PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM THOMAS BAUBERGER,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v. No. 09-8111
GRADY J. HAYNES,
Respondent-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge.
(1:08-cv-00015-TDS-WWD)
Argued: October 26, 2010
Decided: February 11, 2011
Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
Damon J. KEITH, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wilkin-
son wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Motz joined.
Senior Judge Keith wrote a dissenting opinion.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Clarence Joe DelForge, III, NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
2 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
Appellant. David L. Neal, Hillsborough, North Carolina, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Roy Cooper, Attorney General of the
State of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-
lant.
OPINION
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
William Thomas Bauberger was convicted of second-
degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
serious injury after he drove his car the wrong way down an
exit ramp, killing one person and wounding another. Bauber-
ger unsuccessfully challenged his murder conviction in state
court after learning that the jurors read dictionary definitions
of several words in the judge’s instructions.
Bauberger then sought federal habeas relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the jurors’ dictionary use violated
his federal constitutional rights and prejudiced his verdict.
The district court agreed and granted the writ. Given that the
dictionary definitions did not materially alter the instruction
as a whole and that the government presented significant evi-
dence of malice, any misconduct the jurors may have commit-
ted did not exert a "substantial and injurious effect . . . in
determining the jury’s verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 776 (1946)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, the district court’s order granting Bauberger the
writ is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to
dismiss the petition.
I.
On February 3, 2002, William Bauberger attended a Super
Bowl party at a friend’s house. Over the course of the five or
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 3
so hours he was there, he drank more than ten beers. After the
game Bauberger, despite his intoxicated condition, decided to
drive to another friend’s house. He never made it. Instead, he
drove his Cadillac—at a speed somewhere around 45 to 55
miles per hour—the wrong direction down an exit ramp off
U.S. Highway 421 in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Disre-
garding "Do Not Enter" and "Wrong Way" signs, as well as
the honks and swerves of several cars traveling in the proper
direction, Bauberger finally crashed his car into that of Wil-
liam and Carol Foy. William sustained several broken bones,
and Carol died within minutes.
The government charged Bauberger with second-degree
murder and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury. At trial the government introduced Bauberger’s trou-
bled driving record. He had two prior driving-while-impaired
("DWI") convictions, as well as a reckless driving conviction
and other driving offenses. He also had disregarded prior
court orders not to drive and was driving on a revoked license
the night of the collision. Bauberger admitted that his blood-
alcohol content that night was 0.20 and that he was aware of
the dangers of driving while intoxicated. In light of this evi-
dence, Bauberger conceded guilt to the lesser-included
offense of involuntary manslaughter at trial but insisted that
he lacked the malice necessary for a second-degree murder
conviction under North Carolina law.
The jury convicted Bauberger of second-degree murder and
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and he
was sentenced to 189 to 236 months in prison. Shortly after
the verdict came down, however, the parties and the court
learned that the jury may have used a dictionary during its
deliberations. Bauberger filed a postconviction Motion for
Appropriate Relief ("MAR"), arguing that the dictionary was
an impermissible extraneous influence on the jurors and that
the dictionary definitions lowered the government’s burden of
proof regarding malice. The MAR court determined from the
jurors’ affidavits that the jury’s foreperson left the courthouse
4 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
during a break in deliberations, went to a public library, and
brought back the 1953 edition of Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary. He read to the other jurors the dictionary’s defini-
tion of several terms in the judge’s malice instruction but not
the definition of "malice" itself.
The MAR court denied Bauberger’s requested relief, rea-
soning that the jurors’ actions, though improper, were harm-
less. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed,
reasoning that Bauberger’s federal constitutional rights were
not violated because the definitions "concerned legal termi-
nology, not evidence developed at trial." State v. Bauberger,
626 S.E.2d 700, 706 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided vote, leav-
ing Bauberger’s convictions in place but stripping the lower
court’s decision of precedential effect. See State v. Bauberger,
637 S.E.2d 536 (N.C. 2006).
Bauberger filed for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The district court granted his petition, holding that the
jurors’ dictionary use violated Bauberger’s clearly established
Sixth Amendment rights and that the error prejudiced him
because the dictionary’s definitions of "recklessly" and "wan-
tonly" may have lowered the government’s burden of proof
regarding malice.
II.
We review the district court’s decision to grant the writ de
novo. Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 2003).
We shall assume without deciding that the North Carolina
Court of Appeals’s rejection of Bauberger’s Sixth Amend-
ment claims was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States," satisfying the
threshold demands for habeas relief under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). 28 U.S.C.
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 5
§ 2254(d)(1); see also Golphin v. Branker, 519 F.3d 168,
189-90 (4th Cir. 2008) (leaving unresolved whether the state
court unreasonably applied federal law because any error did
not have prejudicial impact under Brecht.) By doing so, we
skirt the problems long associated with unnecessary constitu-
tional decisionmaking: we avoid wasting the parties’ and the
courts’ limited resources on "questions that have no effect on
the outcome of the case," Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct.
808, 818 (2009), and we minimize the threat to good adjudi-
cation that arises when courts enter into thorny constitutional
areas with inadequate briefing or in fact-bound dispositions,
see id. at 819-20.
Assuming arguendo that the state court erred in rejecting
Bauberger’s claim does not end our inquiry, however. "[M]ost
constitutional errors can be harmless," including those of the
kind we shall assume occurred at Bauberger’s trial. Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991); see, e.g., Fullwood
v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 678-83 (4th Cir. 2002) (third-party
influence on juror and jurors’ consideration of extraneous evi-
dence subject to harmless error review). On direct review, the
government has the burden of proving that a constitutional
error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
On collateral review, however, the calculus changes.
