Brandt v. Gooding

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DONALD BRANDT, 
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
ELIZABETH K. GOODING; GOODING
& GOODING PA,
Movants-Appellants,  No. 09-7907
and
JONATHAN E. OZMINT; TOM CARTER,
Sheriff Allendale County;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Respondents.

2 BRANDT v. GOODING

DONALD BRANDT, 
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN E. OZMINT; TOM CARTER,
Sheriff Allendale County,
Respondents-Appellants,
and  No. 09-7909
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Respondent,
ELIZABETH K. GOODING; GOODING
& GOODING PA,
Movants.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.
Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(6:06-cv-01938-HFF)

Argued: December 7, 2010

Decided: February 18, 2011

Before MOTZ, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opin-
ion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Keenan joined.
 BRANDT v. GOODING 3
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Donald John Zelenka, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Colum-
bia, South Carolina; Daniel A. Speights, SPEIGHTS &
RUNYAN, Hampton, South Carolina, for Appellants. James
Mixon Griffin, LAW OFFICES OF JAMES MIXON GRIF-
FIN, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: A.
Gibson Solomons, SPEIGHTS & RUNYAN, Hampton, South
Carolina, for Appellants Elizabeth K. Gooding and Gooding
& Gooding PA. Henry D. McMaster, Attorney General, John
W. McIntosh, Chief Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants Jonathan E. Ozmint
and Tom Carter. Margaret N. Fox, GRIFFIN LLC, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.

OPINION

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

Donald Brandt instituted a legal malpractice suit against
Elizabeth Gooding and her law firm, Gooding & Gooding PA,
(collectively "Gooding") in South Carolina state court after
Gooding represented Brandt in the closing of a real estate
transaction. During the course of that proceeding, the state
court summarily found Brandt guilty of criminal contempt
and sentenced him to six months’ imprisonment for introduc-
ing a letter, which the court deemed to be fraudulent, into the
record at a deposition. Brandt appealed his contempt convic-
tion, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Car-
olina. See Brandt v. Gooding, 630 S.E.2d 259 (S.C. 2006).
Subsequently, Brandt filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina.
4 BRANDT v. GOODING
Once in federal court, Brandt filed a motion for summary
judgment, which a United States Magistrate Judge recom-
mended granting based on his conclusion that the contempt
proceedings in South Carolina state court violated Brandt’s
due process rights. Gooding subsequently moved to intervene
in Brandt’s federal habeas proceeding in order to file a memo-
randum of observations regarding certain allegedly misrepre-
sented facts in the case. The district court ultimately granted
summary judgment in Brandt’s favor and denied Gooding’s
motion to intervene, although the court "construed [Good-
ing’s] submissions as amicus briefs." Brandt v. Ozmint, 664
F. Supp. 2d 626, 632 (D.S.C. 2009). On appeal, Brandt’s cus-
todians challenge the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment in his favor, while Gooding contests the court’s denial
of her motion to intervene.1 For the reasons stated herein, we
affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

The facts of this case are well summarized in the opinion
of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, see Brandt, S.E.2d
at 260-61, and the report and recommendation issued by the
United States Magistrate Judge. See Brandt, 664 F. Supp. 2d
at 633-37. Accordingly, we outline only the facts necessary to
decide the issues presented in this appeal.

A. Proceedings in the State Trial Court

Gooding represented Brandt, among other parties, during a
land transaction conducted in Allendale County, South Caro-
lina. Brandt subsequently filed a malpractice suit in South
Carolina state court alleging Gooding breached her fiduciary
duty, was guilty of negligence, and joined in a civil conspir-
acy against him. Gooding, in turn, filed counterclaims for
slander and malicious prosecution.
1
In this case, Brandt’s custodians are Jonathan Ozmint, the Director of
the South Carolina Department of Corrections, and Tom Carter, the Sher-
iff of Allendale County, South Carolina.
 BRANDT v. GOODING 5
During the discovery phase of the litigation, Brandt pro-
vided a letter to his malpractice expert, John Freeman, which
appeared to have been sent to Brandt by the lender used to
conduct the real estate transaction at issue. The letter, if valid,
was evidence that Gooding conducted the land deal with
knowledge of a conflict of interest related to her representa-
tion of Brandt. At his deposition, Freeman relied on the letter
in opining that Gooding had committed legal malpractice.

