In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-2343
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
S TEVEN SNODGRASS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:09-cr-30039-JPG-1—J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.
A RGUED N OVEMBER 29, 2010—D ECIDED F EBRUARY 18, 2011
Before B AUER, W OOD and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
B AUER, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Steven
Snodgrass on one count of knowingly attempting to
receive child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1) and two counts of possessing
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
The advisory United States Sentencing Guideline range
for the first count was 235 to 240 months’ imprisonment
(with a statutory cap of 20 years), and the Guideline
2 No. 10-2343
range for the remaining two counts was 120 months’
imprisonment (with a statutory cap of 10 years). The
district court judge sentenced Snodgrass to 360 months
in prison, ten years above the Guideline range. Snodgrass
appealed. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2007, postal inspectors contacted Snodgrass
via e-mail and offered to sell him pornographic videos
of Daphne (aged 10), Oxana (aged 12), and Nadia (aged
14). In September 2008, Snodgrass replied to the e-mail
and ordered three videos of Daphne. The descriptions
of these three films were drafted in such a way that
Snodgrass could not mistake the videos’ particularly
heinous content; suffice it to say that each description
portrayed Daphne, a ten-year-old, in explicit sex acts,
including masturbation, oral sex, and incestual rape.
In October 2008, postal inspectors organized a con-
trolled delivery of the three films. Approximately five
minutes after Snodgrass received the videos, postal
inspectors entered Snodgrass’ apartment and executed
a search warrant. Given the small size of the apartment,
two inspectors took Snodgrass to a public laundry room
located inside the apartment complex. They informed
Snodgrass of his Miranda rights, told him that he
was not under arrest, and explained that if Snodgrass
wanted to speak with them, he would need to do so
voluntarily. Snodgrass then waived his Miranda rights
and admitted the following: he ordered three videos
of Daphne; he purchased the money order that was used
No. 10-2343 3
to buy the three videos of Daphne; he knew that Daphne
was only ten years old; he knew that the videos con-
tained child pornography and were illegal; and he had
planned to delete the images of child pornography from
his computer before ordering the videos of Daphne, but
he changed his mind and kept these images on his com-
puter. Snodgrass filed a motion to suppress each of
these statements, but the district court denied the
motion in its entirety.
At trial, Donald Bauer testified that Snodgrass once
lived in a home owned by David Carlin and that Carlin
had access to at least one of Snodgrass’ computers. How-
ever, the district court judge prohibited Bauer from
testifying that (1) Carlin and Snodgrass’ relationship
deteriorated to the point where Carlin and Snodgrass
filed civil lawsuits against each another, and (2) Carlin
cut off Snodgrass’ power, caused a septic tank to back-
flow into Snodgrass’ house, and ripped out Snodgrass’
propane line. The district court judge excluded this testi-
mony because it was hearsay, irrelevant, and speculative.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on each count,
and the district court judge sentenced Snodgrass to
360 months in prison, a sentence which is ten years
above the Guideline range. Under this sentence, Snod-
grass will be nearly 85 years old when he is released.
Although the judge offered very little explanation for
this sentence during the sentencing hearing, he filed a
sentencing memorandum that—through its analysis
of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)—explained the defendant’s sentence in
much more detail.
4 No. 10-2343
II. DISCUSSION
The defendant makes three arguments on appeal: (1) the
district court should have granted Snodgrass’ motion to
suppress; (2) the district court should have permitted
Bauer to testify about Carlin and Snodgrass’ hostile
relationship; and (3) Snodgrass’ sentence is unreasonable.
A. Snodgrass’ Motion to Suppress
Snodgrass filed a motion to suppress the statements he
made to postal inspectors in the laundry room. The dis-
trict court denied this motion because Snodgrass
was not in custody during the interview and, even if
he was, Snodgrass voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights. We review the district court’s conclusions of law
de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United
States v. Figueroa-Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir. 2007).
Under Miranda v. Arizona, an officer cannot interview
a suspect who is in custody until the suspect is notified
of his constitutional rights to counsel and against self-
incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45
(1966). For Miranda purposes, a suspect is “in custody”
when he is “deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.” United States v. Thompson, 496 F.3d
807, 810 (7th Cir. 2007). To determine whether a
suspect was in custody, we inquire whether, under
the totality of circumstances, a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would have believed that he was
free to leave. See United States v. Budd, 549 F.3d 1140, 1145
(7th Cir. 2008). We consider such factors as “whether
No. 10-2343 5
the encounter occurred in a public place; whether the
suspect consented to speak with the officers; whether
the officers informed the individual that he was not
under arrest and was free to leave; whether the indi-
vidual was moved to another area; whether there was
a threatening presence of several officers and a dis-
play of weapons or physical force; and whether the offi-
cers’ tone of voice was such that their requests were
likely to be obeyed.” Thompson, 496 F.3d at 810.