Because of the threat collateral attacks pose to "finality, com-
ity, and federalism," Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007),
habeas petitioners may secure the writ only if the error "actu-
al[ly] prejudice[d]" them, Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting
United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In making this determination,
courts ask whether the error had a "substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict." Id.
(quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In the "unusual" situation where "the matter
is so evenly balanced that [the habeas judge] feels himself in
virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error [under
6 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
Brecht]" — that is, where the judge is in "grave doubt" — the
court must grant the writ. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432,
435 (1995).
The Supreme Court recently addressed the relationship
between the Chapman direct review standard, AEDPA’s def-
erence requirement, and the Brecht collateral review standard.
In Fry, the question before the Court was whether habeas
courts should apply the AEDPA/Chapman test (asking
whether a state court unreasonably applied Chapman’s direct
review standard), the Brecht test (asking whether a constitu-
tional error had a substantial and injurious effect), or both. See
Fry, 551 U.S. at 119-20.
The Court made two critical determinations. First, it held
that "in § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial
impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial
under the [Brecht] standard . . . , whether or not the state
appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harm-
lessness under [Chapman]." Fry, 551 U.S. at 121-22 (empha-
sis added) (citations omitted). Second, the Court stated that "it
certainly makes no sense to require formal application of both
tests (AEDPA/Chapman and Brecht) when the latter obvi-
ously subsumes the former." Id. at 120. That is to say, where
an error is harmful under Brecht, any state court decision
declaring it harmless must have unreasonably applied Chap-
man. As a result, any error satisfying Brecht will also satisfy
AEDPA’s deference requirements. See Ruelas v. Wolfenbar-
ger, 580 F.3d 403, 411-13 (6th Cir. 2009).
Thus the Court took a somewhat convoluted debate over
the appropriate standard in harmless error habeas cases and
opted for simplicity itself. Federal habeas courts must always
review constitutional errors in state trials under Brecht, but
they need not debate whether a state court’s harmless error
determination also unreasonably applied Chapman, as most
circuits since Fry have explicitly or implicitly recognized. See
Welch v. Workman, 607 F.3d 674, 686 (10th Cir. 2010); Wes-
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 7
brook v. Thaler, 585 F.3d 245, 255-56 (5th Cir. 2009); Ruelas
v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403, 411-13 (6th Cir. 2009); Moses
v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 2009); Farley v. Bisson-
nette, 544 F.3d 344, 347-48 (1st Cir. 2008); Bond v. Beard,
539 F.3d 256, 275-76 (3d Cir. 2008). But see Perkins v. Her-
bert, 596 F.3d 161, 175-77 (2d Cir. 2010) (leaving undecided
whether both AEDPA/Chapman and Brecht must be used);
Johnson v. Acevedo, 572 F.3d 398, 403-04 (7th Cir. 2009)
(requiring AEDPA/Chapman and Brecht where a state court
addressed harmlessness).
Of course, most successful habeas petitioners must still go
through "AEDPA[’s] mandate[d] . . . two-step analysis" by
demonstrating that the state court’s resolution of their consti-
tutional claim was contrary to or unreasonably applied clearly
established federal law and that the error was prejudicial
under Brecht. Baum v. Rushton, 572 F.3d 198, 205 (4th Cir.
2009); see also Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 453 (4th Cir.
2008). But this two-step process does not require us to
address the first prong where the petitioner’s claims fail on
the second, see Golphin, 519 F.3d at 189-90, and as explained
above, Fry absolves us of any need to consider both
AEDPA/Chapman unreasonableness and Brecht prejudice in
the harmless error context. Accordingly, we need only deter-
mine whether the jury’s dictionary use prejudiced Bauberger
under the Brecht standard.1
III.
In analyzing whether the prejudice from the jury’s dictio-
1
We therefore need not resolve the parties’ dispute about whether we
should "look through" the North Carolina Court of Appeals’s decision
(which did not conduct a harmless error analysis) to the MAR Court’s
decision (which did) to perform AEDPA/Chapman analysis. See Ylst v.
Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) (habeas courts should look
through summary affirmances to the "last reasoned decision" to determine
whether a state procedural rule bars habeas review).
8 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
nary use meets the Brecht standard, we begin by laying out
the jury’s actions in greater detail.
A.
The trial judge instructed the jurors on the meaning of
"malice," the only element of second-degree murder that Bau-
berger disputed, as follows:
Malice is a necessary element which distinguishes
second degree murder from manslaughter. Malice
arises when an act which is inherently dangerous to
human life is intentionally done so recklessly and
wantonly as to manifest a mind utterly without
regard for human life and social duty and deliber-
ately bent on mischief.
Shortly after beginning its deliberations, the jury requested a
copy of the elements of second-degree murder and man-
slaughter. In response, the judge re-read the instructions to the
jurors and returned them to their deliberations. However, they
soon sent another note to the judge asking for a copy of the
instruction regarding malice and any other contested element,
stating that "[m]any of us are visual people." The judge
informed them he would prepare a copy during their upcom-
ing lunch recess and dismissed them for that recess.
As previously indicated, during lunch the jury’s foreperson
retrieved a dictionary and read some of its definitions to the
other jurors when deliberations resumed. Though he did not
read the definition for "malice" itself to the jury, he did read
them the definitions for some of the words in the judge’s
instruction, including "recklessly" and "wantonly."2 The dic-
2
The jurors also heard the definitions of "manifest" ("show"), "utterly"
("fully, totally"), and "regard" ("respect or consideration for"), and earlier
in Bauberger’s trial one juror looked up the definition of "malice" in a dic-
tionary at his home but did not copy it down, recall it, or share it with oth-
ers. Following the district court, Bauberger focuses on the prejudicial
impact of the dictionary definitions for "recklessly" and "wantonly" on
appeal.