After Gooding learned of the letter’s existence, her counsel
filed a petition for rule to show cause that asked the state
court to hold Brandt in contempt of court unless he could
establish the letter was authentic. Because the case was sched-
uled to go to trial shortly, the state court dismissed the petition
without prejudice based on its conclusion that "a contempt
proceeding [was] premature until after the trial of th[e] case."
Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 159. Gooding thereafter deposed
the purported author of the letter and his secretary, both of
whom testified that the letter was not genuine, as it was nei-
ther written nor signed by them. Gooding also hired an expert,
Marvin Dawson, to examine the letter and he concluded the
letter was counterfeit.

Brandt’s counsel subsequently moved to withdraw. The
state court granted the motion and gave Brandt sixty days to
retain new counsel. After this sixty-day period had elapsed
and a new judge had been assigned to the case, Gooding filed
a motion for summary judgment and a motion for contempt,
sanctions, and dismissal of the complaint ("motion for con-
tempt"). Gooding’s motion for contempt represented to the
state court that criminal contempt proceedings against Brandt
might be appropriate. See id. at 234 ("It is well within the
power and discretion of a circuit court judge to impose a sen-
tence of imprisonment for contempt of court.").

The clerk of the state court scheduled a hearing at which
the state judge would "hear all pending motions in the" case
and mailed a letter notifying the parties five days in advance
6 BRANDT v. GOODING
of that hearing. Id. at 239. That same day, Gooding’s counsel
mailed a letter to the state judge, which contained a copy of
Gooding’s motion for contempt and memorandum of law in
support thereof. Copies of this letter were forwarded to Brandt
and his new counsel.

In federal district court, Gooding presented additional evi-
dence indicating that Brandt was aware the state court would
consider her motion for contempt along with the other pend-
ing motions in the case. This evidence, gained through dis-
covery related to Gooding’s counterclaims for slander and
malicious prosecution, consisted of two notations Brandt
made on faxes sent to his expert witness. The first notation
states "[t]hey have proposed two motions to have [the] case
thrown out and then have me locked up," id. at 1169, while
the second indicates "[t]hey want to take me to the slau[-
gh]ter." Id. at 1173. Both of these comments were written in
advance of the state court hearing date.

At the scheduled hearing before the state court, Brandt
appeared with new counsel who told the court that his repre-
sentation of Brandt extended only to having the allegedly
fraudulent letter examined, as his prior relationship with
Gooding precluded any further involvement in the case. The
state court resolved the matter by taking the letter into court
custody and relieving Brandt’s new counsel. Dawson then tes-
tified regarding his findings that the letter was fraudulent and
that it did not contain an authentic signature. The state court
subsequently recessed the proceedings in order to provide
Brandt’s new expert, Hans Gideon, with an opportunity to
examine the letter. Gideon declined to testify, however, due
to a lack of adequate equipment to perform an analysis of the
letter.

Once the hearing reconvened, the state court denied
Brandt’s request for a continuance to obtain counsel and
informed him that he would have to proceed pro se. Brandt
attempted to cross-examine Dawson and asked if Gideon
 BRANDT v. GOODING 7
could also cross-examine Dawson, a request the state court
denied. Gooding’s counsel subsequently proceeded to sum-
marize the deposition testimony from lay witnesses and other
corroborating evidence indicating that the letter was fraudu-
lent.

Gooding’s counsel concluded by asking the state court to
find Brandt in contempt of court, grant summary judgment in
favor of Gooding, and order Brandt to pay Gooding’s costs
and attorneys’ fees. He also reminded the state court of its
"authority to impose . . . criminal contempt sanctions." Id. at
364. This was the first reference to "criminal contempt" at the
motions hearing.