Snodgrass contends that he was “in custody” when
he admitted to ordering the three pornographic films of
Daphne. We disagree. The following facts are undis-
puted: inspectors took Snodgrass to the laundry room
because Snodgrass’ very small apartment was in the
process of being searched by four postal inspectors;
the laundry room was a public space that remained
open to the public during the interview; the door to
the laundry room was open at all times; nothing ever
blocked Snodgrass’ path to the door; officers told
Snodgrass that he was not under arrest and that they
would interview him only if he consented; Snodgrass
signed a waiver of his Miranda rights; only two in-
spectors interviewed Snodgrass; although the inspec-
tors’ weapons were visible, they were holstered during
the entire interview; and the inspectors never handcuffed
or physically restrained Snodgrass. At no time did the
inspectors raise their voices, encourage Snodgrass to
speak, coerce Snodgrass into speaking, restrain Snod-
grass, threaten Snodgrass, verbally or physically abuse
Snodgrass, or otherwise give Snodgrass a reason to feel
intimidated. Thus, although the defendant subjectively
6 No. 10-2343
felt intimidated, we find that a reasonable person in
Snodgrass’ position would have felt free to leave, and
we affirm the district court’s finding that Snodgrass
was not in custody. See, e.g., Budd, 549 F.3d at 1144-45;
Thompson, 496 F.3d at 811; United States v. Barker, 467
F.3d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Matchopatow,
17 Fed. Appx. 425, 430-31 (7th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 537 (7th Cir. 1999).1 For the
same reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Snodgrass’ motion to suppress.
Nevertheless, even if Snodgrass was in custody,
Snodgrass’ statements were admissible at trial because
he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. A person may
waive his Miranda rights only if the waiver is done
1
Snodgrass’ reliance on United States v. Slaight is misplaced.
620 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2010). In Slaight, police officers reserved
a small police station interview room prior to executing a
search warrant, took the defendant from his home to the
interview room without arresting him, and questioned him
without first explaining his Miranda rights. In fact, the officers
planned and executed the entire day so as to procure the
defendant’s statements without first informing him of his
Miranda rights. This case is unlike Slaight because (1) inspectors
asked Snodgrass to go to the laundry room only because his
small apartment was being searched by four postal in-
spectors; (2) the laundry room—which was open to the
public—was merely a few steps away from his apartment;
(3) although Snodgrass was never arrested, inspectors
informed him of his Miranda rights and told him that any
interview would need to be voluntary; and (4) Snodgrass
waived his Miranda rights.
No. 10-2343 7
“voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” United States
v. Carson, 582 F.3d 827, 833 (7th Cir. 2009). When deter-
mining whether a waiver is voluntary, we look to
whether, “under all the circumstances, [the confession]
is the ‘product of a rational intellect and free will and
not the result of physical abuse, psychological abuse,
psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation
tactics that have overcome the defendant’s free will.’ ” Id.
at 833 (quoting United States v. Dillon, 150 F.3d 754, 757
(7th Cir. 1998)). Coercion is an essential element, and
we determine whether police coerced a suspect by exam-
ining the facts of the case, including “the defendant’s
age, education, intelligence level, and mental state; the
length of the defendant’s detention, the nature of the
interrogations; the inclusion of advice about constitu-
tional rights; and the use of physical punishment, in-
cluding deprivation of food or sleep.’ ” Id. (quoting
United States v. Huerta, 239 F.3d 865, 871 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Snodgrass argues that his waiver was involuntary
and that his statements to postal inspectors were thus
inadmissible. We disagree. Snodgrass was 58 years old
at the time of the interview, he possessed a high school
diploma, and he worked for Wal-Mart and a trucking
company. During the interview itself, there was no in-
dication that Snodgrass was mentally impaired or under
the influence of drugs or alcohol. Postal inspectors in-
formed Snodgrass that he was not under arrest and that
if he would like to speak to them, he would need to do
so voluntarily. After acknowledging that he was “very
familiar” with his Miranda rights, Snodgrass thought-
fully deliberated about whether he wanted to waive
8 No. 10-2343
them. And when Snodgrass finally decided to waive his
Miranda rights, his decision was not a result of mental
or physical harm. Although Snodgrass felt intimidated
by the postal inspectors, graduated at the bottom of his
high school class, and suffered from various health prob-
lems, these facts do not indicate that postal inspectors
coerced Snodgrass into waiving his Miranda rights. With-
out coercion, we cannot find that Snodgrass’ waiver
was involuntary. We therefore affirm the district court’s
ruling that Snodgrass voluntarily waived his Miranda
rights and the district court’s denial of Snodgrass’
motion to suppress.
B. Bauer’s Testimony
Snodgrass contends that the district court should have
permitted Bauer to testify about Carlin’s hostile relation-
ship with Snodgrass. We review the district court’s deci-
sion to exclude this testimony for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Price, 516 F.3d 597, 603 (7th Cir. 2008).
