FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 414, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF No. 09-35472
PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, an agency of
the State of Washington; D.C. No.
3:09-cv-05009-RBL
WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, an OPINION
agency of the State of
Washington,
Defendants-Appellees,
S.G. AND A.G.,
Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
October 8, 2010—Seattle, Washington
Filed February 22, 2011
2755
2756 LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL v. SUPERINTENDENT
Before: Sidney R. Thomas and Milan D. Smith, Jr.,
Circuit Judges, and Raner C. Collins, District Judge.*
Opinion by Judge Thomas
*The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL v. SUPERINTENDENT 2757
COUNSEL
James J. Dionne and Lynette M. Baisch, Seattle Washington,
for the appellant.
Dierk J. Meierbachtol and Kyle J. Crews, Office of the Attor-
ney General of the State of Washington, Olympia, Washing-
ton, for the appellee.
Katherine A. George, Seattle, Washington, for the interve-
nors.
2758 LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL v. SUPERINTENDENT
OPINION
THOMAS, Circuit Judge:
Shakespeare warned us to “defer no time, delays have dan-
gerous ends.”1 Perhaps Lake Washington School District no.
414 (“School District”) took the Bard’s advice a bit too seri-
ously. When a state administrative law judge granted a short
continuance, the School District immediately filed this action
seeking to enjoin the State of Washington from granting con-
tinuances greater than 45 days in any administrative proceed-
ings conducted pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
The district court held that the School District lacked stand-
ing and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We affirm.
I
The IDEA assures that all children with disabilities receive
a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) through indi-
vidualized education programs (“IEP”). See L.M. v. Capis-
trano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 909 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). Congress conditioned fed-
eral funding upon state compliance with the statute’s “exten-
sive substantive and procedural requirements.” Hoeft v.
Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir.
1992). The IDEA’s “core” is the “cooperative process that it
establishes between parents and schools,” the “central vehi-
cle” of which is the development of an IEP. Schaffer v. Weast,
546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005).
A party objecting to an IEP may invoke the IDEA’s “proce-
dural safeguards.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1415; see also Winkelman
v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 525-26 (2007) (sum-
marizing procedures). These safeguards include the opportu-
1
William Shakespeare, Henry VI: Part I, act 3, sc. 2.
LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL v. SUPERINTENDENT 2759
nity for “any party to present a complaint” concerning “any
matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to such
child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). A complaint initiates a pro-
cess of review that can include, in relevant part, a preliminary
meeting (§ 1415(f)(1)(B)(i)) and an impartial due process
hearing conducted by the state or local educational agency
(§ 1415(f)(1)(A)). Once the state educational agency has
reached a decision, an aggrieved party may sue in federal
court. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 526 (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A)).
In the state of Washington, the Office of Superintendent of
Public Instruction is the primary agency charged with over-
seeing K-12 education. See Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.155.090.
By regulation, it delegated its duty to conduct special educa-
tion administrative hearings to the Office of Administrative
Hearings.2 Wash. Admin. Code § 392-172A-05095.
The present controversy began when parents of S.G.
(“Parents”) filed a due process complaint against the School
District, alleging that their child’s educational program vio-
lated the IDEA. The School District, in turn, filed its own
request for a due process hearing, seeking a determination that
its evaluation of the child was appropriate. The Office of
Administrative Hearings assigned both matters to an ALJ,
who consolidated the complaints and set a prehearing confer-
ence for December 31, 2008 and a hearing for January 14,
2009.
During the prehearing conference, counsel for Parents
requested a continuance of the hearing. According to the
School District, counsel’s reasons for the request were her
vacation in January and her unavailability in February, March,
2
Both the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Office
of Administrative Hearings are defendants in this case, and we will refer
to them collectively as “the State.”
2760 LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL v. SUPERINTENDENT
and April due to other special education hearings. The School
District objected, on the grounds that the IDEA requires a
decision be issued within 45 days of the expiration of the 30-
day resolution period. The ALJ granted the continuance
“[w]ithout justification,” the School District alleges.