Brandt was then provided an opportunity to present argu-
ment. He asserted that he made substantial, but unsuccessful,
efforts to obtain counsel and that he did not come to the hear-
ing prepared for a trial. Brandt then proceeded to reaffirm his
testimony that the letter was genuine and that his malpractice
suit had merit.

After a short recess, the state court found that the evidence
was "absolutely overwhelming" that Brandt perpetrated "a
fraud" upon the court. It consequently held Brandt in "direct
contempt." Id. at 377. The state court then provided Brandt an
opportunity to speak "concerning the sentence, and/or sanc-
tions for contempt of court." Id. Brandt proclaimed his inno-
cence and stated that he had not received "a fair trial . . .
without any representation." Id. at 379. Thereafter, the state
court sentenced Brandt to "six months in the State Department
of Corrections" and granted summary judgment in Gooding’s
favor on Brandt’s malpractice claim. Id. at 380.

B. Proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Carolina

The Supreme Court of South Carolina accepted a direct
appeal of Brandt’s conviction for criminal contempt. In that
appeal, Brandt argued that the state trial court "erred in issu-
8 BRANDT v. GOODING
ing a citation for constructive criminal contempt as a result of
a summary proceeding in which [he] was afforded none of the
procedural safeguards required by due process, including
notice, counsel, and an opportunity to be heard in his
defense." J.A. at 71. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina affirmed Brandt’s conviction of criminal contempt,
explaining its reasoning as follows:

Direct contempt involves contemptuous conduct
in the presence of the court. A person may be found
guilty of direct contempt if the conduct interferes
with judicial proceedings, exhibits disrespect for the
court, or hampers the parties or witnesses. Direct
contempt that occurs in the court’s presence may be
immediately adjudged and sanctioned summarily.

South Carolina courts have always taken a liberal
and expansive view of the "presence" and "court"
requirements. The "presence of the court" extends
beyond the mere physical presence of the judge or
the courtroom to encompass all elements of the sys-
tem.

This Court has recognized that depositions are
judicial proceedings and are within the "presence of
the court." . . . Because there is no presiding author-
ity, it is even more incumbent upon attorneys to con-
duct themselves in a professional and civil manner
during a deposition.

In the present case, the record shows that Brandt
presented a fraudulent document to the court. The
document was introduced at the deposition of Pro-
fessor John Freeman. . . . Further, the record shows
that Brandt was the sole cause of the introduction of
the document into this case when he provided a sup-
plemental response to the request to produce one day
before Professor Freeman’s deposition. We hold that
 BRANDT v. GOODING 9
the introduction of the document into the deposition
constituted an introduction of the document into the
presence of the court, warranting a citation for direct
contempt.

Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err
in citing Brandt for direct criminal contempt.

Brandt, 630 S.E.2d at 264 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).

Brandt subsequently filed a petition for rehearing, urging
the Supreme Court of South Carolina to "reconsider its hold-
ing [that] any contempt which affects any element of the judi-
cial system is a direct contempt, regardless of exigency and
regardless of whether the situation was amenable to signifi-
cant delay which would allow the accused the protections of
notice, counsel, and an opportunity to be heard." J.A. at 144.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina denied the petition for
rehearing. See Brandt, 630 S.E.2d at 259, reh’g denied, June
7, 2006.

C. Proceedings in Federal District Court

After the Supreme Court of South Carolina’s affirmance of
his criminal contempt conviction, Brandt filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He
argued "that his conviction and sentence [were] contrary to
the Constitution of the United States," based on, inter alia, a
denial of due process, including the denial of his rights to "no-
tice, counsel, and an opportunity to be heard on the charge of
criminal contempt." J.A. at 13-14.
2
Brandt also filed a motion for bond in the district court, which the court
granted. Upon posting a $50,000 secured bond, Brandt was released from
custody. He remains free on bond pending resolution of this appeal.
10 BRANDT v. GOODING
Brandt ultimately filed a motion for summary judgment,
which the district court referred to a United States Magistrate
Judge for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate judge recognized that "[i]t is
only where the contempt behavior occurs within the view of
the judge so that the judge has personal knowledge of the con-
duct that due process procedural safeguards are dispensed."
Brandt, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (citing Cooke v. United States,
267 U.S. 517, 536-37 (1925)).

