NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-3630
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DARRYL A. BELL, SR.,
Appellant
v.
CHARLES EHRLICH, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY;
FINCOURT B. SHELTON, ESQUIRE, BOTH INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-00289)
District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 22, 2011
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 23, 2011)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Darryl Bell, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the
District Court’s order.
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I
In early 1989, Bell was tried for rape in the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia
County. The trial ended in a hung jury and, after a retrial later that year, Bell was
convicted of two counts of rape. He received a sentence of eight to twenty years’
imprisonment.
Bell maintains that the rape charge was fabricated by his step-daughter, and that
she admitted as much to an investigator, Mr. Thomas Morrison, formerly of the
Philadelphia Office of Children, Youth and Families. Morrison prepared an investigation
report concluding that the charges against Bell were unfounded. Although Morrison
testified at Bell’s first trial, he was never called to testify at the retrial. Because Morrison
was technically unavailable for the retrial, his investigation report was deemed
inadmissible.
In January 2010, Bell filed in the District Court a complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, naming as defendants Fincourt B. Shelton, who represented Bell in his rape trials,
and Charles Ehrlich, who prosecuted Bell. He complained that Shelton and Ehrlich
conspired to conceal from the jury in Bell’s retrial Morrison’s investigatory report, and
that they deprived him of his right to a fair trial. He sought damages, as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte,
without prejudice to Bell’s ability to file an amended complaint. Bell filed an amended
complaint, which the District Court dismissed on the defendants’ motions. Bell now
appeals that decision.
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II
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district
court’s decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. See Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010). In
deciding a motion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be
taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all
inferences must be drawn in favor of them.” McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521,
526 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). We may affirm on
any ground supported by the record. See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir.
2001).
In dismissing Bell’s complaint, the District Court advanced several reasons why
Bell failed to state a viable claim for relief, including prosecutorial immunity, insufficient
pleadings, and an improper defendant. We need not delve into the several reasons
articulated by the District Court because a simpler basis for dismissing Bell’s complaint
is evident: we agree with Appellee Ehrlich that Bell’s claims were barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). A plaintiff may not pursue a claim under § 1983 that
calls into question the validity of his conviction unless he demonstrates that the
“conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486-87.
Because Bell’s conviction stands, and because he complains that he was wrongfully
convicted because of attorney misconduct, his claims are plainly barred by Heck. Bell’s
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attempt to overcome the Heck bar by explaining that his action challenges the attorneys’
conduct, and not his conviction, is unpersuasive. Thus, the District Court appropriately
dismissed Bell’s complaint.
To the extent that Bell’s complaint could be viewed as raising arguments that do
not implicate the validity of his conviction, such claims would be time-barred. In § 1983
cases, federal courts apply the state personal injury statute of limitations, which is two
years in Pennsylvania. See Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 111 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1996); 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524 (West 2004). “A [§] 1983 cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.”
Sameric Corp. of Delaware v. Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). Bell
complains that Ehrlich and Shelton failed to disclose favorable evidence at his 1989 trial,
yet he did not file suit in federal court until more than 20 years later; his argument that he
was unaware of the evidence is not persuasive, and he has offered no reason to toll the
statute of limitations.
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court. Bell’s motion for an
injunction is denied.
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