In response to the continuance, the School District immedi-
ately filed an action in federal district court for a writ of pro-
hibition and a temporary restraining order requiring the state
agency to proceed with the initial 45-day timeline. The district
court denied the motion and issued a minute order notifying
the School District that its case would be dismissed if the Dis-
trict did not advise the court that it was seeking other relief.
The School District amended its complaint, seeking (1) a
declaratory judgment that the agency’s practice of granting
extensions without a showing of good cause violates the
IDEA and federal and state regulations and (2) a permanent
injunction against the State granting extensions beyond 45
days in future IDEA hearings. The State, joined by the Par-
ents, moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) for lack of Article III standing and 12(b)(6) for fail-
ure to state a claim.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss with preju-
dice. The School District timely appeals. We review the dis-
trict court’s dismissal de novo, and we may affirm on any
basis fairly supported by the record. Corrie v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2007).
II
Standing is both a constitutional and statutory principle.
Where a claim is founded on a statute, “[i]t is not enough . . .
for a plaintiff to satisfy the constitutional standing require-
ments of Article III.” City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d
1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2004). We must also consider “whether
a particular plaintiff has been granted a right to sue by the
statute under which he or she brings suit.” Id. In this case, we
LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL v. SUPERINTENDENT 2761
must determine whether the IDEA confers upon a school dis-
trict the right to sue a state agency for its alleged noncompli-
ance with IDEA procedures.
[1] Congress’s intent in providing IDEA procedural pro-
tections is quite clear. Section 1415, which contains the pro-
cedural safeguards at issue here, states that the procedures
shall be established and maintained “to ensure that children
with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural
safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate
public education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). As the Sixth Circuit
observed: “Simply put, the procedural safeguards articulated
in § 1415 were enacted so that parents with disabled children
could enforce their child’s right to a FAPE.” Traverse Bay
Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., 615
F.3d 622, 629 (6th Cir. 2010). Nothing in the text of the IDEA
expressly provides local educational agencies the right to
bring an action against a state educational agency for its
alleged noncompliance with procedural requirements. As the
Third Circuit noted, the statement of purpose “strongly sug-
gests that Congress intended to provide a provide a private
right of action only to disabled children and their parents.”
Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. New Jersey, 417 F.3d 368, 371
(3d Cir. 2005).
The statutory private right of action under IDEA contains
further limitations. It states:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision
made under [subsections for due process hearings
and alternative educational placement] who does not
have the right to an appeal under [subsection for
state review of local hearings], and any party
aggrieved by the findings and decision made under
this subsection, shall have the right to bring a civil
action with respect to the complaint presented pursu-
ant to this section, which action may be brought in
any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a dis-
2762 LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL v. SUPERINTENDENT
trict court of the United States, without regard to the
amount in controversy.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (emphasis and alterations added).
The scope of the civil action authorized under this section
is limited by the phrase “with respect to a complaint presented
pursuant to this section.” Cnty. of San Diego v. Cal. Special
Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 1464-66 (9th Cir. 1996).
The scope of a “complaint presented” is defined in section
1415(b)(6)(A), which provides “[a]n opportunity for any party
to present a complaint . . . with respect to any matter relating
to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of
the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to such child.” 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A) (emphasis added). In County of San
Diego, therefore, we concluded that the county could not con-
test a child’s status as “seriously emotionally disturbed,”
because the child’s complaint in her administrative hearing
concerned only the right to residential placement. 93 F.3d at
1465.
[2] In short, § 1415 establishes a private right of action for
disabled children and their parents. It creates no private right
of action for school boards or other local educational agencies
apart from contesting issues raised in the complaint filed by
the parents on behalf of their child.