During an offer of proof, Bauer testified that although
he did not personally know why Carlin and Snodgrass’
relationship deteriorated, he had heard that Carlin cut
off Snodgrass’ power, caused a septic tank to backflow
into Snodgrass’ residence, and ripped out Snodgrass’
propane line. The district court judge ruled that Bauer
could not testify about these events or the breakdown
of Snodgrass and Carlin’s relationship because it was
“based upon hearsay and speculation and not of per-
sonal knowledge.” Report of Proceedings of Trial Testi-
mony at 189, United States v. Snodgrass, (No. 09-30039).
No. 10-2343 9
Snodgrass argues that this ruling was improper be-
cause the judge improperly excluded testimony on an
entire subject area instead of ruling on every question
when it was asked. We reject this argument. First, there
is no rule which imposes upon a judge the tedious task
of ruling on every question after it is asked, as opposed
to prohibiting testimony about a particular hearsay
matter ex ante. Second, Snodgrass mischaracterized the
district court’s ruling. The judge did not prohibit every
conceivable witness from testifying about Carlin and
Snodgrass’ relationship, thereby excluding an entire
subject area; he merely excluded Bauer’s hearsay testi-
mony and ruled that Bauer could not testify about facts
not within his personal knowledge. This ruling is consis-
tent with the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed R. Evid.
802; Fed. R. Evid. 602; Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d
64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995). We therefore affirm the district
court, finding no abuse of discretion.
C. Snodgrass’ Sentence
Snodgrass contends that his sentence is unreasonable
because the district court inadequately explained his
sentence. We review the reasonableness of Snodgrass’
sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jackson,
547 F.3d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 2008).
At the time of sentencing, a judge must “state in
open court the reasons for its imposition of the par-
ticular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The brevity or length of the
judge’s explanation depends on the circumstances of the
10 No. 10-2343
case, but “[t]he sentencing judge should set forth enough
to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exer-
cising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551
U.S. at 356. Generally, a significant departure from the
Guidelines will require more explanation than a small
departure. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)
(stating that the explanation should be “sufficiently
compelling to support the degree of the variance”).
In this case, the district court judge sentenced Snodgrass
to 360 months in prison, a sentence which was ten years
above the advisory Guideline range. At the sentencing
hearing, the judge explained the upward variance by
stating,
Mr. Snodgrass, there’s not a whole lot I’m going
to say. I listened to the trial, have seen the evidence
at the sentencing hearing. You are definitely a
scourge on society. You are a sick-o. You’re a sex-
ually dangerous person who, in the opinion of this
Court, should never be allowed the freedom to
abuse children again. You may be beyond redemp-
tion, but that’s not for me to decide. There’s good
and evil in this world, and you fit the bill of being evil.
There’s not a [§] 3553(a) factor that doesn’t cry out
for a sentence that will result in your incarceration
the better part of the rest of your life.
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 28-29. Subsequently,
the judge filed a written document that explained
Snodgrass’ sentence through a fact-intensive analysis of
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. This document high-
No. 10-2343 11
lighted the following facts as particularly significant:
Snodgrass was an incestual rapist who abused his
sister, niece, and great-nieces; Snodgrass possessed over
7,000 pornographic images of children, a number which
is ten times larger than the amount required to receive
a maximum enhancement under the Guidelines; Snod-
grass regularly abused four individuals—including his
sister, who he began raping when they were still chil-
dren—while the Guidelines authorize a maximum en-
hancement when the defendant engages in only two
incidents of sexual abuse; Snodgrass engaged in a
lifelong pattern of abusive behavior against minors,
leaving a trail of sexual abuse victims across the
United States; Snodgrass made videos of female
children which focused primarily on their breasts and
genitals; and despite the overwhelming evidence of
sexual abuse and the alarming number of victims who
testified at the sentencing hearing, Snodgrass continues
to deny his behavior. Given these facts and the district
court’s well-reasoned written analysis of the § 3553(a)
factors, we cannot say that the court abused its discre-
tion in sentencing Snodgrass to 360 months in prison,
and we affirm this sentence as reasonable.
We caution, however, that name-calling is not a substi-
tute for reasoned analysis. Regardless of the heinous
nature of the crime, every defendant is entitled to a
reasoned explanation of his sentence. This ensures mean-
ingful appellate review and promotes the perception of
fair sentencing. During Snodgrass’ sentencing hearing,
the judge uttered an explanation that provided no guid-
ance on appeal and served only to insult the defendant.
12 No. 10-2343
Such an explanation is inadequate under the law and
incompatible with of our system of justice. While the
judge’s written explanation of Snodgrass’ sentence pre-
served meaningful appellate review, we lament the
need for it in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court properly denied Snodgrass’ motion to
suppress, excluded Bauer’s hearsay testimony, and im-
posed a reasonable sentence. We therefore A FFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
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