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 9
tionary defined the former as "lack of due caution" and the
latter as "arrogant recklessness of justice or the feelings of
others." Two hours into their resumed deliberations the jury
informed the judge that they had resolved one count but were
split seven to five on the other. The judge instructed them to
do their best to "reconcile [their] differences . . . without the
surrender of conscientious convictions." Within an hour of
this instruction the jury stood at ten to two, and within two
hours they had convicted Bauberger of second-degree murder
and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.
B.
Bauberger argues that the dictionary definitions of "reck-
lessly" and "wantonly" lowered the government’s burden of
proof on the issue of malice, an issue with which he contends
the jury apparently struggled. As a result, Bauberger claims
that the erroneous use of those dictionaries meets the Brecht
standard: one or more of the jurors may have applied an unac-
ceptably low malice standard in convicting Bauberger of
second-degree murder, and therefore the dictionary use had a
substantial and injurious effect upon his verdict. We disagree:
the dictionary definitions did not materially alter the meaning
of the instruction as a whole, and the government introduced
significant evidence of malice.
1.
In assessing the harm from jurors’ use of a dictionary we
look in part to the difference between the dictionary definition
and the legal definition. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.
145, 154 (1977) (looking to the difference between the actual
instruction given and the correct instruction to determine prej-
udice); McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 226-27 (4th Cir. 2007)
(King, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(examining difference between dictionary and legal defini-
tions); McNeill, 476 F.3d at 229-30 (Gregory, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) (same). Under North Carolina law
10 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
the "distinction between ‘recklessness’ indicative of murder
and ‘recklessness’ associated with manslaughter ‘is one of
degree rather than kind.’" State v. Rich, 527 S.E.2d 299, 303
(N.C. 2000) (quoting United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945,
948 (4th Cir. 1984)). North Carolina courts have indicated,
however, that the difference in degree is large. See, e.g., id.;
State v. Wilkerson, 247 S.E.2d 905, 918 (N.C. 1978). None-
theless, they have upheld second-degree murder convictions
even where a portion of the malice instruction veered toward
culpable negligence in defining recklessness, provided the
instruction as a whole conveyed the difference. See Rich, 527
S.E.2d at 301-03 (upholding a second-degree murder convic-
tion where a portion of the recklessness instruction suggested
that "recklessness of consequences" sufficed).
If Bauberger’s jury had only the dictionary’s "lack of due
caution" definition to go on in determining the recklessness
portion of the malice element, he would have more of a case.
But as the Supreme Court has long emphasized in the analo-
gous context of jury instructions, "a single instruction to a
jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be
viewed in the context of the overall charge." Cupp v. Naugh-
ten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973). Viewed in this light, the
instruction, even as possibly modified by the definitions the
jurors consulted, fully conveyed the essence of North Caro-
lina law concerning malice. The modified version still
referred to an "intentionally done," "inherently dangerous"
act. It still described the "lack of due caution" as of such a
nature as to "show a mind fully or totally without respect or
consideration for human life" or "social duty." And it still
spoke of an individual whose acts were so "arrogant[ly] reck-
less[ ] of justice or the feelings of others" as to indicate a
mind "deliberately bent on mischief."
This is not the language of mere culpable negligence.
Phrases like these impose a much higher standard than the
"thoughtless disregard of consequences" and "heedless indif-
ference to the safety and rights of others" culpable negligence
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 11
requires. State v. Mack, 697 S.E.2d 490, 494 (N.C. Ct. App.
2010) (quoting State v. Wade, 589 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Bauberger’s
verdict was not substantially and injuriously affected by the
dictionary’s definition of "recklessly" because the altered
instruction as a whole remained materially equivalent to the
one given by the judge.
So too with "wantonly." Under North Carolina law, "wan-
tonness" describes "intentional wrongdoing," conduct
undertaken in "conscious and intentional disregard of and
indifference to the rights and safety of others." State v. Wil-
liams, 199 S.E.2d 409, 412 (N.C. 1973); see also State v.
Young, 559 S.E.2d 814, 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002). Again, it
would be one thing if the jurors had only considered "arrogant
recklessness of justice or the feelings of others" in determin-
ing whether Bauberger’s conduct was wanton. But the possi-
bly modified instruction in its entirety still conveyed the
knowing disregard of others’ safety central to wantonness
under North Carolina law. It spoke of "intentionally done"
acts, ones performed with such "arrogant recklessness"
toward others as "to show a mind fully or totally without
respect or consideration for human life . . . and deliberately
bent on mischief." (emphases added). Any modification of the
instruction that came about by virtue of the dictionary’s defi-
nition of "wantonly" did not materially affect that instruc-
tion’s malice standard.
The other jury instructions also indicate that the jurors
could not have read the isolated definitions so as to alter the
malice instruction. "[T]he challenged instruction [is often] but
one of many such instructions . . . ." Henderson, 431 U.S. at
152 n.10 (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, those other instructions illustrate that
the jurors were well aware of the difference between malice
and culpable negligence. The jurors were instructed that if
they acquitted Bauberger of second-degree murder they must
consider whether he was guilty of involuntary manslaughter,
12 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
which requires a showing of culpable negligence. To find cul-
pable negligence, the trial court instructed the jurors that they
must find that Bauberger drove while impaired, that he "will-
ful[ly,] wanton[ly,] or intentional[ly]" violated the law, or that
his "inadvertent or unintentional violation of the law . . . [was]
accompanied by recklessness of probable consequences of a
dangerous nature . . . amounting altogether to a thoughtless
disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the
safety of others." The jurors also knew that Bauberger had
conceded guilt to involuntary manslaughter, including its
lower culpable negligence standard, making malice the central
disputed issue before them.
