be that the “mon-
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 33
strously excessive” inquiry will be too vague to be of
much use and is simply a different way of asking whether
there is a rational connection between the award and the
evidence. See Harvey v. Office of Banks & Real Estate, 377
F.3d 698, 713-14 (7th Cir. 2004). However the test is
phrased, we begin our examination there.
In defense of the jury’s award, Schandelmeier argues
that the jury had ample opportunity to view and assess
her demeanor and emotional state during the seven
hours she spent on the witness stand. The jury heard
her describe how Adams screamed at her in front of J.J.’s
aunt and reprimanded her for being ignorant of African-
American culture—a culture that Adams apparently
believed was accepting of child abuse. Schandelmeier
testified that she had “never been yelled at like that in
[her] adult life,” and the things Adams said were “pro-
foundly disturbing” because Schandelmeier had “work[ed]
in the field of racial justice” and “never dreamt that
[she would] be in an environment where [she] would
be so prejudiced against.” Upon being terminated,
Schandelmeier felt “disturbed,” “devastated” and “upset”
because she could not support her family. She also
testified that witnessing the J.J. incident was a haunting
experience, and that “it changed the course of my life
and the life of those I love.” She wished that she could
have done more to protect J.J. because she was a “big
advocate in the prevention of child abuse.”
Although there is a rational connection between this
evidence and a substantial amount of compensatory
damages, it does not approach the level required to
34 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
uphold an award of $200,000. The award is excessive
and must be reduced substantially. Although the jury
could have concluded that the J.J. incident triggered
Adams’s race-based tirade and brought to the surface
a latent racial animus in the Park District that led to
Schandelmeier’s termination, the J.J. incident, in and of
itself, was not an adverse employment action and was
not actionable under Title VII. The jury could not hold
the Park District liable for any emotional injury
Schandelmeier might have suffered as a result of wit-
nessing J.J.’s aunt strike him. Thus, we cannot find sup-
port for the award in Schandelmeier’s testimony that
she has been “haunted” or that the course of her life
was changed because she witnessed the J.J. incident.
We do consider Schandelmeier’s testimony concerning
the emotional impact of the discriminatory acts that
were directed at her, including Adams’s racist tirade
and her termination. Although Adams’s rants on July 31st
and August 1st were understandably offensive and
disturbing to Schandelmeier, those incidents were
also isolated. She was not subjected to such incidents
throughout her employment with the Park District,
but only twice, and she did not testify to any lasting
physical or emotional effects resulting from Adams’s
abuse. Regarding her termination, she testified that she
was “disturbed,” “devastated” and “upset” to be losing
her job, but she also testified that she found a new job
just 10 days later. Schandelmeier did not testify to any
lasting emotional or physical ill-effects from losing her
job with the Park District.
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 35
Schandelmeier cites several cases in which large com-
pensatory damage awards were upheld on appeal. Her
list includes Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust, 433 F.3d 558,
563, 566-67 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding a compensatory
damage award of $200,000 where employee suffered
repeated physical and verbal sexual harassment and
testified to ongoing physical and emotional issues, in-
cluding lost self-esteem, weight gain, sleeping problems,
and nervousness); Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1358-
59 (11th Cir. 2003) (compensatory damage award of
$500,000 for each of seven plaintiffs in race discrimina-
tion case upheld where plaintiffs testified that race-
based transfers destroyed their careers, upset, embar-
rassed, humiliated, and shamed them, and some plaintiffs
became depressed); Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 754
(6th Cir. 1992) (upholding $350,000 for mental anguish
resulting from retaliatory discharge under Michigan law
where employee testified to resulting feelings of anguish
and embarrassment, weight loss, difficulty sleeping, and
marital troubles); Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co.,
915 F.2d 201, 210 (6th Cir. 1990) (upholding $150,000
award for emotional distress in age discrimination case
where plaintiff had ongoing depression and marital
troubles as a result). These cases are helpful even though
they are not controlling. See Lampley v. Onyx Acceptance
Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 485 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Due to the
highly fact-specific nature of Title VII cases, such com-
parisons are rarely dispositive.”). The higher damage
awards affirmed in these cases were supported with first-
and third-person testimony regarding ongoing emo-
tional and physical effects of the discrimination suffered
36 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
by the plaintiffs. No such evidence supported the jury’s
award here.
Other cases from this circuit in which plaintiffs were
found to have suffered discriminatory workplace
incidents and discharge are more instructive than those
cited by Schandelmeier for finding a reasonable range
for an award in this case. See, e.g., Marion County Coroner’s
Office, 612 F.3d at 930-31 (distinguishing Farfaras and
reducing $200,000 award to $20,000 based on plaintiff’s
brief testimony that he had undergone weekly therapy
sessions for several months to treat depression); Pickett
v. Sheridan Health Care Center, 610 F.3d 434, 446 (7th
Cir. 2010) (upholding compensatory damage award of
$15,000 where plaintiff testified that she was very upset
by how she was treated, felt embarrassed, and nearly
became homeless as a result of discriminatory dis-
charge); Lust, 383 F.3d at 589 (finding that district court
did not err in reducing jury’s compensatory damage
award from $100,000 to $27,000, and award was not
excessive where plaintiff testified to “nontrivial symp-
toms of anxiety and other forms of emotional distress” due
to belated promotion); David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d
851, 864 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding district court’s reduc-
tion of compensatory damage award from $100,000 to
$50,000 based on plaintiff’s testimony that she became
depressed, angry, and humiliated following co-worker’s
retaliatory promotion and suffered from stomachaches
and difficulty sleeping); Tullis v. Townley Engineering &
Mfg. Co., 243 F.3d 1058, 1067-68 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding
$80,000 in damages for emotional distress where plain-
tiff felt “degraded” and “backstabbed” by employer).
Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468 37
Under ordinary circumstances, we could remand this
question to the district court for further consideration. As
the Supreme Court has explained, “Trial judges have
the unique opportunity to consider the evidence in the
living courtroom context, while appellate judges see
only the cold paper record.” Gasperini v. Center for Humani-
ties, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 438 (1996) (internal quotations
omitted). In this case, however, Judge Coar, the able
district judge who presided over the trial, has retired
from the judiciary. A remand would go to a different
judge who would not have the benefit of having presided
over the trial. We are now situated at least as well as a
newly-assigned district judge would be to make this
decision.
We do not pretend that this is a scientific or precise
calculation, and we owe the jury’s determination sub-
stantial deference. See, e.g., Morales v. Cadena, 825 F.2d
1095, 1100 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming emotional damages
award of $82,000). In the absence of stronger evidence
of long-lasting emotional harm to plaintiff, and even
giving due deference to the jury’s determination, we
find that an award higher than $30,000 on this record
would be unreasonable. Upon remand, the district court
shall enter judgment in favor of plaintiff for $30,000.
III. Conclusion
We reverse the district court’s grant of the Park
District’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and
reinstate the jury verdict on liability in favor of
Schandelmeier. We affirm the district court’s denial of
38 Nos. 09-3286 & 09-3468
the Park District’s motion for a new trial on the grounds
of the jury instructions and plaintiff’s counsel’s improper
comments during closing argument, but remand with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff for
$30,000. On remand, plaintiff may seek a reasonable
attorney fee and costs.
R EVERSED IN P ART,
A FFIRMED IN P ART, AND R EMANDED.
2-8-11