Because the state court’s knowledge of the letter’s fraudu-
lent nature hinged on expert testimony, the magistrate judge
determined that Brandt was not guilty of direct criminal con-
tempt, as that phrase has been defined by the Supreme Court
of the United States. Brandt was consequently "entitled to due
process safeguards." Id. at 641. After surveying the record,
the magistrate judge reached the conclusion that Brandt had
been deprived of these "basic rights." Id. at 645. He accord-
ingly recommended the district court grant Brandt’s motion
for summary judgment. Gooding subsequently filed a motion
to intervene in Brandt’s habeas proceeding under the Criminal
Victims Rights Act ("CVRA" or "the Act"), see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771, in order to correct various "factual inaccuracies" she
identified in the magistrate judge’s report and recommenda-
tion.

Once Brandt’s custodians had filed their objections to the
report and recommendation, the district court proceeded to
review the magistrate judge’s conclusions de novo. The dis-
trict court similarly concluded that "[a]ssuming . . . the South
Carolina Supreme Court adjudicated [Brandt’s] due process
claim on the merits . . . , its holding was contrary to or unrea-
sonably applied controlling federal law." Brandt, 664 F. Supp.
2d at 630. As the district court explained,

[t]he trial judge did not have personal knowledge
that [Brandt] forged the letter, but instead had to rely
on the testimony of a document expert and evidence
 BRANDT v. GOODING 11
put forth by [Gooding]. Without the trial judge hav-
ing personal knowledge, the contempt cannot be said
to have occurred under the eye or within the view of
the court, and therefore, it did not occur in open
court. Because the contempt occurred outside of
open court, [Brandt] was entitled to his due process
rights, and as described by the Magistrate Judge,
[Brandt] was denied many of his rights, including his
rights to counsel, notice, and the opportunity to be
heard. Hence, by upholding the proceeding where
the trial judge denied [Brandt] many of his due pro-
cess rights when convicting him of criminal con-
tempt that occurred outside of open court, the South
Carolina Supreme Court arrived at a decision that
was contrary to or unreasonably applied controlling
federal law.

Id. at 631.

As to Gooding’s motion to intervene, the district court held
that Gooding essentially sought "to add to the factual record"
and that this interest failed "to satisfy the requirements for
intervention of right or permissive intervention" under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Id. at 632. The court indicated,
however, that it had "construed [Gooding’s] submissions as
amicus briefs." Id.

Brandt’s custodians and Gooding noted timely appeals over
which we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 &
2253(a).

II.

On appeal, Brandt’s custodians argue that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment in Brandt’s favor. They
first contend that the Supreme Court of South Carolina’s
determination that Brandt is guilty of "direct criminal con-
tempt [is] a matter of substantive state law" that is "due
12 BRANDT v. GOODING
appropriate deference in these proceedings." Opening Br. at
20. For this reason, Brandt’s custodians would have us affirm
the Supreme Court of South Carolina’s apparent conclusion
that Brandt was not entitled to traditional due process protec-
tions.3 In the alternative, Brandt’s custodians maintain that we
should reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment
because "evidence in the record . . . shows Brandt had ade-
quate notice of the contempt charges," "waived his right to
have counsel represent him by failing to retain counsel," and
"had an adequate opportunity to be heard on th[e] contempt
motion." Id. at 20-21.

Brandt, in response, argues that the Supreme Court of
South Carolina did not address his due process claim on the
merits and that our review should therefore be de novo. If we
hold to the contrary, however, Brandt maintains that the
Supreme Court of South Carolina reached a ruling that was
contrary to and/or involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established Supreme Court precedent. In his view, the
Court’s opinion in Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517
(1925) "establishes that [he] was entitled to [d]ue [p]rocess
guarantees at his contempt hearing" and that summary judg-
ment in his favor is appropriate because the record discloses
that he "was convicted and sentenced in violation of his [d]ue
[p]rocess rights." Response Br. at 22.