Given these circumstances, it is unlikely the jurors seized
on isolated dictionary definitions to transmute the malice stan-
dard — which they knew to be the disputed issue in the case
—into the culpable negligence standard, to which Bauberger
had already conceded. In other words, Bauberger’s verdict
was not substantially affected because the dictionary defini-
tions, viewed both in light of the instruction as a whole and
in light of the entire trial, did not materially alter the malice
standard.
2.
We also look to the strength of the evidence in assessing
whether the dictionary use substantially and injuriously
affected Bauberger’s verdict. See McNeill, 476 F.3d at 226
(King, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
id. at 229 (Gregory, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part). This approach makes sense: if the evidence presented
was such that the issue of malice was not likely a close one,
it is less likely that the error impacted the jury’s decision.
On this score, Bauberger’s claim to prejudice is particularly
weak. His is the paradigmatic case of second-degree murder
via drunk driving. As detailed above, he had several prior
drunk driving convictions, prior court orders not to drive, and
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 13
a revoked license on the night in question. He stipulated to a
high blood-alcohol content and admitted knowledge of alco-
hol’s dangerous effects upon drivers. He also drove at a high
speed, into oncoming traffic, and in disregard of several signs.
North Carolina courts have routinely accepted evidence less
formidable than this in upholding second-degree murder con-
victions. See, e.g., Rich, 527 S.E.2d at 304 (finding sufficient
evidence of malice where the defendant "drove his vehicle at
a high rate of speed while impaired, on the wrong side of the
road, in a no-passing zone and in violation of right-of-way
rules"); State v. Westbrook, 623 S.E.2d 73, 78-79 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005) (finding sufficient evidence of malice where the
defendant had a prior DWI conviction and sped through a
traffic light on the wrong side of the road). While we are not
analyzing Bauberger’s conviction for the sufficiency of the
evidence, such compelling evidence of malice makes it con-
siderably less likely that the dictionary use affected the jury’s
ultimate decision.
Bauberger discounts the importance of this evidence by
pointing to the struggles the jury apparently had in reaching
its decision. He contends that the actual jury’s decisionmak-
ing process — its requests for printed instructions, its foreper-
son’s decision to retrieve the dictionary, and its initially
divided votes—is what counts under Brecht, not the actions
of a hypothetical jury looking at the evidence. We agree in
principle and have accordingly looked to the jury’s difficulty
in reaching a decision in assessing prejudice in prior dictio-
nary use cases. See McNeill, 476 F.3d at 226 (King, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 229
(Gregory, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
However, as applied here, this principle cannot do the work
Bauberger sets out for it because the record of the jury’s
deliberations cannot bear this much weight. The jurors heard
the definitions only an hour into their deliberations. And yet
despite Bauberger’s contentions that the definitions lowered
the malice standard to a level to which Bauberger had essen-
14 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
tially conceded, the jury still needed an additional four hours
before reaching a decision. This timeline tells us little about
the issues around which the jurors’ struggles revolved. We are
unwilling ultimately to put dispositive weight on a jury’s
ambiguous actions. That would be altogether too speculative.
Where the modified instruction fully conveyed the gist of
North Carolina law and where the evidence presented was so
strong, it takes clearer evidence of jury difficulty than this to
satisfy Brecht.
IV.
"The principle that collateral review is different from direct
review resounds throughout [the Supreme Court’s] habeas
jurisprudence," Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633, and understandably
so. Casually upending state convictions in federal court
threatens "finality, comity, and federalism," Fry, 551 U.S. at
116, words which singly and together convey a sense of
respect toward state judiciaries and the significant responsibil-
ities assigned them. Thus we have respected state judgments
where an error’s impact, considered in the context of the trial
as a whole, was not significant. See, e.g., Golphin, 519 F.3d
at 190-92 (overwhelming evidence rendered any error from
admitting a confession harmless under Brecht); Wilson v.
Ozmint, 357 F.3d 461, 469 (4th Cir. 2004) (sentencing record
rendered any error from not admitting one mitigating state-
ment harmless under Brecht).
The error we assume arguendo occurred at Bauberger’s
trial does not justify the relief he now seeks. Neither the court
nor the government had any role in bringing about the errone-
ous dictionary use. The potentially modified instruction, taken
as a whole, conveyed the essence of North Carolina law
regarding malice. And Bauberger’s disturbing driving record,
combined with his activities on the night of the accident,
would more than permit a jury to find a "mind utterly without
regard for" the life-threatening and ultimately life-ending
risks created by his conduct. Given these circumstances, there
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 15
was no substantial and injurious effect on his verdict from the
jurors’ dictionary reading.3 The district court’s order granting
Bauberger the writ is therefore reversed and the case
remanded with directions to dismiss the petition.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
KEITH, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. It is axi-
omatic that the Constitution prohibits jurors from going out-
side of the record to independently determine the standards
that are to be used when deciding an accused person’s guilt
or innocence. This is based on many sound principles; most
importantly, the reality that such standards frequently differ
from the governing rule and, thus, undermine the basic pre-
cept that all persons are guaranteed due process and equal
protection under the law. Such concerns are not to be taken
lightly. Were we to treat such violations cavalierly, it would
open the floodgates to jurors ignoring the instructions of the
court and, in essence, the responsibilities entrusted them by
the Constitution.
