UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 99-20125
Summary Calendar
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In The Matter Of: RICHARD HENRY PARKER, JR.,
Debtor.
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RICHARD HENRY PARKER, JR.,
Appellant,
versus
DONALD M. LANCON; KATHLEEN ROBINSON; ROY BERT ROBINSON,
Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-97-CV-569
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March 21, 2000
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
As Judge Hittner’s opinion notes, Parker, the attorney-
appellant here, has been a party to many lawsuits and proceedings
in state courts, bankruptcy court and federal district court. In
the appeal before us, he is attempting to overcome the bankruptcy
court’s ruling that a case he attempted to pursue in state court in
Galveston was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. Parker raises only three issues on appeal:
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
the propriety of the removal; the bankruptcy court’s refusal to
abstain; and the bankruptcy court’s summary dismissal of his
claims. These issues are easily resolved.
Although the notice of removal was directed to the wrong
division of the Southern District of Texas, defendants removed the
case from state court to the bankruptcy court intending that it
should be handled by Judge Greendyke, who is presiding over
Parker’s personal bankruptcy. Any error in failing to file the
notice of appeal in the Galveston rather than the Houston division,
in both of which Judge Greendyke is an active judge, is merely
technical and bears on venue rather than the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction. Similarly, any defect in notice of the removal filed
with the Galveston state court is non-jurisdictional and factually
unsubstantiated.
The bankruptcy court did not abuse his discretion in
failing to abstain from hearing this case, which bears on an asset
allegedly belonging to the debtor’s estate and replicates a number
of previous claims asserted by Parker and rejected in the
bankruptcy court.
Finally, the bankruptcy court warned Parker as early as
its September, 1996 hearing, that the claims he asserted in the
Galveston case appeared to be barred by res judicata and collateral
estoppel. The court repeated this belief in the November
scheduling hearing. Parker was on ample notice that the court was
considering these issues, and he had plenty of time to brief them
before the court’s final order denying reconsideration was entered.
2
No reversible error is shown in any of the bankruptcy court’s
rulings or in the district court’s opinion affirming them.
AFFIRMED.
3