For her part, Gooding argues that the district court erred in
denying her request to intervene in this action under the
CVRA. She accordingly asks that we reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment and remand with instruc-
tions to "permit the intervention, allow reasonable discovery,
3
See Opening Br. at 20 ("[This case] concerns a legal conclusion by the
South Carolina Supreme Court in the appeal from th[e] civil action that the
actions of Brandt in presenting a false document was a direct criminal con-
tempt of court and that due process was not required. The Appellant
asserts that this conclusion of direct criminal contempt was a matter of
substantive state law and a correct interpretation of state law and due
appropriate deference in these proceedings.").
 BRANDT v. GOODING 13
and conduct an evidentiary hearing." Movants’ Opening Br.
at 31.

III.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 "applies to habeas pro-
ceedings." Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407, 412 (4th Cir.
1991). Accordingly, "[w]e review a district court’s grant of a
motion for summary judgment in habeas proceedings de
novo," Bostick v. Stevenson, 589 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir.
2009), in determining whether the moving party has demon-
strated that "no genuine issue of material fact remains for
trial." Res. Bankshares Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,
407 F.3d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 2005).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA") places an additional constraint on our ability to
grant habeas relief, however, in cases in which a state court
has adjudicated a petitioner’s claim on the merits. In these cir-
cumstances, the petitioner must show not only that "he is in
[state] custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or trea-
ties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), but also that
the state court’s decision was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," id.
§ 2254(d)(1)), or "resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented in the State court proceeding." Id.
§ 2254(d)(2); see also Cummings v. Polk, 475 F.3d 230, 237
(4th Cir. 2007).

In this case, the parties dispute whether the Supreme Court
of South Carolina adjudicated Brandt’s due process claim on
the merits. See, e.g., Opening Br. at 29 ("Respondent asserts
that Section 2254 deference is required."); Response Br. at 25
("[T]he facts of this case warrant a de novo review because
the South Carolina Supreme Court did not adjudicate Brandt’s
[d]ue [p]rocess claims on their merits.") (emphasis omitted).
14 BRANDT v. GOODING
We deem it unnecessary to decide this issue. As explained
below, even if we assume the more stringent AEDPA stan-
dard applies, Brandt has shown that the Supreme Court of
South Carolina’s decision is contrary to clearly established
precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States.

IV.

We now turn to the question of whether the South Carolina
state court correctly employed a summary contempt proceed-
ing, or whether Brandt was entitled to traditional due process
protections before being adjudged guilty of criminal con-
tempt. The seminal case on a defendant’s due process rights
in criminal contempt proceedings is the Supreme Court’s
decision in Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 (1925),
which involved a lawyer who sent a "contemptuous" letter to
a federal district judge. After receiving the letter, the district
judge summarily found the lawyer guilty of criminal contempt
and sentenced him to thirty days’ imprisonment. See id. at
527.

The Supreme Court held that although courts have the
power to summarily find an individual guilty of criminal con-
tempt, this abbreviated procedure only complies with due pro-
cess if the misconduct at issue occurs "directly under the eye
or within the view of the court" in circumstances in which the
court may proceed "upon its own knowledge of the facts,
without further proof, without issue or trial, and without hear-
ing an explanation of the motives of the offender." Id. at 535.
Otherwise, "[d]ue process of law . . . requires that the accused
. . . be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportu-
nity to meet them by way of defense or explanation." Id. at
537. Cooke thus established that an individual accused of
criminal contempt in federal court is entitled to traditional due
process protections, including "the assistance of counsel, if
requested and the right to call witnesses," id. at 537, unless
his misconduct occurs "‘under the eye or within the view of
the court.’" Id. at 536. Because the district court proceedings
 BRANDT v. GOODING 15
in Cooke failed to comport with this standard, the Supreme
Court reversed the lawyer’s criminal contempt conviction and
remanded for trial before a different district judge. See id. at
539.