I. ANALYSIS
As the majority notes, the appropriate question when con-
sidering a defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is
whether the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(d)(1). "Clearly established federal
3
To the extent the dissent wishes to ascribe some larger significance to
our holding, we should note simply that we have assumed for purposes of
argument the existence of the error and rested decision upon the applica-
tion of the Brecht standard to the facts and circumstances of the case. The
deference due state court judgments of conviction upon collateral attack
has of course not absolved the court of the need to conduct a careful
review of the matter, and we thank our distinguished colleague in dissent
for his willingness to do likewise.
16 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
law" under § 2254(d)(1) refers to the governing legal princi-
ple or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time
the state court rendered its decision. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 698 (2002); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 413
(2000).
Even if the state court proceedings violated clearly estab-
lished law, the court may not grant a defendant’s petition for
relief if the error was harmless. Jones v. Polk, 401 F.3d 257,
265 (4th Cir. 2005). The habeas petitioner will be entitled to
relief if a habeas court is "in grave doubt about whether a trial
error of federal law had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict." O’Neal v.
McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). "[G]rave doubt exists when, in
the relevant circumstances, the question is so evenly balanced
that the reviewing court finds itself in virtual equipoise on the
harmlessness issue." Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 461
(4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted). The test is whether it can be said with fair assurance that
not a single juror’s decision was swayed by resort to the
extrinsic influence. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 366
(1966) (A defendant is "entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or
even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors."); Fullwood v.
Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 678 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[I]f even a single
juror’s impartiality is overcome by an improper extraneous
influence, the accused has been deprived of the right to an
impartial jury."); Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Cir.
1995) (noting that if even one juror was improperly influ-
enced the verdict must be reversed).
A. THE TRIAL COURT UNREASONABLY APPLIED ESTAB-
LISHED SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT.
The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "the
accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial[ ] by an impartial
jury . . . [and to] be confronted with the witnesses against
him." U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. The right to trial by an impar-
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 17
tial jury "guarantees . . . a fair trial by a panel of impartial,
indifferent jurors." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)
(internal quotation marks omitted). This right prohibits "any
private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indi-
rectly, with a juror during trial about the matter pending
before the jury." Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229
(1954).
As the Fourth Circuit has interpreted the relevant Supreme
Court precedent, all influences, outside the record, on a
juror’s decisions are not necessarily prohibited. The Supreme
Court has clearly established that while external influences on
a jury’s deliberations are prohibited, internal ones are permis-
sible. Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 362 (4th Cir. 2006).
Under established Supreme Court case law, an influ-
ence is external if it (1) is extraneous prejudicial
information; i.e., information that was not admitted
into evidence but nevertheless bears on a fact at
issue in the case or (2) is an outside influence upon
the partiality of the jury, such as private communica-
tion, contact, or tampering . . . with a juror.
Id. at 363 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Examples of internal influences include alcohol or drugs
taken by a juror, Turner, 379 U.S. at 466, or Bible readings
which a juror relies upon for the purpose of "examining his
or her own conscience from within," Robinson, 438 F.3d at
363-64.
It is clear under the Supreme Court’s precedents that when
the jury relies on a source outside of its own knowledge or
beliefs, not presented at trial or by the trial judge as part of
his or her instructions, to determine what relevant law to
apply, the jury has been subject to an "external influence" in
violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975) (finding
violation of the Sixth Amendment where the court, without
18 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
consulting the defendant, provided further instruction to the
jury which the jury then relied on in convicting the defen-
dant). See also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117-18
(1987) (noting the distinction between "external" influences,
such as a juror reading a newspaper or hearing prejudicial
statements from others, and "internal" influences); Parker,
385 U.S. at 364-66 (finding that a bailiff’s statement to jurors
that the defendant was a "wicked fellow" and "guilty" consti-
tuted an "outside influence" that violated the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to fair trial and confrontation because
"the evidence developed against a defendant shall come from
the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full
judicial protection of the defendant’s right of confrontation, of
cross-examination, and of counsel"); Turner v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 466, 473 (1965) (finding a violation of defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights where two deputies who testified against
him were assigned to guard, and fraternized with, the jury);
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (stating
that "private communication, contact, or tampering" with the
jury is presumptively prejudicial); Mattox v. United States,
146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892) (stating that "in capital cases . . . the
jury should pass upon the case free from external causes tend-
ing to disturb the exercise of deliberate and unbiased judg-
ment").
Unlike ingesting alcohol or drugs or reading a Bible to set-
tle one’s conscience, looking up legal terms to apply in the
decision-making process is not merely an "internal" matter
that merely affects how one feels or facilitates an examination
of what one already thinks or believes. Rather, in this case,
the jury in considering the dictionary’s definitions was con-
sulting an external source — the dictionary — specifically
because they found their internal knowledge to be insuffi-
cient. See Robinson, 438 F.3d at 364 (external influences
impart pressure or knowledge on "a juror apart from the juror
himself, the reading of Bible passages invites the listener to
examine his or her own conscience from within."). Had the
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 19
jury had the knowledge within itself, it would not have found
it necessary to consult the dictionary in the first place.
Likewise, unlike reading the Bible or ingesting alcohol or
drugs, consulting the dictionary to determine the applicable
legal principle was not merely incidental to the issues before
the jury, but was directly relevant as the jury looked up words
it was instructed to apply. See id. at 363 (finding that juror’s
reading of the Bible did not require reversal of the conviction
because "the Bible had no bearing on any fact relevant to sen-
tencing, and was therefore not tantamount to ‘evidence’ that
was used against him at sentencing."). Any doubt concerning
the correctness of this conclusion is all but vitiated in a situa-
tion such as this where the defendant has conceded all but one
legal element and the jury acquired information about this one
legal element at issue.
