FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 16, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 10-1289
v. (D. Colorado)
DOMINGO FREDDIE VILLASENOR, (D.C. No. 1:10-CR-00037-PAB-1)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, ANDERSON, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10 th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Domingo Freddie Villasenor pled guilty to one count of being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one
count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to thirty-two months’
imprisonment. Arguing that his thirty-two month sentence is substantively
unreasonable, Mr. Villasenor appeals his sentence, which we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The plea agreement between the government and Mr. Villasenor stipulated
to the following relevant facts: On January 6, 2010, Pueblo, Colorado police
were patrolling the area around a bar known as Sammy’s Lounge, when a police
officer observed suspicious activity around a car. As the officer approached the
car, several people walked from the car into Sammy’s Lounge. Mr. Villasenor
remained inside the car, however, crouched down behind the front seat. When the
officer arrived at the car, Mr. Villasenor climbed over the front seat of the car,
exited through the front door and began walking away.
When the officer caught up to Mr. Villasenor, the officer could smell a
strong odor of alcohol on Mr. Villasenor’s breath and noticed that he was acting
nervous. When the police officer asked Mr. Villasenor whether he had any drugs
or weapons with him, Mr. Villasenor responded, “No.” He did, however, permit
the officer to check his pockets, where the officer discovered 2.2 grams of
methamphetamine in a front pants pocket and a handgun holster in the pocket of
his coat. Another police officer looked into the car and saw a 9mm Keltee
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handgun in plain view on the backseat floor. Officers subsequently determined
that the gun was loaded.
Mr. Villasenor was charged, as indicated, with possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm as a
previously convicted felon. His guilty plea followed.
In preparation for sentencing under the advisory United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) (2009), the United States Probation
Officer prepared a presentence report (“PSR”). The PSR calculated Mr.
Villasenor’s base offense level as 14, and then added 4 levels as a “specific
offense characteristic” under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6), for a total of 18. With a 3-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Mr. Villasenor’s total adjusted
offense level was 15. Applying a criminal history category of IV, the PSR
calculated an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of thirty to thirty-seven
months’ imprisonment.
The PSR recommended a thirty-month sentence for each count, to be served
concurrently. It noted, however, several factors which could warrant a non-
Guidelines sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): while the offense of conviction
was “relatively simple in nature,” it was “troubling because [it was] the second
occasion where the defendant was arrested with methamphetamine and a firearm
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in his possession”; 1 Mr. Villasenor was appearing “before the Court at age 30 for
sentencing on his 15th adult conviction [and his prior convictions and sentences]
appear to have had no impact on the defendant’s behavior”; Mr. Villasenor’s
background and childhood were “disconcerting,” in that he witnessed drug use
and crimes and experienced “physical abuse and little stability” in his home; and
Mr. Villasenor “could benefit from substance abuse treatment, additional
education and/or vocational training.” PSR at ¶¶ 128-131, R. Vol. 1 at 22-23.
Mr. Villasenor filed a motion for a downward departure and/or a variance
from the advisory Guidelines range. He argued that he was entitled to a departure
because, pursuant to USSG § 4A1.3(b)(1), his criminal history category IV over-
represented the seriousness of his actual prior record. Mr. Villasenor’s argument
here was that, with the exception of his prior felony possession of
methamphetamine offense that was very similar to the instant offense, the vast
majority of his prior offenses were minor. He claimed, alternatively, that he was
entitled to a downward variance in view of the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). The government opposed the motion, and the probation department
disagreed with Mr. Villasenor’s argument for a departure based on the claim that
his criminal history was over-represented.
1
As discussed more fully below, Mr. Villasenor has an extensive criminal
history, including a conviction for possessing methamphetamine while also
possessing a firearm.
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At sentencing, Mr. Villasenor addressed the court and made three specific
points in favor of a lower-than-Guidelines sentence. First, he informed the court
that, while incarcerated for the instant offense, he had obtained his GED. 2
Second, he told the court that, for the first time in his life, he had the support of
his family. Finally, he confessed that he was addicted to methamphetamine and
that he was ready and eager to participate in a rehabilitation program. He also
indicated that he was willing to have his tattoos removed as a part of his effort to
distance himself from his prior drug and crime-filled life.
After adopting the factual findings of the PSR, the district court denied
Mr. Villasenor’s motion for a departure or a variance. Its explanation was as
follows:
[T]he Court first of all finds that Category IV . . . does not
overrepresent Mr. Villasenor’s criminal history. And that’s largely
because of the fact that there are a lot of . . . convictions.
....
[S]ince his becoming an adult, he has only really skipped 2008 in
terms of receiving some type of a conviction. 2008 was a good year.
He was paroled from his drug sentence . . . in January. His parole
expired in September and he doesn’t have any arrests for the rest of
that year. But otherwise his criminal history is characterized by a lot
of different convictions, failing to appear, getting revocations of
probation and generally not displaying a willingness to abide by
either the law or orders of courts regarding his sentencing.
2
GED is the common term for a General Education Diploma, which is the
equivalent of a high school diploma.
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So the Court doesn’t believe that the motion for downward
departure is well grounded and for the exact same reasons the Court
also doesn’t believe that a variant sentence is appropriate either
because Mr. Villasenor, like his tattoos, can’t distance himself from
his criminal history category.
Tr. of Sentencing at 15-16, R. Vol. 2 at 40-41.
The court did, however, decide to sentence him “towards the bottom of the
[advisory Guidelines sentencing] range because . . . Mr. Villasenor has some
strong incentives in his life to get his act together.” Id. at 19, R. Vol. 2 at 44.
The court therefore sentenced Mr. Villasenor to thirty-two months on each count,
to be served concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release. This
appeal from his sentence followed.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Villasenor makes a single argument—that his thirty-two month
sentence is substantively unreasonable. “[S]ubstantive reasonableness addresses
whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the
case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v.
Huckins, 529 F. 3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations marks
omitted). On appeal, we presume a sentence within the properly calculated
Guideline range to be reasonable. See United States v. Kristl, 437 F. 3d 1050,
1055 (10 th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). As the Supreme Court has noted, district
courts are “in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under
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§ 3553(a) in the individual case.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Accordingly, “as long as the balance struck by the district court among the factors
set out in § 3553(a) is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly unreasonable, we
must defer to that decision even if we would not have struck the same balance in
the first instance.” United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10 th Cir. 2008).
Mr. Villasenor’s primary argument is that the court placed too much
emphasis on a negative incident in his past (his 2006 methamphetamine
conviction) and not enough emphasis on all of the positive aspects to Mr.
Villasenor’s past and his likelihood of repeating an offense. We disagree. While
the court acknowledged that many of Mr. Villasenor’s prior offenses were
misdemeanors, their negative impact was compounded by the fact that he often
missed court deadlines or failed to appear for scheduled appointments. Thus, as
the court stated, Mr. Villasenor demonstrated a persistent refusal “to abide by
either the law or orders of the court.” Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g at 16, R. Vol. 2 at
40. Furthermore, there were additional convictions in Mr. Villasenor’s past that
were not counted in calculating his criminal history. Finally, the court was
clearly troubled by Mr. Villasenor’s 2006 conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, as it was strikingly similar to the instant crime of conviction.
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In sum, we cannot say that the district court’s selected sentence was
arbitrary, capricious or manifestly unreasonable, and Mr. Villasenor has failed to
overcome the presumption that the sentence is reasonable under the § 3553(a)
factors.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the sentence is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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