Twenty-three years later in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948), the Supreme Court clarified that the same due process
rights apply, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to individuals
accused of criminal contempt in state court.4 In re Oliver
involved a Michigan state judge acting as a "‘one-man grand
jury’" who disbelieved an individual’s testimony based, in
part, on the testimony of another witness. See id. at 258. The
state judge "immediately charged [the witness] with con-
tempt, immediately convicted him, and immediately sen-
tenced him to sixty days in jail." Id. at 259. The Supreme
Court held that the state court’s failure to afford the witness
"a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the
charge of false and evasive swearing was a denial of due pro-
cess of law." Id. at 273.

The In re Oliver Court emphasized that summary criminal
contempt proceedings are available only in limited circum-
stances where an individual’s misconduct not only occurs
"within the ‘personal view’ of the judge, ‘under his own
eye,’" id. at 274, but also "disturbs the court’s business." Id.
at 275. Unless "all of the essential elements of the misconduct
. . . are actually observed by the court" and "immediate pun-
ishment is essential to prevent ‘demoralization of the court’s
authority,’" id., an individual must be afforded "reasonable
notice of [the] charge against him[ ] and an opportunity to be
heard in his defense," including "a right to examine the wit-
4
See also Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982 (1997) (reviewing a crimi-
nal contempt conviction entered by a California trial court); Bloom v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (reviewing a criminal contempt conviction
entered by an Illinois trial court); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964)
(reviewing a criminal contempt conviction entered by a New York trial
court); Fisher v. Pace 336 U.S. 155 (1949) (reviewing a criminal contempt
conviction entered by a Texas trial court).
16 BRANDT v. GOODING
nesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented
by counsel."5 Id. at 273. Because In re Oliver involved a fac-
tual scenario in which "essential elements" of the witness’
alleged "offense" were not within the personal knowledge of
the judge, thus requiring the judge to "depend upon state-
ments made by others for his knowledge," id. at 275, the
Supreme Court held that the witness should have been "ac-
corded notice and a fair hearing." Id. at 275-76.

The same reasoning evident in Cooke and In re Oliver
applies to the case at bar. Brandt’s alleged offense consisted
of knowingly introducing a fraudulent letter into the state
court proceedings. The judge’s knowledge of the letter’s
fraudulent nature depended, however, on the testimony of oth-
ers, including the views of an expert witness. And the alleg-
edly criminal act of knowingly introducing the fraudulent
letter into the state court proceedings occurred in a deposition,
not in open court. We therefore cannot conclude that "all of
the essential elements of [Brandt’s alleged] misconduct"
occurred "under the eye of the court," as the judge "depend-
[ed] upon statements made by others for his knowledge." Id.
at 275. Accordingly, clearly established Supreme Court prece-
dent required that Brandt receive the traditional protections
5
The Supreme Court later held that additional rights, not at issue in this
appeal, adhere to a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding. The
Court in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787
(1987) summarized those rights as follows:
[T]his Court has found that defendants in criminal contempt pro-
ceedings must be presumed innocent, prove[n] guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and accorded the right to refuse to testify
against [themselves]; must be advised of charges, have a reason-
able opportunity to respond to them, and be permitted the assis-
tance of counsel and the right to call witnesses; must be given a
public trial before an unbiased judge; and must be afforded a jury
trial for serious contempts.
Id. at 798-99 (internal citations omitted).
 BRANDT v. GOODING 17
provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.6

The relevant question thus becomes whether the proceed-
ings in the South Carolina trial court afforded Brandt his due
process rights to "reasonable notice of [the] charge against
him[ ] and an opportunity to be heard in his defense," includ-
ing "a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer tes-
timony, and to be represented by counsel." Id. at 273. We
conclude that the state court proceedings in this case did not
do so. Although Brandt’s custodians point to various commu-
nications related to Gooding’s motion for contempt as evi-
dence that Brandt had prior notice of the criminal contempt
charge made against him, this argument misconceives the true
nature of a criminal contempt charge and the type of notice
to which Brandt was constitutionally entitled.