The cases the state provides, in response, are clearly distin-
guishable. In none of the cases did the jurors rely on an influ-
ence to resolve a legal question or factual dispute relevant to
the case before it. Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140 (4th Cir.
2009) (finding no error where juror brought pictures of his
son into jury room and another juror spoke with his wife);
Robinson, 438 F.3d at 364 (finding no clearly established law
prohibiting a juror from relying on Bible not to garner any
external fact or legal principle merely to reflect on his own
conscience); Lynch v. Polk, 204 F. App’x. 167 (4th Cir. 2006)
(same). The state’s reliance on the aforementioned cases suf-
fers from the flawed assumption that merely because the
influence of some materials may not violate the Sixth Amend-
ment, the consideration of any and all external material does
not violate the Sixth Amendment.
Beyond citing these cases, the state provides no explanation
as to why it believes that a dictionary used to define the ele-
ment at the center of trial constitutes a permissible internal
influence as opposed to an impermissible external influence.
Rather, the state simply asserts that no case has specifically
20 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
found that a jury’s use of a dictionary to define the specific
legal terms at issue in this case violates the Sixth Amendment.
Accordingly, it concludes that the issue in this case is not
clearly established.
This line of argument misconstrues the relevant legal prin-
ciple. "[T]he relevant Supreme Court precedent need not be
directly on point, but must provide a ‘governing legal princi-
ple’ and articulate specific considerations for lower courts to
follow when applying the [relevant] precedent." Quinn v.
Hayes, 234 F.3d 837, 844 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)); see Panetti v. Quarter-
man, 551 U.S. 930, 953, (2007) ("That the standard is stated
in general terms does not mean the application was reason-
able. [The statute] does not ‘require state and federal courts
to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal
rule must be applied.’"); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76,
(2003) ("Section 2254(d)(1) permits a federal court to grant
habeas relief based on the application of a governing legal
principle to a set of facts different from those of the case in
which the principle was announced.").1
Finally, this conclusion is buttressed by the decisions of
other courts which similarly have found that the reliance of a
jury on a dictionary in defining the applicable legal principles
violates the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Duncan,
598 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1979); McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206
(4th Cir. 2007) (two of three judges on panel finding that juror
relied on improper external influence by consulting dictionary
for definition of mitigate) (King, J., concurring in judgment)
(Gregory, J., dissenting in judgment); Marino v. Vasquez, 812
1
The state posits in its reply brief that it is not arguing that the Supreme
Court must have decided an identical issue before a federal court may
grant a petition for habeas relief, merely that the Supreme Court has not
decided that looking up the words which the jurors looked up in this case
violated the Sixth Amendment. This argument is obviously internally
inconsistent. The state at once argues that it is not arguing that there must
be an identical case and then complains that there is not an identical case.
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 21
F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[U]nauthorized reference to
dictionary definitions constitutes reversible error which the
State must prove harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.");
United States v. Kupau, 781 F.2d 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986) (same).2
Accordingly, while the majority assumes, without deciding
that the jury’s conduct violated the Sixth amendment, no such
assumptions are necessary. Under both the Supreme Court’s
and this Circuit’s jurisprudence, such conduct is unconstitu-
tional.
B. THE ERROR HAD A SUBSTANTIAL AND INJURIOUS EFFECT
ON THEDEFENDANT.
Upon assuming that the jurors’ conduct violated the Sixth
amendment, the majority erroneously rejects Bauberger’s
petition on the grounds that any such error was not prejudicial
to him.
In Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d
919 (10th Cir. 1992), the Tenth Circuit set out a five part test
to use when determining whether a lower court’s error is prej-
udicial. The test assesses:
(1) The importance of the word or phrase being
defined to the resolution of the case; (2) The extent
to which the dictionary definition differs from the
jury instructions or from the proper legal definition;
(3) The extent to which the jury discussed and
emphasized the definition; (4) The strength of the
2
As the district court noted, "[t]he unreasonableness of a state court’s
application of . . . [the relevant] Supreme Court jurisprudence cannot be
established by decisions of lower federal courts or state courts. [However],
the analysis of these decisions is persuasive in the objective inquiry before
the court." Bauberger v. Haynes, 666 F. Supp. 2d 558, 563 (M.D.N.C.
2003) (internal citation omitted).
22 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
evidence and whether the jury had difficulty reach-
ing a verdict prior to introduction of the dictionary
definition; and (5) Any other factors that relate to a
determination of prejudice.
Id. at 924. The test was subsequently adopted by the majority
of the judges of a panel of this circuit. McNeill, 476 F.3d at
226, 229. However, the history of this circuit’s consideration
of these factors is not so nascent. The Supreme Court and the
Fourth Circuit have long considered each of the factors set out
in Mayhue and adopted in McNeill when considering the prej-
udicial effect of constitutional violations. Henderson v. Kibbe,
431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)(examining the difference between
the instruction given and the instruction that should have been
given in determining prejudice); Barbe, 521 F.3d at 459-60
(explaining that the trial court’s error prevented the defendant
from cross-examining the prosecution’s expert as to a matter
"crucial to his presentation of an effective defense"); Fitzger-
ald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 366 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that
a potentially biased juror’s impact was minimal as the jury
rejected his sentencing suggestion and the jury had made its
decision before he made potentially prejudicial statements);
Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1143 (4th Cir. 1996) (con-
cluding that "in light of all the evidence presented at trial, [the
court] harbor[ed] no grave doubt" as to the minimal prejudi-
cial effect of the juror’s "site visit.") (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted); Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740,
746 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding comment to jury by restaurant
owner prejudicial where it "bore on the exact issue . . . that
the jurors were deliberating on at the time"); Duncan, 598
F.2d at 866 (finding error was not prejudicial as the foreman
immediately squelched any discussion of dictionary defini-
tion); Cairns v. Johnson, 267 F. App’x 240, 247 (4th Cir.
