UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4338
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL DENNIS OLDS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:96-cr-00030-F-2)
Submitted: January 28, 2011 Decided: February 15, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a hearing, the district court revoked
Michael Olds’ supervised release and sentenced him to thirty
months in prison. Olds now appeals, claiming that his sentence
is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.
At his revocation hearing, the district court found
that Olds had committed five Grade C release violations as
charged. Olds’ criminal history category was III, and his
recommended Guidelines range upon revocation of release was 5-11
months. After hearing from counsel and Olds, the court imposed
a thirty-month sentence based on the need to protect society
from Olds’ ongoing drug use and his need for intensive drug
therapy.
We will affirm a sentence imposed following revocation
of supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir 2006). Here, our review of the
record reveals that the sentence falls within the statutory
maximum of five years. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West 2000
& Supp. 2010). Further, the sentence is procedurally reasonable:
in sentencing Olds, the district court considered both the
Chapter 7 policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors that it was permitted to consider. See Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 438-40; 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e). Notably, two of those factors
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(the need to protect society and his need for intensive drug
therapy, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D)) were the
court’s stated reasons for imposing a sentence above the
recommended range. Finally, the sentence is substantively
reasonable, for the court adequately explained the sentence.
See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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