The judicial contempt power’s "great and only purpose is
to secure judicial authority from obstruction in the perfor-
mance of its duties." Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383
(1919). "The exercise of this power has a two-fold aspect,
namely: first, the proper punishment of the guilty party for his
disrespect to the court or its order, and the second, to compel
his performance of some act or duty required of him by the
court, which he refuses to perform." In re Chiles, 89 U.S. 157,
168 (1874). In short, the contempt power’s sole function is to
punish an "act derogatory to the power and authority of the
court." Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 155 U.S. 3,
5 (1894).
6
We must therefore disagree with the Supreme Court of South Caroli-
na’s apparent conclusion that the nature of Brandt’s alleged misconduct
allowed the state trial court to employ summary criminal contempt pro-
ceedings. Although the Supreme Court of South Carolina may conclu-
sively define the term "direct criminal contempt" for purposes of state law,
the clearly established precedent of the Supreme Court of the United
States gives that term an invariable meaning in the context of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
18 BRANDT v. GOODING
More specifically, a criminal contempt charge "initiate[s] ‘a
separate and independent proceeding at law . . . to vindicate
the authority of the court’ [that is] ‘not a part of the original
[case].’" Bray v. United States, 423 U.S. 73, 75 (1975) (quot-
ing Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445
(1911)). Criminal contempt proceedings are thus initiated at
the sole discretion of the court and are "not dependent on the
[success] or even the continuation of the" underlying suit. Id.
at 76. Indeed, the very "purpose of a criminal court is not to
provide a forum for the ascertainment of private rights" but
"to vindicate the public interest in the enforcement of the
criminal law." Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25
(1980) (quotations omitted).

Any suggestions Gooding may have made to the effect that
Brandt was guilty of criminal contempt are consequently
beside the point in determining whether Brandt received ade-
quate notice of the charge against him. A criminal contempt
proceeding was not Gooding’s to bring or prosecute. Only the
state trial court was empowered to initiate a criminal con-
tempt proceeding against Brandt; Gooding had no legitimate
interest in such a proceeding, nor could she — as a private lit-
igant in a civil case — provide "real notice of the true nature
of the charge against him, the first and most universally rec-
ognized requirement of due process." Smith v. O’Grady, 312
U.S. 329, 334 (1941). Only the state court could provide such
notice and it was incumbent upon that court to ensure that
Brandt was not deprived of his liberty before he received
"reasonable notice of the charge[ ] against him," Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949), and an "‘opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’" Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950)). As the Supreme Court has explained, an accused
contemnor’s "liberty is valuable and must be seen as within
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination
calls for some orderly process, however informal." Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
 BRANDT v. GOODING 19
In this case, it is undisputed that the state court failed to
provide Brandt with notice of the criminal contempt charge
before the hearing in which that charge was adjudicated. This
lack of notice deprived Brandt of an "elementary due process
protection[ ]," Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 500 n.9 (1974),
and undoubtedly compromised his further due process rights
to representation by counsel, provide testimony, and examine
the witnesses against him. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273.
We therefore conclude that the "absence of fair notice . . .
deprived [Brandt] of procedural due process," In re Ruffalo,
390 U.S. 544, 552 (1968), and affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Brandt.7

V.

We now turn to Gooding’s claim that the district court
erred in denying her motion to intervene in Brandt’s habeas
proceedings. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1) pro-
vides for "intervention as of right when a statute of the United
States confers an unconditional right to intervene." Black v.
Cent. Motor Lines, Inc., 500 F.2d 407, 408 n.2 (4th Cir. 1974)
(emphasis omitted). Gooding claims that the CVRA grants
her such a right. See Movants’ Opening Br. at 31 ("The Dis-
trict Court erred when it refused to permit the Goodings to
intervene under the Federal Crime Victims Rights Act . . . .").