2008) (noting that potentially erroneously excluded journals
were relevant to the central issue in the case). Given the well-
founded basis for the application of the factors the test lists,
the parties, likewise, agree on its applicability.
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 23
Nonetheless, the majority focuses its analysis primarily on
the extent to which the dictionary definition differed from the
jury instruction — which in and of itself was substantial —
and the strength of the evidence supporting Bauberger’s con-
viction. It meanwhile attaches no weight to the centrality of
the issue for which the jury sought assistance and the length
of time for which the jury was exposed to the erroneous defi-
nitions, both of which past courts of this circuit have deemed
relevant. Consideration of such in addition to a careful weigh-
ing of the important differences between the dictionary and
legal definitions of the examined terms establishes that both
the magistrate and district judges correctly concluded "grave
doubt" existed as to the prejudicial effect of the constitutional
error.
As to the first factor, the parties do not dispute that the
words the jurors looked up in the dictionary were of supreme
importance in this case. As noted above, Bauberger conceded
every other element, but whether he had acted with malice —
the precise term the jury sought additional help in defining.
The parties, as the majority notes, do disagree as to the
extent the definitions provided in the dictionary for the words
"recklessly" and "wantonly" differ from their legal counter-
parts. The dictionary defined "recklessly" as "lack of due cau-
tion." App. 157. The dictionary defined "wantonly" as an
"arrogant recklessness of justice or the feelings of others." Id.
Bauberger argues that the jury’s use of these definitions effec-
tively lowered the standard for malice to something more
equivalent to negligence. The state argues, and the majority
agrees, that the standard imposed by these terms is virtually
identical to their legal counterpart.
To understand the effect these definitions had on the jury,
one must examine, as the majority does, the trial judge’s
charge to the jury on malice, of which the disputed words
were part. The judge’s instruction to the jury on malice pro-
vided that "[m]alice arises when an act which is inherently
24 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
dangerous to human life is intentionally done so recklessly
and wantonly as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for
human life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief."
Tr. Vol. IV at 38 (Emphasis added). The trial judge contrasted
this standard with the more lenient one applicable to involun-
tary manslaughter, with which Bauberger was also charged.
To be guilty of involuntary manslaughter, the defendant must
have acted with "culpable negligence." "Culpable negli-
gence," the court explained, requires either (1) a "willful,
wanton, or intentional" violation of law governing the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle, or (2) an "inadvertent or unintentional
violation of the law" that is "accompanied by recklessness of
probable consequences of a dangerous nature when tested by
the rule of reasonable foresight amounting altogether to a
thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indiffer-
ence to the safety of others." Trial Tr. Vol. VI at 21-22. The
trial judge also instructed the jury on the meaning of "reck-
less" in the context of reckless driving, which required that
the jury find Bauberger "acted carelessly and heedlessly in
willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others."
Id.
The North Carolina courts have clearly stated, as the major-
ity acknowledges, "malice" for the purposes of murder
requires "a high degree of recklessness." State v. Rich, 527
S.E.2d 299, 303 (N.C. 2000). However, even in contrast with
the trial court’s instruction regarding the meaning of "reck-
less" in the context of reckless driving, the dictionary defini-
tion — lack of due caution — sets a low standard. It seems
clear that a person may have acted without due caution, but
not necessarily in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or
safety of others. Stated otherwise, there may be many circum-
stances in which a person may not have exercised proper cau-
tion (thereby acting recklessly as defined by the dictionary)
but may not necessarily have acted with willful or wanton dis-
regard for the rights or safety of others. Bauberger correctly
points out that the dictionary’s definition of recklessness,
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 25
because it does not require that the disregard for others be
willful or wanton, resembles the legal standard for negligence.
North Carolina courts have similarly interpreted wanton-
ness, in the criminal context, as requiring more than a mere
unintentional disregard of others. "Wantonness . . . connotes
intentional wrongdoing. . . . Conduct is wanton when in con-
scious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the
rights and safety of others." State v. Williams, 199 S.E.2d 409,
412 (N.C. 1973) (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted) (emphasis added). Furthermore, "[t]he words ‘willful’
and ‘wanton’ have substantially the same meaning when used
in reference to the requisite state of mind for a violation of a
criminal statute." State v. Davis, 356 S.E.2d 607, 610 (N.C.
1987) (citing Williams 199 S.E.2d at 412). “ ‘Willful’ as used
in criminal statutes means the wrongful doing of an act with-
out justification or excuse, or the commission of an act pur-
posely and deliberately in violation of the law." Id. at 610.
The dictionary in contrast defined "wanton" as the "arrogant
recklessness of justice or the feelings of others." App. 157.
Again, the dictionary definition imposed a more lenient stan-
dard. Not every act which is in arrogant disregard of others
will necessarily involve a conscious and intentional disregard
of others. Rather, as noted above, the dictionary’s definition,
because it does not require that the disregard be conscious or
intentional, resembles the lower standard of negligence.
