FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 23 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TILAK RAJ, No. 07-71409
Petitioner, Agency No. A097-515-264
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 17, 2011**
San Francisco, California
Before: NOONAN, O’SCANNLAIN, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Raj petitions this court for review of the IJ and BIA’s adverse credibility
determination and denial of withholding of removal and relief under the
Convention Against Torture. We deny the petition.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and also adds its own
reasons, both decisions are reviewed. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th
Cir. 2005). Questions of law are reviewed de novo, but factual findings underlying
the agency’s final order are reviewed for substantial evidence. Id. Reviewing for
substantial evidence means the BIA’s findings must be upheld unless the evidence
compels a contrary result. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992).
Substantial evidence supported the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. Mr. Raj
was evasive, unaware what the ISI was despite referencing it in his application for
relief, and his testimony was inconsistent with his application for relief regarding
police visits to his home in the time since he left India.
Alternatively, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Mr. Raj is
ineligible for withholding of removal. The local police were interested in Sukha;
the police left Mr. Raj alone when Sukha was not present. This evidence does not
support Mr. Raj’s contention that he was persecuted on the grounds of an imputed
political belief.
Substantial evidence also supported the conclusion that Mr. Raj is ineligible
for relief under the Convention Against Torture. Mr. Raj did not carry his burden
of showing that he would more likely than not be tortured upon his return to India.
Furthermore, Mr. Raj did not establish that he would be unable to move to a
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different part of India and live in peace. See Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279,
1282 (9th Cir. 2001).
DENIED.
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