Case: 10-30192 Document: 00511382706 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/15/2011
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 15, 2011
No. 10-30192 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
MICHAEL CAULFIELD, also known as Big Mike,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Before GARZA, STEWART, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Michael Caulfield appeals the district court’s calculation of the
amount of his sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Caulfield
was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 5
grams but less than 50 grams of cocaine base and more than 500 grams but less
than 5 kilograms of cocaine hydrocholoride (Count 1), distribution of more than
5 grams but less than 50 grams of crack cocaine (Count 2), and using a
communication facility to facilitate the commission of a drug trafficking crime
(Count 3). The district court sentenced Caulfield to 275 months in prison on
Count One and Count Two and 48 months on Count Three, to be served
concurrently. Caulfield filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to
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No. 10-30192
§ 3582(c)(2), based on the United States Sentencing Commission’s retroactive
amendment to the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses. The district
court granted the motion and sentenced him to 250 months in prison. Caulfield
filed a notice of appeal, but later filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which we
granted. Caulfield then filed a motion for reconsideration in the district court,
arguing that the court had erred by applying an amendment to the Sentencing
Guidelines that was not adopted until after he initially moved for a reduction of
his sentence. He also contended that his continued good behavior in prison
warranted a further reduction. The district court rejected Caulfield’s argument
that it had relied on the incorrect Guidelines amendment, but it granted him a
further reduction to 235 months based on his good behavior. Caulfield appeals.
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the district court’s ruling.
“‘[A] judgment of conviction that includes [a sentence of imprisonment]
constitutes a final judgment’ and may not be modified by a district court except
in limited circumstances.” Dillon v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2690 (2010)
(quoting § 3582(b)). “Section 3582(c)(2) permits a district court to reduce a term
of imprisonment when it is based upon a sentencing range that has subsequently
been lowered by an amendment to the Guidelines, if such a reduction is
consistent with the policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 105 F.3d 981, 982 (5th Cir.1997). Caulfield’s
sentence was reduced pursuant to a series of amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines commonly known as the “crack cocaine amendments.” In 2007, the
Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 706, which “amended the
guidelines applicable to cocaine base (i.e., crack cocaine) offenses by raising the
quantity required to trigger each base offense level, effectively lowering each
respective sentencing range.” United States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 669 n.1 (5th
Cir. 2009) (citing U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007)). Amendment 706
was made retroactive by the subsequent Amendment 713. Id. (citing U.S.S.G.
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app. C, amend. 713 (Mar. 3, 2008)). It was soon discovered that the original
method of calculation set forth in Amendment 706 sometimes resulted in a
“sentencing anomaly” whereby some offenders did not receive the benefit of the
two-level reduction, whereas some others received “a reduction greater than
intended.” U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 715 (Reason for Amendment ¶ 1) (2008). In
order to prevent such “bizarre results,” the Sentencing Commission adopted
Amendments 715 and 716. United States v. Woods, 581 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir.
2009). Amendment 715 amended the method for calculating sentence reductions
and Amendment 716 rendered Amendment 715 retroactive. U.S.S.G. app. C,
amends. 715-716 (2008).
Caulfield argues that he is one of the handful of defendants who fared
better under Amendment 706 than under Amendment 715, and that, because
Amendment 706 was the amendment in effect at the time he brought his motion
for a sentencing reduction, he is entitled to be sentenced under that amendment.
The Government responds that the district court correctly applied Amendment
715 and that, in any event, it did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant
a more substantial reduction. Caulfield bases his argument at least in part on
the Ex Post Facto Clause. U.S. Const., art. I, § 9; see United States v. Kimler,
167 F.3d 889, 893 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A sentencing court must apply the version of
the sentencing guidelines effective at the time of sentencing unless application
of that version would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.”). We
disagree that it has any application here. “The heart of the Ex Post Facto Clause
bars application of a law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” Johnson v.
United States, 529 U.S. 694, 699 (2000) (citations, alterations, and quotation
marks omitted). “A statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause only if it
retroactively effects [a] change in the definition of respondent’s crime or
increases the punishment attached to respondent’s crime.” Wallace v.
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Quarterman, 516 F.3d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Amendment 715 did not increase Caulfield’s punishment from that
which was authorized at the time his crime was committed; to the contrary,
under Amendment 715, Caulfield was eligible to receive a reduction in his
original sentence. That he might have been eligible for a greater discretionary
reduction under Amendment 706 does not give rise to an ex post facto violation.
Nor can Caulfield rely on the intent of the Sentencing Commission or the terms
of § 3582(c)(2). A defendant may receive a § 3582(c)(2) reduction only insofar as
the reduction “is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.” Amendments 715 and 716 make clear that the
Sentencing Commission does not intend for the anomalies that arose under
Amendment 706 to persist. Applying the most recent amendments in this
situation was not error.
In light of the above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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