The state argues, and the majority agrees, that even if the
jury attached the lower standard associated with each of the
term’s dictionary definitions, when the terms are read in the
context of the overall instruction for malice their insertion
could only have had a minimal effect. The majority empha-
sizes that a reading of the instruction as a whole shows that
the criminal act must still have been "intentionally done" and
"manifest[ed] a mind utterly without regard for human life
and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief." In actual-
ity, the majority by simply emphasizing that these words are
present in the instruction, regardless of their placement, views
26 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
them in isolation and out of context. In doing so, it ignores
both the instruction’s text and the facts of this case.
The instruction, on its face, has two separate parts. Under
the instruction’s terms, for an individual to have acted with
malice, he must not only have committed the act intentionally,
but also acted in willful or wanton disregard of the risk his
actions posed, i.e., he must have been aware of the risk his
actions entailed and disregarded them nonetheless. As noted,
the dictionary definition of reckless — lack of due caution —
requires no such awareness. Accordingly, as the instruction
read to the jury, Bauberger must a) have committed an inten-
tional act; and b) done so in spite of the fact a grave danger
existed — whether or not he was aware of it. To simply con-
flate the instruction’s two parts, and assume the jury likewise
did so, ignores the instruction’s plain construction.
Importantly, this conclusion is further undercut by the
jury’s actions. Had the jury imputed "intentionally" to the
whole instruction, as the majority suggests, it is not clear why
the foreman would have so felt the need to define the follow-
ing scienter terms that he, on his lunch break, would have
gone out of his way to obtain further assistance.
Likewise, pursuant to the third factor, there is strong reason
to believe that the jury placed significant emphasis on the
terms for which they garnered definitions. The relevant con-
siderations under this factor include the number of jurors
exposed to the potentially prejudicial information, at what
point in their deliberations they received the violative material
and the length of time they considered it. See, e.g., Fitzgerald,
150 F.3d at 366 (noting that a potentially biased member’s
impact was minimal as jury rejected her sentencing sugges-
tion and they had made their decision before she made poten-
tially prejudicial statements).
It is undisputed that several members of the jury requested
further instruction from the judge on the definition of malice,
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 27
of which the terms they looked up are part. Likewise, the par-
ties do not dispute that once the foreman retrieved the dictio-
nary, the definitions for the disputed terms were shared with
all twelve of the jurors. It is relevant that it was the foreman
who was responsible for obtaining the dictionary and sharing
it with other jurors. That he was the party providing the defi-
nitions suggests that the other jurors may have attached addi-
tional weight to the external information. See Mayhue, 969
F.2d at 925. Finally, it is notable that the foreman obtained the
definitions relatively early in the jury’s deliberative process.
The state argues, and the majority agrees, the fact that the
jury deliberated for more than four hours after acquiring the
dictionary definitions before reaching a verdict indicates that
the dictionary had little or no effect. While this is relevant, it
is not as conclusive as the state presumes. The state miscon-
strues the appropriate question before the court. As noted
above, the relevant question is merely whether one individual
was affected by the dictionary. Accordingly, even if one vote
shifted as a result of the dictionary’s use, the violation had a
prejudicial effect.
The fourth factor — the strength of evidence and the diffi-
culty of the jury in reaching a verdict — weighs in favor of
the state. As the majority notes, there is substantial evidence
that the defendant acted with malice.
Nonetheless, there is evidence that the jury, despite the
aforementioned evidence, struggled to decide whether malice
existed. The jury requested additional clarification as to the
meaning of the term "malice." During lunch, the foreman took
the unusual step of going to the library to acquire a dictionary
to aid the jury in determining whether the evidence was suffi-
cient to support a finding of malice. However, even after
returning from lunch, receiving the additional materials
requested and reviewing the dictionary, the jury needed multi-
ple votes and an Allen charge before it found Bauberger
guilty.
28 BAUBERGER v. HAYNES
Considering all these factors, the question of whether the
jury’s consideration of the dictionary was prejudicial is a
close question. Factors weighing in favor of a finding of prej-
udice are that the jury sought evidence directly relevant to the
sole disputed legal issue, and the substantial difference
between the terms as defined in the dictionary and as they are
defined by North Carolina Courts. However, the substantial
evidence justifying a finding of malice weighs against a find-
ing of prejudice. Ultimately, my conclusion that the constitu-
tional violation was prejudicial is based on two realities. First,
while, as a legal matter, there may have been substantial evi-
dence of malice, the jury obviously did not see the situation
as such. As noted, the foreman felt it necessary to go to the
library, and the other members of the jury likewise felt it nec-
essary to request additional information regarding the legal
rules to apply. Even once these pieces of information had
been provided, only after an Allen charge and multiple votes
did the jury reach its conclusion. Second, as noted above, the
defendant, to garner a new trial, need not prove that the result
was a proximate result of the impropriety, but merely that the
evidence is in virtual equipoise that his trial may have been
affected.
Given the centrality of the issue to the case, the substantial
difference in the standard applied and that which was appro-
priate and the jury’s struggles to resolve the issue, I, like the
district court, find that Bauberger has raised grave doubt as to
whether the jury’s decision was in fact unbiased.
II. CONCLUSION
The Constitution’s protections exist not only because they
ensure that all persons are treated fairly and equally by our
criminal justice system, but because they speak to the integ-
rity and values of the nation and its residents. Therefore, when
these rights are infringed, it hurts us all.
Today’s majority opinion concerns me deeply. With it, we
embark down a dangerous road which permits jurors to go
BAUBERGER v. HAYNES 29
outside of the record to determine guilt or innocence. Such
conduct threatens to open a Pandora’s box of unconstitutional
behavior. It creates the potential for a system in which any
juror may determine another human being’s guilt on nothing
more than a whim; a system more worthy of Kafka than the
Constitution. With these thoughts in mind, I respectfully DIS-
SENT from today’s majority opinion.