IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-20567
(Summary Calendar)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JUAN ANTONIO GONZALEZ, also
known as Tony Gonzalez,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-98-CR-122-1)
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April 17, 2000
Before POLITZ, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-Appellant Juan Antonio Gonzalez appeals his jury-
trial conviction for possession of, and aiding and abetting
possession of, cocaine with intent to distribute. Gonzalez argues
that (1) the district court abused its discretion in admitting
improper “other acts” evidence, including evidence that he was
involved in prior drug transactions; (2) he was given inadequate
notice of the government’s intent to use such evidence; and (3) the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
court abused its discretion in admitting a post-arrest statement
that was more prejudicial than probative.
Assuming without deciding that the other acts evidence was
extrinsic to the instant offense, the evidence was nonetheless
admissible. At issue in the trial was whether Gonzalez knew that
a bag he transported contained cocaine. The evidence in question
was admissible to prove Gonzalez’s intent or absence of mistake, or
both. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); See United States v. Beechum, 582
F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). We conclude, under all
the circumstances of this case, including a late plea by the
testifying co-defendant, additionally that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in holding that the notice provided by the
government of its intent to use the Rule 404(b) evidence was
reasonable. And we are convinced that Gonzalez’s post-arrest
statement was probative of Gonzalez’s consciousness of guilt and
that its probative value was not outweighed by any prejudicial
effect. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
AFFIRMED.
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