Our sister circuits are in accord with this interpretation. See
Lawrence Twp. Bd. of Educ, 417 F.3d at 373 (holding that a
township has neither an express nor implied right of action
under the IDEA, in suit seeking costs of student’s placement
from state); Cnty. of Westchester v. New York, 286 F.3d 150,
153 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that Congress did
not intend to create a private right of action for a county to
remedy a state’s alleged failure to comply with the IDEA);
Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park & River Forest High Sch. Dist. No.
200 v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 935-36 (7th Cir. 2000) (inter-
preting § 1415(i) to allow a local board of education to seek
LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL v. SUPERINTENDENT 2763
judicial review of an education plan, but as not authorizing
awards of financial relief from the state); Andrews v. Ledbet-
ter, 880 F.2d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that “noth-
ing [in § 1415 of the IDEA’s predecessor statute] indicates
that Congress intended to grant a[ ] [local education agency]
statutory standing to bring suit to compel a state agency to
fulfill its statutory duties”).
Of particular relevance here, the Sixth Circuit recently held
that “the IDEA does not provide School Districts with an
express or implied right to compel State Defendants’ compli-
ance with § 1415(b)’s procedural safeguards absent an under-
lying claim that directly involves a disabled child’s IEP.”
Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist., 615 F.3d at 631.
In Traverse Bay, as here, plaintiff school districts appealed
the dismissal of their amended complaint against state defen-
dants, including the Michigan State Office of Administrative
Hearings, for their alleged failure to maintain due process pro-
tections in accordance with the IDEA. Id. at 624. The Sixth
Circuit examined whether the IDEA conferred an express or
implied right of action permitting the school districts’ suit.
First, the court held that the IDEA did not expressly authorize
the school districts’ action, because the state defendants’
claim did “not involve a ‘complaint’ that ‘relat[es] to the iden-
tification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or
the provision of a [FAPE] to such child.’ ” Id. at 628 (quoting
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A)) (latter alteration added). Second,
the court analyzed whether such a right to sue could be
implied from the IDEA. Drawing on the four factors estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975), especially Congressional intent, the Sixth Circuit
determined that Sections 1412 and 1415 of the IDEA, includ-
ing the right to sue, were “designed to benefit disabled chil-
dren and their parents,” and the IDEA’s procedural safeguards
were enacted to resolve disputes about a child’s IEP. Id. at
629. A local educational agency’s suit under the IDEA, there-
fore, must concern administrative decisions “directly involv-
[ing] a disabled child’s right to a FAPE.” Id. Additionally, the
2764 LAKE WASHINGTON SCHOOL v. SUPERINTENDENT
Sixth Circuit reasoned that since Congress expressly allocated
enforcement authority to parties aggrieved under Section
1415(i)(2)(A) and the Secretary of Education, see 20 U.S.C.
§ 1417, it follows that Congress excluded local educational
agencies from enforcing state compliance with the IDEA’s
statutory provisions, Traverse Bay, 615 F.3d at 629-30 (citing
Cnty. of Westchester, 286 F.3d at 152-53).
[3] When we apply these principles to the case at hand, it
is quite apparent that the School District lacks statutory stand-
ing. Here, the School District seeks to enforce for its own
ends the procedural protections intended to safeguard the
rights of disabled children and their parents. The School Dis-
trict makes no pretense of relating its suit to the issues raised
in the Parents’ complaint. To the contrary, the District repeat-
edly emphasizes that its suit does not involve the IEP of a par-
ticular student, but instead challenges the state’s “systematic
violation of the IDEA.” Even if it were challenging only the
continuance granted in this particular case, the School District
would lack statutory standing to seek enforcement of IDEA’s
procedural protections.
[4] In sum, we join our sister circuits in holding that a
school district or other local educational agency has no
express or implied private right of civil action under the IDEA
to litigate any question aside from the issues raised in the
complaint filed by the parents on behalf of their child. In this
case, the school district lacks statutory standing to challenge
the State of Washington’s compliance with the IDEA’s proce-
dural protections. The district court correctly dismissed its
complaint with prejudice.
Given our resolution of this case, we need not reach any of
the other issues presented by the parties.
AFFIRMED.