The CVRA provides "crime victim[s]" in "a Federal habeas
corpus proceedings arising out of a State conviction" certain
rights, including "[t]he right to be reasonably heard at any
public proceeding in the district court involving release." 18
U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) & (b)(2)(A). For purposes of this appeal,
we assume, without deciding, that Gooding is a "crime vic-
tim" within the meaning of the Act. Nevertheless, the
CVRA’s plain language makes no reference to intervention;
7
We note that our holding in this case extends only to the prior proceed-
ings in state court and does not reach any future contempt proceedings the
state court may wish to pursue.
20 BRANDT v. GOODING
the Act therefore "grants no privilege, much less an uncondi-
tional right, to intervene." Allen Calculators, Inc. v. Nat’l
Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137, 141 (1944); see also Pann
v. Warren, No. 5:08-CV-13806, 2010 WL 2836879, at *4
(E.D. Mich. July 19, 2010) (denying the victims’ motion to
intervene but granting their "request to be heard under the
Crime Victims’ Rights Act"); United States v. Rubin, 558 F.
Supp. 2d 411, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that crime victims
"are not accorded formal party status nor . . . intervenor sta-
tus;" instead, "the CVRA appears to simply accord them
standing to vindicate their rights as victims under the [Act]").

Gooding alternatively argues that the district court deprived
her of her independent statutory "right to be reasonably heard
at any public proceeding . . . involving release." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771(a)(4). We agree with Gooding that Brandt’s habeas
petition initiated a "public proceeding" within the meaning of
the Act. First, "[c]ourt records in habeas proceedings are gen-
erally accessible to the public." Pann, 2010 WL 2836879, at
*4. Second, Congress enacted the CVRA in order "to protect
victims and guarantee them some involvement in the criminal
justice process." United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220,
234 (4th Cir. 2007). Because "[m]ost habeas cases are
resolved on the pleadings," preventing "crime victims from
submitting documents to the court in support of their right to
be heard in a habeas proceeding would effectively preclude
them from being heard at all in most cases." Pann, 2010 WL
2836879, at *4.

Third, the legislative history of the CVRA indicates that the
right to be "reasonably heard" may mean something "other
than an in-person right to be heard." United States v.
Burkholder, 590 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting 150 Cong. Rec. S10910, S10911 (daily ed.
Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl)). Indeed, "the term ‘rea-
sonably’ is meant to allow for alternative methods of commu-
nicating a victim’s views to the court when the victim is
 BRANDT v. GOODING 21
unable to attend the proceedings."8 Id. (emphasis omitted)
(quoting the statement of Sen. Kyl). The language, purpose,
and legislative history of the CVRA thus indicate that Good-
ing’s statutory right to be "reasonably heard" applied to the
habeas proceeding in this case.
In circumstances such as those present here, in which the
district court ruled on Brandt’s motion for summary judgment
based on the parties’ written submissions, we conclude the
district court fully complied with Gooding’s right to be rea-
sonably heard by construing her submissions as amicus briefs.
Congress intended the CVRA to allow "the victim[s] of
crime, or their counsel, . . . to provide any information, as
well as their opinion, directly to the court concerning the
release, plea, or sentencing of the accused." Id. at 1075 (quot-
ing the statement of Sen. Kyl). The district court’s review of
Gooding’s submissions as amicus briefs was fully commensu-
rate with this purpose and provided Gooding a full and fair
opportunity, under the CVRA, to provide information and
communicate her views to the court.9 Thus, we conclude the
district court did not err in denying Gooding’s motion to inter-
vene.
VI.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the district court.
AFFIRMED
8
See also Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d
1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[V]ictims should always be given the power
to determine the form of the statement. . . . The Committee does not intend
that the right to be heard be limited to ‘written’ statements, because the
victim may wish to communicate in other appropriate ways." (quoting S.
Rep. No. 108-191, at 38 (2003))).
9
Because Gooding has presented no evidence that the district court
failed to "treat[ ] [her] with fairness and with respect for [her] dignity and
privacy," we conclude there is no merit to her suggestion that the district
court violated § 3771(a)(8) & (b)(2)(a) of the Act.