10-1251-cv
Heicklen v. Kelly
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY
PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York,
on the 9th day of February, two thousand eleven.
PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
________________________________________
JULIAN HEICKLEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 10-1251-cv
RAYMOND KELLY,* New York City Police Commissioner,
JASON TOALA, Police Officer Shield #27613,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________________________
*
The original complaint listed “Robert Kelly” as a defendant, but the New York City
Police Commissioner’s actual name is “Raymond Kelly,” and the Clerk of Court is directed to
amend the official caption accordingly.
FOR APPELLANT: Julian Heicklen, pro se, Teaneck, NJ.
FOR APPELLEES: Scott Schorr, Julie Steiner, for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel
of the City of New York, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York (Koeltl, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Julian Heicklen, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment granting the
defendants-appellees’ motion for summary judgment and denying Heicklen’s cross-motion for summary
judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the
case, and the issues on appeal.
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and ask whether the district court
properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300
(2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to
resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks
omitted). However, “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary
judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002).
Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record in light of these principles,
we affirm the district court's judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in
its thorough and well-reasoned decision.
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We have considered Heicklen’s other arguments on appeal and have found them to be without
merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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